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NASA NTRS2002

Technical Challenges of Drilling on Mars

In the last year, NASA's Mars science advisory committee (MEPAG: Mars Exploration Payload Advisory Group) has formally recommended that deep drilling be undertaken as a priority investigation to meet astrobiology and geology goals. This proposed new dimension in Mars exploration has come about for several reasons. Firstly, geophysical models of the martian subsurface environment indicate that we may well find liquid water (in the form of brines) under ground-ice at depths of several kilometers near the equator. On Earth we invariably find life forms associated with any environmental niche that supports liquid water. New data from the Mars Global Surveyor have shown that the most recent volcanism on Mars is very young so we cannot rule out contemporary volcanism -- in which case subsurface temperatures consistent with having water in its liquid phase may be found at relatively shallow depths. Secondly, in recent decades we have learned to our surprise that the Earth's subsurface (microbial) biosphere extends to depths of many kilometers and this discovery provides the basis for planning to explore the martian subsurface in search of ancient or even extant microbial life forms. We know (from Viking measurements) that all the biogenic elements (C, H, O, N, P, S) are available on Mars. What we therefore hope to learn is whether or not the evolution of life is inevitable given the necessary ingredients and, by implication, whether the Universe may be teeming with life. The feasibility of drilling deep into the surface of Mars has been the subject of increasing attention within NASA (and more recently among some of its international partners) for several years and this led to a broad-based feasibility study carried out by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and, subsequently, to the development of several hardware prototypes. This paper is intended to provide a general survey of that activity.

Briggs, Geoffrey↗

NASA NTRS2018

From Apollo to the Future, the NASA Curation Model for Engaging the Sample Science Community Maximizes Science on Extraterrestrial Samples

The Astromaterials Acquisition and Curation Office at Johnson Space Center (JSC) has enjoyed a long-term partnership (50 years!) with a broad community of planetary sample scientists. This partnership has enabled the curators of planetary samples to plan for and enact evolving requirements for preservation of sample scientific integrity and for handling and long-term storage. The basis for this relationship is a standing peer review advisory committee composed of leading scientists who are recognized for achievements in sample analysis. The committee and its descendants have brought familiarity with the most relevant scientific investigations and the associated analytical and contamination challenges. Beginning with Apollo, the review committee was charged with oversight of curatorial operations and with ensuring fair access to samples. As additional samples from other planetary bodies were acquired, the committee evolved, taking on new responsibilities, reflected in committee name changes. However, oversight of curatorial operations and fair allocation of samples remain basic responsibilities. Committee recommendations are sent to the NASA Headquarters Discipline Scientist for approval. To minimize conflict of interest and maximize fair access, the rules governing the make-up of the committee is structured. Systematic rotation of leadership and staggered terms of membership allow the committee to retain expertise while bringing in fresh ideas. The first peer review committee was called the Lunar Sample Analysis and Planning Team (LSAPT) and was formalized in early 1968 with about 15 members. Their function was to review a) the equipment and procedures used in the new Lunar Receiving Laboratory (LRL); b) the proficiency and capability of the LRL staff; c) the sequence of sample analysis and allocation after quarantine release; and d) the findings of the Preliminary Examination Team (PET). According to LSAPT member Gerald Wasserburg, one of the first issues they faced was deciding whether to have most of the sample analyses performed in house at the LRL or to distribute samples to members of the scientific community. LSAPT concluded that the major scientific investigations should be carried out externally to the LRL by scientists chosen for their expertise in specific disciplines. Further they recommended that the PET's basic characterization of samples be circulated to the broad scientific community. LSAPT set its own agenda, paid attention to facility details, closely monitored the move of samples from the LRL to the interim curatorial facility in 1973, and was active in inspecting curation facilities. Between 1975 and 1979, a Facility Subcommittee of LSAPT oversaw the design and construction of a permanent facility for preservation of lunar samples. The result was an outstanding facility still in use today. In 1977, a separate peer review committee, the Meteorite Working Group (MWG), was formed to evaluate requests for new meteorites then being collected in Antarctica under what would in 1980 become a 3-agency agreement (National Science Foundation, NASA, Smithsonian Institution). By 1979, after lunar samples were moved into the new permanent facility, the vacated gloveboxes and laboratory were prepared for meteorite curation. Recognizing that LSAPT had been helpful in setting up the JSC curatorial facility for Antarctic meteorites, JSC recommended the review committee be given expanded duties, including advice on curation and analysis of materials from other planetary bodies and the name be changed to Lunar and Planetary Sample Team (LAPST). In 1993, LAPST was renamed the Curation and Analysis Planning Team for Extraterrestrial Materials (CAPTEM) to reflect additional functions. CAPTEM is chartered to be (1) a community-based, interdisciplinary forum for discussion and analysis of matters concerning the collection and curation of extraterrestrial samples, including planning future sample return missions and (2) a standing review panel, charged with evaluating proposals requesting allocation of all extraterrestrial samples contained in NASA collections. Efficiency and flexibility are gained through use of subcommittees, both ad hoc and standing. Transition of the MWG to a subcommittee of CAPTEM was completed in 2017. Today subcommittees review allocation requests for lunar samples, Antarctic meteorites, cosmic dust, Stardust cometary samples, Genesis solar wind samples, and samples returned from asteroids. Other subcommittees address facilities, informatics, and micro-cratered substrates. Planetary samples have been sent to research teams in over 30 countries world-wide. The expertise in the care and fair distribution of astromaterials by NASA using this model spans generations of planetary sample scientists and is a valuable resource to be tapped for future sample returns - OSIRIS-REx, Hayabusa 2, and Mars 2020.

Allton, Judith↗

NASA NTRS1999

System Identification for Integrated Aircraft Development and Flight Testing [l'Identification Des Systemes Pour le Developpement Integre des Aeronefs et les Essais en Vol]

Over the last decades flight vehicles such as aircraft and helicopters entering service and requiring increased operational effectiveness have with few exceptions experienced prolonged flight test development to achieve full certification. In many cases the original requirements had later to be reduced to enable release to service. The impact on the customer, and manufacturer has been considerable leading to increased costs and or reduced operational capabilities. These costly experiences are largely a result of the flight vehicle not behaving as modelled and designed. The evaluation of flight test data can be used as a tool for validating windtunnel results and mathematical models describing the flight dynamical behaviour. In this sense the uncertainty of important aerodynamic stability and control parameters can be reduced and the confidence of aircraft mathematical models improved. An additional important factor comes from the implementation of active control systems offering the promise of significantly increased flight vehicle performance and operational capability. This approach extends the traditional trade-offs between aerodynamics, structures and propulsion systems to include full- time, full-authority fly-by-wire/light systems. It is imperative that the aerodynamic stability and control parameters of such integrated flight and propulsion control systems have to turn out inflight as predicted, since inherent stability margins will be lower and the flight control system must correct these deficiencies to provide flight critical redundancy and safety. With the methodology of system identification from flight tests it is possible to sense the control inputs and the flight vehicle reactions Such as accelerations, rates and attitudes. The mathematical model, e.g. the model structure and parameters, has to be determined from the relationship of the measured control inputs and the system's responses. The aim of this symposium was to review the present state of the art of flight vehicle system and parameter identification techniques, and to provide a critical appraisal of current methods developed and applied to flight test data in a number of NATO nations. Particular emphasis was placed on practical aspects and lessons learned in order to generate information useful to the flight test community in industry and government agencies. The technical papers share invaluable experience and emphasize the advances of flight vehicle system identification over the last years to the point where confidence and robustness level is now reasonably high. The symposium covered overviews of identification methodologies, flight test techniques, recent aircraft and helicopter application programs, and a session of short papers covering up-to-the-minute flight test results. A final discussion included prepared comments from experts and concluded with key issues learned in the application of system identification and future research needs. The essential benefits to NATO nations can be condensed as follows: More accurate mathematical models for high bandwidth flight control systems, Improved assessment and evaluation of flying qualities, High fidelity mathematical models for flight vehicle development and mission training simulators, and generally, Reduced flight test time and costs.

Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Developm↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗