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At least 235 records · Page 13

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NASA NTRS2009

A Belief-Based Model of Air Traffic Controllers Performing Separation Assurance

A model of an air traffic controller performing a separation assurance task was produced. The model was designed to be simple to use and deploy in a simulator, but still provide realistic behavior. The model is based upon an evaluation of the safety function of the controller for separation assurance, and utilizes fast and frugal heuristics and belief networks to establish a knowledge set for the controller model. Based on this knowledge set, the controller acts to keep aircraft separated. Validation results are provided to demonstrate the model s performance.

Landry, S.J.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Risk-Informed Safety Assurance and Probabilistic Assessment of Mission-Critical Software-Intensive Systems

This report validates and documents the detailed features and practical application of the framework for software intensive digital systems risk assessment and risk-informed safety assurance presented in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for Managers and Practitioner. This framework, called herein the "Context-based Software Risk Model" (CSRM), enables the assessment of the contribution of software and software-intensive digital systems to overall system risk, in a manner which is entirely compatible and integrated with the format of a "standard" Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as currently documented and applied for NASA missions and applications. The CSRM also provides a risk-informed path and criteria for conducting organized and systematic digital system and software testing so that, within this risk-informed paradigm, the achievement of a quantitatively defined level of safety and mission success assurance may be targeted and demonstrated. The framework is based on the concept of context-dependent software risk scenarios and on the modeling of such scenarios via the use of traditional PRA techniques - i.e., event trees and fault trees - in combination with more advanced modeling devices such as the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) or other dynamic logic-modeling representations. The scenarios can be synthesized and quantified in a conditional logic and probabilistic formulation. The application of the CSRM method documented in this report refers to the MiniAERCam system designed and developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center.

Guarro, Sergio B.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Changing the Safety and Mission Assurance (S and MA) Paradigm

This slide presentation reviews the change in the work and impact of the Safety and Mission Assurance directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center. It reviews the background and the reasons given for a strong Safety & Mission Assurance presence in all planning for space flight. This was pointed out by the Rogers Commission Report after the Space Challenger accident, by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) and by a 2006 NASA Exploration Safety Study (NESS) Team. The overall objective of the work in this area was to improve and maintain S&MA expertise and skills. Training for this work was improved and the S&MA organization was reorganized. This has resulted in a paradigm shift for NASA's safety efforts, which is described. The presentation then reviews the impact of the new S&MA work in the Ares I design and development.

Malone, Roy W.↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Software Assurance's Roles in Research and Technology

This slide presentation reviews the interactions between the scientist and engineers doing research and technology and the software developers and others who are doing software assurance. There is a discussion of the role of the Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) in developing software to be used for research and technology, and the importance of this role as the technology moves to the higher levels of the technology readiness levels (TRLs). There is also a call to change the way the development of software is developed.

Wetherholt, Martha↗

NASA NTRS2010

Functional Allocation for Ground-Based Automated Separation Assurance in NextGen

As part of an ongoing research effort into functional allocation in a NextGen environment, a controller-in-the-loop study on ground-based automated separation assurance was conducted at NASA Ames' Airspace Operations Laboratory in February 2010. Participants included six FAA front line managers, who are currently certified professional controllers and four recently retired controllers. Traffic scenarios were 15 and 30 minutes long where controllers interacted with advanced technologies for ground-based separation assurance, weather avoidance, and arrival metering. The automation managed the separation by resolving conflicts automatically and involved controllers only by exception, e.g., when the automated resolution would have been outside preset limits. Results from data analyses show that workload was low despite high levels of traffic, Operational Errors did occur but were closely tied to local complexity, and safety acceptability ratings varied with traffic levels. Positive feedback was elicited for the overall concept with discussion on the proper allocation of functions and trust in automation.

Prevot, Thomas↗

NASA NTRS2011

Single-Event Gate Rupture in Power MOSFETs: A New Radiation Hardness Assurance Approach

Almost every space mission uses vertical power metal-semiconductor-oxide field-effect transistors (MOSFETs) in its power-supply circuitry. These devices can fail catastrophically due to single-event gate rupture (SEGR) when exposed to energetic heavy ions. To reduce SEGR failure risk, the off-state operating voltages of the devices are derated based upon radiation tests at heavy-ion accelerator facilities. Testing is very expensive. Even so, data from these tests provide only a limited guide to on-orbit performance. In this work, a device simulation-based method is developed to measure the response to strikes from heavy ions unavailable at accelerator facilities but posing potential risk on orbit. This work is the first to show that the present derating factor, which was established from non-radiation reliability concerns, is appropriate to reduce on-orbit SEGR failure risk when applied to data acquired from ions with appropriate penetration range. A second important outcome of this study is the demonstration of the capability and usefulness of this simulation technique for augmenting SEGR data from accelerator beam facilities. The mechanisms of SEGR are two-fold: the gate oxide is weakened by the passage of the ion through it, and the charge ionized along the ion track in the silicon transiently increases the oxide electric field. Most hardness assurance methodologies consider the latter mechanism only. This work demonstrates through experiment and simulation that the gate oxide response should not be neglected. In addition, the premise that the temporary weakening of the oxide due to the ion interaction with it, as opposed to due to the transient oxide field generated from within the silicon, is validated. Based upon these findings, a new approach to radiation hardness assurance for SEGR in power MOSFETs is defined to reduce SEGR risk in space flight projects. Finally, the potential impact of accumulated dose over the course of a space mission on SEGR susceptibility is explored. SEGR evaluation of gamma-irradiated power MOSFETs suggests a non-significant SEGR susceptibility enhancement due to accumulated dose from gamma rays. During SEGR testing, an unexpected enhanced dose effect from heavy-ion irradiation was detected. We demonstrate that this effect could be due to direct ionization by two or more ions at the same channel location. The probability on-orbit for such an occurrence is near-zero given the low heavy-ion fluence over a typical mission lifetime, and did not affect SEGR susceptibility. The results of this work can be used to bound the risk of SEGR in power MOSFETs considered for insertion into spacecraft and instruments.

Lauenstein, Jean-Marie↗

NASA NTRS2011

Safety and Mission Assurance: A NASA Perspective

Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) consists of the safety, reliability, maintainability, software assurance and quality disciplines, which are applied to reduce the probability of mishaps and ensure mission success. NASA uses a risk management process which requires various organizations to identify, analyze and mitigate/control risks associated with operations and decision making processes.

Higginbotham, Scott Alan↗

NASA NTRS2011

Requirement Assurance: A Verification Process

Requirement Assurance is an act of requirement verification which assures the stakeholder or customer that a product requirement has produced its "as realized product" and has been verified with conclusive evidence. Product requirement verification answers the question, "did the product meet the stated specification, performance, or design documentation?". In order to ensure the system was built correctly, the practicing system engineer must verify each product requirement using verification methods of inspection, analysis, demonstration, or test. The products of these methods are the "verification artifacts" or "closure artifacts" which are the objective evidence needed to prove the product requirements meet the verification success criteria. Institutional direction is given to the System Engineer in NPR 7123.1A NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements with regards to the requirement verification process. In response, the verification methodology offered in this report meets both the institutional process and requirement verification best practices.

Alexander, Michael G.↗

NASA NTRS2004

History of Reliability and Quality Assurance at Kennedy Space Center

This Kennedy Historical Document (KHD) provides a unique historical perspective of the organizational and functional responsibilities for the manned and un-manned programs at Kennedy Space Center, Florida. As systems become more complex and hazardous, the attention to detailed planning and execution continues to be a challenge. The need for a robust reliability and quality assurance program will always be a necessity to ensure mission success. As new space missions are defined and technology allows for continued access to space, these programs cannot be compromised. The organizational structure that has provided the reliability and quality assurance functions for both the manned and unmanned programs has seen many changes since the first group came to Florida in the 1950's. The roles of government and contractor personnel have changed with each program and organizational alignment has changed based on that responsibility. The organizational alignment of the personnel performing these functions must ensure independent assessment of the processes.

Childers, Frank M.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Analysis of Traffic Conflicts in a Mixed-Airspace Evaluation of Airborne Separation Assurance

A pair of human-in-the-loop simulation evaluations of a distributed air/ground separation assurance system have been conducted to investigate the function allocation between humans and automation systems as well as ground-based and airborne agents in the Next Generation Air Transportation System and beyond. This paper focuses on an analysis of certain critical conflicts observed between self-separating aircraft and ground-managed traffic in the same airspace. The principal cause of each conflict is identified and potential mitigations are discussed, such as: the sharing of trajectory intent information between the ground and the air; more cautious trajectory planning by the self-separating aircraft; and more equitable rules-of-the-road between the self-separating aircraft and ground-managed aircraft. This analysis will inform the ongoing design of an airborne separation assurance automation tool.

Lewis, Timothy A.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Assurance Cases for Proofs as Evidence

Proof-carrying code (PCC) provides a 'gold standard' for establishing formal and objective confidence in program behavior. However, in order to extend the benefits of PCC - and other formal certification techniques - to realistic systems, we must establish the correspondence of a mathematical proof of a program's semantics and its actual behavior. In this paper, we argue that assurance cases are an effective means of establishing such a correspondence. To this end, we present an assurance case pattern for arguing that a proof is free from various proof hazards. We also instantiate this pattern for a proof-based mechanism to provide evidence about a generic medical device software.

Chaki, Sagar↗

NASA NTRS2015

Explicate '78: Uncovering the Implicit Assurance Case in DO-178C

For about two decades, compliance with Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification (DO-178B/ED-12B) has been the primary means for receiving regulatory approval for using software on commercial airplanes. A new edition of the standard, DO-178C/ED-12C, was published in December 2011, and recognized by regulatory bodies in 2013. The purpose remains unchanged: to provide guidance 'for the production of software for airborne systems and equipment that performs its intended function with a level of confidence in safety that complies with airworthiness requirements.' The text of the guidance does not directly explain how its collection of objectives contributes to achieving this purpose; thus, the assurance case for the document is implicit. This paper presents an explicit assurance case developed as part of research jointly sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Holloway, C. Michael↗

NASA NTRS2015

Integrating Safety and Mission Assurance into Systems Engineering Modeling Practices

During the early development of products, flight, or experimental hardware, emphasis is often given to the identification of technical requirements, utilizing such tools as use case and activity diagrams. Designers and project teams focus on understanding physical and performance demands and challenges. It is typically only later, during the evaluation of preliminary designs that a first pass, if performed, is made to determine the process, safety, and mission quality assurance requirements. Evaluation early in the life cycle, though, can yield requirements that force a fundamental change in design. This paper discusses an alternate paradigm for using the concepts of use case or activity diagrams to identify safety hazard and mission quality assurance risks and concerns using the same systems engineering modeling tools being used to identify technical requirements. It contains two examples of how this process might be used in the development of a space flight experiment, and the design of a Human Powered Pizza Delivery Vehicle, along with the potential benefits to decrease development time, and provide stronger budget estimates.

Requirements↗

NASA NTRS2016

An Investigation of Proposed Techniques for Quantifying Confidence in Assurance Arguments

The use of safety cases in certification raises the question of assurance argument sufficiency and the issue of confidence (or uncertainty) in the argument's claims. Some researchers propose to model confidence quantitatively and to calculate confidence in argument conclusions. We know of little evidence to suggest that any proposed technique would deliver trustworthy results when implemented by system safety practitioners. Proponents do not usually assess the efficacy of their techniques through controlled experiment or historical study. Instead, they present an illustrative example where the calculation delivers a plausible result. In this paper, we review current proposals, claims made about them, and evidence advanced in favor of them. We then show that proposed techniques can deliver implausible results in some cases. We conclude that quantitative confidence techniques require further validation before they should be recommended as part of the basis for deciding whether an assurance argument justifies fielding a critical system.

Graydon, Patrick J.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Goal Structuring Notation in a Radiation Hardening Assurance Case for COTS-Based Spacecraft

A systematic approach is presented to constructing a radiation assurance case using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) for spacecraft containing commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) parts. The GSN paradigm is applied to an SRAM single-event upset experiment board designed to fly on a CubeSat November 2016. Construction of a radiation assurance case without use of hardened parts or extensive radiation testing is discussed.

Witulski, Arthur↗

NASA NTRS2016

Function Allocation between Automation and Human Pilot for Airborne Separation Assurance

Maintaining safe separation between aircraft is a key determinant of the airspace capacity to handle air transportation. With the advent of satellite-based surveillance, aircraft equipped with the needed technologies are now capable of maintaining awareness of their location in the airspace and sharing it with their surrounding traffic. As a result, concepts and cockpit automation are emerging to enable delegating the responsibility of maintaining safe separation from traffic to the pilot; thus increasing the airspace capacity by alleviating the limitation of the current non-scalable centralized ground-based system. In this paper, an analysis of allocating separation assurance functions to the human pilot and cockpit automation is presented to support the design of these concepts and technologies. A task analysis was conducted with the help of Petri nets to identify the main separation assurance functions and their interactions. Each function was characterized by three behavior levels that may be needed to perform the task: skill, rule and knowledge based levels. Then recommendations are made for allocating each function to an automation scale based on their behavior level characterization and with the help of Subject matter experts.

Idris, Husni↗

NASA NTRS2016

Printed Circuit Board Quality Assurance

PCB Assurance Summary: PCB assurance actives are informed by risk in context of the Project. Lessons are being applied across Projects for continuous improvements. Newer component technologies, smaller/high pitch devices: tighter and more demanding PCB designs: Identifying new research areas. New materials, designs, structures and test methods.

Reliability↗

NASA NTRS2016

Certification Strategies using Run-Time Safety Assurance for Part 23 Autopilot Systems

Part 23 aircraft operation, and in particular general aviation, is relatively unsafe when compared to other common forms of vehicle travel. Currently, there exists technologies that could increase safety statistics for these aircraft; however, the high burden and cost of performing the requisite safety critical certification processes for these systems limits their proliferation. For this reason, many entities, including the Federal Aviation Administration, NASA, and the US Air Force, are considering new options for certification for technologies that will improve aircraft safety. Of particular interest, are low cost autopilot systems for general aviation aircraft, as these systems have the potential to positively and significantly affect safety statistics. This paper proposes new systems and techniques, leveraging run-time verification, for the assurance of general aviation autopilot systems, which would be used to supplement the current certification process and provide a viable path for near-term low-cost implementation. In addition, discussions on preliminary experimentation and building the assurance case for a system, based on these principles, is provided.

automatic collision avoidance↗