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Guidance is provided for the airworthiness approval of both annunciation only and annunciation with guidance airborne windshear warning systems. Characteristics of a comprehensive certification plan, the criticality of certain system failure cases for windshear warning with and without escape guidance, software based systems, and probability analysis are among the topics covered.
A typical aircraft certification process consists of obtaining a type, production, airworthiness, and continued airworthiness certificates. During this process, a type certification plan is created that includes the intended regulatory operating environment, the proposed certification basis, means of compliance, and a list of documentation to show compliance. Earlier work by the authors demonstrated a model-based framework for the management of these certification artifacts for normal category airplanes. Presently, it is expanded and adapted to consider certification for transport category airplanes regulated under 14 CFR Part 25, providing clear transparency and traceability between the text of the regulations and imposed requirements, contextual information, and specified test activities. In particular, a capability to identify potential gaps in the applicability of regulations for novel architectures such as electrified aircraft is proposed. This capability, based on mismatches between the functional intent and the corresponding prescribed physical implementation, is developed. A sample implementation of the proposed capability is presented for a notional electrified powertrain aircraft architecture.
This paper details the results of an initial study to develop a certification plan for human-rated inflatable space structures, including guidelines for qualification testing. Habitable softgoods inflatables are multi-layered shell structures that use high-strength webbing, cordage and broadcloth fabric to carry the skin loads of a variety of volumetric shapes and structural architectures. The primary objectives of this study are to define the key parameters that affect these structures and propose a statistically robust approach to defining safety and knockdown factors based on test and analysis. Current NASA standards for habitable inflatable space structures use a factor of safety of 4, which was inherited from airship design criteria. An updated approach to defining a design factor, taking into account material strength variability, load variability in the article, number of test samples, and damage and degradation effects is specified. Accurate analytical modeling of these structures is hindered by the difficulty of obtaining accurate and consistent material data due to load-history- dependent, nonlinear load versus strain behavior. A building block approach to certification is detailed that uses stochastic modeling and statistical test design and analysis to address the unique challenges these high-strength softgoods structures present. Human-rated inflatable modules are a transformative capability for launching much larger habitable volumes into space than is possible with rigid shell structures. This research aims to provide the framework for certifying these structures for future human space exploration missions.
Interlaminar fracture mechanics has proven useful for characterizing the onset of delaminations in composites and has been used with limited success primarily to investigate onset in fracture toughness specimens and laboratory size coupon type specimens. Future acceptance of the methodology by industry and certification authorities however, requires the successful demonstration of the methodology on structural level. For this purpose a panel was selected that was reinforced with stringers. Shear loading cases the panel to buckle and the resulting out-of-plane deformations initiate skin/stringer separation at the location of an embedded defect. For finite element analysis, the panel and surrounding load fixture were modeled with shell element. A small section of the stringer foot and the panel in the vicinity of the embedded defect were modeled with a local 3D solid model. A failure index was calculated by correlating computed mixed-mode failure criterion of the graphite/epoxy material.
The method planned for the surface figure error measurement of the AMSDs at the XRCF will be discussed. Alignment, surface figure measurement, gravity effects, vibration & temperature environment effects, total error analysis, and data output will be discussed.
The high-resolution wind profile of the Automated Meteorological Profiling System (HRAMPS) is the proposed replacement for the Jimsphere measurement system used to support NASA Shuttle launches from the Eastern Test Range (ETR). Samples of twenty-six ETR near simultaneous Jimsphere and HRAMPS wind profiles were obtained for Shuttle program HRAMPS certification studies. Shuttle systems engineering certification is to ensure that spacecraft and launch vehicle systems performance and safety evaluations for each launch (derived from flight simulations with Jimsphere wind profile data bases) retain their validity when HRAMPS profiles are used on day-of-launch (DOL) in trajectory and loads simulations to support the commit-to-launch decision. This paper describes a statistical analysis of the near simultaneous profiles. In principle the differences between a Jimsphere profile and an HRAMPS profile should be attributed to tracking technology (radar versus GPS tracking of a Jimsphere flight element) and the method for derivation of wind vectors from the raw tracking data. In reality, it is not technically feasible to track the same Jimsphere balloon with the two systems. The aluminized Mylar surface of the standard Jimsphere flight element facilitates radar tracking, but it interferes with HRAMPS during simultaneous tracking. Suspending a radar reflector from an HRAMPS flight element (Jimsphere without aluminized coating) does not produce satisfactory Jimsphere profiles because of intermittent radar returns. Thus, differences between the Jimsphere and HRAMPS profiles are also attributed to differences in the trajectories of separate flight elements. Because of small sample size and a test period limited to one winter season, test measurements during extreme high winds aloft could not have been expected and did not occur. It is during the highest winds that the largest differences between Jimsphere and HRAMPS would occur because the distance between flight elements would be larger. Jimsphere radar tracking noise increases as a function of balloon displacement downrange. The Jimsphere data processing compensates for tracking signal/noise degradation by increasing the smoothing interval. The Jimsphere wind profile effective resolution is a function of downrange distance and altitude, whereas the effective resolution of the HRAMPS should be independent of those variables. The procedure used for editing Jimsphere spikes in Shuttle DOL profiles was not implemented for the Jimsphere profile measurements during the AMPS field tests. For this analysis a code was developed that essentially mimics DOL Jimsphere spike editing. Jimsphere profiles have somewhat more noise in the wavelength range less than 200m defined as the noise floor. No differences between Jimsphere and HRAMPS wind profile pairs have been found that would support denial of HRAMPS certification for application in Shuttle DOL applications. The reliability of the HRAMPS system, which is an important certification issue, is not addressed in this study.
For unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to be successfully deployed and integrated within the national airspace, it is imperative that they possess the capability to effectively complete their missions without compromising the safety of other aircraft, as well as persons and property on the ground. This necessity creates a natural requirement for UAS that can respond to uncertain environmental conditions and emergent failures in real-time, with robustness and resilience close enough to those of manned systems. We introduce a system that meets this requirement with the design of a real-time onboard system health management (SHM) capability to continuously monitor sensors, software, and hardware components. This system can detect and diagnose failures and violations of safety or performance rules during the flight of a UAS. Our approach to SHM is three-pronged, providing: (1) real-time monitoring of sensor and software signals; (2) signal analysis, preprocessing, and advanced on-the-fly temporal and Bayesian probabilistic fault diagnosis; and (3) an unobtrusive, lightweight, read-only, low-power realization using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) that avoids overburdening limited computing resources or costly re-certification of flight software. We call this approach rt-R2U2, a name derived from its requirements. Our implementation provides a novel approach of combining modular building blocks, integrating responsive runtime monitoring of temporal logic system safety requirements with model-based diagnosis and Bayesian network-based probabilistic analysis. We demonstrate this approach using actual flight data from the NASA Swift UAS.
Process variations and process-induced defects like porosity cause significant uncertainty in the microstructure and mechanical behavior of additively manufactured metals. Establishing process-structure-property (PSP) relationships and quantifying uncertainty using experiments alone is costly, especially for structural applications where mechanical allowables must be established for qualification and certification. This work presents a PSP simulation framework for laser powder bed fusion with a focus on uncertainty quantification through probabilistic calibration and multi-fidelity uncertainty propagation. Motivated by phenomenological input parameters related to grain nucleation and growth that are difficult to characterize, a global sensitivity analysis (GSA) is completed. Through GSA, the most important input parameters are identified based on their influence on the statistical distributions of microstructural metrics that influence mechanical behavior, including grain size, morphology, and crystallographic texture. The results provide insight on what experiments are necessary to quantify and control PSP uncertainties, particularly those associated with the more challenging input parameters.
White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) was requested to perform ambient temperature hydrostatic pressurization testing of a Space Transportation System (STS) 40-in. Kevlar Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel (COPV). The 40-in. vessel was of the same design and approximate age as the STS Main Propulsion System (MPS) and Orbiter Maneuvering System (OMS) vessels. The NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) assembled a team of experts and conducted an assessment that involved a review of national Kevlar COPY data. During the review, the STS COPVs were found to be beyond their original certification of ten years. The team observed that the likelihood of STS COPV Stress rupture, a catastrophic burst before leak failure mode, was greater than previously believed. Consequently, a detailed assessment of remaining stress rupture life became necessary. Prior to STS-114, a certification deviation was written for two flights of OV-103 (Discovery) and OV-104 (Atlantis) per rationale that was based on an extensive review of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, COPV data, and revisions to the STS COPV stress levels. In order to obtain flight rationale to extend the certification deviation through the end of the Program, the Orbiter Project Office has directed an interagency COPV team to conduct further testing and analysis to investigate conservatism in the stress rupture model and evaluate material age degradation. Additional analysis of stress rupture life requires understanding the fiber stresses including stress that occurs due to thru-wall composite compression in COPV components. Data must be obtained at both zero gauge pressure (pre-stress) and at the component operating pressure so that this phenomenon can be properly evaluated. The zero gauge pressure stresses are predominantly a result of the autofrettage process used during vessel manufacture. Determining these pre-stresses and the constitutive behavior of the overwrap at pressure will provide necessary information to better predict the remaining life of the STS COPVs. The primary test objective is obtaining data to verify the hypothesis of a radially oriented thru-thickness stress-riser in the COPV composite whose magnitude is a function of the applied pressure and the load history. The anticipated load dependent response follows from the constitutive behavior of the composite overwrap so data to quantify its nonlinear and time dependent response will be sought. The objective of the Fiber Braggs Gratings (FBGs) were to advance the state-of-the-art by developing techniques using FBG sensors that are capable of assessing stress-rupture degradation in Kevlar COPVs in a health monitoring mode (1). Moreover, they sought to answer questions of how embedded sensors affect overall integrity of the structure. And lastly, they sought to provide an important link in the overall stress rupture study that will help close the loop on the COPV fabrication process. NDE inspection methods will be used from start to finish and FBG will be an integral link within the overall chain.
Ground reflections generate undesirable effects on acoustic measurements such as those conducted outdoors for jet noise research, aircraft certification, and motor vehicle regulation. Cepstral techniques developed in speech processing are adapted to identify echo delay time and to correct for ground reflection effects. A sample result is presented using an actual narrowband sound pressure level spectrum. The technique can readily be adapted to existing fast Fourier transform type spectrum measurement instrumentation to provide field measurements/of echo time delays.
Ground reflections generate undesirable effects on acoustic measurements such as those conducted outdoors for jet noise research, aircraft certification, and motor vehicle regulation. This paper shows how cepstral techniques developed in speech processing can be adapted to identify the echo delay time and to correct for ground reflection effects. A sample result is presented using an actual narrowband sound pressure level spectrum. The technique can readily be adapted to existing fast Fourier transform type spectrum measurement instrumentation to provide field measurement of echo time delays.
The certification procedures for the initial Shuttle flight are discussed. Particular attention is paid to the entry guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) verification, comprising tests, analysis, demonstration, inspection, and simulation. Flow diagrams for the verification and operational flight sequences are provided, along with a block diagram of the GNC circuitry interfaces. The development of the test matrix software for the GNC is outlined, noting the constant interplay between software verification and spacecraft reconfiguration to meet simulated performance requirements. Comparison of GNC performance predictions with actual entry flight data showed a good match in all performance areas except for sideslip excursions, bank overshoots, an area of transonic buffet, and an increased lift/drag ratio in the preflare to landing flight phase.
SMART is a uniform automated discrepancy analysis and repair-authoring platform that improves technical accuracy and timely delivery of repair procedures for a given discrepancy (see figure a). SMART will minimize data errors, create uniform repair processes, and enhance the existing knowledge base of engineering repair processes. This innovation is the first tool developed that links the hardware specification requirements with the actual repair methods, sequences, and required equipment. SMART is flexibly designed to be useable by multiple engineering groups requiring decision analysis, and by any work authorization and disposition platform (see figure b). The organizational logic creates the link between specification requirements of the hardware, and specific procedures required to repair discrepancies. The first segment in the SMART process uses a decision analysis tree to define all the permutations between component/ subcomponent/discrepancy/repair on the hardware. The second segment uses a repair matrix to define what the steps and sequences are for any repair defined in the decision tree. This segment also allows for the selection of specific steps from multivariable steps. SMART will also be able to interface with outside databases and to store information from them to be inserted into the repair-procedure document. Some of the steps will be identified as optional, and would only be used based on the location and the current configuration of the hardware. The output from this analysis would be sent to a work authoring system in the form of a predefined sequence of steps containing required actions, tools, parts, materials, certifications, and specific requirements controlling quality, functional requirements, and limitations.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Col~imbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational and sustaining quality assurance strategy for long-term manned space flight. An analysis of the ISS waiver processes and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) process implemented as quality functions. Impact of current ISS Program procedures and practices with regards to operational safety and risk A discussion regarding a "defense-in-depth" approach to quality functions will be provided to address the issue of "integration vs independence" with respect to the roles of Programs, NASA Centers, and NASA Headquarters. Generic recommendations are offered to address the inadequacies identified in the implementation of ISS quality assurance. A reassessment by the NASA community regarding the importance of a "quality culture" as a component within a larger "safety culture" will generate a more effective and value-added functionality that will ultimately enhance safety.
Upon the commencement of the analytical effort to characterize the impact dynamics and damage of the Space Shuttle Columbia leading edge due to External Tank insulating foam, the necessity of creating analytical descriptions of these materials became evident. To that end, material models were developed of the leading edge thermal protection system, Reinforced Carbon Carbon (RCC), and a low density polyurethane foam, BX-250. Challenges in modeling the RCC include its extreme brittleness, the differing behavior in compression and tension, and the anisotropic fabric layup. These effects were successfully included in LS-DYNA Material Model 58, *MAT_LAMINATED_ COMPOSITE_ FABRIC. The differing compression and tension behavior was modeled using the available damage parameters. Each fabric layer was given an integration point in the shell element, and was allowed to fail independently. Comparisons were made to static test data and coupon ballistic impact tests before being utilized in the full scale analysis. The foam's properties were typical of elastic automotive foams; and LS-DYNA Material Model 83, *MAT_FU_CHANG_FOAM, was successfully used to model its behavior. Material parameters defined included strain rate dependent stress-strain curves for both loading and un-loading, and for both compression and tension. This model was formulated with static test data and strain rate dependent test data, and was compared to ballistic impact tests on load-cell instrumented aluminum plates. These models were subsequently utilized in analysis of the Shuttle leading edge full scale ballistic impact tests, and are currently being used in the Return to Flight Space Shuttle re-certification effort.
The Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Module (CM) is being designed to operate in an atmosphere of up to 30% oxygen at a pressure of 10.2 psia for lunar missions. Spacecraft materials selection is based on an upward flammability test conducted in a closed chamber under the worst expected conditions of pressure and oxygen concentration. Material flammability depends on both oxygen concentration and pressure but, since oxygen concentration is the primary driver, all materials are certified in the 30% oxygen, 10.2 psia environment. Extensive data exist from the Shuttle Program at this condition which used relatively the same test methodology as currently used in the Constellation Program. When the CM returns to Earth, a snorkel device will be activated after splashdown to provide outside air to the crew; however, for operational reasons, it is desirable to maximize the time the crew is able to breathe cabin air before the snorkel device is activated. To maximize this time, it has been proposed to raise the partial pressure of oxygen in the CM immediately before reentry while maintaining the total cabin pressure at 14.7 psia. In addition, it has been proposed to leak-test the Orion CM with ambient air at a maximum pressure of 17.3 psia. No data exist to assess how high the cabin oxygen concentration can be at 14.7 psia or 17.3 psia. One is to re-test a large number of materials at these pressures at a significant cost. However, since the maximum oxygen concentration (MOC) at which a material will self-extinguish has been determined for a variety of spacecraft materials as a function of pressure, a second alternative is to use existing data to estimate the MOC at 14.7 psia and 17.3 psia. This data will be examined in this paper and an analysis presented to determine the oxygen concentrations at the increased pressures that will result in self-extinguishment of a material. This analysis showed that the oxygen concentration for the Orion CM at 14.7 psia cannot be set higher than 25.6% without potentially invalidating the materials flammability certification in 30% oxygen at 10.2 psia for some materials. Materials certified under these conditions would still be self-extinguishing in ambient air at 17.3 psia. alternative
High reliability of mission- and safety-critical software systems has been identified by NASA as a high-priority technology challenge. We present an approach for the performance analysis of a neural network (NN) in an advanced adaptive control system. This problem is important in the context of safety-critical applications that require certification, such as flight software in aircraft. We have developed a tool to measure the performance of the NN during operation by calculating a confidence interval (error bar) around the NN's output. Our tool can be used during pre-deployment verification as well as monitoring the network performance during operation. The tool has been implemented in Simulink and simulation results on a F-15 aircraft are presented.
In Spring of 2005, the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) was engaged by the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) to peer review the suite of analytical tools being developed to support the determination of impact and damage tolerance of the Orbiter Thermal Protection Systems (TPS). The NESC formed an independent review team with the core disciplines of materials, flight sciences, structures, mechanical analysis and thermal analysis. The Math Model Tools reviewed included damage prediction and stress analysis, aeroheating analysis, and thermal analysis tools. Some tools are physics-based and other tools are empirically-derived. Each tool was created for a specific use and timeframe, including certification, real-time pre-launch assessments, and real-time on-orbit assessments. The tools are used together in an integrated strategy for assessing the ramifications of impact damage to tile and RCC. The NESC teams conducted a peer review of the engineering data package for each Math Model Tool. This report contains the summary of the team observations and recommendations from these reviews.