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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2010

Public Risk Assessment Program

The Public Entry Risk Assessment (PERA) program addresses risk to the public from shuttle or other spacecraft re-entry trajectories. Managing public risk to acceptable levels is a major component of safe spacecraft operation. PERA is given scenario inputs of vehicle trajectory, probability of failure along that trajectory, the resulting debris characteristics, and field size and distribution, and returns risk metrics that quantify the individual and collective risk posed by that scenario. Due to the large volume of data required to perform such a risk analysis, PERA was designed to streamline the analysis process by using innovative mathematical analysis of the risk assessment equations. Real-time analysis in the event of a shuttle contingency operation, such as damage to the Orbiter, is possible because PERA allows for a change to the probability of failure models, therefore providing a much quicker estimation of public risk. PERA also provides the ability to generate movie files showing how the entry risk changes as the entry develops. PERA was designed to streamline the computation of the enormous amounts of data needed for this type of risk assessment by using an average distribution of debris on the ground, rather than pinpointing the impact point of every piece of debris. This has reduced the amount of computational time significantly without reducing the accuracy of the results. PERA was written in MATLAB; a compiled version can run from a DOS or UNIX prompt.

Mendeck, Gavin↗
NASA NTRS1995

Artificial neural network application for space station power system fault diagnosis

This study presents a methodology for fault diagnosis using a Two-Stage Artificial Neural Network Clustering Algorithm. Previously, SPICE models of a 5-bus DC power distribution system with assumed constant output power during contingencies from the DDCU were used to evaluate the ANN's fault diagnosis capabilities. This on-going study uses EMTP models of the components (distribution lines, SPDU, TPDU, loads) and power sources (DDCU) of Space Station Alpha's electrical Power Distribution System as a basis for the ANN fault diagnostic tool. The results from the two studies are contrasted. In the event of a major fault, ground controllers need the ability to identify the type of fault, isolate the fault to the orbital replaceable unit level and provide the necessary information for the power management expert system to optimally determine a degraded-mode load schedule. To accomplish these goals, the electrical power distribution system's architecture can be subdivided into three major classes: DC-DC converter to loads, DC Switching Unit (DCSU) to Main bus Switching Unit (MBSU), and Power Sources to DCSU. Each class which has its own electrical characteristics and operations, requires a unique fault analysis philosophy. This study identifies these philosophies as Riddles 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The results of the on-going study addresses Riddle-1. It is concluded in this study that the combination of the EMTP models of the DDCU, distribution cables and electrical loads yields a more accurate model of the behavior and in addition yielded more accurate fault diagnosis using ANN versus the results obtained with the SPICE models.

Momoh, James A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

BioSentinel: Mission Summary and Lessons Learned From the First Deep Space Biology CubeSat Mission

Launched on Artemis-1, BioSentinel carries a biology experiment into deep space for the first time in 50 years. A 6U CubeSat form factor was utilized for the spacecraft which included technologies newly developed or adapted for operations beyond Earth orbit. The spacecraft carries onboard budding yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, as an analog to human cells to test the biological response to deep space radiation. This was the maiden deep-space voyage for many of the subsystems, and the first time to evaluate their performance in flight operation. Flying a CubeSat beyond LEO comes with unique challenges with respect to trajectory uncertainty and mission operations planning. The nominal plan was a lunar fly-by, followed by an insertion into Heliocentric orbit. However, some possible scenarios included lunar eclipses that could have severely impacted the power budget during that phase of the mission, while others could have resulted in a “Retrograde” hyperbola at swing-by resulting in the spacecraft traveling inward toward Earth or even towards a collision with the lunar surface. The commissioning phase of the mission was successful and completed a week ahead of schedule. It did not come without its exciting moments and challenges. First contact with the spacecraft uncovered that the vehicle was unexpectedly tumbling after deployment, a situation that needed to be corrected urgently. The mission operations team executed a contingency plan to stabilize the spacecraft, with just moments to spare before the battery ran out of power. The BioSensor payload onboard the spacecraft is a complex instrument that includes microfluidics, fluid systems, sensor control electronics, as well at the living yeast cells. BioSentinel also included a TimePix radiation sensor implemented by JSC’s RadWorks group. Dose and Linear Energy Transfer (LET) data is compared directly to the rate of DSB-and repair events measured by the S. cerevisiae cells. BioSentinel mature nanosatellite technologies included: deep space communications and navigation, autonomous attitude control and momentum management, and micro-propulsion systems, to provide an adaptable nanosatellite platform for deep space uses. This paper discusses the performance of the BioSentinel spacecraft through the mission phase, and includes lessons learned from challenges and anomalies. BioSentinel had many successes and will be a pathfinder for future deep space CubeSats and biology missions.

BioSentinel↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Biosentinel: Mission Summary and Lessons Learned From the First Deep Space Biology CubeSat Mission

Launched on Artemis-1, BioSentinel carries a biology experiment into deep space for the first time in 50 years. A 6U CubeSat form factor was utilized for the spacecraft which included technologies newly developed or adapted for operations beyond Earth orbit. The spacecraft carries onboard budding yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, as an analog to human cells to test the biological response to deep space radiation. This was the maiden deep-space voyage for many of the subsystems, and the first time to evaluate their performance in flight operation. Flying a CubeSat beyond LEO comes with unique challenges with respect to trajectory uncertainty and mission operations planning. The nominal plan was a lunar fly-by, followed by an insertion into Heliocentric orbit. However, some possible scenarios included lunar eclipses that could have severely impacted the power budget during that phase of the mission, while others could have resulted in a “Retrograde” hyperbola at swing-by resulting in the spacecraft traveling inward toward Earth or even towards a collision with the lunar surface. The commissioning phase of the mission was successful and completed a week ahead of schedule. It did not come without its exciting moments and challenges. First contact with the spacecraft uncovered that the vehicle was unexpectedly tumbling after deployment, a situation that needed to be corrected urgently. The mission operations team executed a contingency plan to stabilize the spacecraft, with just moments to spare before the battery ran out of power. The BioSensor payload onboard the spacecraft is a complex instrument that includes microfluidics, fluid systems, sensor control electronics, as well at the living yeast cells. BioSentinel also included a TimePix radiation sensor implemented by JSC’s RadWorks group. Dose and Linear Energy Transfer (LET) data is compared directly to the rate of DSB-and repair events measured by the S. cerevisiae cells. BioSentinel mature nanosatellite technologies included: deep space communications and navigation, autonomous attitude control and momentum management, and micro-propulsion systems, to provide an adaptable nanosatellite platform for deep space uses. This paper discusses the performance of the BioSentinel spacecraft through the mission phase, and includes lessons learned from challenges and anomalies. BioSentinel had many successes and will be a pathfinder for future deep space CubeSats and biology missions.

BioSentinel↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Biosentinel: The First Deep Space Biology CubeSat Mission- Mission Summary and Lessons Learned

Launched on Artemis-1, BioSentinel carries a biology experiment into deep space for the first time in 50 years. A 6U CubeSat form factor was utilized for the spacecraft which included technologies newly developed or adapted for operations beyond Earth orbit. The spacecraft carries onboard budding yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, as an analog to human cells to test the biological response to deep space radiation. This was the maiden deep-space voyage for many of the subsystems, and the first time to evaluate their performance in flight operation. Flying a CubeSat beyond LEO comes with unique challenges with respect to trajectory uncertainty and mission operations planning. The nominal plan was a lunar fly-by, followed by an insertion into Heliocentric orbit. However, some possible scenarios included lunar eclipses that could have severely impacted the power budget during that phase of the mission, while others could have resulted in a “Retrograde” hyperbola at swing-by resulting in the spacecraft traveling inward toward Earth or even towards a collision with the lunar surface. The commissioning phase of the mission was successful and completed a week ahead of schedule. It did not come without its exciting moments and challenges. First contact with the spacecraft uncovered that the vehicle was unexpectedly tumbling after deployment, a situation that needed to be corrected urgently. The mission operations team executed a contingency plan to stabilize the spacecraft, with just moments to spare before the battery ran out of power. The BioSensor payload onboard the spacecraft is a complex instrument that includes microfluidics, fluid systems, sensor control electronics, as well at the living yeast cells. BioSentinel also included a TimePix radiation sensor implemented by JSC’s RadWorks group. Dose and Linear Energy Transfer (LET) data is compared directly to the rate of DSB-and repair events measured by the S. cerevisiae cells. BioSentinel mature nanosatellite technologies included: deep space communications and navigation, autonomous attitude control and momentum management, and micro-propulsion systems, to provide an adaptable nanosatellite platform for deep space uses. This paper discusses the performance of the BioSentinel spacecraft through the mission phase, and includes lessons learned from challenges and anomalies. BioSentinel had many successes and will be a pathfinder for future deep space CubeSats and biology missions.

BioSentinel↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Testing a Run-Time Assurance Framework Coupled with Integrated Risk Mitigation Capabilities for Autonomous Urban UAS Flights

The In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) Concept of Operations (ConOps) envisions new capabilities to monitor, assess, and mitigate flight safety risks. Systems will be tailored to mission type, vehicle/equipage type, operational environment, and safety risk tolerance. Within an IASMS framework, several capabilities may be implemented spanning three operational phases (pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight/off-line); and consisting of lower level functions and information services which may reside onboard the aircraft, on third-party server(s), and/or on ground/operator station(s). Each capability will be designed to produce and disseminate safety-relevant information; perform detection, diagnosis, and prediction of unsafe situations; and/or execute mitigation actions when hazardous events warrant such changes. This paper focuses on recent testing of airborne capabilities that demonstrate inflight aspects of the overarching concept for autonomous unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations in urban environments. A flight test architecture is described that applies run-time assurance principles (e.g., executes independent of the unassured autopilot), real-time risk assessment, and a technique to execute contingencies if necessary either automatically or via pilot intervention. Several tests using small UAS were conducted to verify the assured in-flight risk mitigation capability. The paper draws significantly from a larger NASA technical report and recent prior conference papers, providing additional details. Data is analyzed for two representative flights to illustrate the performance for various sequential and simultaneous hazards used during testing. During each automated flight, several hazards are encountered at various points along the flight path. At each point, the hazard is mitigated by the system, with the vehicle then continuing to subsequent points. The paper concludes with lessons-learned regarding relevant aspects of the overarching IASMS concept and how it may be updated and further advanced in the future.

population activity↗
NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitive Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

SHM/FM theory has been successfully applied to the selection of the baseline set Abort Triggers for the NASA SLS center dot Quantitative assessment played a useful role in the decision process  M&FM, which is new within NASA MSFC, required the most "new" work, as this quantitative analysis had never been done before center dot Required development of the methodology and tool to mechanize the process center dot Established new relationships to the other groups  The process is now an accepted part of the SLS design process, and will likely be applied to similar programs in the future at NASA MSFC  Future improvements center dot Improve technical accuracy ‒Differentiate crew survivability due to an abort, vs. survivability even no immediate abort occurs (small explosion with little debris) ‒Account for contingent dependence of secondary triggers on primary triggers ‒Allocate "Δ LOC Benefit" of each trigger when added to the previously selected triggers. center dot Reduce future costs through the development of a specialized tool  Methodology can be applied to any manned/unmanned vehicle, in space or terrestrial

Lo, Yunnhon↗
NASA NTRS1988

Space Station battery system design and development

The Space Station Electric Power System will rely on nickel-hydrogen batteries in its photovoltaic power subsystem for energy storage to support eclipse and contingency operations. These 81-Ah batteries will be designed for a 5-year life capability and are configured as orbital replaceable units (ORUs), permitting replacement of worn-out batteries over the anticipated 30-year Station life. This paper describes the baseline design and the development plans for the battery assemblies, the battery ORUs and the battery system. Key elements reviewed are the cells, mechanical and thermal design of the assembly, the ORU approach and interfaces, and the electrical design of the battery system. The anticipated operational approach is discussed, covering expected performance as well as the processor-controlled charge management and discharge load allocation techniques. Development plans cover verification of materials, cells, assemblies and ORUs, as well as system-level test and analyses.

Haas, R. J.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Emergency medical services

When NASA was established in 1958, it was known that space flight would require efforts beyond those of NASA to ensure the health and safety of our astronauts. On 10 Aug. 1958, a Secretary of Defense memorandum was signed that assigned the first Department of Defense (DOD) Manager to provide support to NASA for Project Mercury. This established a chain of command through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. The current charter is dated 19 Mar. 1986 and assigns the DOD Manager responsibilities to the Commander and Chief, US Space Command. The DOD Managers charter has many support areas and among them are recovery of astronauts and medical support. Today these efforts support the Space Shuttle and Space Station Programs. Briefly, the program works with each organization tasking the other through a requirements document. Level of care, communications, and recovery requirements are established; NASA and the DOD provide the capability to meet them. NASA is also responsible for the specialized training and equipment needed to meet these requirements. A Shuttle launch a KSC requires an Emergency Medical Services (EMS) coordinator on console to facilitate communications, ensure proper coverage, and coordinate with area hospitals. A contingent of NASA medical personnel are assembled to provide triage and medical support capabilities. The DOD provides medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters with surgeons and pararescue specialists (PJ's) or emergency medical technicians (EMT's). Each helicopter is equipped with at least one doctor and one PJ/EMT per astronaut crew member. Transoceanic abort landing (TAL) sites and end of mission (EOM) sites have similar structures, with TAL sites utilizing fixed wingg aircraft for MEDEVAC. The DOD also supports contingency planning for the support and return of crew members from the Space Station Freedom. Much of this support has been directed at the recovery of crew members following the landing of an Assured Crew Return Vehicle.

Billica, Roger↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human-Autonomy Teaming Assistant to Support Small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems for Wildland Firefighting Operations

An exploratory human-in-the-loop simulation was conducted to investigate and characterize a Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) Assistant to support a remote operator of multiple small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) using a ground control station (GCS) in the context of a wildland fire surveillance mission. Operator performance using the GCS with the HAT Assistant (Assisted Mode) was compared to operator performance using the GCS without the HAT Assistant (Unassisted Mode) during two types of contingency-event scenarios (Low and High Complexity). In the Assisted Mode, the HAT Assistant provided updates to the level of risk to the mission along with recommendations for risk mitigation, which were not provided in the Unassisted Mode. No significant differences in objective performance and subjective ratings of workload, situation awareness, and trust in automation between the Assisted and Unassisted Modes were detected, however there were indications that participants preferred the Assisted GCS over the Unassisted GCS and directions for further development were explored. Additional work is necessary to further refine the HAT Assistant and better characterize its effects on remote operator performance while managing multiple sUAS assets. Future work is recommended to optimize the implementation of an assistant to support operator performance during different missions and across vehicle classes.

Human-Autonomy Teaming↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human-Autonomy Teaming Assistant to Support Small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems for Wildland Firefighting Operations

An exploratory human-in-the-loop simulation was conducted to investigate and characterize a Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) Assistant to support a remote operator of multiple small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) using a ground control station (GCS) in the context of a wildland fire surveillance mission. Operator performance using the GCS with the HAT Assistant (Assisted Mode) was compared to operator performance using the GCS without the HAT Assistant (Unassisted Mode) during two types of contingency-event scenarios (Low and High Complexity). In the Assisted Mode, the HAT Assistant provided updates to the level of risk to the mission along with recommendations for risk mitigation, which were not provided in the Unassisted Mode. No significant differences in objective performance and subjective ratings of workload, situation awareness, and trust in automation between the Assisted and Unassisted Modes were detected, however there were indications that participants preferred the Assisted GCS over the Unassisted GCS and directions for further development were explored. Additional work is necessary to further refine the HAT Assistant and better characterize its effects on remote operator performance while managing multiple sUAS assets. Future work is recommended to optimize the implementation of an assistant to support operator performance during different missions and across vehicle classes

Human-Autonomy Teaming↗
NASA NTRS2000

Shuttle Upgrade Using 5-Segment Booster (FSB)

In support of NASA's continuing effort to improve the over-all safety and reliability of the Shuttle system- a 5-segment booster (FSB) has been identified as an approach to satisfy that overall objective. To assess the feasibility of a 5-segment booster approach, NASA issued a feasibility study contract to evaluate the potential of a 5-segment booster to improve the overall capability of the Shuttle system, especially evaluating the potential to increase the system reliability and safety. In order to effectively evaluate the feasibility of the 5-segment concept, a four-member contractor team was established under the direction of NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). MSFC provided the overall program oversight and integration as well as program contractual management. The contractor team consisted of Thiokol, Boeing North American Huntington Beach (BNA), Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) and United Space Alliance (USA) and their subcontractor bd Systems (Control Dynamics Division, Huntsville, AL). United Space Alliance included the former members of United Space Booster Incorporated (USBI) who managed the booster element portion of the current Shuttle solid rocket boosters. Thiokol was responsible for the overall integration and coordination of the contractor team across all of the booster elements. They were also responsible for all of the motor modification evaluations. Boeing North American (BNA) was responsible for all systems integration analyses, generation of loads and environments. and performance and abort mode capabilities. Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) was responsible for evaluating the impacts of any changes to the booster on the external tank (ET), and evaluating any design changes on the external tank necessary to accommodate the FSB. USA. including the former USBI contingent. was responsible for evaluating any modifications to facilities at the launch site as well as any booster component design modifications.

Sauvageau, Donald R.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Information and Best Practices Related to NASA Nuclear Flight Safety for Space Flights Involving Space Nuclear Systems

The purpose of this handbook is to facilitate a repeatable and robust process that promotes clear and effective interfaces between activities and stakeholders focused on meeting nuclear flight safety requirements for missions utilizing space nuclear systems (SNS), within the context of NASA’s broader nuclear-related activities and interfaces. NPR 8715.26, Nuclear Flight Safety, requires that the NASA project manager “incorporate nuclear flight safety considerations starting with program or project formulation through the point at which the SNS or other radioactive material no longer has the potential to affect Earth’s biosphere.” NASA’s use of SNS inherently involves partnering with other stakeholders to conduct a range of related activities that interface with nuclear flight safety. From a categorical perspective these include: (i) meeting the authorities and licensing requirements for possession and use of nuclear material, as governed by other Federal authorities; (ii) conducting National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) activities for nuclear-enabled missions; (iii) meeting Federal nuclear launch authorization requirements; (iv) conducting radiological contingency planning activities, including those associated with international commitments; (v) performing risk communication and public outreach activities; and (vi) ensuring decommissioning and disposal strategies reflect National policies and interests. It is the intent of this handbook to promote an effective interface between nuclear flight safety and these interrelated categorical activities. In addition to activities undertaken with partnering agencies, there are individual nuclear-related activities and programs that have a nexus to nuclear flight safety, and these include: (i) applicable NASA Standing Review Boards; (ii) the US Department of Energy nuclear safety activities conducted in partnership with NASA under Memoranda of Understanding; (iii) the Department of Defense’s Range Safety activities; (iv) NASA’s general involvement in interagency and international dialogues regarding nuclear safety; (v) the NASA-administered Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board; (vi) NASA’s program and project governance activities and nuclear-specific Technical Discipline Team activities under the Office of the Chief Engineer; and others. It is the intent of this handbook to promote effective leveraging of these additional interrelated organizational activities, as appropriate.

Donald Helton↗
NASA NTRS2008

Operational Experience with Long Duration Wildfire Mapping: UAS Missions Over the Western United States

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, United States Forest Service, and National Interagency Fire Center have developed a partnership to develop and demonstrate technology to improve airborne wildfire imaging and data dissemination. In the summer of 2007, a multi-spectral infrared scanner was integrated into NASA's Ikhana Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) (a General Atomics Predator-B) and launched on four long duration wildfire mapping demonstration missions covering eight western states. Extensive safety analysis, contingency planning, and mission coordination were key to securing an FAA certificate of authorization (COA) to operate in the national airspace. Infrared images were autonomously geo-rectified, transmitted to the ground station by satellite communications, and networked to fire incident commanders within 15 minutes of acquisition. Close coordination with air traffic control ensured a safe operation, and allowed real-time redirection around inclement weather and other minor changes to the flight plan. All objectives of the mission demonstrations were achieved. In late October, wind-driven wildfires erupted in five southern California counties. State and national emergency operations agencies requested Ikhana to help assess and manage the wildfires. Four additional missions were launched over a 5-day period, with near realtime images delivered to multiple emergency operations centers and fire incident commands managing 10 fires.

Hall, Philip↗
NASA NTRS2003

NASA's Orbital Space Plane Risk Reduction Strategy

This paper documents the transformation of NASA s Space Launch Initiative (SLI) Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle Program under the revised Integrated Space Transportation Plan, announced November 2002. Outlining the technology development approach followed by the original SLI, this paper gives insight into the current risk-reduction strategy that will enable confident development of the Nation s first orbital space plane (OSP). The OSP will perform an astronaut and contingency cargo transportation function, with an early crew rescue capability, thus enabling increased crew size and enhanced science operations aboard the International Space Station. The OSP design chosen for full-scale development will take advantage of the latest innovations American industry has to offer. The OSP Program identifies critical technologies that must be advanced to field a safe, reliable, affordable space transportation system for U.S. access to the Station and low-Earth orbit. OSP flight demonstrators will test crew safety features, validate autonomous operations, and mature thermal protection systems. Additional enabling technologies may be identified during the OSP design process as part of an overall risk-management strategy. The OSP Program uses a comprehensive and evolutionary systems acquisition approach, while applying appropriate lessons learned.

Dumbacher, Dan↗
NASA NTRS2012

Requirements, Resource Planning and Management for Decrewing/Recrewing Scenarios of the International Space Station

Following the failure of 44P on launch in August 2011, and the subsequent grounding of all Russian Soyuz rocket based launches, the ISS ground teams engaged in an effort to determine how long the ISS could remain crewed, what would be required to safely configure the ISS for decrewing, and what would be required to recrew the ISS upon resumption of Soyuz rocket launches if decrewing became necessary. This White Paper was written to capture the processes and lessons learned from real-time time events and to provide a reference and training document for ISS Program teams in the event decrewing of the ISS is needed. Through coordination meetings and assessments, teams identified six decrewing priorities for ground and crew operations. These priorities were integrated along with preflight priorities through the Increment replanning process. Additionally, the teams reviewed, updated, and implemented changes to the governing documentation for the configuration of the ISS for a contingency decrewing event. Steps were taken to identify critical items for disposal prior to decrewing, as well as identifying the required items to be strategically staged or flown with the astronauts and cosmonauts who would eventually recrew the ISS. After the successful launches and dockings of both 45P and 28S, the decrewing team transitioned to finalizing and publishing the documentation for standardizing the decrewing flight rules. With the continued launching of crews and cargo to the ISS, utilization and science is again a high priority, with the Increment pairs 29 and 30, and 31 and 32 reaching the milestone of at least 35 hours per week average utilization.

Bach, David A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Requirements, Resource Planning, and Management for Decrewing/Recrewing Scenarios of the International Space Station

Following the failure of 44 Progress (44P) on launch in August 2011, and the subsequent grounding of all Russian Soyuz rocket based launches, the International Space Station (ISS) ground teams engaged in an effort to determine how long the ISS could remain crewed, what would be required to safely configure the ISS for decrewing, and what would be required to recrew the ISS upon resumption of Soyuz rocket launches if decrewing became necessary. This White Paper was written to capture the processes and lessons learned from real-time time events and to provide a reference and training document for ISS Program teams in the event decrewing of the ISS is needed. Through coordination meetings and assessments, teams identified six decrewing priorities for ground and crew operations. These priorities were integrated along with preflight priorities through the Increment re-planning process. Additionally, the teams reviewed, updated, and implemented changes to the governing documentation for the configuration of the ISS for a contingency decrewing event. Steps were taken to identify critical items for disposal prior to decrewing, as well as identifying the required items to be strategically staged or flown with the astronauts and cosmonauts who would eventually recrew the ISS. After the successful launches and dockings of both 45P and 28 Soyuz (28S), the decrewing team transitioned to finalizing and publishing the documentation for standardizing the decrewing flight rules. With the continued launching of crews and cargo to the ISS, utilization and science is again a high priority; both Increment pairs 29 and 30, and Increment 31 and 32 reaching the milestone of at least 35 hours per week average utilization.

Bach, David A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

m:N ConOps/R&R Remote Simulation

This presentation details the experimental design of an investigation of small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) operations involving multiple vehicle management by a remote operator. The study is part of an ongoing effort to explore multiple vehicle control by multiple operators, i.e., the control of N vehicles by m operators (m:N operations). For this effort, NASA and collaborators have developed prototypes of a concept of operations (ConOps), roles and responsibilities (R&R) for operators and supervisors, and a ground control station (GCS), including software displays and interfaces. Participants in this study acted as the pilot-in-command of twelve aircraft flying pre-approved routes in a simulation of a food delivery operation utilizing sUAS in the San Diego, CA area. Each participant experienced four experimental trials. Twice within the course of each trial, participants were responsible for responding to a sudden, unanticipated, and high-priority contingency: an airspace restriction for sUAS operations known as a UAS Volume Reservation (UVR). Upon issuance of a UVR, pilots were expected to reroute affected vehicles around the airspace. The level of automation (LoA) and workload of the flight rerouting task were varied. The LoA was manipulated by providing reroute suggestions ("auto" condition) for aircraft or by requiring pilots to manually reroute ("manual" condition) affected vehicles. Workload was varied as a function of the number of vehicles affected by the UVR contingencies: 2 vehicles ("low workload" condition) versus 4 vehicles ("high workload" condition). Additionally, some vehicles required pilots to adjust for terrain conflicts while avoiding the UVR region. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in-person data collection for this study was not possible. Researchers adapted to this circumstance through the development of remote data collection protocol. Participants were able to view adapted GCS displays using the Microsoft Teams teleconferencing platform and responded to events by using a verbal protocol developed for the experiment. Using this protocol, participants provided instructions for actions to a researcher, referred to as the surrogate, to carry out on their behalf. This presentation describes the experiment design, including special details for remote data collection via a subject-surrogate configuration, and concludes with planned data analysis and results to be presented at a later date.

multi-UAS↗