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DOE OSTI2026

Fleet Utilization

A key goal of NextGen Profiles' fleet utilization study was to conduct a comprehensive, strategic, and standardized assessment of the operational behavior and utilization patterns across EV and EVSE production-ready fleets. These data-driven insights were intended to inform current fleet management strategies and support future infrastructure planning, ensuring the effective adoption and adaptation of the growing EV fleet market. The study applied a series of metrics defined in NextGen Profiles to evaluate diverse fleet operations across various use cases, emphasizing trends in charging, routing, and other critical behaviors. The fleet utilization dataset includes these three sets of metrics from 17 EV fleets, each consisting of a wide range of vehicle types and operational categories, as well as two EVSE fleets. Data were collected from a variety of sources and reformatted into a unified structure before metric computation, ensuring consistency and comparability across all fleets. To protect confidentiality, all fleet metadata are anonymized, and the publicly released metric datasets are aggregated to an hourly cadence.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2020

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Novel Architecture for Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Protection and Control System in Smart Grid

Wide-area protection and control (WAPAC) systems are widely applied in the energy management system (EMS) that rely on a wide-area communication network to maintain system stability, security, and reliability. As technology and grid infrastructure evolve to develop more advanced WAPAC applications, however, so do the attack surfaces in the grid infrastructure. This paper presents an attack-resilient system (ARS) for the WAPAC cybersecurity by seamlessly integrating the network intrusion detection system (NIDS) with intrusion mitigation and prevention system (IMPS). In particular, the proposed NIDS utilizes signature and behavior-based rules to detect attack reconnaissance, communication failure, and data integrity attacks. Further, the proposed IMPS applies state transition-based mitigation and prevention strategies to quickly restore the normal grid operation after cyberattacks. As a proof of concept, we validate the proposed generic architecture of ARS by performing experimental case study for wide-area protection scheme (WAPS), one of the critical WAPAC applications, and evaluate the proposed NIDS and IMPS components of ARS in a cyber-physical testbed environment. Our experimental results reveal a promising performance in detecting and mitigating different classes of cyberattacks while supporting an alert visualization dashboard to provide an accurate situational awareness in real-time.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2018

Concept of Operations: National Technology Test Bed Network for Water Resource Recovery

There is an urgency to advancing wastewater technologies due to aging water infrastructure and emerging regulations. A crosscutting working group proposes a conceptual design for a test bed network to understand and evaluate wastewater technologies to drive acceptance and deployment of new technologies to enhance performance. The working group includes contributors from the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. National Science Foundation, and the Water Research Foundation (formerly known as the Water Environment & Reuse Foundation). Upgrading today's aging wastewater treatment infrastructure to a new generation of water resource recovery facilities (WRRFs) requires the development and deployment of innovative technologies. The path to technology adoption depends on expensive, time consuming, and often repetitive cycles of testing and validation. Existing water resource recovery technology testing facilities (e.g., test beds) are underutilized and cannot, by themselves, broaden technology uptake. It has been proposed that technology adoption could be accelerated by a network linking these test facilities with innovators, manufacturers, utilities, regulators, policymakers, and educators. This document proposes a structure for a National Test bed Network (TBN) for water resource recovery. The concepts for its operation are explored herein. This document identifies drivers to launch a TBN and critical needs for successful implementation of the network. An important driver to technology implementation at WRRFs is the relationship between local utilities and state regulators. The TBN could provide access to validated performance data and facilitate deployment. To link the stakeholders and accelerate deployment, the TBN will require standards for methods, data quality, data management, and data security. These standards will enable validation of performance and will expand the “toolbox” that utilities and regulators could consider. Design, set up, and launch of this toolbox is beyond the scope of operations of utilities and regulators and will likely require external support to achieve full operation. Herein, a pathway is proposed to achieve this full operation. This document defines the function of a WRRF TBN. It also proposes a structure for the TBN to achieve its stated goals and mission. Finally, this document summarizes findings from several sources, including a series of workshops about the TBN concept, operators of test beds in ancillary industries, and discussions with regulators and permitting agencies. A description of this work was published in the peer-reviewed literature (Mihelcic 2017).

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2018

Subject Matter Expert Workshop for the Use of Municipal and Commercial Equipment for Radiological Response and Recovery: National Urban Security Technology Laboratory Workshop Summary Report

This report documents equipment and methods to aid in a wide-area radiological or nuclear response and recovery effort in an urban environment. This report summarizes a workshop held in New York City. The objective of this workshop was to incorporate lessons learned from a prior workshop, close the gaps on some areas that were not discussed in the prior workshop, and include additional subject matter experts from critical infrastructure operations, such as tunnels and bridges, the Port Authority, and mass transit. Various missions were postulated in a hypothetical emergency scenario under five broad support goal categories. Based on the findings and input from a series of such workshops and meetings, we plan to develop “best practices” for use of equipment responding to and recovering from a wide-area radiological incident.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2015

Power System Protection and Resilient Metrics

During a real-time power system event, a system operator need to conservatively reduce the operating limits while changing system conditions are analyzed. The time it takes to develop new operating limits could affect millions of transmission system users especially if this event is classified by NERC as a Category D type event (extreme events resulting in the loss of two or more bulk electric system elements) . Controls for the future grid must be able to perform real-time analysis, identify new reliability risks, and set new SOLs (System Operating Limit) for real-time operations. In this paper we are inducing “Resilience Metrics” requirements that describe how systems operate at an acceptable level of normalcy despite disturbances or threats. We consider the interdependencies inherent in critical infrastructure systems and discuss some resilience metrics that can be distributed in current supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) to provide a level of state awareness. This level of awareness provides knowledge that can be used to characterize and reduce the risk of cascading events. A “resilience power system agent” is proposed that provides attributes to measure and perform this metrics.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2017

Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid

Cyber security and resiliency of Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications is critically important to ensure secure, reliable, and economic operation of the bulk power system. WAMPAC relies heavily on the security of measurements and control commands transmitted over wide-area communication networks for real-time operational, protection, and control functions. Also, the current “N-1 security criteria” for grid operation is inadequate to address malicious cyber events and therefore it is important to fundamentally redesign WAMPAC and to enhance Energy Management System (EMS) applications to make them attack-resilient. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end defense-in-depth architecture for attack-resilient WAMPAC that addresses resilience at both the infrastructure layer and the application layers. Also, we propose an attack-resilient cyber-physical security framework that encompasses the entire security life cycle including risk assessment, attack prevention, attack detection, attack mitigation, and attack resilience. The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a broad scope that comprehensively describes most of the major research issues and potential solutions in the context of cyber-physical security of WAMPAC for the power grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2014

40 years of progress in NDT - History as a guide to the future

The paper is focussed on the progress which has been made over 40 years in the science, technology and application of NDT/NDE both during manufacture and in-service, from the perspective of the author and his background in the energy industries in the UK. New techniques not dreamt of 40 years ago and new technology such as personal computers, lasers and robotics which are now common-place in everyday life have transformed some aspects of NDT. But other aspects have remained unchanged, including the continued use of the more basic NDT methods and the challenges of recruitment, training, certification and motivation of personnel. There have been major changes in the world scene over 40 years including the globalization of trade, the emergence of new countries as industrial powers, and the ageing of safety critical infrastructure. These have impacted on NDT business and on the activities of the international NDT community (including ICNDT, the International Committee for NDT). The paper concludes by introducing the activities championed by ICNDT to promote the understanding of the importance of NDT, to support the development of NDT Societies around the world, to educate users on the correct use of personnel certification and to pursue the objective of global harmonisation and recognition of third party certification.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Optimize the Autonomous Sensor Fish Device for Understanding Interactions of Aquatic Animals with Marine and Hydrokinetic and Hydro Systems (CRADA 476) Final Report

This project at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) enhances our understanding of how aquatic life interacts with marine renewable energy (MRE) and hydropower systems through the development and testing of advanced sensor technology. The Marine Sensor Fish (MSF) and its smaller variants, the Sensor Fish Mini (SF Mini) and Flexible Sensor Fish (FSF), measure critical environmental stressors, such as shear forces, pressure changes, and strike impacts, that are essential for assessing the risks posed by energy devices, including tidal turbines, hydropower installations, and other MRE infrastructure. Rigorous field testing has shown that these tools are effective in capturing detailed data on turbulence, pressure variations, strike impacts, and other stressors near these devices, providing valuable insights into the conditions faced by aquatic species. Economically, these tools offer renewable energy developers a practical solution for streamlining environmental assessments and ensuring regulatory compliance, ultimately reducing costs associated with evaluating and mitigating ecological impacts. This research also benefits the public by promoting the growth of renewable energy sources that protect aquatic ecosystems, advancing both sustainable energy production and environmental stewardship.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2018

Development of Defenses against False Data Injection Attacks for Nuclear Power Plants

With the recent successful attempts against the digital control systems of critical infrastructures, there is a need to develop new defense strategies that recognize two important realities, 1) state- sponsored attackers can rely on a number of techniques including espionage, social engineering, and brute force techniques, etc. to gain access to the raw data used to control system behavior, 2) attackers can falsify operational data in manners that do not trigger conventional outlier/anomaly detection techniques in order to go undetected, which is referred to as false data injection attacks. Therefore, there is a strong need to explore another class of defense measures, referred to as physical process defense, serving as a new line of defense in the event existing defenses relying on information protection measures are breached. This physical process defenses utilize the physics and engineering models of the system to build unique signatures for genuine system behavior. If successful, the signatures would be able to detect attacks that falsify the operational data and render them harmless before they can inflict physical damage on the system. This report is focused on exploring the feasibility of physical process defenses for nuclear reactors, and their associated functional requirements to maximize their resiliency against state-sponsored, or equivalent, attackers.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Digital Assurance for Grid Reliability in the Era of Large Load Growth

The rapid expansion of large electric loads is reshaping the operational and regulatory landscape of the U.S. electric grid. These facilities are reaching new scales of expansion, now exceeding a gigawatt per site, and their highly sensitive, digitally driven behaviors introduce new reliability risks. Recent grid events, including large load losses following routine transmission disturbances, highlight the consequences of limited ride-through capability, inconsistent protection settings, inadequate modeling, and lack of behind-the-meter visibility. Parallels to earlier integration challenges of new grid technologies suggest that the grid’s existing processes, standards, and interconnection frameworks are no longer adequate for emerging large loads. This brief synthesizes lessons from the evolution of inverter-based resource regulation and applies them to large-load integration. It identifies critical gaps in modeling accuracy, interconnection processes, performance standards, and compliance mechanisms. Technical recommendations emphasize advanced monitoring, improved modeling, coordinated communication protocols, modernized substations, and structured behind-the-meter control schemes. Collectively, these measures provide a roadmap to maintain bulk power system reliability while enabling the continued growth of large, electrified digital infrastructure.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

A heuristic tool to assess regional impacts of renewable energy infrastructure on conservation areas

Wind and hydropower are important renewable components of national energy portfolios, but their infrastructure negatively affects biodiversity. Regional development requires identification of scenarios that minimize the cumulative impacts of multiple facilities. We introduce the cumulative impact plot (CIP) to quantify cumulative impacts of renewable energy development within a region. Summed impacts of facilities are plotted as a function of the number of facilities, with facilities ranked by increasing (the best-case scenario) or decreasing (worst-case scenario) individual impact. These curves represent lower and upper bounds to which alternative development scenarios (e.g., facilities ranked by generating capacity) can be compared. We used CIPs to assess overlap of potential wind and hydropower facilities with two types of conservation area in the United States: (1) federally protected lands and (2) critical habitats of federally threatened and endangered species. Here, we evaluated two alternative scenarios: facilities ranked by (A) decreasing generating capacity and (B) increasing distance from urban centers. Differences between the best-case and worst-case scenarios were large, thus revealing opportunities to develop facilities with limited impact on conservation areas. Alternative scenarios maximizing energy density generally resulted in conservation area overlap intermediate to best-case and worst-case scenarios. CIPs can also identify the proportion of wind versus hydropower favored under alternative scenarios. Build-out scenarios aimed at minimizing conservation area overlap favor hydropower, whereas alternative scenarios favor wind power. We conclude that CIPs can (1) complement—but should not replace—project-level environmental impact assessment, (2) integrate strategic, cumulative, and scenario-based assessments, and (3) harness rapidly growing geospatial data.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Protecting and Defending against Autonomous Control Systems and Digital Twin Cyber Attacks: Response Strategy for Hyperparameter attacks of Digital Twin Machine Learning Models in Nuclear Power Plants (Final)

Navigating through the complex tapestry of technological advancements, "Response Strategy for Hyperparameter attacks of Digital Twin Machine Learning Model in Nuclear Power Plants" stands at the intersection of cybersecurity and nuclear power plant operations, embarking on a journey through the intricacies of securing digital twins against malicious cyber activities. As nuclear power plants progressively integrate digital twin technology and machine learning models to optimize operations and ensure system reliability, they inadvertently expose themselves to a new spectrum of vulnerabilities, notably in the realm of hyperparameter attacks. Hyperparameters, integral in machine learning model tuning and optimal performance of digital twins, have emerged as a target for adversaries aiming to destabilize the predictive capabilities and therefore, the operational accuracy of these digital entities within critical infrastructures like nuclear plants. This paper, therefore, meticulously threads the needle through the development of a robust response strategy, poised to shield these digital reflections against calculated hyperparameter manipulations, ensuring that the digital twin can effectively and securely function as a reliable proxy for its physical counterpart. The ensuing sections delve into the orchestrated maelstrom of multi-rate time-changing intelligent coordinated hyperparameter attacks and the implementation of event-triggered predictive control, laying down a structured, predictive, and responsive framework that safeguards the nexus where the digital and physical realms of nuclear power plants coalesce. The operational integrity of digital twins in nuclear power plants depends critically on the security of machine learning hyperparameters. This study makes two different contributions. First, a decision-based idea known as a multi-rate time changing intelligent coordinated hyperparameter attack is put forth. In this attack, many hyperparameters are repeatedly changed using both random and intelligent optimal techniques by the attacker. These assaults introduce varied rates at different attack steps, compromise various amounts of hyperparameters, and improve stealth and flexibility. Second, a technique is developed for event triggered predictive control to rapidly respond to potential hyperparameter attacks. This control integrates a sliding window framework, retaining a history of previous data points and employing linear regression to predict the next data point from the current dataset. The control gain K is determined using the Lyapunov-Krasovskii method, and subsequently, an action is developed. Finally, the outcome of the simulation demonstrates the viability of the proposed method for defending nuclear power plant digital twins from hyperparameter attacks.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Demonstration of Wide Area Radiological Decontamination and Mitigation Technologies for Building Structures and Vehicles - 16508

Researchers at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security conducted the 'Wide-Area Urban Radiological Contaminant, Mitigation, and Clean-Up Technology Demonstration' in Columbus, Ohio on June 22-25, 2015. EPA's National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) demonstrated five wide-area radiological decontamination technologies (including strippable coatings, gels, and chemical foam technologies) on an urban building. Decontamination technologies were applied to remove the contaminants from the building's surfaces by physical, chemical, or other methods, which in practice could reduce radiation exposure level. In addition, NHSRC teamed with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to demonstrate several radiological contaminant mitigation technologies including building and vehicle wash technologies, as well as several approaches to contain wash water and radioactive particles. 'Radiological contaminant mitigation' technologies are measures taken to reduce adverse impacts of radiological contamination on people and the environment, and facilitate such purposes as restoration of first responder services and critical infrastructure. Radiological contaminant mitigation technologies are designed for containing and removing radiological contamination on the surface in the first hours or days following a radiological event (early phase response). Such technologies include 'radiological particle containment', which is design to prevent the spread of particles which might result from vehicle or foot traffic. Radiological particle containment technologies are applicable for early phase response to contain the radionuclides and to reduce radiation dose to responders and the public. Mitigation also includes 'gross decontamination' technologies, which perform a type of decontamination that is conducted with the goal of reducing contamination levels. This reduction may not meet final cleanup levels, but may be useful to mitigate some public hazard or contain contamination. The purpose of the demonstrations was to educate potential end-users and stakeholders of this technology about a 'Toolbox of Options' for radiological decontamination, as well as radiological contaminant mitigation. Both demonstrations were conducted using a 75-year old brick building and the surrounding area (including parking lots) in Columbus, OH. No radioactive contaminants were applied during either demonstration, as the objective was to duplicate and implement realistic operational conditions for these technologies. Surrogate contaminants such as particle tracers were used in several demonstrations. The decontamination technologies were used in a scaled-up setting with application to the building. Contaminant mitigation technologies were demonstrated on the building as well as on vehicles. Example technology application techniques/accessories included an articulating boom lift, repelling boatswain chair, stand-alone surface material structures, high-volume foam applicators, fire truck foam applicator, a vehicle wash tent for vehicles, particle tracers to simulate radiological contaminants, and high- and low-technology liquid containment approaches. Results and stakeholder observations from the demonstration are now publically in a report entitled 'Technical Report for the Demonstration of Radiological Decontamination and Mitigation Technologies for Building Structures and Vehicles' available at http://www.epa.gov/hsresearch Example information that was obtained included decontamination rate, contaminant mitigation and containment capacity, user friendliness of each technology, the required utilities (electric, water, etc.) for each technology, skill of worker required, and the cost. The condition (color, texture, integrity, etc.) of each building material present on the structure along with all structural components such as gutters, windows, doors, etc. were carefully examined and documented. All demonstrations were open to individuals, organizations, and local, state, federal, tribal, and international governments who may be involved with implementing or planning radiological incident response. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Methodology for Preliminary Design of Electrical Microgrids

Many critical loads rely on simple backup generation to provide electricity in the event of a power outage. An Energy Surety MicrogridTM can protect against outages caused by single generator failures to improve reliability. An ESM will also provide a host of other benefits, including integration of renewable energy, fuel optimization, and maximizing the value of energy storage. The ESM concept includes a categorization for microgrid value propositions, and quantifies how the investment can be justified during either grid-connected or utility outage conditions. In contrast with many approaches, the ESM approach explicitly sets requirements based on unlikely extreme conditions, including the need to protect against determined cyber adversaries. During the United States (US) Department of Defense (DOD)/Department of Energy (DOE) Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security (SPIDERS) effort, the ESM methodology was successfully used to develop the preliminary designs, which direct supported the contracting, construction, and testing for three military bases.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2013

Sustaining the National Geothermal Data System: Considerations for a System Wide Approach and Node Maintenance, Geothermal Resources Council 37th Annual Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada, September 29-October 2, 2013

Since the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act the U.S. Department of Energy’s Geothermal Technologies Office has funded $33.7 million for multiple data digitization and aggregation projects focused on making vast amounts of geothermal relevant data available to industry for advancing geothermal exploration. These projects are collectively part of the National Geothermal Data System (NGDS), a distributed, networked system for maintaining, sharing, and accessing data in an effort to lower the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). Determining “who owns” and “who maintains” the NGDS and its data nodes (repositories in the distributed system) is yet to be determined. However, the invest- ment in building and populating the NGDS has been substantial, both in terms of dollars and time; it is critical that this investment be protected by ensuring sustainability of the data, the software and systems, and the accessibility of the data. Only then, will the benefits be fully realized. To keep this operational system sustainable will require four core elements: continued serving of data and applications; maintenance of system operations; a governance structure; and an effective business model. Each of these presents a number of challenges. Data being added to the NGDS are not strictly geothermal but data considered relevant to geothermal exploration and develop- ment, including vast amounts of oil and gas and groundwater wells, among other data. These are relevant to a broader base of users. By diversifying the client base to other users and other fields, the cost of maintaining core infrastructure can be spread across an array of stakeholders and clients. It is presumed that NGDS will continue to provide free and open access to its data resources. The next-phase NGDS operation should be structured to eventually pursue revenue streams to help off-set sustainability expenses as necessary and appropriate, potentially including income from: grants and contracts (agencies, foundations, pri- vate sector), membership, fees for services (consulting, training, customization, ‘app’ development), repository services (data, services, apps, models, documents, multimedia), advertisements, fees for premier services or applications, subscriptions to value added services, licenses, contributions and donations, endow- ments, and sponsorships.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2016

On the Path to SunShot - Emerging Issues and Challenges with Integrating High Levels of Solar into the Distribution System

Wide use of advanced inverters could double the electricity-distribution system’s hosting capacity for distributed PV at low costs—from about 170 GW to 350 GW (see Palmintier et al. 2016). At the distribution system level, increased variable generation due to high penetrations of distributed PV (typically rooftop and smaller ground-mounted systems) could challenge the management of distribution voltage, potentially increase wear and tear on electromechanical utility equipment, and complicate the configuration of circuit-breakers and other protection systems—all of which could increase costs, limit further PV deployment, or both. However, improved analysis of distribution system hosting capacity—the amount of distributed PV that can be interconnected without changing the existing infrastructure or prematurely wearing out equipment—has overturned previous rule-of-thumb assumptions such as the idea that distributed PV penetrations higher than 15% require detailed impact studies. For example, new analysis suggests that the hosting capacity for distributed PV could rise from approximately 170 GW using traditional inverters to about 350 GW with the use of advanced inverters for voltage management, and it could be even higher using accessible and low-cost strategies such as careful siting of PV systems within a distribution feeder and additional minor changes in distribution operations. Also critical to facilitating distributed PV deployment is the improvement of interconnection processes, associated standards and codes, and compensation mechanisms so they embrace PV’s contributions to system-wide operations. Ultimately SunShot-level PV deployment will require unprecedented coordination of the historically separate distribution and transmission systems along with incorporation of energy storage and “virtual storage,” which exploits improved management of electric vehicle charging, building energy systems, and other large loads. Additional analysis and innovation are neede

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗