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At least 235 records · Page 13

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A Blockchain Case Study for Urban Air Mobility Operational Intent

To realize the potential of Urban Air Mobility (UAM), an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. UAM is a concept that proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. The intent of this work is to leverage a permissioned blockchain to simulate secure data exchange and storage for the UAM operational intent use case.

UAM↗

NASA NTRS2023

A Blockchain Case Study for Urban Air Mobility Operational Intent

UAM↗

DOE OSTI2024

Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber-Informed Engineering

Engineers have super powers to provide cybersecurity resilience with deterministic engineering solutions and to protect systems from the most catastrophic consequences that a cyber saboteur could cause. Come to this session to learn how to use engineering risk management skills to harden your engineered systems from cyberattacks. Objective 1 Identify what system functions could be digitally induced to cause undesired high-impact consequences. Objective 2 Analyze how loss or instability of digital controls in a subsystem could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 3 Analyze how loss or instability in the digital connectivity between systems could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 4 Identify engineering controls which could build resilience by eliminating digital loss or instability pathways or reduce the impact of digital loss or instability. This presentation will introduce Cyber-Informed Engineering, described below, and walk participants through specific engineering use cases to show how engineers can consider the potential for cyber sabotage in their existing system designs and enact deterministic engineering-based controls which eliminate pathways for attack or mitigate specific consequences. A wide variety of application use cases will be considered so that audience members can align the material with familiar engineering applications. CIE is an engineering approach that integrates cyber resilience into the conception, design, build, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, sensors, monitoring, or control. CIE offers the opportunity to use engineering to eliminate or mitigate avenues for cyber attack—starting from the earliest stage of design and continuing throughout the system’s lifecycle. Today, engineers and industrial control system (ICS) technicians build engineered systems with specific goals for safety, reliability, and functionality. While systems engineering includes considerable safety and failure mode analysis, cybersecurity risks are often not specifically addressed—particularly the risks of intentional cyber compromise, exploitation, and misuse. Cyber-Informed Engineering pairs well with traditional cyber defenses and offers an extra designed-in protection to eliminate the most catastrophic consequences which can be realized by an adversary should traditional cyber defenses fail.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G)

The first slide deck provides an overview of the goals and objectives of the DOE Grid Modernization Initiative's Project entitled "Assessment and Coordination of DER Cybersecurity Standards." It covers the project's ongoing efforts to create a library of standards related to the cybersecurity of DER. The presentation will review the progress of this effort to-date and solicit feedback from participants on future directions. The second slide deck summarizes NREL's accomplishments for last three years under S2G project in a 10-12 min presentation.

clean energy↗

DOE OSTI2024

IBR Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis and Recommendations

The adoption of clean energy technologies, including solar photovoltaics, continues to introduce non-traditional stakeholders to the operations and planning of the electric system. Stakeholders such as manufacturers, vendors, owners, aggregators, and others are enabling the adoption, integration, and optimum operations of solar technologies at accelerated rates. Inverters form the foundation of many digitally controlled energy sources for clean energy technologies, including Solar, Battery Energy Storage Systems, Hybrid Systems, and Hydrogen Fuel Cells. Their supply chain is complex, a series of microchips, electronic switches and other components making up its primary functions. The complexity of this space and the growing digitization associated with these components can create supply chain cyber risks. One measure to mitigate cybersecurity attacks is proper digital supply chain security. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO), in partnership with the Cybersecurity, Energy, Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) office, is hosting a workshop to bring together solar vendors and services providers to discuss digital supply chain security for solar systems and challenges and opportunities in the transitioning to a fully domestic supply chain for solar energy in the U.S. This workshop will support the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) and Energy Cyber Sense program activities. During the workshop, industry experts and researchers from DOE National Laboratories will discuss the current solar supply chain landscape and the transition to domestic manufacturing of solar components in the U.S. Tools and techniques to better manage and secure the digital supply chain of solar devices and systems will be discussed.

cybersecurity↗

DOE OSTI2024

Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment Security Solutions

The EVs@Scale cybersecurity pillar deep dive focuses on the three main tasks that NREL has in the consortium: (1) Analysis of EV charging mobile applications, (2) Cybersecurity risk assessments of EVSE through DER-CF, and (3) PKI for EVSE.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,MATHEMATICS AND COMPUT↗

DOE OSTI2024

Verifying Cyber Implementation Best Practices With Malcolm

Network traffic analysis can reveal a lot about what's right or wrong with a network's cybersecurity footing. Using Malcolm, a powerful open-source network traffic analysis tool suite for network security monitoring, cyber analysts and asset owners can validate cybersecurity best practices and uncover red flags in network configuration, including: proper network segmentation east-west (cross-segment) and north-south traffic unsecure or outdated network protocols authentication using clear text credentials rogue devices and services unexpected protocols (e.g., IPv6, DNS, DHCP, update checks, etc.) suspicious file transfers

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. A comprehensive exploration of BESS cybersecurity supply chain risks, systematic vendor risk assessment through the BESS Procurement Guide, and practical application of the INL SCRM Chatbot for enhanced supply chain resilience. This is Session 2 of 3. (Full Version)

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2026

Automated Generation of Graph-based Cyber Threat Intel

With the advancement of AI technology and tools, specifically in the cybersecurity domain, both cyber defenders and threat actors are continuously adapting the use of these capabilities to expedite their operations. With this phenomenon, threat intelligence that is up to date, refreshable, and has relevant context to a specific threat becomes more and more important as it enables cybersecurity professionals to gain insight into relevant data and relationships to guide their operations. This project enables users to frequently aggregate threat intelligence from various sources, such as vendor vulnerability advisories affecting critical infrastructure, malware reports, and adversary writeups into a centralized, standardized database. The project utilizes the Structured Threat Intelligence eXpression (STIX) for a standardized, shareable threat intelligence data format and Neo4j as a graph database solution to store STIX nodes and relationships. Initial results of the project include datasets of over 8,000 nodes and 20,000 relationships extracted from over 500 data sources that have been released within the past month.

Threat Intelligence↗

DOE OSTI2025

AI-based Cyber Event OSINT via Twitter Data

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is largely regarded as a necessary component for cybersecurity intelligence gathering to secure network systems. With the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and increasing usage of social media, like Twitter, we have a unique opportunity to obtain and aggregate information from social media. In this study, we propose an AI-based scheme capable of automatically pulling information from Twitter, filtering out security-irrelevant tweets, performing natural language analysis to correlate the tweets about each cybersecurity event (e.g., a malware campaign), and validating the information. This scheme has many applications, such as providing a means for security operators to gain insight into ongoing events and helping them prioritize vulnerabilities to deal with. To give examples of the possible uses, we present three case studies demonstrating the event discovery and investigation processes.

Dale, Dakota↗

DOE OSTI2025

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2026

SDN-Based Smart Cyber Switching (SCS) for Cyber Restoration of a Digital Substation

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have increasingly been targets of cyber-attacks, causing widespread and extended blackouts. Digital substations are particularly vulnerable to such cyber incursions, jeopardizing grid stability. This paper addresses these risks by proposing a cybersecurity framework that leverages software-defined networking (SDN) to bolster the resilience of substations based on the IEC- 61850 standard. The research introduces a strategy involving smart cyber switching (SCS) for mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for restoration, ensuring ongoing operational integrity and cybersecurity within a substation. The SCS framework improves the physical network’s behavior (i.e., leveraging commercial SDN capabilities) by incorporating an adaptive port controller (APC) module for dynamic port management and an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect and counteract malicious IEC-61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages within the substation’s communication network. The framework’s effectiveness is validated through comprehensive simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, demonstrating its ability to sustain substation operations during cyber-attacks and significantly improve the overall resilience of the power grid.

Liu, Chen-Ching (ORCID:0000000289417958)↗

DOE OSTI2024

Cytrics Repository Of Analysis Tools And Engineering Resources

Cybersecurity Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) is a DOE-funded project that works with vendors to evaluate the cybersecurity of equipment used in US critical infrastructure. In the process of testing systems, CyTRICS researchers often develop custom tools. The tools in this repository were developed during multiple CyTRICS tests to assist with the testing process. They help solve problems encountered by CyTRICS researchers and address uncommon testing subjects for which limited tooling is available. They are useful to other researchers working on similar systems and architectures.

Laird, SutterE↗

DOE OSTI2024

Application Guide for the Cyber-Resilient Design Framework for Hybrid Systems

As the energy landscape evolves, hybrid power plants—integrating multiple renewable energy sources (e.g., solar, wind, and battery storage) with the bulk power electric system—play a crucial role in meeting growing energy demands. However, with a hybrid power plant’s increased number of components, complex network connectivity and digitization of controls, these systems face growing cybersecurity risks. To help mitigate these risks, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) presents this application guide specifically designed for operators and systems engineers to evaluate the cybersecurity resilience of their hybrid power plant’s design.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security 2024 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program was established to provide research support addressing near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), Physical Protection System (PPS), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A, PPS, and Cybersecurity designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARSS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARSS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems are becoming more widely deployed throughout the country, and as their presence continues to grow, it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity, and to the company that owns the facility. The two main mechanisms malicious actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when facility managers conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks applicable to a wide variety of hydrogen storage systems by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2025

ARCADE Technical Pathway and Industry Impact

The Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) simplifies the evaluation and assessment of robustness factor and cyber resilience that support secure-by-design for advanced reactor nuclear power plants. In this manner, ARCADE supports risk-informed performance based (RIPB) evaluations of cybersecurity through its integration of plant physics with high-fidelity emulations of control systems. This cross domain approach enables comprehensive analysis of control system sensitivities, cyber-attack scenarios, and their consequences. ARCADE has been custom developed to meet the demands identified in Tier 1 of the Tiered Cyber Analysis (TCA) as outlined in NRC Draft Regulation Guide (RG) 5.96, which provides a RIPB cybersecurity approach for new reactors.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Center of Excellence for Operational Technology

The Center of Excellence for Operational Technology Traditional Presentation Abstract 2025 National Laboratories Information Technology Summit | Denver, CO Traditional Presentation Session Managing cybersecurity risk in Operational Technology (OT) presents a significant challenge across the Department, and critically, at many of the national laboratories. This includes IT-OT convergence, aging OT systems, cost of updating OT systems, and increased Advanced Persistent Threat efforts against OT including the 16 critical infrastructure sectors as listed in Presidential Policy Directive 21. DoE’s Office of Science and NNSA’s Office of the Chief Information Officer are taking the lead in addressing this challenge to include critical systems, by establishing the Center of Excellence (CoE) for Operational Technology. Championed by NNSA Deputy Chief Information Officer Steven McAndrews and the Office of Science Chief Information Officer Shila Cooch, the CoE for OT was chartered in February 2025 to address the challenges of OT cybersecurity and compliance. The CoE for OT will create partnerships and leverage expertise from across the NNSA National Security Enterprise and DOE Labs, Plants and Sites. The CoE will also collaborate with colleagues in other government agencies, industry partners and academia. The CoE for OT discussion at the National Laboratories Information Technology Summit ’25 will include the genesis of the CoE, stated goals, organizational structure, and the effort to attract OT subject matter experts to join the CoE effort to share knowledge and expertise. The discussion will include opportunities to get involved and contribute to this important effort. This session will be led by CoE for OT Co-Chairs Matt Kwiatkowski, Fermi National Laboratory Chief Information Security Officer, and Steven Weldon, Savannah River National Laboratory Cyber Program Director at the Georgia Cyber Center. The session will be of particular interest to CIOs, CTOs, CISOs, as well as IT and OT practitioners.

Kwiatkowski, Matt [Fermilab]↗