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At least 235 records · Page 13

W-DO Unclassified Talk Series: W-Division Military & Stockpile Operations Office (W-MSO) [Slides]

LANL W-MSO (W-Division Military & Stockpile Operations Office) is designated by LANL W-DO to act as the interface within LANL to respond with capacity to fulfill their DA responsibilities on specific matters relating to field and stockpile support. They share responsibility with SNL-ML for NNSA interface with DOD for certain military activities, such as NW fielding, component exchange, and issues in support of USAF, USN, and UK trident programs. They are also a single point agent to SNL-ML, which is the primary DOD interface for the NNSA. W-MSO is designated by W-DO to act as the LANL interface for issues that arise with LANL designed components.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

LANSCE Science Overview [Slides]

LANSCE is primarily focused on three science questions for NNSA and contributes to several other programs. We will primarily consider the NNSA questions: (1) How can we advance our understanding of dynamic material behavior using focused experiments? (2) What tools are needed to address Advanced Manufacturing and Aging? (3) How do we constrain the nuclear reaction networks involved in weapons?

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Technical Basis for Proposed Changes to DOE-STD-1194-2019, Nuclear Material Attractiveness Determination and Categorization

The Department of Energy (DOE)’s Technical Standard DOE-STD-1194-2019 (dated September 2019), Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability, provides key guidance for the determination of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) attractiveness levels. Attractiveness levels are a key component in the security categorization of SNM processed, used, and stored at DOE facilities. Upon review, the writing team identified specific components relating to the determination of attractiveness levels that could be modified to improve clarity, reduce burden on sites, and/or better align with the graded safeguards principle that is central to the DOE’s nuclear security program. The report outlines the original verbiage, issues with implementation of that verbiage, proposed new verbiage, and the expected benefits thus serving as the technical basis for the proposed changes.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Quantum Lock Technologies: Innovation Crossroads Final Report

At Quantum Lock Technologies, our mission is to use future-proof hardware and software to bridge the gap between physical access control and cyber security. Physical security includes access to doors, lockboxes/containers, and machinery/robots. Connecting physical access control to the cloud allows for remote detection, fast ledger updates, and mobile or remote access. However, this also opens physical security up to the world of cyber-attacks. At Quantum Lock, we use quantum random number generation to generate completely random and unpredictable digital keys to be used by connected equipment in a facility. This quantum technology is then paired with end-to-end encryption and a one-time-key communication protocol to ensure the highest level of security. Through the Innovation Crossroads program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, we have developed benchtop prototypes of our technology, connected with utility boards as our first target customers, and prepared for our first pilot with customers (target end of summer 2022). Below is a photograph of myself at an energy substation where we plan to eventually apply our technology.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Quantum Lock Technologies: Innovation Crossroads Final CRADA Report

At Quantum Lock Technologies, our mission is to use future-proof hardware and software to bridge the gap between physical access control and cyber security. Physical security includes access to doors, lockboxes/containers, and machinery/robots. Connecting physical access control to the cloud allows for remote detection, fast ledger updates, and mobile or remote access. However, this also opens physical security up to the world of cyber-attacks. At Quantum Lock, we use quantum random number generation to generate completely random and unpredictable digital keys to be used by connected equipment in a facility. This quantum technology is then paired with end-to-end encryption and a one-time-key communication protocol to ensure the highest level of security. Through the Innovation Crossroads program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, we have developed benchtop prototypes of our technology, connected with utility boards as our first target customers, and prepared for our first pilot with customers (target end of summer 2022). Below is a photograph of myself at an energy substation where we plan to eventually apply our technology.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Calibration and Initial Results of Space Radiation Dosimetry Using the iMESA-R

The integrated Miniaturized Electrostatic Analyzer-Reflight (iMESA-R) is a space weather instrument designed to measure plasma density, temperature, and spacecraft charging, along with total ionizing dose and dose rate. A constellation consisting of five nearly identical instruments has been designed and developed to act as science payloads hosted on-board Department of Defense satellites operating in low-Earth orbit. To validate the dosimetry component of the iMESA-R, a radiation test study was performed to calibrate the dosimeter and ascertain the attenuation due to the instrument aluminum housing. An 80 curie Cobalt-60 radioisotope source emitting beta, X-ray, and gamma ray radiation decay products was used to calibrate the dosimeter response as a function of distance and instrument shielding. We present results of the calibration study along with initial on-orbit data presented from the first operational iMESA-R hosted on-board Space Test Program Satellite 5 in a polar Earth orbit. The initial on-orbit data demonstrate the ability to map the radiation environment, particularly the South Atlantic Anomaly and the auroral regions using total ionizing dose rate due to electrons of E > 1.5 MeV and protons of E > 25 MeV.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Csx3 is a cyclic oligonucleotide phosphodiesterase associated with type III CRISPR–Cas that degrades the second messenger cA 4

Cas10 is the signature gene for type III CRISPR–Cas surveillance complexes. Unlike type I and type II systems, type III systems do not require a protospacer adjacent motif and target nascent RNA associated with transcriptionally active DNA. Further, target RNA recognition activates the cyclase domain of Cas10, resulting in the synthesis of cyclic oligoadenylate second messengers. These second messengers are recognized by ancillary Cas proteins harboring CRISPR-associated Rossmann fold (CARF) domains and regulate the activities of these proteins in response to invading nucleic acid. Csx3 is a distant member of the CARF domain superfamily previously characterized as a Mn 2+ -dependent deadenylation exoribonuclease. However, its specific role in CRISPR–Cas defense remains to be determined. Here we show that Csx3 is strongly associated with type III systems and that Csx3 binds cyclic tetra-adenylate (cA 4 ) second messenger with high affinity. Further, Csx3 harbors cyclic oligonucleotide phosphodiesterase activity that quickly degrades this cA 4 signal. In addition, structural analysis identifies core elements that define the CARF domain fold, and the mechanistic basis for ring nuclease activity is discussed. Overall, the work suggests that Csx3 functions within CRISPR–Cas as a counterbalance to Cas10 to regulate the duration and amplitude of the cA 4 signal, providing an off ramp from the programmed cell death pathway in cells that successfully cure viral infection.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Characterization of Precipitate Reactor Feed Tank (PRFT) Batches 44 and 49 from the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) processes a Monosodium Titanate/Sludge Solids (MST/SS) waste stream received from the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) via the Precipitate Reactor Feed Tank (PRFT). During processing, DWPF is required to provide evidence of compliance with the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS). Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) has requested Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to analyze PRFT samples representing each SWPF salt batch for thirty-two radionuclides. Additionally, elemental analysis of PRFT slurry and MST/SS solids was performed to aid SRMC in further refinement of the inputs and assumptions used in future frit development and Material Tracking Program calculations. The analyses of PRFT Batches 44 and 49, which correspond to material from the processing of Salt Batches (StB) 12 and 11, respectively, are reported herein. The unwashed dried solids of the PRFT Batches 44 and 49 are predominately MST, ~63-59% MST. The two batches have a much higher amount of Fe, Mn, and Ni compared to all previous batches. For Batch 44 this appears to be due to the use of a sludge simulant filter aid during processing of StB 12 and for Batch 49, it is possibly due to the larger amount of insoluble solids for StB 11 in comparison to all previous salt batches. Like previous PRFT batches, a significant amount of the unwashed dried solids are alkaline earth metals. The total sulfate, in mg/kg of slurry, for PRFT Batches 44 and 49 is 119 and 139, respectively, which is well below the current sulfate concentration used in Material Tracking Program calculations and is in agreement with DWPF laboratory sulfate measurements.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Comparative Analysis of Confidence Metrics for Nuclear Criticality Safety

Nuclear criticality safety standards provide guidance on the requirements and recommendations to establish confidence in computerized model results used to support operation with fissionable materials. By design, the guidance is not prescriptive, leaving the analysts free to determine how various sources of uncertainties are to be statistically aggregated. This report compares the analyses and key assumptions behind four notable methodologies documented in the nuclear criticality safety literature: the parametric, nonparametric, Whisper, and TSURFER methodologies. Because of the involved use of statistics entangled with heuristic recipes, the results of these methodologies are often difficult to interpret. Also, they are augmented by additional large administrative margins, eliminating the incentive to understand their differences. With the new resurgent wave of advanced nuclear systems focused on economizing operation—including advanced reactors, fuel cycles, and fuel concepts—there is a strong need to develop a clear understanding of uncertainties and their fusion methodologies to reduce uncertainties in a scientifically defensible manner. This report offers a deep dive into the various assumptions of the four noted methodologies, their adequacy, and their limitations, to provide guidance on developing confidence for the emergent nuclear systems. These systems are expected to be challenged by the scarcity of experimental data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗

Advanced Simulation and Computing (FY22 Implementation Plan Rev 0)

The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, surety, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP incorporates nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. The suite of data analyzed comes from activities including stockpile surveillance, experimental research, and development and engineering programs. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and the computational capabilities to support the SSP missions. These component parts, in addition to an appropriately scaled production capability, enable NNSA to support stockpile requirements. The ultimate goal of the SSP, and thus of the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, is to ensure that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. Specific work activities and scope contained in this Implementation Plan (IP) represent the full-year annual operating plan for FY22. The Initial IP, effective , should be consistent with the Department’s Base Table when operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR). The final IP, effective date TBD, is consistent with the final, enacted appropriation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Middlesex South FUSRAP Site: Collaboration Towards Beneficial Reuse - 20338

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) manages DoE's post-closure responsibilities and ensures the future protection of human health and the environment with respect to sites that have no continuing DOE mission after undergoing remediation. LM's beneficial reuse program promotes the LM strategic goal to sustainably manage and optimize use of public lands. The beneficial reuse program aims to repurpose former contaminated sites to restore the environment, protect the public health, revitalize communities, and spur economic growth. Benefits from the reuse of a site may increase the local tax base, facilitate job growth, utilize existing infrastructure, and enhance or protect natural resources. Beneficial reuse also promotes protectiveness by ensuring activities are compatible with long-term maintenance and protection of public health and the environment, as well as by retaining good stewardship of natural resources. LM actively participates in promoting the economic development vision of the surrounding communities by collaborating with local communities to promote regional or municipal initiatives. The Borough of Middlesex, New Jersey, has prepared the Lincoln Boulevard Redevelopment Plan, which will reinvent a once-viable downtown and enhance the quality of life for the community. The Middlesex South, New Jersey, Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) site lies within the boundaries of this redevelopment area. In support of this development plan, the Borough is interested in acquiring the site for its Department of Public Works and to increase street access in the future commercial district to be built near adjacent properties. The opportunity to put the FUSRAP site into productive use aligns with LM's mission and strategic goals. In support of beneficial reuse activities, DOE can dispose of excess real property using several mechanisms. The two disposal options applicable to the Middlesex south site include (1) utilizing the US General Services Administration (GSA) or (2) using the Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Section 770, 'Transfer of Real Property at Defense Nuclear Facilities for Economic Development' (known as a '770 transfer') process. Using the 770 transfer requires economic development as the primary driver, and a specific redevelopment proposal must be submitted. If there is no interest in specific economic development, the GSA option becomes the default mechanism for disposal of the property. In the case of the Middlesex south site, the 770 transfer process is being utilized and the Borough has submitted its economic development proposal to LM. Although LM is encouraged by the opportunity to put the site into productive use, the Middlesex south site is currently on the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Priorities List and remediation is being performed by the US Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Consequently, any property transfer must meet the requirements under CERCLA Section 120(h), 'Property Transferred by Federal Agencies.' As the groundwater remedy will not be in place for several years, approval would be required from the US EPA administrator and the governor of the state of New Jersey to perform an early transfer of the site (before all response actions have been completed). The time frame for these approvals to occur under the normal process conflicts with the proposed redevelopment schedule; therefore, various options for expedited sale, transfer, or lease of portions of the site to the Borough were evaluated. The subsequent decision on a mutually beneficial path forward was the result of a collaborative effort between LM, USACE, the Borough and its redevelopment team, EPA, and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. (authors)

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Strategic National Level Exercises Program White Paper - Draft

The general objective of this white paper is to share lessons learned and provide interdisciplinary recommendations on how to use NLE to evaluate, assess and improve national nuclear security regimes. The specific objectives of this white paper are: — To describe the type of exercises, benefits and requirements — To outline the different capacity areas and capability performance levels — To provide concrete and actionable recommendations to INS’s partners on how to use NLE to improve national nuclear security regimes.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Joint LLNL & SNL Material Compatibility Study Commences

The fundamental goal of the W80-4 Life Extension Program (LEP) is the design and production of a safe and reliable system. Ensuring long-term viability and chemical compatibility of the materials in the warhead is paramount to its success. To that end, the material and aging compatibility team, which includes researchers from Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), has launched the LEP’s most comprehensive compatibility test to date.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security 2024 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program was established to provide research support addressing near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), Physical Protection System (PPS), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A, PPS, and Cybersecurity designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARSS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARSS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis of DWPF Sludge Batch 6 (Macrobatch 7): Pour Stream Glass Samples

The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) began processing Sludge Batch 6 (SB6), also referred to as Macrobatch 7 (MB7), in June 2010. SB6 is a blend of the heel of Tank 40 from Sludge Batch 5 (SB5), H-Canyon Np transfers and SB6 that was transferred to Tank 40 from Tank 51.1 SB6 was processed using Frit 418. Sludge is received into the DWPF Chemical Processing Cell (CPC) and is processed through the Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) and Slurry Mix Evaporator Tank (SME). The treated sludge slurry is then transferred to the Melter Feed Tank (MFT) and fed to the melter. During processing of each sludge batch, the DWPF is required to take at least one glass sample to meet the objectives of the Glass Product Control Program (GPCP) and to complete the necessary Production Records so that the final glass product may be disposed of at a Federal Repository. The DWPF requested various analyses of radioactive glass samples obtained from the melter pour stream during processing of SB6 as well as reduction/oxidation (REDOX) analysis of MFT samples to determine the impact of Argon bubbling. Sample analysis followed the Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP) and an Analytical Study Plan (ASP). Four Pour Stream (PS) glass samples and two MFT slurry samples were delivered to the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) from the DWPF. Table 1-1 lists the sample information for each pour stream glass sample. SB6 PS3 (S03472) was selected as the official pour stream sample for SB6 and full analysis was requested. This report details the visual observations of the as-received SB6 PS No.3 glass sample as well as results for the chemical composition, Product Consistency Test (PCT), radionuclide content, noble metals, and glass density. REDOX results will be provided for all four pour stream samples and vitrified samples of MFT-558 and MFT-568A. Where appropriate, data from other pour stream samples will be provided.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

New Predictive Capabilities for Nuclear Weapons in Composite Fires

The prevalence of flammable carbon-based composite airframe materials and their use in high-temperature nuclear weapon re-entry systems requires analysts to address the abnormal thermal environment hazards associated with composite material fires. These fires tend to burn very differently than conventional fuel fires, usually burning less intensely, but much longer. This could lead to challenges in understanding margins in classic safety themes. The technical challenges in modeling the phenomena associated with these new types of fires are considerable, but new models have been developed. Their predictions have been compared with well-documented measurements of a vertical porous burner fire, known as a "wall fire" (a "wall-fire" validation simulation is reflected in the figures below). These measurements were conducted at FMGlobal, a mutual insurance company with a strong fire risk management program, as part of an ongoing collaboration between Sandia and FMGlobal. To date, the "wall-fire" scenario has been set up and initial model assessments with grid refinement studies have been conducted focusing on mesh resolutions suitable for full weapon system simulations. This work will continue with further verification and validation tasks assessing the predictions of the new model. Future work will address specific aspects of the wall models that are lacking in their predictive ability.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Getting things done onsite: Heat Source production never ramps down

The COVID-19 pandemic has changed many norms in the world and at LANL. During the rapid transition of sending many to work from home in March, some programs were deemed mission critical, with the expectation to continue driving their missions forward. One of those essential programs is Heat Source Technologies, a group within the Actinide Material Power & Processing (AMPP) Division at TA-55. Within the Associate Laboratory Directorate of Weapons Production (ALDWP), the group responsible for the Pu-238 heat sources continued their work nearly uninterrupted as many others made the mandatory transition to work remotely. This group, known as AMPP-1, Heat Source Technologies, works on the production line producing heat sources from Plutonium (Pu)-238, which is an essential mission for National Security. This group is comprised of nearly 90 employees and operates out of the TA-55 Plutonium Facility (PF-4 and PF-5) producing heat sources. Heat source production includes the operations that purify, process, and weld Pu-238 oxide into encapsulated heat sources that are essential for space and defense missions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗