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B 727 digital flight data recorder data taken in 1978 through 1980 were analyzed to provide many statistical data useful for updating airliner airworthiness design criteria.
B 747 digital flight data taken in 1978 through 1980 were analyzed to provide many statistical data useful for updating airliner airworthiness design criteria.
DC 10 digital flight data recorder data taken in 1981 through 1982 were analyzed to provide statistical data useful for updating airliner airworthiness design criteria.
This document was generated in support of NASA contract NAS1-18586, Design and Validation of Digital Flight Control Systems suitable for Fly-By-Wire Applications, Task Assignment 2. Task 2 is associated with a formal representation of requirements and specifications. In particular, this document contains results associated with the development of a Wide-Spectrum Requirements Specification Language (WSRSL) that can be used to express system requirements and specifications in both stylized and formal forms. Included with this development are prototype tools to support the specification language. In addition a preliminary requirements specification methodology based on the WSRSL has been developed. Lastly, the methodology has been applied to an Advanced Subsonic Civil Transport Flight Control System.
The task assignment 3 of the design and validation of digital flight control systems suitable for fly-by-wire applications is studied. Task 3 is associated with formal verification of embedded systems. In particular, results are presented that provide a methodological approach to microprocessor verification. A hierarchical decomposition strategy for specifying microprocessors is also presented. A theory of generic interpreters is presented that can be used to model microprocessor behavior. The generic interpreter theory abstracts away the details of instruction functionality, leaving a general model of what an interpreter does.
Software safety assurance philosophy and practices at the NASA Ames are discussed. It is shown that, to be safe, software must be error-free. Software developments on two digital flight control systems and two ground facility systems are examined, including the overall system and software organization and function, the software-safety issues, and their resolution. The effectiveness of safety assurance methods is discussed, including conventional life-cycle practices, verification and validation testing, software safety analysis, and formal design methods. It is concluded (1) that a practical software safety technology does not yet exist, (2) that it is unlikely that a set of general-purpose analytical techniques can be developed for proving that software is safe, and (3) that successful software safety-assurance practices will have to take into account the detailed design processes employed and show that the software will execute correctly under all possible conditions.
The design and formal verification of the Reliable Computing Platform (RCP), a fault tolerant computing system for digital flight control applications is presented. The RCP uses N-Multiply Redundant (NMR) style redundancy to mask faults and internal majority voting to flush the effects of transient faults. The system is formally specified and verified using the Ehdm verification system. A major goal of this work is to provide the system with significant capability to withstand the effects of High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF).
A general description of various types of fly-by-wire systems is provided. The risks inherent in digital flight control systems, like those used in the Space Shuttle, are identified. The results of a literature survey examining risk management methods in use throughout the aerospace industry are presented. The applicability of these methods to the Space Shuttle program is discussed.
The experiences gained from the development of the X-29 aircraft's digital flight control system is discussed. The master test plan, validation testing, verification testing, and flight hardware testing of the system are briefly reviewed, and the test facilities are described. Simulator verification and results are summarized.
We describe our experience with formal, machine-checked verification of algorithms for critical applications, concentrating on a Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm for synchronizing the clocks in the replicated computers of a digital flight control system. First, we explain the problems encountered in unsynchronized systems and the necessity, and criticality, of fault-tolerant synchronization. We give an overview of one such algorithm, and of the arguments for its correctness. Next, we describe a verification of the algorithm that we performed using our EHDM system for formal specification and verification. We indicate the errors we found in the published analysis of the algorithm, and other benefits that we derived from the verification. Based on our experience, we derive some key requirements for a formal specification and verification system adequate to the task of verifying algorithms of the type considered. Finally, we summarize our conclusions regarding the benefits of formal verification in this domain, and the capabilities required of verification systems in order to realize those benefits.
A flight digital data acquisition system that uses the MIL-STD-1553B bus for transmission of data to a host computer for control law processing is described. The instrument, the Remote Interface Unit (RIU), can accommodate up to 16 input channels and eight output channels. The RIU employs a digital signal processor to perform local digital filtering before sending data to the host. The system allows flexible sensor and actuator data organization to facilitate quick control law computations on the host computer. The instrument can also run simple control laws autonomously without host intervention. The RIU and host computer together have replaced a similar larger, ground minicomputer system with favorable results.
Forebody Vortex Control (FVC) is an emerging technology that has received widespread and concentrated attention by many researchers for application on fighter aircraft to enhance aerodynamic controllability at high angles of attack. This research explores potential application of FVC to a NASP-type configuration. The configuration investigated is characterized by a slender, circular cross-section forebody and a 78 deg swept delta wing. A man-in-the-loop, six-degress-of-freedom, high-fidelity simulation was developed that demonstrates the implementation and advantages of pneumatic forebody vortex control. Static wind tunnel tests were used as the basis for the aerodynamic characteristics modeled in the simulation. Dynamic free-to-roll wind tunnel tests were analyzed and the wing rock motion investigated. A non-linear model of the dynamic effects of the bare airframe and the forebody vortex control system were developed that closely represented the observed behavior. Multiple state-of-the-art digital flight control systems were developed that included different utilizations of pneumatic vortex control. These were evaluated through manned simulation. Design parameters for a pneumatic forebody vortex control system were based on data collected regarding the use of blowing and the mass flow required during realistic flight maneuvers.
In this paper the design and formal verification of the lower levels of the Reliable Computing Platform (RCP), a fault-tolerant computing system for digital flight control applications, are presented. The RCP uses NMR-style redundancy to mask faults and internal majority voting to flush the effects of transient faults. Two new layers of the RCP hierarchy are introduced: the Minimal Voting refinement (DA_minv) of the Distributed Asynchronous (DA) model and the Local Executive (LE) Model. Both the DA_minv model and the LE model are specified formally and have been verified using the Ehdm verification system. All specifications and proofs are available electronically via the Internet using anonymous FTP or World Wide Web (WWW) access.
For several years, scientists at San Jose State University, NASA-Ames, and the University of Arizona have carried out cooperative research programs to understand the causes and effects of severe turbulence. The primary sources of data for this work are Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) tapes from airliners that have been involved in turbulence incidents. A significant result of the analysis of these data has been the identification and quantification of the turbulence causes. Turbulence signatures include breaking Kelvin-Helmholtz waves, large amplitude mountain lee waves, turbulence in and around thunderstorms, and maneuvering. The requirements that must be met for a turbulence incident to be included in the NASA study are rather straightforward: (1) severe or greater turbulence must have been reported (usually with passenger injuries) and (2) the flight data tapes must be available. Despite these rather general criteria, and the fact that our cases are drawn from a wide geographical area over the U.S. and the Atlantic Ocean, we have found an interesting bias in our sample. Of 12 cases at cruise altitude, four were definitely associated with thunderstorms and two are suspected thunderstorm cases. The others were due to mountain waves, CAT, high level windshear/maneuvering, or to causes not yet determined. Although our sample is small, these numbers have raised several questions, not the least of which are: How pervasive is the problem of aircraft encounters with severe turbulence in or near thunderstorm tops (TNTT)? Given the available visible and radar evidence of thunderstorms, Why do such incidents occur? Can anything be done to allevaite the problem? This paper outlines some very preliminary efforts to answer these questions. In the following sections, physical and statistical characteristics of TNTT are discussed (Section 2), TNTT causes are summarized (Section 3), current recommendations for TNTT avoidance are reviewed (Section 4), and some suggestions to ameliorate the problem are given (Section 5).
Mode confusion is one of the most serious problems in aviation safety. Today's complex digital flight decks make it difficult for pilots to maintain awareness of the actual states, or modes, of the flight deck automation. NASA Langley leads an initiative to explore how formal techniques can be used to discover possible sources of mode confusion. As part of this initiative, a flight guidance system was previously specified as a finite Mealy automaton, and the theorem prover PVS was used to reason about it. The objective of the present paper is to investigate whether state-exploration techniques, especially model checking, are better able to achieve this task than theorem proving and also to compare several verification tools for the specific application. The flight guidance system is modeled and analyzed in Murphi, SMV, and Spin. The tools are compared regarding their system description language, their practicality for analyzing mode confusion, and their capabilities for error tracing and for animating diagnostic information. It turns out that their strengths are complementary.
On September 8, 1994, a Boeing 737-300 passenger airplane was on a downwind approach to the Pittsburgh International Airport at an altitude of 5000 feet above ground level (6000 feet MSL). While in a shallow left turn onto a downwind approach heading, the airplane crossed into the vortex trail of a Boeing 727 flying in the same approach pattern about 4 miles ahead. The B-737 airplane rolled and turned sharply to the left, exited the vortex wake and plunged into the ground. Weather was not a factor in the accident. The airplane was equipped with a 11+ channel digital Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and a multiple channel Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). Both recorders were recovered from the crash site and provided excellent data for the development of an accident scenario. Radar tracking of the two airplanes as well as the indicated air speed (IAS) perturbations clearly visible on the B-737 FDR recordings indicate that the upset was apparently initiated by the airplane's crossing into the wake of the B-727 flying ahead in the same traffic pattern. A 6 degree-of-freedom simulation program for the B-737 airplane using MATLAB and SIMULINK was constructed. The simulation was initialized at the stabilized flight conditions of the airplane about 13 seconds prior to its entry into the vortex trail of the B-727 airplane. By assuming a certain combination of control inputs, it was possible to produce a simulated motion that closely matched that recorded on the FDR.
This is a listing of recent unclassified RTO technical publications processed by the NASA Center for AeroSpace Information from Jan 1, 2002 through Mar 31, 2002. Topics covered included information management, ice accretion, digital flight control systems, supercavitation flows, and tactical decision aids.
Under a NASA-Ames Space Act Agreement, Coryphaeus Software and Simauthor, Inc., developed an Aviation Performance Measuring System (APMS). This software, developed for the aerospace and airline industry, enables the replay of Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data in a flexible, user-configurable, real-time, high fidelity 3D (three dimensional) environment.