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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2018

An “EPIIC” Vision to Evolve Project Integration, Innovation, and Collaboration with Broad Impact for How NASA Executes Complex Projects

Evolving Project Integration, Innovation, and Collaboration (EPIIC) is a vision defined to transform the way projects manage information to support real-time decisions, capture best practices and lessons learned, perform assessments, and manage risk across a portfolio of projects. The foundational project management needs for data and information will be revolutionized through innovations on how we manage and access that data, implement configuration control, and certify compliance. The embedded intelligence of new interactive data interfaces integrate technical and programmatic data such that near real time analytics can be accomplished to more efficiently and accurately complete systems engineering and project management tasks. The system-wide data analytics that are integrated into customized data interfaces allows the growing team of engineers and managers required to develop and implement major NASA missions the ability to access authoritative source(s) of system information while greatly reducing the labor required to complete system assessments. This would allow, for example, much of what is accomplished in a scheduled design review to take place as needed, between any team members, at any time. An intelligent data interface that rigorously integrates systems engineering and project management information in near real time can provide substantially greater insight for systems engineers, project managers, and the large diverse teams required to complete a complex project. System engineers, programmatic personnel (those who focus on cost, schedule, and risk), the technical engineering disciplines, and project management can realize immediate benefit from the shared vision described herein. Implementation of the vision also enables significant improvements in the performance of the engineered system being developed.

Moreland, Robert J.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Methods for Determining the Level of Autonomy to Design into a Human Spaceflight Vehicle: A Function Specific Approach

The next-generation human spaceflight vehicle is in a unique position to realize the benefits of more than thirty years of technological advancements since the Space Shuttle was designed. Computer enhancements, the emergence of highly reliable decision-making algorithms, and an emphasis on efficiency make an increased use of autonomous systems highly likely. NASA is in a position to take advantage of these advances and apply them to the human spaceflight environment. One of the key paradigm shifts will be the shift, where appropriate, of monitoring, option development, decision-making, and execution responsibility from humans to an Autonomous Flight Management (AFM) system. As an effort to reduce risk for development of an AFM system, NASA engineers are developing a prototype to prove the utility of previously untested autonomy concepts. This prototype, called SMART (Spacecraft Mission Assessment and Replanning Tool), is a functionally decomposed flight management system with an appropriate level of autonomy for each of its functions. As the development of SMART began, the most important and most often asked question was, How autonomous should an AFM system be? A thorough study of the literature through 2002 surrounding autonomous systems has not yielded a standard method for designing a level of autonomy into either a crewed vehicle or an uncrewed vehicle. The current focus in the literature on defining autonomy is centered on developing IQ tests for built systems. The literature that was analyzed assumes that the goal of all systems is to strive for complete autonomy from human intervention, rather than identifying how autonomous each function within the system should have been. In contrast, the SMART team developed a method for determining the appropriate level of autonomy to be designed into each function within a system. This paper summarizes the development of the Level of Autonomy Assessment Tool and its application to the SMART project.

AFM (AUTONOMOUS FLIGHT MANAGEMENT)↗
NASA NTRS1985

Protecting intellectual property in space; Proceedings of the Aerospace Computer Security Conference, McLean, VA, March 20, 1985

The primary purpose of the Aerospace Computer Security Conference was to bring together people and organizations which have a common interest in protecting intellectual property generated in space. Operational concerns are discussed, taking into account security implications of the space station information system, Space Shuttle security policies and programs, potential uses of probabilistic risk assessment techniques for space station development, key considerations in contingency planning for secure space flight ground control centers, a systematic method for evaluating security requirements compliance, and security engineering of secure ground stations. Subjects related to security technologies are also explored, giving attention to processing requirements of secure C3/I and battle management systems and the development of the Gemini trusted multiple microcomputer base, the Restricted Access Processor system as a security guard designed to protect classified information, and observations on local area network security.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2013

Space Mission Concept Development Using Concept Maturity Levels

Over the past five years, pre-project formulation experts at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) has developed and implemented a method for measuring and communicating the maturity of space mission concepts. Mission concept development teams use this method, and associated tools, prior to concepts entering their Formulation Phases (Phase A/B). The organizing structure is Concept Maturity Level (CML), which is a classification system for characterizing the various levels of a concept's maturity. The key strength of CMLs is the ability to evolve mission concepts guided by an incremental set of assessment needs. The CML definitions have been expanded into a matrix form to identify the breadth and depth of analysis needed for a concept to reach a specific level of maturity. This matrix enables improved assessment and communication by addressing the fundamental dimensions (e.g., science objectives, mission design, technical risk, project organization, cost, export compliance, etc.) associated with mission concept evolution. JPL's collaborative engineering, dedicated concept development, and proposal teams all use these and other CML-appropriate design tools to advance their mission concept designs. This paper focuses on mission concept's early Pre-Phase A represented by CMLs 1- 4. The scope was limited due to the fact that CMLs 5 and 6 are already well defined based on the requirements documented in specific Announcement of Opportunities (AO) and Concept Study Report (CSR) guidelines, respectively, for competitive missions; and by NASA's Procedural Requirements NPR 7120.5E document for Projects in their Formulation Phase.

Concept Maturity Levels (CMLs)↗
NASA NTRS2021

Model-Based SMA Initiative Phase 1 Report: Reliability Tips Excerpt

The emergence of model-based engineering, with Model- Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) leading the way, is transforming design and analysis methodologies. [7] The recognized benefits to systems development include moving from document-centric information systems and document-centric project communication to a model-centric environment in which control of design changes in the life cycles is facilitated. In addition, a “single source of truth” about the system, that is up-to-date in all respects of the design, becomes the authoritative source of data and information about the system. This promotes consistency and efficiency in regard to integration of the system elements as the design emerges and thereby may further optimize the designs. Therefore Reliability Engineers (REs) supporting NASA missions must be integrated into model-based engineering, using these recommended modeling techniques, to ensure the outputs of their analyses are relevant and value-needed to the design, development, and operational processes for failure risk assessment and communication.

Nancy J. Lindsey↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Technology Maturation Plan for the Development of Nuclear Electric Propulsion

Over the last two years NASA’s Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) Project formulated a Technology Maturation Plan (TMP) for development of the sub-systems needed for a MW-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) system which, combined with a high thrust chemical propulsion stage, would be suitable for human missions to Mars. Two recent assessments, independently conducted by the National Academies for Science, Engineering, and Medicine and the NASA Engineering & Safety Center, concluded that the technologies required for a high-power NEP system are immature and the attendant risks insufficiently quantified to justify initiating a flight project. For NEP to be available as a viable option to meet flight opportunities in the late 2030s / 2040s time frame, development of the key sub-systems must begin now. SNP has subdivided the NEP system into five Critical Technology Elements (CTE): the nuclear reactor, power conversion, power management and distribution, electric propulsion sub-system, and the primary heat rejection system. Development plans for each of these CTEs have been drafted which will serve as the template for a focused milestone-driven research and development campaign intended to advance each CTE to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 5. This will be accomplished by building and testing hardware at relevant power levels (~ 1 MW) and for relevant durations (2,500 hours, ~10% of the required operational lifetime) and conducting numerical modeling of the CTEs anchored by the accumulated test data to predict system performance and reliability. Concurrent with this work, high-level coupled system/mission modeling will be carried out to refine the key performance parameters that the various CTEs must achieve. Non-advocate reviews will be held at milestone points to assess progress and inform down-select decisions. The strategy for formulating the TMP was described previously; this paper describes ongoing progress on the drafting and baselining of the plan, including key specific details.

Space Nuclear Propulsion↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Technology Maturation Plan for the Development of Nuclear Electric Propulsion

Over the last two years NASA’s Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) Project formulated a Technology Maturation Plan (TMP) for development of the sub-systems needed for a MW-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) system which, combined with a high thrust chemical propulsion stage, would be suitable for human missions to Mars. Two recent assessments, independently conducted by the National Academies for Science, Engineering, and Medicine and the NASA Engineering & Safety Center, concluded that the technologies required for a high-power NEP system are immature and the attendant risks insufficiently quantified to justify initiating a flight project. For NEP to be available as a viable option to meet flight opportunities in the late 2030s / 2040s time frame, development of the key sub-systems must begin now. SNP has subdivided the NEP system into five Critical Technology Elements (CTE): the nuclear reactor, power conversion, power management and distribution, electric propulsion sub-system, and the primary heat rejection system. Development plans for each of these CTEs have been drafted which will serve as the template for a focused milestone-driven research and development campaign intended to advance each CTE to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 5. This will be accomplished by building and testing hardware at relevant power levels (~ 1 MW) and for relevant durations (2,500 hours, ~10% of the required operational lifetime) and conducting numerical modeling of the CTEs anchored by the accumulated test data to predict system performance and reliability. Concurrent with this work, high-level coupled system/mission modeling will be carried out to refine the key performance parameters that the various CTEs must achieve. Non-advocate reviews will be held at milestone points to assess progress and inform down-select decisions. The strategy for formulating the TMP was described previously*; this paper describes ongoing progress on the drafting and baselining of the plan, including key specific details. * “Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems”, K.A. Polzin, et. al., International Electric Propulsion Conference IEPC 2022, IEPC-2022-155

Nuclear Electric Propulsion↗
NASA NTRS1997

The 1997 JANNAF Propellant Development and Characterization Subcommittee and Safety and Environmental Protection Subcommittee Joint Meeting

In the Propellant Development and Characterization Subcommittee (PDCS) meeting, topics included: the analysis, characterization, and processing of propellants and propellant ingredients; chemical reactivity; liquid propellants; test methods; rheology; surveillance and aging; and process engineering. In the Safety and Environmental Protection Subcommittee (S&EPS) meeting, topics covered included: hydrazine propellant vapor detection methods; toxicity of propellants and propellants; explosives safety; atmospheric modeling and risk assessment of toxic releases; reclamation, disposal, and demilitarization methods; and remediation of explosives or propellant contaminated sites.

Cocchiaro, James E.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Robotic Mars Sample Return: Risk Assessment and Analysis Report

A comparison of the risk associated with two alternative scenarios for a robotic Mars sample return mission was conducted. Two alternative mission scenarios were identified, the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) reference Mission and a mission proposed by Johnson Space Center (JSC). The JPL mission was characterized by two landers and an orbiter, and a Mars orbit rendezvous to retrieve the samples. The JSC mission (Direct/SEP) involves a solar electric propulsion (SEP) return to earth followed by a rendezvous with the space shuttle in earth orbit. A qualitative risk assessment to identify and characterize the risks, and a risk analysis to quantify the risks were conducted on these missions. Technical descriptions of the competing scenarios were developed in conjunction with NASA engineers and the sequence of events for each candidate mission was developed. Risk distributions associated with individual and combinations of events were consolidated using event tree analysis in conjunction with Monte Carlo techniques to develop probabilities of mission success for each of the various alternatives. The results were the probability of success of various end states for each candidate scenario. These end states ranged from complete success through various levels of partial success to complete failure. Overall probability of success for the Direct/SEP mission was determined to be 66% for the return of at least one sample and 58% for the JPL mission for the return of at least one sample cache. Values were also determined for intermediate events and end states as well as for the probability of violation of planetary protection. Overall mission planetary protection event probabilities of occurrence were determined to be 0.002% and 1.3% for the Direct/SEP and JPL Reference missions respectively.

Lalk, Thomas R.↗
NASA NTRS2005

On Automating Failure Mode Analysis and Enforcing its Integrity

This paper reports our experience on the development of a design-for-safety (DFS) workbench called Risk Assessment and Management Environment (RAME) for microelectronic avionics systems. Our objective is to transform DFS practice from an ad-hoc, inefficient, error-prone approach to a stringent engineering process such that DFS can keep up with the rapidly growing complexity of avionics systems. In particular, RAME is built upon an information infrastructure that comprises a fault model, a knowledge base, and a failure reporting/tracking system. This infrastructure permits systematic learning from prior projects and enables the automation of failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). Among other unique features, the most important advantage of RAME is its capability of directly accepting design source code in hardware description languages (HDLs) for automated failure mode analysis, which enables RAME to be compatible and to evolve with most electronic-computer-aided-design systems. Through an initial experimental evaluation of the RAME prototype, we show that our approach to FMECA automation improves failure mode analysis turn-around-time, completeness, and accuracy.

design for safety↗
NASA NTRS2015

Combustion Stability Verification for the Thrust Chamber Assembly of J-2X Developmental Engines 10001, 10002, and 10003

The J-2X engine, a liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen propellant rocket engine available for future use on the upper stage of the Space Launch System vehicle, has completed testing of three developmental engines at NASA Stennis Space Center. Twenty-one tests of engine E10001 were conducted from June 2011 through September 2012, thirteen tests of the engine E10002 were conducted from February 2013 through September 2013, and twelve tests of engine E10003 were conducted from November 2013 to April 2014. Verification of combustion stability of the thrust chamber assembly was conducted by perturbing each of the three developmental engines. The primary mechanism for combustion stability verification was examining the response caused by an artificial perturbation (bomb) in the main combustion chamber, i.e., dynamic combustion stability rating. No dynamic instabilities were observed in the TCA, although a few conditions were not bombed. Additional requirements, included to guard against spontaneous instability or rough combustion, were also investigated. Under certain conditions, discrete responses were observed in the dynamic pressure data. The discrete responses were of low amplitude and posed minimal risk to safe engine operability. Rough combustion analyses showed that all three engines met requirements for broad-banded frequency oscillations. Start and shutdown transient chug oscillations were also examined to assess the overall stability characteristics, with no major issues observed.

Morgan, C. J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analyzing the Impact of Lunar Dust on Astronaut Health – an Update to the Risk Modeling

INTRODUCTION Lunar dust exposure is an unavoidable hazard during lunar surface operations. Given the large number of surface EVAs expected to be performed during Artemis missions, it is critical that the incidence and extent of symptoms resulting from contact with lunar dust be fully understood in order to accurately predict the resources needed to treat Artemis astronauts. The purpose of this study will be to gather the latest data regarding the risk of and severity of symptoms associated with lunar dust exposure and refine the estimates of the impact of lunar dust on astronaut health for PRA models, both those in operational use and those currently being developed. METHODS The latest data on the pathophysiologic effects of lunar dust on humans will be gathered by querying the peer-reviewed literature as well as NASA technical documents. This data will be supplemented with discussions with hardware designers regarding methods used to mitigate exposure to lunar dust during lunar surface operations. Taken together, this data will be used to refine both the estimates for exposure to lunar dust for astronauts inside and outside lunar habitats, as well as provide evidence to guide estimates for the percentage of astronauts who are exposed to lunar dust who will be symptomatic. RESULTS Querying the peer-reviewed literature and NASA technical documents will begin in October of 2024, with the goal of codifying this information by the end of October. In parallel, discussions will begin with hardware engineering teams, also in October. Using the evidence found will help refine the estimate for resources needed to treat astronauts who exhibit symptoms from lunar dust exposure. DISCUSSION Lunar dust exposure is expected to be a major risk for upcoming exploration missions that include a lunar surface interval. Until recently, most of the information to inform the risk associated with lunar dust exposure has come from anecdotal evidence from Apollo astronauts about their symptoms while on the lunar surface; however, this evidence is sparse. Newer studies are now coming out, looking at the impact of lunar dust on human physiology, including studies on effects to the immune system. Additionally, there are new engineering efforts to attempt to mitigate the exposure to lunar dust from the space suits of astronauts returning to the lunar habitat after surface operations. Thus, developing an updated risk assessment, based on our current understanding of human physiology and our current resources for risk mitigation, is prudent to best estimate overall human health and performance risk for future Artemis missions. This project will lead to an updated and more accurate assessment of the risk of lunar dust exposure for exploration missions and will therefore allow mission planners to more accurately predict resources needed for these exploration-class missions.

D M Nusbaum↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Large Vehicle Lunar Landing Surface Interaction and In-Situ Resource Based Risk Mitigation: Landing & Launch Pads

A key capability required for the exploration of planetary bodies is the ability to land on the surface. Previous work performed by NASA and other institutions has primarily focused on landing small spacecraft on planetary surfaces and the associated small-to-medium thrusters required for the soft landing. In the case of human exploration—particularly the establishment of long duration exploration and habitation outposts—the ability to land large landers, such as the SpaceX Starship, is necessary. These larger landing systems require the use of more powerful engines, with higher engine exhaust temperatures and higher landing loads. Understanding the excavation of material by the engines, as well as the potential for the landing legs to sink into the subsurface, is key in ensuring reliable and safe landings. A further improvement in landing reliability can be achieved by constructing landing / launch pads, especially with in-situ resources. Some material excavation by the plume is inevitable, leaving at least a portion of the surface scoured and uneven under the lander and ejecting regolith particles and rocks at very high velocities. One possible solution would be to robotically build landing / launch pads (ideally autonomously) at the destination using in-situ materials. In this case, the first one or few landers will need to land on unimproved surfaces at higher risk; however, they would bring the required equipment to build the landing pads with mostly local resources, thus increasing the reliability of safe landing for subsequent larger landers. A number of methods to build in-situ landing and launch pads have already been developed. These methods include no, or some, addition of required binder additives to the local regolith material, different processing approaches and result in varying landing pad strengths. A sub-scale rocket engine plume, was used to simulate some of the conditions of a landing on the Moon to assess the effectiveness of various materials for an in-situ built landing pad, The GO2/GCH4rocket engine fired on a 1m2area coupons of representative pad materials. The results will allow continued development towards materials that satisfy the landing pad properties required for the effective risk reduction and increased reliability for landing people and equipment on the lunar surface. This work contained two parts: (1) computer modeling of a large rocket engine plume interacting with regolith on the Moon, using the Granular Gas Flow Solver (GGFS) provided by CFD Research Corporation as well as other computational fluid dynamics codes (CFD) such as Loci/CHEM. (2) Developing landing/launch pad materials that could be used for in-situ construction on the lunar surface in the future, to mitigate the calculated effects of a large vehicle rocket engine landing and launching on the Moon.

Lunar↗
NASA NTRS2008

Review of NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program: An Interim Report

NASA requested that a committee under the auspices of the National Research Council's Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board carry out an assessment of NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP). Organizationally, this program functions under the direction of NASA's Exploration Systems Mission Directorate and is charged with developing new technologies that will enable NASA to conduct future human and robotic exploration missions, while reducing mission risk and cost. The Committee to Review NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program has been tasked to examine how well the program is aligned with the stated objectives of the President's Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), to identify gaps in the program, and to assess the quality of the research. The full statement of task is given in Appendix A. The committee consists of 25 members and includes a cross section of senior executives, engineers, researchers, and other aerospace professionals drawn from industry, universities, and government agencies with expertise in virtually all the technical fields represented within the program.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1990

Information and problem report usage in system saftey engineering division

Five basic problems or question areas are examined. They are as follows: (1) Evaluate adequacy of current problem/performance data base; (2) Evaluate methods of performing trend analysis; (3) Methods and sources of data for probabilistic risk assessment; and (4) How is risk assessment documentation upgraded and/or updated. The fifth problem was to provide recommendations for each of the above four areas.

Morrissey, Stephen J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Large Vehicle Lunar Landing Surface Interaction and In-Situ Resource Based Risk Mitigation: Landing & Launch Pads

A key capability required for the exploration of planetary bodies is the ability to land on the surface. Previous work performed by NASA and other institutions has primarily focused on landing small spacecraft on planetary surfaces and the associated small-to-medium thrusters required for the soft landing. In the case of human exploration—particularly the establishment of long duration exploration and habitation outposts—the ability to land large landers, such as the SpaceX Starship, is necessary. These larger landing systems require the use of more powerful engines, with higher engine exhaust temperatures and higher landing loads. Understanding the excavation of material by the engines, as well as the potential for the landing legs to sink into the subsurface, is key in ensuring reliable and safe landings. A further improvement in landing reliability can be achieved by constructing landing / launch pads, especially with in-situ resources. Some material excavation by the plume is inevitable, leaving at least a portion of the surface scoured and uneven under the lander and ejecting regolith particles and rocks at very high velocities. One possible solution would be to robotically build landing / launch pads (ideally autonomously) at the destination using in-situ materials. In this case, the first one or few landers will need to land on unimproved surfaces at higher risk; however, they would bring the required equipment to build the landing pads with mostly local resources, thus increasing the reliability of safe landing for subsequent larger landers. A number of methods to build in-situ landing and launch pads have already been developed. These methods include no or some addition of required binder additives to the local regolith material, different processing approaches and result in varying landing pad strengths. A sub-scale rocket engine plume, was used to simulate some of the conditions of a landing on the Moon to assess the effectiveness of various materials for an in-situ built landing pad, The GO2/GCH4 rocket engine fired on 1m2 area coupons of representative pad materials. The results will allow continued development towards materials that satisfy the landing pad properties required for the effective risk reduction and increased reliability for landing people and equipment on the lunar surface. This work contained two parts: (1) computer modeling of a large rocket engine plume interacting with regolith on the Moon, using the Granular Gas Flow Solver (GGFS) provided by CFD Research Corporation as well as other computational fluid dynamics codes (CFD) such as Loci/CHEM. (2) Developing landing/launch pad materials that could be used for in-situ construction on the lunar surface in the future, to mitigate the calculated effects of a large vehicle rocket engine landing and launching on the Moon. The resulting computed values of plume impingement surface temperature, stagnation pressure, gas velocity, shear stress and heat flux were then matched as closely as possible in the Earth’s atmosphere in a sub-scale rocket engine GO2/CH4 test which was provided by Masten Space Systems in Mojave, California. The rocket engine was mounted on a test stand with vertical translation capabilities so that the landing operations of a lander could be simulated (Figure 1).The pad materials test coupons were placed at the surface of a large bin containing simulated lunar basalt regolith and subjected to a test firing as shown in Figure 2. The results of this testing will be presented with related findings, analysis and discussion.

Plume Surface Interaction↗
NASA NTRS1996

Conversion-Integration of MSFC Nonlinear Signal Diagnostic Analysis Algorithms for Realtime Execution of MSFC's MPP Prototype System

NASA's advanced propulsion system Small Scale Magnetic Disturbances/Advanced Technology Development (SSME/ATD) has been undergoing extensive flight certification and developmental testing, which involves large numbers of health monitoring measurements. To enhance engine safety and reliability, detailed analysis and evaluation of the measurement signals are mandatory to assess its dynamic characteristics and operational condition. Efficient and reliable signal detection techniques will reduce the risk of catastrophic system failures and expedite the evaluation of both flight and ground test data, and thereby reduce launch turn-around time. During the development of SSME, ASRI participated in the research and development of several advanced non- linear signal diagnostic methods for health monitoring and failure prediction in turbomachinery components. However, due to the intensive computational requirement associated with such advanced analysis tasks, current SSME dynamic data analysis and diagnostic evaluation is performed off-line following flight or ground test with a typical diagnostic turnaround time of one to two days. The objective of MSFC's MPP Prototype System is to eliminate such 'diagnostic lag time' by achieving signal processing and analysis in real-time. Such an on-line diagnostic system can provide sufficient lead time to initiate corrective action and also to enable efficient scheduling of inspection, maintenance and repair activities. The major objective of this project was to convert and implement a number of advanced nonlinear diagnostic DSP algorithms in a format consistent with that required for integration into the Vanderbilt Multigraph Architecture (MGA) Model Based Programming environment. This effort will allow the real-time execution of these algorithms using the MSFC MPP Prototype System. ASRI has completed the software conversion and integration of a sequence of nonlinear signal analysis techniques specified in the SOW for real-time execution on MSFC's MPP Prototype. This report documents and summarizes the results of the contract tasks; provides the complete computer source code; including all FORTRAN/C Utilities; and all other utilities/supporting software libraries that are required for operation.

Jong, Jen-Yi↗