Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “GAMES”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 235 records · Page 13

Optimal CO 2 storage management considering safety constraints in multi-stakeholder multi-site GCS projects: A Markov game perspective

Geological carbon storage (GCS) projects could involve a diverse array of stakeholders or players from public, private, and regulatory sectors, each with different objectives and responsibilities. Given the complexity, scale, and long-term nature of GCS operations, determining whether individual stakeholders can independently optimize their interests — or whether collaborative coalition agreements are needed — remains a central question for effective GCS project planning and management. To access large, high-quality storage resources, future GCS deployment may increasingly occur in geologically connected sites, where shared geological features such as pressure space and reservoir pore capacity can lead to competitive behavior among stakeholders. In this work, we propose a paradigm based on Markov games to quantitatively investigate how different coalition structures affect the goals of stakeholders. We frame this multi-stakeholder multi-site problem as a multi-agent reinforcement learning problem with safety constraints. Our approach enables agents to learn optimal strategies while complying with safety regulations. We present an example where multiple operators are injecting CO 2 into their respective project areas in a geologically connected basin. To address the high computational cost of repeated simulations of high fidelity models, a previously developed surrogate model based on the Embed-to-Control (E2C) framework is employed. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in addressing optimal management of CO 2 storage when multiple stakeholders with different objectives and goals are involved.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Simulating policy interventions in the interfirm diffusion of low-carbon technologies: An agent-based evolutionary game model

Policy interventions are frequently used by authorities around the world to mitigate carbon emissions. However, economic systems are essentially complex adaptive systems, which often exhibit unexpected responses to exogenous interventions and leave intervenors in a dilemma, even if the interventions are elaborately designed. To explore the behaviors of the diffusion system regarding low-carbon technologies, this study builds an agent-based model (ABM) to simulate enterprises' reactions to multiple policy interventions aimed at spurring low-carbon technology diffusion. The simulated enterprises are in a complex network where they play evolutionary games with their neighbors, which enables the model to possess two critical features of economic systems: adaptiveness and equilibrium. The model reveals a dilemma of policy interventions: intuitively, carbon taxes, asymmetric penalties (only imposed on un-low-carbon enterprises) and subsidies can improve the diffusion, which is consistent with previous research; counter-intuitively, all these policies turn out to be inefficient or even harmful to low-carbon enterprises because of the diffusion system's high adaptiveness. Specifically, when carbon taxes and penalties increase, both the low-carbon and un-low-carbon enterprises end up with the equilibrium of equivalent but lower profits. In contrast, all the enterprises earn equivalent but more profits even though subsidies are only given to the low-carbon enterprises, which implies that the un-low-carbon enterprises (indirectly) grab a portion of the subsidies and accordingly weaken the incentive effect of subsidies. These system behaviors are summarized as "equalizing effect" because the system tends to equalize the impact of both positive and negative interventions among all enterprises even though the policy interventions are asymmetrically imposed on one type of the enterprises. The findings also indicate that policies implemented to enlarge green market sizes can help policymakers bypass the dilemma.

Agent-based modeling↗

A topological proof of chaos for two nonlinear heterogeneous triopoly game models

We rigorously prove the existence of chaotic dynamics for two nonlinear Cournot triopoly game models with heterogeneous players, for which in the existing literature the presence of complex phenomena and strange attractors has been shown via numerical simulations. In the first model that we analyze, costs are linear but the demand function is isoelastic, while, in the second model, the demand function is linear and production costs are quadratic. As concerns the decisional mechanisms adopted by the firms, in both models one firm adopts a myopic adjustment mechanism, considering the marginal profit of the last period; the second firm maximizes its own expected profit under the assumption that the competitors' production levels will not vary with respect to the previous period; the third firm acts adaptively, changing its output proportionally to the difference between its own output in the previous period and the naive expectation value. The topological method we employ in our analysis is the so-called “Stretching Along the Paths” technique, based on the Poincaré-Miranda Theorem and the properties of the cutting surfaces, which allows to prove the existence of a semi-conjugacy between the system under consideration and the Bernoulli shift, so that the former inherits from the latter several crucial chaotic features, among which a positive topological entropy.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Nash equilibrium in differential games and the construction of the programmed iteration method

This work is devoted to the study of nonzero-sum differential games. The set of payoffs in a situation of Nash equilibrium is examined. It is shown that the set of payoffs in a situation of Nash equilibrium coincides with the set of values of consistent functions which are fixed points of the program absorption operator. A condition for functions to be consistent is given in terms of the weak invariance of the graph of the functions under a certain differential inclusion. Bibliography: 18 titles.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Non-cooperative Game-based Approach to Distributed Beam Scheduling in Millimeter-Wave Networks

We consider the distributed beam scheduling problem in mm-Wave networks where the base stations may belong to different operators and there is no centralized coordination among them. Our goal is to design distributed beam scheduling algorithms such that the network utility, which is defined as a logarithm function of the average throughput of the user equipment, can be maximized. We propose a non-cooperative game-based scheduling approach where the base stations are modeled as players that greedily maximize their own utilities. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) then provides a distributed solution to the network utility maximization problem. By employing the Lyapunov optimization, the asymptotic optimality of the proposed scheduling can be guaranteed. We prove the existence and provide sufficient conditions which guarantee the uniqueness of the NE by establishing an equivalence to the Variational Inequality (VI) problem. We also propose a parallel power adaptation algorithm which is proved to converge to the NE. Numerical results show the superiority of the proposed scheduling over several distributed baseline schemes.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Defense of Cyber Infrastructures Against Cyber-Physical Attacks Using Game-Theoretic Models

The operation of cyber infrastructures relies on both cyber and physical components, which are subject to incidental and intentional degradations of different kinds. Within the context of network and computing infrastructures, we study the strategic interactions between an attacker and a defender using game-theoretic models that take into account both cyber and physical components. The attacker and defender optimize their individual utilities expressed as sums of cost and system terms. First, we consider a Boolean attack-defense model, wherein the cyber and physical sub-infrastructures may be attacked and reinforced as individual units. Second, we consider a component attack-defense model wherein their components may be attacked and defended, and the infrastructure requires minimum numbers of both to function. We show that the Nash equilibrium under uniform costs in both cases is computable in polynomial time, and it provides high-level deterministic conditions for the infrastructure survival. When probabilities of successful attack and defense, and of incidental failures are incorporated into the models, the results favor the attacker but otherwise remain qualitatively similar. This approach has been motivated and validated by our experiences with UltraScience Net infrastructure, which was built to support high-performance network experiments. In conclusion, the analytical results, however, are more general, and we apply them to simplified models of cloud and high-performance computing infrastructures.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

GPLADD: Quantifying Trust in Government and Commercial Systems A Game-Theoretic Approach

Trust in a microelectronics-based system can be characterized as the level of confidence that a system is free of subversive alterations made during system development, or that the development process of a system has not been manipulated by a malicious adversary. Trust in systems has become an increasing concern over the past decade. This report introduces a novel game-theoretic framework, called GPLADD (Graph-based Probabilistic Learning Attacker and Dynamic Defender), for analyzing and quantifying system trustworthiness at the end of the development process, through the analysis of risk of development-time system manipulation. GPLADD represents attacks and attacker-defender contests over time. Here, time is an explicit constraint and allows incorporating the informational asymmetries between the attacker and defender into analysis. GPLADD includes an explicit representation of attack steps via multi-step attack graphs, attacker and defender strategies, and player actions at different times. GPLADD allows quantifying the attack success probability over time and the attacker and defender costs based on their capabilities and strategies. This ability to quantify different attacks provides an input for evaluation of trust in the development process. We demonstrate GPLADD on an example attack and its variants. We develop a method for representing success probability for arbitrary attacks and derive an explicit analytic characterization of success probability for a specific attack. We present a numeric Monte Carlo study of a small set of attacks, quantify attack success probabilities, attacker and defender costs, and illustrate the options the defender has for limiting the attack success and improving trust in the development process.

37 attack↗

Game Theory Approaches for System-level Incentive Design

This report presents a generalized Stackelberg game framework for designing and evaluating financial incentives that enhance power system resilience through strategic deployment of distributed energy resources(DERs) under various contingencies. The proposed approach addresses the challenge of coordinating individual community investment decisions to meet system-wide resilience objectives. The framework is demonstrated in a three-community test system subjected to two transmission contingency scenarios: inter-community line failure (Case 1) and complete main grid disconnection (Case 2). In both cases, three incentive levels are compared: a Base case with no financial incentives, and low and high incentive cases. In Case 1, the Base case (no incentives) results in a total installed DER capacity of 217.2 MW, with no load shedding due to alternative routing, but community costs remain high. Increasing incentives raises DER deployment to 286.9 MW, lowers aggregate community costs by $22M annually, and completely avoids the need for costly new transmission line construction. In Case 2, the Base case results in 24.3 MWh of unserved load; introducing incentives eliminates all load shedding and ensures up to 89 MWh of battery storage is available for emergency reserve. These results demonstrate that targeted incentives can dramatically improve grid resilience and cost-effectiveness. The framework thus offers policymakers and system planners a robust tool to quantify and compare the effectiveness of incentive programs for multi-community transmission networks behavior, system resilience, and economic efficiency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber-Physical Correlations for Infrastructure Resilience: A Game-Theoretic Approach

In several critical infrastructures, the cyber and physical parts are correlated so that disruptions to one affect the other and hence the whole system. These correlations may be exploited to strategically launch components attacks, and hence must be accounted for ensuring the infrastructure resilience, specified by its survival probability. We characterize the cyber-physical interactions at two levels: (i) the failure correlation function specifies the conditional survival probability of cyber sub-infrastructure given the physical sub-infrastructure as a function of their marginal probabilities, and (ii) the individual survival probabilities of both sub-infrastructures are characterized by first-order differential conditions. We formulate a resilience problem for infrastructures composed of discrete components as a game between the provider and attacker, wherein their utility functions consist of an infrastructure survival probability term and a cost term expressed in terms of the number of components attacked and reinforced. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions and sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of infrastructure resilience on the cost term, correlation function and sub-infrastructure survival probabilities. These results generalize earlier ones based on linear failure correlation functions and independent component failures. We apply the results to models of cloud computing infrastructures and energy grids.

cyber-physical infrastructures↗

Markovian Search Games in Heterogeneous Spaces

We consider how to search for a mobile evader in a large heterogeneous region when sensors are used for detection. Sensors are modeled using probability of detection. Due to environmental effects, this probability will not be constant over the entire region. We map this problem to a graph search problem and, even though deterministic graph search is NP-complete, we derive a tractable, optimal, probabilistic search strategy. We do this by defining the problem as a differential game played on a Markov chain. We prove that this strategy is optimal in the sense of Nash. Simulations of an example problem illustrate our approach and verify our claims.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗