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At least 235 records · Page 13

Analysis to determine the maximum dimensions of flexible apertures in sensored security netting products.

Although technological advances provide new capabilities to increase the robustness of security systems, they also potentially introduce new vulnerabilities. New capability sometimes requires new performance requirements. This paper outlines an approach to establishing a key performance requirement for an emerging intrusion detection sensor: the sensored net. Throughout the security industry, the commonly adopted standard for maximum opening size through barriers is a requirement based on square inches typically 96 square inches. Unlike standard rigid opening, the dimensions of a flexible aperture are not fixed, but variable and conformable. It is demonstrably simple for a human intruder to move through a 96-square-inch opening that is conformable to the human body. The longstanding 96-square-inch requirement itself, though firmly embedded in policy and best practice, lacks a documented empirical basis. This analysis concluded that the traditional 96-square-inch standard for openings is insufficient for flexible openings that are conformable to the human body. Instead, a circumference standard is recommended for these newer types of sensored barriers. The recommended maximum circumference for a flexible opening should be no more than 26 inches, as measured on the inside of the netting material.

Murton, Mark↗

Development and Demonstration of a Security Core Component

In recent years, the convergence of a number of trends has resulted in Cyber Security becoming a much greater concern for electric utilities. A short list of these trends includes: · Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) have evolved from depending on proprietary hardware and operating software toward using standard off-the-shelf hardware and operating software. This has meant that these ICSs can no longer depend on “security through obscurity. · Similarly, these same systems have evolved toward using standard communications protocols, further reducing their ability to rely upon obscurity. · The rise of the Internet and the accompanying demand for more data about virtually everything has resulted in formerly isolated ICSs becoming at least partially accessible via Internet-connected networks. · “Cyber crime” has become commonplace, whether it be for industrial espionage, reconnaissance for a possible cyber attack, theft, or because some individual or group “has something to prove.” Electric utility system operators are experts at running the power grid. The reality is, especially at small and mid-sized utilities, these SCADA operators will by default be “on the front line” if and when a cyber attack occurs against their systems. These people are not computer software, networking, or cyber security experts, so they are ill-equipped to deal with a cyber security incident. Cyber Security Manager (CSM) was conceived, designed, and built so that it can be configured to know what a utility’s SCADA/EMS/DMS system looks like under normal conditions. To do this, CSM monitors log messages from any device that uses the syslog standard. It can also monitor a variety of statistics from the computers that make up the SCADA/EMS/DMS: outputs from host-based security tools, intrusion detection systems, SCADA alarms, and real-time SCADA values – even results from a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) system. When the system deviates from “normal,” CSM can alert the operator in language that they understand that an incident may be occurring, provide actionable intelligence, and informing them what actions to take. These alarms may be viewed on CSM’s built-in user interface, sent to a SCADA alarm list, or communicated via email, phone, pager, or SMS message. In recognition of the fact that “real world” training for cyber security events is impractical, CSM has a built-in Operator Training Simulator capability. This can be used stand alone to create simulated event scenarios for training purposes. It may also be used in conjunction with the recipient’s SCADA/EMS/DMS Operator Training Simulator. In addition to providing cyber security situational awareness for electric utility operators, CSM also provides tools for analysts and support personnel; in fact, the majority of user interface displays are designed for use in analyzing current and past security events. CSM keeps security-related information in long-term storage, as well as writing any decisions it makes to a (syslog) log for use forensic or other post-event analysis.

Turke, Andy↗

TA-V Sub-Area Plan: Overview & Summary

The TA-V Sub-Area Plan is currently under development. A major input into the plan will be the results of a strategic planning study to be conducted in FY 2016 that will investigate the long-term programmatic future for TA-V. Anticipated planning issues to be explored include: (1) Nature of future programs and facility needs; (2) Recapitalization needed to sustain key facilities and resources; (3) Validation of existing land use as a remote nuclear research and radiation testing site; (4) Physical security requirements including the need to sustain or reconfigure the existing Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS); (5) Environmental remediation and restoration strategy; and (6) Site design improvements needed to enhance the quality of the working environment.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Blockchain based Communication Architectures with Applications to Private Security Networks

Existing communication protocols in high consequence security networks are highly centralized. While this naively makes the controls easier to physically secure, external actors require fewer resources to disrupt the system because there are fewer points in the system can be destroyed or interrupted without the entire system failing. We present a solution to this problem using a proof-of-work-based blockchain implementation built on MultiChain. We construct a test-bed network containing two types of data input: visual imagers and microwave sensor information. These data types are ubiquitous in perimeter intrusion detection security systems and allow a realistic representation of a real-world network architecture. The cameras in this system use an object detection algorithm to nd important targets in the scene. The raw data from the camera and the outputs from the detection algorithm are then placed in a transaction on the distributed ledger. Similarly, microwave data is used to detect relevant events and are placed in a transaction. These transactions are then bundled into blocks and broadcast to the rest of the network using the Bitcoin-based MultiChain protocol. We develop five tests to examine the security metrics of our network. We performed the five security metric test using different sized networks from 7 to 39 nodes to determine how the metrics scale with respect to size. We nd that when compared to a centralized architecture our implementation provides a resiliency increase that is expected from a blockchain-based protocol without slowing the system so much that a human operator would notice. Furthermore, our approach is able to detect tampering in real time. Based on these results, we theorize that security networks in general could use a blockchain-based approach in a meaningful way.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

MS-SPEAK: Final Report and Implementation Roadmap

This report describes the scope and results of a project undertaken to help consumer-owned electric utilities improve the cybersecurity of their system interfaces. The team developed a cybersecurity reference architecture for the MultiSpeak interoperability standard, which is used by many of these consumer-owned utilities and their supporting vendors. The analysis and use cases focused on the Remote Connect/Disconnect (RCD) interface, and its vulnerabilities. An open-source toolkit has also been developed to facilitate customized intrusion detection systems (IDS) for MultiSpeak applications. This report includes a roadmap for others to use and customize this IDS toolkit for additional MultiSpeak versions and interfaces.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Stucco System

Security event data, such as intrusion detection system alerts, provide a starting point for analysis, but are information impoverished. To provide context, analysts must manually gather and synthesize relevant data from myriad sources within their enterprise and external to it. Analysts search system logs, network flows, and firewall data; they search IP blacklists and reputation lists, software vulnerability information, malware and threat data, OS and application vendor blogs, and news sites. All of these sources are manually searched for data relevant to the event being investigated. Relevant results must then be brought together and synthesized to put the event in context and make decisions about its importance and impact.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Acoustic Steady-State Excitation Spatial Spectroscopy (ASSESS)

Safely launching and landing spacecraft, especially reusable spacecraft, requires detailed inspections of the launch vehicle to identify potential manufacturing and service-induced flaws. As an automated full-structure ultrasonic scanning technology, Acoustic Steady-State Excitation Spatial Spectroscopy (ASSESS) can rapidly and non-intrusively detect a wide variety of defects in applications where identifying subtle flaws is paramount. ASSESS is a non-destructive evaluation technology that leverages continuous excitation and laser Doppler vibrometry to make fast, high-quality inspections at stand-off distances. The ASSESS technology has undergone extensive laboratory testing and several field tests specific to oil and gas and additive manufacturing applications. We seek a commercialization partner to fund aerospace application-specific R&D and product development through a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Statement of Work. Y-12 National Security Complex Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program Project - Combination Inspector

The Y-12 SIRP Quadrant 1, Quadrant 2, and Vehicle Barrier project involves the following summary elements. The perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system (PIDAS) is an existing system at the Y-12 National Security Complex, which is a government-owned facility located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and managed by Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) for the Department of Energy (DOE). National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS) is the engineering design agent and construction manager (CM) for the Y-12 SIRP effort. The Quadrants 1 and 2 portion of the project involves the replacement of the PIDAS, and the vehicle barrier portion of the project involves the installation of a continuous passive vehicle barrier alongside the inner PIDAS fence.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Networked Microgrid Cybersecurity Architecture Design Guide: A New Jersey TRANSITGRID Use Case

Microgrids require reliable communication systems for equipment control, power delivery optimization, and operational visibility. To maintain secure communications, Microgrid Operational Technology (OT) networks must be defensible and cyber-resilient. The communication network must be carefully architected with appropriate cyber-hardening technologies to provide security defenders the data, analytics, and response capabilities to quickly mitigate malicious and accidental cyberattacks. In this work, we outline several best practices and technologies that can support microgrid operations (e.g., intrusion detection and monitoring systems, response tools, etc.). Then we apply these recommendations to the New Jersey TRANSITGRID use case to demonstrate how they would be deployed in practice.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Draft Summary Report on Irradiated Fuel Handling and Management for LOTUS

The National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC) has conceptualized the design of the Laboratory for Operation and Testing in the United States (LOTUS) test bed to provide the United States Department of Energy (DOE) with the infrastructure necessary to make advanced reactor designs available for commercial developers. LOTUS will provide a test bed to developers with the capabilities of supporting a wide range of experiment design possibilities. Upon completion of the developers’ operations and experiments within the test bed, the irradiated fuel, reactor components, and other experiment materials must be removed. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) possesses significant capabilities for radioactive material handling such as casks, carts, and forklifts. However, given the unique environment presented by the NRIC-LOTUS test bed, located inside the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS) area at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) and the complexity of novel removal activities of recently operated reactor experiments through the new proposed access tunnel. The efficacy was not apparent for existing equipment to provide all the needed capability. To bridge the potential gaps in cask designs, storage, and transportation, NRIC requested the development of trade studies for the transfer, handling, and storage requirements of irradiated fuel salts and other radioactive materials. NRIC directed Boston Government Services, LLC (BGS) to perform the trade studies and develop a report analyzing alternatives. In addition to the BGS reports, the Idaho National Lab’s (INL), provided by the first potential user’s Advanced Reactor Development (ARD) team, prepared a feasibility study for the storage of specific irradiated fuel within the existing ZPPR vault.This summary report is intended to present the trade studies, options, and alternatives that were investigated. The maturity level of LOTUS, the reactor, fuel salt containers, gloveboxes, and reactor testing campaign and concept of operations were not at a level sufficient to base critical decisions on. This report is not intended to present a final recommendation. The final recommendations for fuel storage location, transport, handling equipment, and operations will be made in FY 2024 and will be based on known materials, test campaign requirements, funding, and final analysis of the fuel and equipment to be used.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Increased Interpretability for Model-Driven Deception: MARS LDRD Project

Machine learning has been proposed as a solution to several cybersecurity solutions and one of the most promising applications is for digital twins for intrusion detection and driving deceptive defense. However, machine learning techniques often result in a black-box function that is difficult for end users to interpret which for deception limits their ability to effectively define decoys. In this report, an approach to validate the equations learned are accurate is provided and demonstrated. Following, begins the process of addressing this issue for a model-driven deception technology that produces equations representing the physical process controlled by operation technology devices. This research was performed by applying subject matter expert context to machine learned models.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Enabling Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Resilience in Distribution Grids with High Penetration of Photovoltaics (CARE-PV) (Final Report)

Since legacy distribution systems have very limited visibility beyond the substation, high penetration of PV at the grid edge presents some unique operational challenges. One approach to address these challenges is to use information from advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and µPMUs. However, exploiting this information is impacted by a number of factors, including multi-timescale measurements, volume of data generated, communication network impairments (e.g., information loss and latency) and susceptibility to cyber-attacks. Therefore, one of the critical tasks involved in the management of a distribution grid is to develop complete situational awareness by integrating cyber-security mechanisms with state estimation strategies and leveraging this situational awareness to assure energy services at strategic locations while exploiting AMI/PV inverter/ µPMU data. This CARE-PV project addresses the fundamental challenges in situational awareness and resilience to cyber and physical vectors by exploiting the synergy between innovative modeling, estimation, data analytics, testing and validation using smart PV inverters designed at K-State and facilities at NREL. Specifically, the project involved the development, testing and validation of the following novel enabling technologies: (Thrust 1) Resilience to cyber vectors that impact data integrity was addressed via a two-level defense strategy that combines cyber intrusion detection using self-learning, cooperative smart PV inverters, and a novel moving target defense framework to combat data integrity attacks. (Thrust 2) Resilience to cyber-physical vectors that impact situational awareness by limiting data availability was addressed via novel centralized and decentralized, sparsity-based static and dynamic state estimation approaches that enhance observability even when the underlying system is unobservable. (Thrust 3) Leveraging a unique probabilistic sensitivity analysis approach accompanied by one-of-a-kind dominant influencer set computation, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure at strategic locations was evaluated so that proactive PV-based control strategies can be used to support operations under normal/outage scenarios. These CARE-PV project innovations were demonstrated on both small-scale IEEE and larger utility-scale testbeds (Thrust 4). Feedback from Industry Advisory Board members was used to formulate a commercialization pathway for a subset of CARE-PV technologies. These CARE-PV technologies will ultimately lead to reliable and secure, large-scale integration of renewable energy and mitigate the risk of energy disruption resulting from cyber incidents and other emerging threats within the energy environment.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Multilevel Cybersecurity for Photovoltaic Systems

The motivation behind this project is to protect critical infrastructure in electric power generation pertaining to solar photovoltaic (PV) systems. This growing renewable energy resource is becoming a more vital part of the nation’s energy portfolio, particularly since it has achieved grid-parity to existing generation methods in terms of cost. It is thus vital that steps be taken to ensure the cybersecurity of these assets. The project goal was to devise a multilevel cybersecurity solution to address PV security gaps at the inverter and system levels, and field test the solution under the supervision and review of a US-based solar inverter manufacturer and PV installer/operator. A two-level cyberattack defense approach was formulated whereby the first level, the solar inverter level, hardens individual devices and achieves a deeply cyber-secure inverter. The inverter level security involves a multi-layer defense-in-depth approach for securing the inverter while also providing data for the system level algorithms. The second level, the system level, addresses intrusion detection and restoration involving an ensemble of inverters and relevant systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

PLC Vulnerabilities and Mitigations

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are used extensively in many high-importance industrial and nonindustrial settings including controlling elevators, manufacturing machines, and utility facilities such as power and natural gas, however cybersecurity protection for them has been neglected. Within recent years, PLCs have been put under more security scrutiny and experts have advocated for changes from the addition of protocol encryption and network segmentation to intrusion detection systems on the PLCs themselves. While PLC security is critical, a large portion of the PLCs available today will never receive these changes due to being legacy or the difficulty of overhauling the security on existing systems. Due to the infeasibility of applying many recommended security measures towards currently available machines, we aim to provide realistic and affordable best practices for hardening PLCs. We will first conduct security analysis and consider attack vectors within our target PLC. Once we’ve analyzed the device’s security, we will evaluate a variety of mitigation methods and create guidelines to effectively reduce the threat posed by PLC attacks with minimal disruption to operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

An Advanced Cyber-Physical System Security Testbed for Substation Automation

A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) testbed serves as a powerful platform for testing and validating cyber intrusion detection and mitigation strategies in substations. This study presents the design and development of a CPS testbed that can effectively assess the real-time dynamics of a substation. Cyber attacks exploiting IEC 61850-based SV and GOOSE protocols are demonstrated using the testbed, along with an analysis on attack detection. Realistic timing measurements are obtained, and the time frames for deploying detection and mitigation strategies are evaluated.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Information Security and Integrity Systems

Viewgraphs from the Information Security and Integrity Systems seminar held at the University of Houston-Clear Lake on May 15-16, 1990 are presented. A tutorial on computer security is presented. The goals of this tutorial are the following: to review security requirements imposed by government and by common sense; to examine risk analysis methods to help keep sight of forest while in trees; to discuss the current hot topic of viruses (which will stay hot); to examine network security, now and in the next year to 30 years; to give a brief overview of encryption; to review protection methods in operating systems; to review database security problems; to review the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (Orange Book); to comment on formal verification methods; to consider new approaches (like intrusion detection and biometrics); to review the old, low tech, and still good solutions; and to give pointers to the literature and to where to get help. Other topics covered include security in software applications and development; risk management; trust: formal methods and associated techniques; secure distributed operating system and verification; trusted Ada; a conceptual model for supporting a B3+ dynamic multilevel security and integrity in the Ada runtime environment; and information intelligence sciences.

Source record↗

The impact of the eruptions of Mount Pinatubo and Cerro Hudson on antarctic aerosol levels during the 1991 austral spring

At the beginning of the 1991 Austral spring, volcanic aerosols from Mt. Pinatubo and Cerro Hudson were present in the polar stratosphere of the Southern Hemisphere. Satellite observations of aerosol extinction were used to identify and track the movement of these aerosols in the vicinity of the Antarctic vortex during August through November 1991. A layer of mature Mt. Pinatubo aerosols was identified near 21 km and a layer of fresh Cerro Hudson aerosols was identified near 12 km. This altitude separation of the Mt. Pinatubo and Cerro Hudson aerosols was observed throughout the period. Below 15 km, the polar stratosphere was subject to episodes of strong wave activity which transported the Cerro Hudson aerosols poleward and, after the middle of September, they became a persistent feature beneath the vortex. Above 15 km, signatures of Mt. Pinatubo aerosols were observed near the vortex boundary, but significant portions of the vortex interior remained free of any detectable intrusions of Mt. Pinatubo aerosols until the final warming in mid-November.

Pitts, M. C.↗