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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Options for Offloading a 90-Ton Common Habitat from its Lander on the Surface of Mars

The Common Habitat is a large, long-duration habitat being explored as part of a conceptual study (not an active NASA program) that uses an SLS core stage liquid oxygen (LOX) tank as its primary structure. Measuring 8.4 meters in diameter and 15.6 meters in length, it is manufactured as a habitat and launched as such into space. It is intended for use on the Moon as part of a permanently occupied outpost, on Mars as part of an outpost that will be occupied for hundreds of days at a time, and in deep space as part of the Deep Space Exploration Vehicle where it will support crewed missions up to 1200 days in duration. A study of internal orientation and crew size resulted in a Common Habitat configuration sized for a crew of eight with a three-deck horizontal orientation. There are obvious challenges associated with the delivery of such a large habitat, which may mass as much as 90-tons when initially deployed. The Mars destination in particular imposes extreme challenges due to Martian gravity. This paper identifies initial options for the offloading of a 90-ton Common Habitat from a lander spacecraft on the surface of Mars. On Mars, the Common Habitat is part of a surface outpost where a Habitation Zone includes the Common Habitat docked to a two-chamber airlock node, up to two logistics modules, and up to two pressurized rovers. It is connected by underground conduit to a radiator farm and communications tower assembly. These elements and other surface infrastructure, including robotic systems for surface preparation, are landed prior to the Common Habitat. In the baseline Common Habitat Architecture, the Common Habitat is delivered on the third heavy cargo flight. The Habitation Zone configuration dictates that the Common Habitat needs to be offloaded from the lander. All of the docked elements require direct access to the surface and the Common Habitat must actually be placed in a trench to lower its docking ports to be level with those of the mated elements. Additionally, the habitat must be emplaced in a horizontal configuration, while for any conceivable Earth launch system it must be launched in a vertical configuration. It is true that the Common Habitat must be offloaded from its lander on both the Moon and Mars and a common offloading system must therefore work in both destinations. Mars, however, is considered the driving case for offloading in most, but not all, aspects. A four-day internal study in 2021 recommended that a modified Starship be used to land the Common Habitat on Mars and considered multiple approaches to offload the Common Habitat from the payload section and lower it to the surface. The topic was presented at a public hackathon organized by the Johnson Space Center’s Emerge Employee Resource Group. One team took on the challenge and proposed a concept in some ways similar to the previously considered jib crane. Despite the excellent innovation in the team’s work, a number of study refinements are necessary to truly establish feasibility. These and other future work needed to mature the concept are discussed in this work.

Lander Offloading↗

NASA NTRS1988

Mars Exploration: Mission and System Analysis of the Split Sprint Mission

The information presented in this report provides detailed mission and system analysis of the Split Sprint Mission to Mars. These data were generated from September 1987 through July 1988 and involved numerous individuals within Program Development. This mission derives its name from the fact that the total mission payload is split between two vehicles, a cargo vehicle, and a piloted vehicle. The cargo vehicle carries the Mars lander and propellant for the piloted vehicle return to Earth. Then approximately 1 1/2 years later, the piloted vehicle carries the crew on a higher energy "sprint” trajectory to Mars. The advantages of the Split Sprint Mission is that the payload for the piloted vehicle is minimized and the crew would be in space for only 14 months. Mission and system data are presented for a Sprint Mission in the year 2004. Many important aspects of the mission were studied in detail. These include orbital lighting and lifetime analysis, Mars parking orbit selection, Earth departure window analysis, lander descent and ascent performance, vehicle aerobraking requirements, mission orbital maneuvers, and many other analyses listed in the Table of Contents. Emphasis was placed on vehicle performance analysis which ranged from recovery of the Earth departure stages to aerocapture of the Earth Return Capsule. There is also a section describing the computer programs that were used for this study. These programs provide many useful tools for future studies of manned planetary missions. This introductory section will give an overall view of the Split Sprint Mission and describe the orbital operations and vehicles that were studied.

Mars Architecture Team↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA's Space Launch System Progress Report

Exploration beyond Earth will be an enduring legacy for future generations, confirming America's commitment to explore, learn, and progress. NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) Program, managed at the Marshall Space Flight Center, is responsible for designing and developing the first exploration-class rocket since the Apollo Program's Saturn V that sent Americans to the Moon. The SLS offers a flexible design that may be configured for the MultiPurpose Crew Vehicle and associated equipment, or may be outfitted with a payload fairing that will accommodate flagship science instruments and a variety of high-priority experiments. Both options support a national capability that will pay dividends for future generations. Building on legacy systems, facilities, and expertise, the SLS will have an initial lift capability of 70 metric tons (mT) and will be evolvable to 130 mT. While commercial launch vehicle providers service the International Space Station market, this capability will surpass all vehicles, past and present, providing the means to do entirely new missions, such as human exploration of asteroids and Mars. With its superior lift capability, the SLS can expand the interplanetary highway to many possible destinations, conducting revolutionary missions that will change the way we view ourselves, our planet and its place in the cosmos. To perform missions such as these, the SLS will be the largest launch vehicle ever built. It is being designed for safety and affordability - to sustain our journey into the space age. Current plans include launching the first flight, without crew, later this decade, with crewed flights beginning early next decade. Development work now in progress is based on heritage space systems and working knowledge, allowing for a relatively quick start and for maturing the SLS rocket as future technologies become available. Together, NASA and the U.S. aerospace industry are partnering to develop this one-of-a-kind asset. Many of NASA's space centers across the country will provide their unique expertise to the Space Launch System endeavor. Unique infrastructure to be used includes the Michoud Assembly Facility for tank manufacturing, Stennis Space Center for engine testing, and Kennedy Space Center for processing and launch. As this panel will discuss, the SLS team is dedicated to doing things differently-from applying lean oversight/insight models to smartly using legacy hardware and existing facilities. Building on the foundation laid by over 50 years of human and scientific space flight--and on the lessons learned from the Apollo, Space Shuttle, and Constellation Programs-the SLS team has delivered both technical trade studies and business case analyses to ensure that the SLS architecture will be safe, affordable, reliable, and sustainable.

Singer, Joan A.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Data Production on Past and Future NASA Missions

Data return is a metric that is commonly publicized for all space science missions. In the early days of the Space Program, this figure was small, and could be described in bits or maybe even megabits. But now, missions are capable of returning data volumes two or three orders of magnitude larger. For example, Voyager 1 and 2 combined produced a little over 5 Terabits of data in 39 years of operation. In contrast, the Cassini mission, launched two decades after Voyager, produced about one and a half times those data volumes in half the time. NISAR, an Earth Science Mission currently in implementation, plans to produce over 28 Petabits of raw data in just 3 years. This means that NISAR will produce about as many data in 30 days as the combined data production of nearly all planetary missions to date. These increases in capability are a result of technology enhancements in two main areas: telecommunications architecture (both space and ground segments) and data storage technology. This paper describes the progression of these two technologies over the course of more than three decades of space missions and provides additional insight into the design of the end-to-end NISAR Data System Architecture. Trends in the data are briefly explored and compared to Moore’s Law which provides only a qualitative model for memory growth but not for data production. In summary, early missions are found to be driven by unrefined processes while later missions, having utilized earlier lessons learned, focus more on improvements to flight and ground capabilities. Data return seems to fall into three categories. First, deep space missions are driven by the large distances that limit data return to the Earth. Next, the orbiter infrastructure around Mars helps these missions generate more data than other deep space spacecraft. Finally, near-Earth missions have the greatest capabilities for the studied metrics due to their close proximity to Earth and the ground network availability.

Xaypraseuth, Peter↗

NASA NTRS2008

Summary of Propulsion System Needs in Support of Project Constellation

In January 2004, the President of the United States established the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) to return man to the moon and ultimately to extend manned space travel to Mars. This paper will summarize the manned space flight liquid propulsion system needs in support of Project Constellation over the next 10 years. It will include all engine needs to return man to the moon. An overview of engines currently under contract, those baselined but not yet under contract, and those engine needs that hav.e yet to be initiated. Project Constellation includes the components as shown Figure 1. Liquid propulsion systems supporting the manned portion of these elements include the following: the Crew Exploration Vehicle named Orion (crew module reaction control system (CMRCS), service module Orion Main Engine (OME), service module auxiliary RCS, and service module reaction control system (SMRCS)), the Crew Launch Vehicle named Ares 1 (J2X upper stage, first stage roll control system, second stage reaction control system, and the Ares I-X roll control system), the Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle named Ares V (RS68B first stage booster, J-2X upper stage, roll control systems, and the Earth Departure Stage (EDS) (powered by the same Ares V Upper Stage J-2X), and the Lunar Lander named Altair with both descent and ascent stages (lunar orbit insertion and descent main engine, ascent main engine, and attitude control systems for both stages). In addition, there may be additional engine needs for early demonstrators, but those will not be speculated on as part of this paper. Also, other portions of the VSE architecture, including the planned Orion abort demonstrations and the Lunar Precursor Robotic Program, are not addressed here as they either use solid motors or are focused on unmanned precursor missions.

Sumrall, Phil↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems

In late fiscal year 2020, the Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) project began the process of formulating an investment strategy to support development of the technologies required for a high-power (megawatt-class) nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) system capable of performing human-scale missions. This activity was initiated concurrent with several high-level studies and assessments were either under way or had just concluded. Studies of human-scale Mars missions have been performed several times over the past two decades. One of the most recent studies examined opposition-class human Mars missions to occur in the late 2030s timeframe [1,2]. The mission architecture assumed a hybrid NEP/chem-propelled vehicle that used a high specific impulse (Isp) NEP-system and a liquid oxygen (LOx)-liquid methane high thrust chemical stage (two 110 kN (25 klbf) thrust, 365 s Isp engines) for maneuvers performed to enter and exit gravity wells. Trajectory analyses performed in this study showed that such a mission could be performed with 2-4 MWe directed into the electric propulsion system (operating for 20,000+ hours), with the large range representing different opposition-class Mars mission opportunities and permutations on the trajectory design, concept of operations, and technology choices. In 2020, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) performed a study to evaluate the maturity of the different technologies required for nuclear propulsion systems [3]. The executive summary of this report provided the following top-level conclusions: • “The majority of critical technologies for… NEP/Chem… systems are relatively immature” • “TRLs [technology readiness levels] in the literature are often overestimated” • “The majority of critical technologies… for NEP/Chem… systems are at a relatively high level of advancement degree of difficulty (AD2 > 4) for maturation, requiring a dual development approach” • “The proper assessment of baseline TRL and AD2 values and the estimation of requirements and resources required for advancement have been consistent issues for NEP,” • “Non-advocate reviews should occur at the start of a technology program and at all key milestones.” In 2021, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) issued a separate report [4] identifying the “primary technical and programmatic challenges, merits, and risks for maturing space nuclear propulsion technologies of interest to a future human Mars exploration mission.” That work contained several important findings, including: • “Developing a MWe-class NEP system for the baseline mission would require increasing power by orders of magnitude relative to NEP system flight- or ground-based technology demonstrations completed to date.” • “Subscale in-space flight testing of NEP systems cannot address many of the risks and potential failure modes associated with the baseline mission NEP system. With sufficient M&S [modeling & simulation] and ground testing, including modular subsystem tests at full scale and power, flight qualification requirements can be met by the cargo missions that will precede the first crewed mission to Mars. Fully integrated ground testing may not be required.” • “As a result of low and intermittent investment over the past several decades, it is unclear if even an aggressive program would be able to develop an NEP system capable of executing the baseline mission in 2039.” These efforts motivated the SNP project to investigate the technologies available for a megawatt-class high power nuclear electric propulsion system. That system is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 and is comprised of five separate top-level critical technology elements (CTEs). 1. Nuclear Reactor – Thermal power source for the system, utilizing high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the nuclear fuel. Reactor radiation shielding is also included in this CTE. 2. Power Conversion – Operates as a thermodynamic cycle, accepting nuclear reactor thermal power as an input and converting it to mechanical power. 3. Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) – Accepts as an input mechanical power from the power conversion system, which is used to generate electrical power. The PMAD system also distributes the generated electrical power to all other parts of the spacecraft, including the high-power EP system. The PMAD system may also perform duties such as isolation, fault detection, and power transformation/rectification for different spacecraft systems, including the thrusters. 4. Electric Propulsion (EP) – Accepts as an input electrical power, which is used to accelerate a propellant to high speeds to produce thrust. This system includes the power processing unit (PPU), which converts the power it receives to the correct current and voltage required by the thrusters, and the propellant storage and feed systems, which contain and meter the flow of propellant to the thrusters. 5. Thermal Management (Radiators/Heat Rejection) – The cold side of the thermodynamic power conversion cycle, accepts thermal power from the power conversion system and radiatively rejects that heat to space. In this paper, we describe the SNP project formulation and investment strategy that aims to accomplish the research and development required to advance the technology readiness for each CTE. The strategy relies heavily upon experimental testing supported by modeling and simulation to yield realistic assessments of the technologies, which in turn will be used to inform future NEP system-level design decisions and any potential technology downselects.

Kurt A Polzin↗

NASA NTRS2017

CisLunar Habitat Internal Architecture Design Criteria

BACKGROUND: In preparation for human exploration to Mars, there is a need to define the development and test program that will validate deep space operations and systems. In that context, a Proving Grounds CisLunar habitat spacecraft is being defined as the next step towards this goal. This spacecraft will operate differently from the ISS or other spacecraft in human history. The performance envelope of this spacecraft (mass, volume, power, specifications, etc.) is being defined by the Future Capabilities Study Team. This team has recognized the need for a human-centered approach for the internal architecture of this spacecraft and has commissioned a CisLunar Phase-1 Habitat Internal Architecture Study Team to develop a NASA reference configuration, providing the Agency with a "smart buyer" approach for future acquisition. THE CISLUNAR HABITAT INTERNAL ARCHITECTURE STUDY: Overall, the CisLunar Habitat Internal Architecture study will address the most significant questions and risks in the current CisLunar architecture, habitation, and operations concept development. This effort is achieved through definition of design criteria, evaluation criteria and process, design of the CisLunar Habitat Phase-1 internal architecture, and the development and fabrication of internal architecture concepts combined with rigorous and methodical Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) evaluations and testing of the conceptual innovations in a controlled test environment. The vision of the CisLunar Habitat Internal Architecture Study is to design, build, and test a CisLunar Phase-1 Habitat Internal Architecture that will be used for habitation (e.g. habitability and human factors) evaluations. The evaluations will mature CisLunar habitat evaluation tools, guidelines, and standards, and will interface with other projects such as the Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Program integrated Power, Avionics, Software (iPAS), and Logistics for integrated human-in-the-loop testing. The mission of the CisLunar Habitat Internal Architecture Study is to become a forcing function to establish a common understanding of CisLunar Phase-1 Habitation Internal Architecture design criteria, processes, and tools. The scope of the CisLunar Habitat Internal Architecture study is to design, develop, demonstrate, and evaluate a Phase-1 CisLunar Habitat common module internal architecture based on design criteria agreed to by NASA, the International Partners, and Commercial Exploration teams. This task is to define the CisLunar Phase-1 Internal Architecture Government Reference Design, assist NASA in becoming a "smart buyer" for Phase-1 Habitat Concepts, and ultimately to derive standards and requirements from the Internal Architecture Design Process. The first step was to define a Habitat Internal Architecture Design Criteria and create a structured philosophy to be used by design teams as a filter by which critical aspects of consideration would be identified for the purpose of organizing and utilizing interior spaces. With design criteria in place, the team will develop a series of iterative internal architecture concept designs which will be assessed by means of an evaluation criteria and process. These assessments will successively drive and refine the design, leading to the combination and down-selection of design concepts. A single refined reference design configuration will be developed into in a medium-to-high fidelity mockup. A multi-day human-in-the-loop mission test will fully evaluate the reference design and validate its configuration. Lessons learned from the design and evaluation will enable the team to identify appropriate standards for Phase-1 CisLunar Habitat Internal Architecture and will enable NASA to develop derived requirements in support of maturing CisLunar Habitation capabilities. This paper will describe the criteria definition process, workshop event, and resulting CisLunar Phase-1 Habitat Internal Architecture Design Criteria.

Jones, R.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Program Options to Explore Ocean Worlds

Including Earth, roughly a dozen water ocean worlds exist in the solar system: the relict worlds Ceres and Mars, vast oceans inside most of the large Jovian and Saturnian icy moons, and Kuiper Belt Objects like Triton, Charon, and Pluto whose geologies are dominated by water and ammonia. Key pieces of the ocean-world science puzzle – which when completed may reveal whether life is widespread in the cosmos, why it exists where it does, and how it originates – are distributed among them. The eventual exploration of all these worlds will yield humanity’s total tangible knowledge about life in the universe, essentially forever. Thus, their exploration has existential significance for humanity’s self-regard, and indeed perhaps of our place in the natural scheme. The matter of planning how to pursue such a difficult and unprecedented exploration opportunity is therefore historic. The technical challenges are formidable, far harder than at Mars: missions to the Jovian and Saturnian ocean worlds are severely power-limited; trip times can be as much as a half decade and decade, respectively. And the science targets are global-scale oceans beneath kilometers of cryogenic ice. Reaching and exploring them would be a multi-generational undertaking, so again it is essential to plan and prepare. Today, we lack the instrumentation, subsystems, and remote operational-intelligence technologies needed to build and use exploration avatars as good as what we can envision needing. Each ocean world holds a piece of the puzzle, but the three priority targets are Europa at Jupiter, and Enceladus and Titan at Saturn. As with the systematic exploration of Mars, exploring these diverse worlds poses a complex technical and programmatic challenge – a strategic challenge – that needs to be designed and managed if each generation is to see its work bear fruit, and if the space science community is to make most effective use of the public money devoted to the quest. Strategic programs benefit from coherence. In only 15 years, the Mars Exploration Program (MEP) has transformed humanity’s view of Mars as a once and future habitable place, a world quite possibly holding relict evidence of life. Finding such evidence, we would study it to know if that life shared an origin common with Earth life. However, life in the ocean worlds could not have shared our origin, so exploring them opens another level in our quest to understand life in the universe: not only to places with vast salt-water seas known to contain organics and hydrothermal seafloors active today, but to places where anything alive cannot be related to us. MEP’s success – from its presence in the public consciousness to its rewriting of planetary habitability – make it an obvious template and source of lessons learned for a viable ocean worlds exploration program (OWEP). Six attributes of the MEP are analyzed for application to a potential OWEP. From this, five hypothetical programmatic scenarios are compared to the default case, and conclusions drawn. A coherent OWEP should have several parts: first, dedicated continuous investment in enabling technologies; and second, two directed-purpose, medium-class (~$1B) missions per decade that conduct pivotal investigations on a documented roadmap. Science could start in 2035, informing development of decadal flagship missions after Europa Clipper, to the places revealed to hold the most promise. The fastest pace of scientific discoveries would require access to high-performance propulsion infrastructure, e.g., the Space Launch System, Falcon Heavy, and high-power in-space solar electric propulsion, all capable of halving trip time. Not including these boosts, such a program would cost about a half-billion dollars more per year than NASA’s existing mission portfolio; the program architecture funded today cannot deliver a strategic OWEP while also sustaining balance among other solar system exploration priorities and opportunities.

Naderi, F.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Earth-Independent Medical Operations (EIMO) Concept of Operations

In contrast to the current crew health paradigm for low-Earth orbit and Lunar missions, which depends on real-time communication with Mission Control, deep-space exploration missions will require a significant shift in medical operations. This shift is driven by the constraints of operating at a considerable distance from Earth, such as resource limitations—lack of resupply, restricted mass, power, volume, and data—as well as communication delays and the inability to evacuate back to Earth during emergencies. To move toward a more self-reliant medical model, a strategy is needed to gradually increase space-based crew autonomy and reduce risks to mission success in the challenging environment of deep space. This transformative change, known as "Earth-Independent Medical Operations" (EIMO), explores the gradual transfer of medical care and decision-making from Earth-based support to space-based systems. The goal of this transition is to enhance astronaut health and performance while minimizing mission risks. EIMO requires the development of a medical system that integrates seamlessly with mission planning, vehicle and spacesuit design, and data architecture. This integration is crucial for building a robust medical infrastructure that not only safeguards astronaut well-being but also ensures overall mission success. The Human Research Program (HRP) Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Element has revised the EIMO model-based Concept of Operations (ConOps) which outlines an initial vision for EIMO. The ConOps, which is built on the stakeholders’ need, system goals, and objectives (NGOs), presents an array of in-mission scenarios that span a wide range of medical conditions demonstrating the system’s capabilities from basic to complex events. Developed by a multidisciplinary team of systems engineers, scientists, and clinicians within ExMC, the ConOps revision includes two new scenarios(Barotrauma and Self-Medical Management and Behavioral Health and Chronic Medical Care), and implementation of findings from EIMO technical interchange meetings that focused on data and training. The envisioned EIMO Medical System (MS) operates as a system of systems, gathering data from various sources such as reference databases, real-time wearable sensors, point-of-care diagnostics, and environmental controls. The MS also incorporates advanced training tools to support autonomous medical care, assisting the Crew Medical Officer (CMO) during medical events where Ground Support is either unavailable or communication-delayed beyond practicality. Furthermore, MS functions and capabilities were decomposed from the scenarios to establish foundational requirements for EIMO and traced to the NASA Spaceflight Human-System Standard(NASA-STD-3001, Volumes 1 and 2). These traces were performed to gain insights on the alignment of EIMO requirements with the NASA standard. This work serves as an initial recommendation to increase crew autonomy gradually and safely for Mars missions and future deep-space exploration.

medical system↗

NASA NTRS2019

The Value Proposition of Multi-Megawatt Electric Power/Propulsion for the Human Exploration of Mars

NASA and other space agencies have been offering stakeholders an architecture for the human exploration of Mars that has remained essentially unchanged since the 1960's. The mission duration and launch mass are the two first order figures of merit that drive the total cost of such an architecture. The options studied to date center on the "conjunction class" or "Long Stay" mission, in which surface infrastructure elements are sent ahead on uncrewed, slow trajectories requiring a minimum amount of propellant, and the crewed elements are sent at the synotic cycle's shortest trajectory, stay on Mars until the next close alignment, and then return to Earth. Total crewed mission durations for these architectures range from 900 to 1100 days, with variations driven primarily by trades between the amount of propellant launched and the effective specific mass of the propulsion technology assumed (e.g., chemical, nuclear thermal, solar electric, nuclear electric). Mars transit propulsion systems assumed in mission architectures studied to date have all resulted in architectural figures of merit that drive the cost to a level of "too much." However, nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) technology offers a "knob" that might be turned to enable a radically different Mars architecture, whose launch mass and mission duration may enable a value proposition more palatable to mission stakeholders. Mars architectures studied to date have assumed an NEP system providing 2.5 MWe at a specific mass of no less than 20 kg/kWe. This has often been seen as obtainable with a moderately high temperature fission reactor. An NEP system providing 15 MWe at specific mass of ~1 kg/kWe, though, could enable a short stay (30 days on surface) Mars mission, requiring only two or three SLS-class launch vehicles and a total mission duration of under one calendar year. However, turning this NEP "knob" would require a high risk development program driving innovation on the order of that delivered by the Manhattan Project, but for a fraction of the cost. Any technology option that might offer such a capability at such a development cost now stands at a low Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 3, would be based on a nuclear energy source (likely fusion), and would require an extremely high risk (and rapid) development effort. The aggressive, parallel path project management paradigm exemplified by the original Manhattan Project might have the best chance of success. An energy source developed in this manner may also have a major impact on the terrestrial power industry.

power↗

NASA NTRS2015

Orion Launch Abort System Performance During Exploration Flight Test 1

The Orion Launch Abort System Office is taking part in flight testing to enable certification that the system is capable of delivering the astronauts aboard the Orion Crew Module to a safe environment during both nominal and abort conditions. Orion is a NASA program, Exploration Flight Test 1 is managed and led by the Orion prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, and launched on a United Launch Alliance Delta IV Heavy rocket. Although the Launch Abort System Office has tested the critical systems to the Launch Abort System jettison event on the ground, the launch environment cannot be replicated completely on Earth. During Exploration Flight Test 1, the Launch Abort System was to verify the function of the jettison motor to separate the Launch Abort System from the crew module so it can continue on with the mission. Exploration Flight Test 1 was successfully flown on December 5, 2014 from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's Space Launch Complex 37. This was the first flight test of the Launch Abort System preforming Orion nominal flight mission critical objectives. The abort motor and attitude control motors were inert for Exploration Flight Test 1, since the mission did not require abort capabilities. Exploration Flight Test 1 provides critical data that enable engineering to improve Orion's design and reduce risk for the astronauts it will protect as NASA continues to move forward on its human journey to Mars. The Exploration Flight Test 1 separation event occurred at six minutes and twenty seconds after liftoff. The separation of the Launch Abort System jettison occurs once Orion is safely through the most dynamic portion of the launch. This paper will present a brief overview of the objectives of the Launch Abort System during a nominal Orion flight. Secondly, the paper will present the performance of the Launch Abort System at it fulfilled those objectives. The lessons learned from Exploration Flight Test 1 and the other Flight Test Vehicles will certainly contribute to the vehicle architecture of a human-rated space launch vehicle.

McCauley, Rachel↗

NASA NTRS2018

Cryogenic Selective Surfaces

There are many challenges involved in deep-space exploration, but several of these can be mitigated, or even solved, by the development of a coating that reflects most of the Sun’s energy, yet still provides far-infrared heat emission. Such a coating would allow non-heat-generating objects in space to reach cryogenic temperatures without using an active cooling system. This would benefit deep-space sensors that require low temperatures, such as the James Webb Telescope focal plane array. It would also allow the use of superconductors in deep space, which could lead to magnetic energy storage rings, lossless power delivery, or perhaps a large-volume magnetic shield against galactic cosmic radiation. However, perhaps the most significant enablement achieved from such a coating would be the long-term, deep space storage of cryogenic liquids, such as liquid oxygen (LOX). In our Phase I NIAC study, we realized that a combination of scattering particles and a silver backing could yield a highly effective, very broadband, reflector that could potentially reflect more than 99.9% of the Sun’s irradiant power. We developed a sophisticated model of this reflector and theoretically showed that cryogenic temperatures could be achieved in deep space at one astronomical unit (1 AU) from the Sun. We showed how this new reflector could minimize heat conduction into the cryogenic tanks by coating the tank support struts. We then modelled a strawman architecture for a mission to Mars, using a coated LOX tank, coated struts, and infrared shields, to show that with our new coating it would be possible to maintain liquid oxygen passively. As a result of this work a patent application was generated and a paper published in Optics Letters. Our Phase II NIAC study had two primary goals, to develop a rigid version of the cryogenic selective surface proposed in Phase I and to test its performance in a simulated deep space environment. During the first year of the project the work concentrated on developing rigid tiles of BaF2, leading to tiles as large as 4 inches in diameter that transmitted very little visible light. In addition, during the first year a simulated deep space environment was created using a vacuum chamber and cryocooler. Using this facility, we showed that our BaF2 tiles absorbed less than ¼% of 375 nm radiation, a significant milestone for the work. During the second year of the project, we continued to develop the BaF2 tiles and we put significant effort into the construction of a deep space environment where we could project simulated solar radiation onto a sample. In the spring of 2018, we conducted our first solar simulator test with BaF2 and saw about 3.6% absorption. This is better than the state-of-the-art, but disappointing since predictions were for much lower absorption. We, erroneously, attributed this absorption to water retention by the BaF2, and decided to change materials. We considered several oxides and settled on yttrium oxide (Y2O3) for further development, because it is broadband, lightweight, has high index, and is hydrophobic. In July 2018 we conducted our first test of a rigid tile of Y2O3 in the simulated deep space environment and saw significant absorption again. We then realized that the issue was not water, but mid-wave radiation passing through the tile and being absorbed by the temperature sensor and the varnish used to hold it in place. We wrapped the sensor in silver foil, re-ran the test, and saw much lower absorption; only 1.1%. We then re-ran the BaF2 tile and saw 1.4% absorption. These values are almost adequate to maintain LOX in deep space, but we suspect that there are still issues in our test apparatus; we suspect thermocouple wires may be absorbing radiation. Further, post-NIAC, testing will better determine the performance of our new solar reflector. In order to restrict the size of this report, we will only briefly describe topics that we have previously published, allowing us to devote more time to new material. So minimal material will be devoted to modeling the material and deep space cryogenic storage, while longer sections will cover our material development, simulated deep space testing, and new applications. The Launch Service Program (LSP) requested that we explore ways to use this new coating to maintain LOX in low Earth Orbit and that work is described. In addition, the Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) Program asked us to explore ways to reduce the heat load for liquid hydrogen, resulting in the development of a spray-on version of the coating that should significantly improve in-space multi-layer insulation performance.

Robert C. Youngquist,↗

NASA NTRS2018

A Plasma Aerocapture and Entry System for Manned Missions and Planetary Deep Space Orbiters

A rapid mission to Mars requires a large change in vehicle velocity upon arrival to establish a stable orbit. This demand is even greater for a Neptune science, requiring many kilometers per second of V. It is clear from past mission studies that a manned Mars mission and deep space planetary orbiters require aerobraking and aerocapture which use aerodynamic drag forces to slow the spacecraft. Aerocapture would enable long term studies of the outer planets and moons that would not be possible with existing braking methodologies. While the ability to utilize these atmospheres to slow down and capture spacecraft would dramatically reduce the cost, launch mass, and travel time, currently planned approaches require significant additional spacecraft mass and risk as the spacecraft must descend deep into the planetary atmosphere in order to produce significant drag on a relatively small aeroshell. The plasma based Magnetoshell being developed in this program holds the potential to perform the desired braking with significantly increased drag and control while dramatically reducing mass. Most importantly, this technology significantly lowers the risk involved with aerocapture thereby making manned planetary missions possible. The fundamental physics of the Magnetoshell is based on demonstrated experimental results. Successful implementation will dramatically decrease radiation exposures, mission risk, launch cost, and launch mass. Implementation of aerobraking by employing a solid deflector or aeroshell as a method for orbit insertion and circularization has been successfully demonstrated in the past, resulting in launch mass savings greater than 50%. In order to reduce the effect of frictional heating and dynamic pressure on the typically fragile aeroshell, or worse solar panels, the braking must be distributed over many orbital passes at a high altitude in the less dense regions of the atmosphere. It can thus take several months for a meter-scale, 1000 kg, aeroshell to execute the many elliptic orbital passes through the atmosphere to achieve the required V. This rather slow method of braking not only reduces frictional heating and dynamic forces, but also avoids unpredictable dynamic behavior due to turbulence, as well as unknown and seasonally variable atmospheric composition and temperature which has led to dangerous, mission-critical events. For exploration class missions such as DRA 5.0 aerocapture and Thermal Protection Systems (TPS) are proposed for breaking at Mars for cargo missions. Traditional aerocapture is considered too risky for manned missions. Even with the enormous mass savings that aerocapture allows, it still requires 80 tons of aeroshell and significantly increased launch mass and propellant. As will be shown, by using Magnetoshells for aerobraking, the DRA 5.0 mission will save 224 metric tons (MT) and greater than $2 B in launch costs. Beyond the dramatic savings for existing mission architectures, a low-mass, risk-free aerocapture system would allow much more rapid missions to Mars and deep space orbiters by allowing direct, faster trajectories. As will be shown, the plasma Magnetoshell Aerobraking, Aerocapture, and Entry System (AAES) not only reduces mass and cost while enabling significant new mission architectures, but also significantly reduces radiation exposures by decreasing trip times.

Manned Missions↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Identified Risks of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture in Human Spaceflight

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. One of the identified risks is due to inadequate human systems integration architecture (HSIA) and a driving factor of this risk is that given decreasing real-time ground support for execution of complex operations during future exploration missions, there is a possibility of adverse performance outcomes including that crew are unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety critical procedural errors. The HSRB uses Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) as a communication tool for describing how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes and as the basis for understanding intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes. The HSIA risk DAG will be presented and described. Historically, critical malfunctions requiring Crew/MCC management occurred at a rate of 1.7 times per year for ISS averaged over the lifetime and 3-4 times per year in the burn in phase for the vehicle. These averages do not include EVA data, which greatly increases the incident rate. Prior experience from the Apollo program showed 10/11 crewed missions experienced significant anomalies where crew relied heavily on MCC expertise in real-time. These failure patterns are in line with those observed in other complex engineered systems (e.g., oil rigs, launch systems, commercial aviation, etc.) It is likely that general malfunction and error rates are > 10% for short duration missions (<30 days), based on past and current spaceflight operations data. Likelihood of adverse outcomes has the potential to increase as crew conduct work with new, complex systems and with less ground support. For Low Earth Orbit missions and Lunar missions less than 30 days, assuming minimal comm delays, disruptions and bandwidth limitations, malfunctions and errors can affect mission objectives and crew health but may be mitigated by ground support. For Lunar missions greater than 30 days and any potential Mars mission malfunctions and errors can have Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences due to reduced ground support (communication delays, constraints and blackouts) for more complex operations, as well as reduced resupply and evacuation options.

Daniel M Buckland↗

NASA NTRS2007

High-Performance, Radiation-Hardened Electronics for Space Environments

The Radiation Hardened Electronics for Space Environments (RHESE) project endeavors to advance the current state-of-the-art in high-performance, radiation-hardened electronics and processors, ensuring successful performance of space systems required to operate within extreme radiation and temperature environments. Because RHESE is a project within the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP), RHESE's primary customers will be the human and robotic missions being developed by NASA's Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) in partial fulfillment of the Vision for Space Exploration. Benefits are also anticipated for NASA's science missions to planetary and deep-space destinations. As a technology development effort, RHESE provides a broad-scoped, full spectrum of approaches to environmentally harden space electronics, including new materials, advanced design processes, reconfigurable hardware techniques, and software modeling of the radiation environment. The RHESE sub-project tasks are: SelfReconfigurable Electronics for Extreme Environments, Radiation Effects Predictive Modeling, Radiation Hardened Memory, Single Event Effects (SEE) Immune Reconfigurable Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) (SIRF), Radiation Hardening by Software, Radiation Hardened High Performance Processors (HPP), Reconfigurable Computing, Low Temperature Tolerant MEMS by Design, and Silicon-Germanium (SiGe) Integrated Electronics for Extreme Environments. These nine sub-project tasks are managed by technical leads as located across five different NASA field centers, including Ames Research Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Langley Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center. The overall RHESE integrated project management responsibility resides with NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). Initial technology development emphasis within RHESE focuses on the hardening of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA)s and Field Programmable Analog Arrays (FPAA)s for use in reconfigurable architectures. As these component/chip level technologies mature, the RHESE project emphasis shifts to focus on efforts encompassing total processor hardening techniques and board-level electronic reconfiguration techniques featuring spare and interface modularity. This phased approach to distributing emphasis between technology developments provides hardened FPGA/FPAAs for early mission infusion, then migrates to hardened, board-level, high speed processors with associated memory elements and high density storage for the longer duration missions encountered for Lunar Outpost and Mars Exploration occurring later in the Constellation schedule.

Keys, Andrew S.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Human Flight to Lunar and Beyond - Re-Learning Operations Paradigms

For the first time since the Apollo era, NASA is planning on sending astronauts on flights beyond LEO. The Human Space Flight (HSF) program started with a successful initial flight in Earth orbit, in December 2014. The program will continue with two Exploration Missions (EM): EM-1 will be unmanned and EM-2, carrying astronauts, will follow. NASA established a multi-center team to address the communications, and related tacking/navigation needs. This paper will focus on the lessons learned by the team designing the architecture and operations for the missions. Many of these Beyond Earth Orbit lessons had to be re-learned, as the HSF program has operated for many years in Earth orbit. Unlike the Apollo missions that were largely tracked by a dedicated ground network, the HSF planned missions will be tracked (at distances beyond GEO) by the DSN, a network that mostly serves robotic missions. There have been surprising challenges to the DSN as unique modern human spaceflight needs stretch the experience base beyond that of tracking robotic missions in deep space. Close interaction between the DSN and the HSF community to understand the unique needs (e.g. 2-way voice) resulted in a Concept of Operations (ConOps) that leverages both the deep space robotic and the Human LEO experiences. Several examples will be used to highlight the unique challenges the team faced in establishing the communications and tracking capabilities for HSF missions beyond Earth Orbit, including: Navigation. At LEO, HSF missions can rely on GPS devices for orbit determination. For Lunar-and-beyond HSF missions, techniques such as precision 2-way and 3-way Doppler and ranging, Delta-Difference-of-range, and eventually possibly on-board navigation will be used. At the same time, HSF presents a challenge to navigators, beyond those presented by robotic missions - navigating a dynamic/"noisy" spacecraft. Impact of latency - the delay associated with Round-Trip-Light-Time (RTLT). Imagine trying to have a 2-way discussion (audio or video) with an astronaut, with a 2-3 sec or more delay inserted (for lunar distances) or 20 minutes delay (for Mars distances). Balanced communications link. For robotic missions, there has been a heavy emphasis on higher downlink data rates, e.g. bringing back science data. Higher uplink data rates were of secondary importance, as uplink was used only to send commands (and occasionally small files) to the spacecraft. The ratio of downlink-to-uplink data rates was often 10:1 or more. For HSF, a continuous forward link is established and rates for uplink and downlink are more similar.

Kenny, Edward (Ted)↗

NASA NTRS2016

Life Support and Environmental Monitoring International System Maturation Team Considerations

Human exploration of the solar system is an ambitious goal. Future human missions to Mars or other planets will require the cooperation of many nations to be feasible. Exploration goals and concepts have been gathered by the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG) at a very high level, representing the overall goals and strategies of each participating space agency. The Global Exploration Roadmap published by ISECG states that international partnerships are part of what drives the mission scenarios. It states "Collaborations will be established at all levels (missions, capabilities, technologies), with various levels of interdependency among the partners." To make missions with interdependency successful, technologists and system experts need to share information early, before agencies have made concrete plans and binding agreements. This paper provides an overview of possible ways of integrating NASA, ESA, and JAXA work into a conceptual roadmap of life support and environmental monitoring capabilities for future exploration missions. Agencies may have immediate plans as well as long term goals or new ideas that are not part of official policy. But relationships between plans and capabilities may influence the strategies for the best ways to achieve partner goals. Without commitments and an organized program like the International Space Station, requirements for future missions are unclear. Experience from ISS has shown that standards and an early understanding of requirements are an important part of international partnerships. Attempting to integrate systems that were not designed together can create many problems. Several areas have been identified that could be important to discuss and understand early: units of measure, cabin CO2 levels, and the definition and description of fluids like high purity oxygen, potable water and residual biocide, and crew urine and urine pretreat. Each of the partners is exploring different kinds of technologies. Different specific parameters may important to define or explore possible ranges depending on the system concepts. Early coordination between technology developers can create new possibilities for collaboration, and provide input to determine what combined options may provide the best overall system architecture.

Anderson, Molly↗

NASA NTRS2016

Life Support and Environmental Monitoring International System Maturation Team Considerations.

Human exploration of the solar system is an ambitious goal. Future human missions to Mars or other planets will require the cooperation of many nations to be feasible. Exploration goals and concepts have been gathered by the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG) at a very high level, representing the overall goals and strategies of each participating space agency. The Global Exploration Roadmap published by ISECG states that international partnerships are part of what drives the the mission scenarios. It states "Collaborations will be established at all levels (missions, capabilities, technologies), with various levels of interdependency among the partners." To make missions with interdependency successful, technologists and system experts need to share information early, before agencies have made concrete plans and binding agreements. This paper provides an overview of possible ways of integrating NASA, ESA, and JAXA work into a conceptual roadmap of life support and environmental monitoring capabilities for future exploration missions. Agencies may have immediate plans as well as long term goals or new ideas that are not part of official policy. But relationships between plans and capabilities may influence the strategies for the best ways to achieve partner goals. Without commitments and an organized program like the International Space Station, requirements for future missions are unclear. Experience from ISS has shown that standards and an early understanding of requirements are an important part of international partnerships. Attempting to integrate systems that were not designed together can create many problems. Several areas have been identified that could be important to discuss and understand early: units of measure, cabin CO2 levels, and the definition and description of fluids like high purity oxygen, potable water and residual biocide, and crew urine and urine pretreat. Each of the partners is exploring different kinds of technologies. Different specific parameters may important to define or explore possible ranges depending on the system concepts. Early coordination between technology developers can create new possibilities for collaboration, and provide input to determine what combined options may provide the best overall system architecture.

Anderson, Molly↗