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At least 235 records · Page 13
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗
DOE OSTI2024

Investigation of Misuse Potential and Detection for Homogeneous Fluoride Fast Molten Salt Reactors Based on Neutronics Signatures

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has obligations to apply safeguards to nuclear material and facilities within States subject to IAEA safeguards agreements. As a result of these obligations, safeguards will need to be applied to Generation IV reactors, including liquid fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs), if they are deployed in States with safeguards agreements. Recently, the IAEA has noted that a growing number of Member States are showing interest in MSR technology. This has been accompanied by an increase in short term development and deployment activities relating to MSRs. To ensure MSRs can be safeguarded effectively and efficiently upon possible future deployment, safeguards approaches and techniques need to be investigated now.

DeGuire, Thomas↗
DOE OSTI2023

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office Visit: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Program at LANL [Slides]

The Laboratory’s nuclear nonproliferation and security portfolio is managed by the GS-NNS program office: NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation office (DNN) makes up ~80% of our work. We also support State Dept activities closely aligned with our work for DNN and NASAprograms. Our work is executed across the entire Laboratory, approximately half in the Global Security directorate and a third in the Weapons Program.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Molten Salt Aerosol Spectroscopy Approach to Online Process Monitoring in Molten Salt Reactors

Recent research and development in molten salt reactors (MSRs) has led to many advanced reactor designs, many of which have demonstrations planned in the next decade. However, a significant challenge that must be overcome before liquid fueled MSRs become viable globally is nuclear material accountancy (NMA) and safeguards. Liquid-fueled MSRs are problematic to safeguards because the nuclear material is in the bulk phase, inventories are constantly changing, and there are potentially many outlet pathways that must be monitored, especially in designs with online chemical processing. At the Idaho National Laboratory, we have developed a process monitoring tool to circulate molten salt through a nebulizer and optical cell, where laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) and ultraviolet-visible (UV-VIS) are applied to track the elemental and oxidation states of the constituents in the salt aerosol. This approach has the potential to provide information on the actinides, fission products, and corrosion in the reactor or process. Preliminary testing in aqueous praseodymium chloride (PrCl3) and neodymium chloride (NdCl3) showed good sensitivity detection limits n developed calibration curves. Additional tests and analysis or ongoing in aqueous solutions while equipment is being scaled up for high temperature molten salt testing. Results for continued testing as well as a status of the molten salt design and anticipated commissioning will be presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Performance Testing of Software Upgrade for SRNL CPC Instrument at the Nuclear Material Laboratory, Office of Safeguards Analytical Services, International Atomic Energy Agency

This report summarizes the performance testing for the Software upgrade for the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Controlled Potential Coulometry (CPC) instrument. This upgrade is specifically to meet the needs of the Nuclear Material Laboratory, Office of Safeguards Analytical Services, International Atomic Energy Agency at Seibersdorf, Austria. The instrument hardware was upgraded in 2010, but the software continued to operate on a Windows platform using a High Tech Basic (HT Basic) application. HT Basic usage is declining. The IAEA requested an upgrade to the existing coulometer software to Laboratory Virtual Instrument Engineering Workbench (LabVIEW), an object-oriented programming language in wide use and one the NML staff is familiar with. The software was developed by SRNL Software Engineer, with assistance from Electrical Engineer and Scientist. Once developed, the new LabVIEW software was validated, tested with Iron (surrogate for plutonium) and plutonium. Once testing was completed, the software was installed at the International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Material Laboratory (IAEA NML) coulometer, and SRNL provided hands on training to NML staff on using the new software.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Performance of a dynamic single bubbler in single and two-phase immiscible liquids

Ensuring nonproliferation and safeguards of special nuclear materials (SNM) is a critical aspect of advancing the nuclear fuel cycle. Traditional bubbler systems used to estimate liquid levels and densities in nuclear recycling processes have limitations, particularly in harsh environments where dip-tube corrosion and buildup necessitate frequent maintenance and recalibration. This study explores the Dynamic Single Bubbler (DSB) method, which utilizes a single dip-tube attached to a linear actuator to estimate liquid properties dynamically. This approach is extended to estimate liquid-liquid interfaces in immiscible liquids and employs a linear regression method to reduce uncertainties and improve accuracy. The DSB method achieved density estimate uncertainties of less than 0.5% and surface level estimate uncertainties typically under 0.5%, across various fluids including water, acetone, methanol, mineral oil, glycerol, and aqueous salt solutions. Results indicate that the DSB method provides accurate and robust estimates of liquid density and surface levels with minimal maintenance and without the need for calibration. Additionally, the method's applicability to immiscible liquids and various dip-tube geometries was demonstrated, showing promise for widespread use in nuclear and other industrial applications.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
NASA NTRS1986

1985 Nuclear Science Symposium, 32nd, and 1985 Symposium on Nuclear Power Systems, 17th, San Francisco, CA, October 23-25, 1985, Proceedings

The present conference ranges over topics in high energy physics instrumentation, detectors, nuclear medical applications, health physics and environmental monitoring, reactor instrumentation, nuclear spacecraft instrumentation, the 'Fastbus' data acquisition system, circuits and systems for nuclear research facilities, and the development status of nuclear power systems. Specific attention is given to CCD high precision detectors, a drift chamber preamplifier, a Cerenkov ring imaging detector, novel scintillation glasses and scintillating fibers, a modular multidrift vertex detector, radial wire drift chambers, liquid argon polarimeters, a multianode photomultiplier, the reliability of planar silicon detectors, the design and manufacture of wedge and strip anodes, ultrafast triode photodetectors, photomultiplier tubes, a barium fluoride plastic scintillator, a fine grained neutron hodoscope, the stability of low leakage silicon photodiodes for crystal calorimeters, and X-ray proportional counters. Also considered are positron emission tomography, single photon emission computed tomography, nuclear magnetic resonance imaging, Geiger-Muller detectors, nuclear plant safeguards, a 32-bit Fastbus computer, an advanced light water reactor, and nuclear plant maintenance.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2021

Passive Low-Energy Nuclear-Recoil Detection with Color Centers

Crystal-damage events such as tracks and point defects have been used to record and detect radiation for a long time and recently they have been proposed as a means for dark-matter detection. Color centers can be read out optically and we propose a scheme based on selective plane illumination microscopy for micrometer-scale imaging of large volumes corresponding to kilogram mass detectors. This class of detectors would be passive and would operate at room temperature and we call this the passive low-energy optical color-center nuclear-recoil (PALEOCCENE) detection method. We apply these concepts to the detection of reactor neutrinos using coherent elastic neutrino nucleus scattering (CE ν NS). Crystal-damage formation energies are intrinsically on the order of 25 eV, resulting in similarly low nuclear-recoil thresholds. Furthermore, this would enable the observation of reactor-neutrino CE ν NS with detectors as small as 10 g. Additionally, a competitive search for spin-dependent dark-matter scattering down to a dark-matter mass of 0.3 GeV could be possible. Passive crystal detectors might also be attractive for nuclear-nonproliferation safeguards if used to monitor reactor power and to put limits on plutonium production. The passive nature and small footprint of the proposed detectors implies that these might fit well within accepted reactor-safeguards operations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Utilizing Time Reversal Ultrasonics to Detect the Removal of Nuclear Materials from Geological Repositories (FY26 Mid-Year)

Detecting unauthorized nuclear material removal from storage environments, such as geological repositories, is a critical safeguards task essential to ensuring the integrity and non-diversion of nuclear materials. However, this process is fraught with significant technical challenges. Storage configurations often involve tightly packed nuclear material containers or obstructed environments, making detection of removal events exceedingly difficult. Optical surveillance cameras, which are commonly used for monitoring, suffer from substantial limitations, including restricted coverage, reliance on line-of-sight measurements, and vulnerability to environmental conditions in certain storage scenarios. As the global inventory of monitored nuclear materials increases and storage configurations become more complex— such as deep geological repositories, inaccessible storage vaults, and tightly packed containers—there is an urgent need for innovative detection technologies that can reliably identify unauthorized diversion events in these challenging environments. The challenge of detecting nuclear material removal in complex storage environments is both significant and urgent. Preventing unauthorized access, diversion, or tampering with nuclear materials is a cornerstone of global nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation efforts. Current detection methods are increasingly inadequate as storage configurations become more intricate and inaccessible. The limitations of existing technologies—such as their inability to detect changes behind obstructions, reliance on costly and labor-intensive processes, and vulnerability to environmental conditions—pose risks to the effectiveness of safeguards systems. Addressing this challenge is critical to maintaining international trust in nuclear safeguards frameworks and ensuring compliance with nonproliferation agreements. Our project builds on the proven concept of TRU technology that can address this unmet need. TRU has demonstrated exceptional spatial sensitivity and change detection capabilities in complex non-line-ofsight environments, making it uniquely suited for detecting unauthorized nuclear material removal in challenging storage configurations. Unlike optical methods, TRU is not limited by line-of-sight constraints or environmental conditions, enabling reliable detection of subtle alterations even behind obstructions. By leveraging TRU’s ability to identify removal or tampering events, we aim to develop a robust detection system that enhances safeguards in geological repositories, storage vaults, and other complex environments.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear forensics: How science helps stop the trafficking of nuclear materials

Nuclear forensics is an essential activity in support of national counter-nuclear smuggling operations, as it can be used to provide unique and useful data to law enforcement for the prosecution of criminal nuclear smugglers and traffickers. Nuclear forensics can also be used to determine the origin of nuclear materials that have fallen out of regulatory control, allowing for the identification of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the safeguarding of nuclear materials, while also generating a deterrent effect through attribution to the legal and responsible owners of nuclear materials out of regulatory control. This article describes the benefits of a nuclear forensics capability to any country in possession of nuclear materials, and describes how nuclear forensics can support an investigation into the origin of interdicted nuclear materials, using a case study of a nuclear materials interdiction in Australia to describe how nuclear forensics works in practice.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2024

Concepts for Neutrino Applications

Will neutrinos find uses outside basic science? It may be too early to say, but neutrino physicists have already imagined a variety of possibilities from the relatively modest to the more blue-sky. In this review, we survey the range of proposed applications, most involving nuclear reactors and other fission sources. We give special attention to the most recent proposals, including verifying submarine reactor integrity, safeguarding advanced nuclear power plants, and monitoring spent nuclear fuel. All of these concepts take advantage of the fact that neutrinos pass through barriers other signals cannot penetrate. That same fact creates the central challenge for neutrino applications: the size and complexity of detectors needed to collect a signal. Although the weakly interacting nature of neutrinos makes them fundamentally difficult to use, developments in detector technology are making some ideas more feasible.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Sensitivity of the simulation of passive neutron emission from UF 6 cylinders to the uncertainties in both 19 F(α,n) energy spectrum and thick target yield of 234 U in UF 6

Interest in safeguards verification measurements using passive thermal neutron counting to assay 235 U content in large 30B UF 6 canisters has grown in recent years. Here, the prohibitively high cost and impracticality of using reference 30B calibration cylinders extensively will likely make accurate simulations of increasing interest. Accuracy of the simulated response will define the confidence in the predicted response and the extent to which simulations can reasonably be relied upon. With 234 U driven 19 F(α, n) reactions being the main neutron source in low enriched UF 6 the uncertainties of the 19 F(α, n) energy spectrum and the thick target yield of 234 U in UF 6 propagate into the uncertainty in the predicted response and represent a major influence of basic nuclear data. Here sensitivity of the simulated total (Singles) and coincidence (Doubles) count rates are assessed for the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter using six potential 19 F(α, n) neutron energy spectra over a range of enrichments and material distributions. The results indicate that variations in the Singles and Doubles due to simulated (α, n) neutron spectrum are less than 1.5% for this set of simulated neutron spectra, with dependence varying inversely with enrichment. Singles uncertainty is only slightly less than that of the thick target 19 F(α, n) yield corresponding to the primary neutron source, whereas the 19 F(α, n) yield dependence of the Doubles is reduced by the non-negligible 238 U(SF) coincident neutron emissions. Based on available thick target 19 F(α, n) yield estimates the uncertainty is on the order of 5%, establishing this as the main nuclear data limitation when simulating thermal neutron detectors response for 30B UF 6 storage cylinders. Based on these findings, it appears that the measurement and evaluation of the thick target 19 F(α, n) yield for uranium hexafluoride is due.

19F(α,n) neutron spectrum↗
DOE OSTI2021

SoW: Energy-Dependent Fission Product Yields

The purpose of this LLNL subcontract is to capitalize on our already established long-term relationship with Duke University and Triangle Universities Nuclear Laboratory (TUNL) to study fission observables like Fission Product Yields (FPY), fission cross-section and other data relevant to our programmatic needs. LLNL with Duke university partnership, wants to further develop new experimental capabilities to measure critical nuclear data important for LLNL stakeholders. The new FPY data will provide important benchmarks for nuclear theory and evaluation currently developed by the nuclear data and theory group. The improved FPY data is of interest to many major laboratory programs, including nuclear chemistry, nuclear forensics, safeguard, and nonproliferation communities. The impact of new FPY data, obtained by a graduate student from Duke (Aitor Bracho), will result in the U.S. Nuclear Data Program.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

FNCL Enhancements Implementation (FY25 Annual Report)

The FNCL investigations team at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has completed research and development of hardware, signal processing, and analysis tools to enhance the measurement capabilities of both the current CAEN SyS VeryFuel Fast Neutron Collar (FNCL) instrument and a next-generation FNCL prototype. The team successfully built and commissioned the LLNL Demonstrator System: a fully integrated, three-panel detector system featuring higher segmentation, plastic scintillators (EJ-276D), Silicon Photomultipliers (SiPMs), no high-voltage requirement, a reduced electronic footprint, and the LLNL-developed Gaussian Mixture Model Pulse Shape Discrimination (GMM-PSD) signal processing. An extensive experimental campaign was conducted at LLNL’s Inherently Safe Subcritical Assembly (ISSA) facility using both the baseline FNCL and the LLNL Demonstrator. The campaign results validated system performance, calibration stability, and the effectiveness of advanced signal processing and analysis algorithms in a relevant environment.

and physical protection↗
DOE OSTI2020

The MPACT 2020 Milestone: Safeguards and Security by Design of Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities.

The Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign, within the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, has developed a Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed for safeguards and security design for future nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The purpose of the Virtual Test Bed is to bring together experimental and modeling capabilities across the U.S. national laboratory and university complex to provide a one-stop-shop for advanced Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD). Experimental testing alone of safeguards and security technologies would be cost prohibitive, but testbeds and laboratory processing facilities with safeguards measurement opportunities, coupled with modeling and simulation, provide the ability to generate modern, efficient safeguards and security systems for new facilities. This Virtual Test Bed concept has been demonstrated using a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility as an example, but the concept can be extended to other facilities. While much of the recent work in the MPACT program has focused on electrochemical safeguards and security technologies, the laboratory capabilities have been applied to other facilities in the past (including aqueous reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and molten salt reactors as examples). This paper provides an overview of the Virtual Test Bed concept, a description of the design process, and a baseline safeguards and security design for the example facility. Parallel papers in this issue go into more detail on the various technologies, experimental testing, modeling capabilities, and performance testing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

NCERC 2024 Highlights

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is entrusted with ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile while advancing programs aimed at reducing global nuclear proliferation. These critical mission objectives are achieved through the expertise of a highly skilled team of professionals. The operations at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) play a vital role in developing and enhancing knowledge and expertise in advanced nuclear technologies. NCERC supports a wide range of mission areas, including nuclear criticality safety, nuclear emergency response, and nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and arms control. It also provides support to the Department of Homeland Security, advances stockpile stewardship science, and delivers scientific expertise to other government agencies, such as NASA and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. NCERC conducts experiments utilizing diverse nuclear materials, from small neutron-emitting sources for testing radiation detection equipment to larger quantities of uranium and plutonium for criticality experiments. A cornerstone of NCERC's mission portfolio includes the operation of four critical mass assembly machines—Planet, Comet, Flattop, and Godiva-IV—which are instrumental in advancing nuclear science and ensuring the nation’s nuclear security objectives.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Applicability of the Milestones Approach to Deployments of Transportable Nuclear Power Plants (TNPPs)

Transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs) can provide potential benefits to countries embarking on nuclear programs, offering reduced infrastructure requirements, shorter timeframes for implementation, cost savings and greater deployment flexibility than larger conventional reactors. However, the deployment of a TNPP in a Host State comes with the obligation to establish sufficient regulatory, institutional, and technical infrastructure, which, among others, includes a legal and regulatory framework and a competent regulatory body to implement a State’s safeguards obligations. This paper considers how the unique technical and deployment features of TNPPs may affect the process of preparing for and implementing safeguards in nuclear newcomer countries. Evaluating this issue through the lens of the IAEA’s Milestones Approach, this paper discusses some potential implications arising from the shortening of some milestones phases due to reduced construction or licensing time for TNPPs, and the need for increased cooperation between Host States and Supplier States in preparing for and meeting certain safeguards obligations. These considerations are potentially relevant to various stakeholders: newcomer States considering TNPP deployment; the States and companies that supply such reactors; as well as organizations that support international safeguards capacity building.

Siserman-Gray, Ioana-Cristina↗