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The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) is investigating revolutionary and advanced universal, reliable, always available, cyber secure and affordable Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS) options for all altitudes of UAS operations. In Spring 2015, NASA issued a Call for Proposals under NASA Research Announcements (NRA) NNH15ZEA001N, Amendment 7 Subtopic 2.4. Boeing was selected to conduct a study with the objective to determine the most promising candidate technologies for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) air-to-air and air-to-ground data exchange and analyze their suitability in a post-NextGen NAS environment. The overall objectives are to develop UAS CNS requirements and then develop architectures that satisfy the requirements for UAS in both controlled and uncontrolled air space. This contract is funded under NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (ARMD) Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) project and proposes technologies for the Unmanned Air Systems Traffic Management (UTM) service.There is a need for accommodating large-scale populations of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in the national air space. Scale obviously impacts capacity planning for Communication, Navitation, and Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless communications data links provide the necessary capacity for accommodating millions of small UASs (sUAS) nationwide? Does the communications network provide sufficient Internet Protocol (IP) address space to allow air traffic control to securely address both UAS teams as a whole as well as individual UAS within each team? Can navigation and surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe separation of vehicles even in crowded skies?Our objective is to identify revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives supporting UASs operating at all altitudes and in all airspace while accurately navigating in the absence of navigational aids. These CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. The approach will identify CNS technology candidates that can meet the needs of the range of UAS missions to specific air traffic management applications where they will be most beneficial and cost effective.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) is investigating revolutionary and advanced universal, reliable, always available, cyber secure and affordable Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS) options for all altitudes of UAS operations. In Spring 2015, NASA issued a Call for Proposals under NASA Research Announcements (NRA) NNH15ZEA001N, Amendment 7 Subtopic 2.4. Boeing was selected to conduct a study with the objective to determine the most promising candidate technologies for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) air-to-air and air-to-ground data exchange and analyze their suitability in a post-NextGen NAS environment. The overall objectives are to develop UAS CNS requirements and then develop architectures that satisfy the requirements for UAS in both controlled and uncontrolled air space. This contract is funded under NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (ARMD) Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) project and proposes technologies for the Unmanned Air Systems Traffic Management (UTM) service.There is a need for accommodating large-scale populations of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in the national air space. Scale obviously impacts capacity planning for Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless communications data links provide the necessary capacity for accommodating millions of small UASs (sUAS) nationwide? Does the communications network provide sufficient Internet Protocol (IP) address space to allow air traffic control to securely address both UAS teams as a whole as well as individual UAS within each team? Can navigation and surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe separation of vehicles even in crowded skies?Our objective is to identify revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives supporting UASs operating at all altitudes and in all airspace while accurately navigating in the absence of navigational aids. These CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. The approach will identify CNS technology candidates that can meet the needs of the range of UAS missions to specific air traffic management applications where they will be most beneficial and cost effective.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of the universe. In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study the Red Planet's upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis. The success of these missions is enabled by mission assurance. In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance. The information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure. NASA - like every other U.S. Federal Government agency - is required to manage the security of its information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that followed it. Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal information security management takes a "one-size fits all" approach for protecting IT systems. While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions. These systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment. They must be carefully configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions' initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations. Certain protective measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment. This is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few. The security audits confirmed that the framework for managing information system security developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by NASA, is indeed effective. However, the selection of the technical, operational and management security controls offered by the NIST model - and how they are implemented - does not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in even though there is no apparent impact on mission success. The authors observed that unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or non-existent protection. This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all. It offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed. In addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential impact of recent legislation such as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 - aimed at the enterprise - on the ground system, and offers other recommendations to Information System Owners (ISOs).
The Operations Engineering Lab (OEL) at JPL has developed the multimission command system as part of JPL's Advanced Multimission Operations System. The command system provides an advanced multimission environment for secure, concurrent commanding of multiple spacecraft. The command functions include real-time command generation, command translation and radiation, status reporting, some remote control of Deep Space Network antenna functions, and command file management. The mission-independent architecture has allowed easy adaptation to new flight projects and the system currently supports all JPL planetary missions (Voyager, Galileo, Magellan, Ulysses, Mars Pathfinder, and CASSINI). This paper will discuss the design and implementation of the command software, especially trade-offs and lessons learned from practical operational use. The lessons learned have resulted in a re-engineering of the command system, especially in its user interface and new automation capabilities. The redesign has allowed streamlining of command operations with significant improvements in productivity and ease of use. In addition, the new system has provided a command capability that works equally well for real-time operations and within a spacecraft testbed. This paper will also discuss new development work including a multimission command database toolkit, a universal command translator for sequencing and real-time commands, and incorporation of telecommand capabilities for new missions.
Communications security for space systems has been a specialized field generally far removed from considerations of mission interoperability and cross-support in fact, these considerations often have been viewed as intrinsically opposed to security objectives. The space communications protocols defined by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) have a twenty-five year history of successful use in over 400 missions. While the CCSDS Telemetry, Telecommand, and Advancing Orbiting Systems protocols for use at OSI Layer 2 are operationally mature, there has been no direct support within these protocols for communications security techniques. Link-layer communications security has been successfully implemented in the past using mission-unique methods, but never before with an objective of facilitating cross-support and interoperability. This paper discusses the design of a standard method for cryptographic authentication, encryption, and replay protection at the data link layer that can be integrated into existing CCSDS protocols without disruption to legacy communications services. Integrating cryptographic operations into existing data structures and processing sequences requires a careful assessment of the potential impediments within spacecraft, ground stations, and operations centers. The objective of this work is to provide a sound method for cryptographic encapsulation of frame data that also facilitates Layer 2 virtual channel switching, such that a mission may procure data transport services as needed without involving third parties in the cryptographic processing, or split independent data streams for separate cryptographic processing.
Today's advanced network management systems can automate many aspects of the tactical networking operations within a military domain. However, automation of joint and coalition tactical networking across multiple domains remains challenging. Due to potentially conflicting goals and priorities, human agreement is often required before implementation into the network operations. This is further complicated by incompatible network management systems and security policies, rendering it difficult to implement automatic network management, thus requiring manual human intervention to the communication protocols used at various network routers and endpoints. This process of manual human intervention is tedious, error-prone, and slow. In order to facilitate a better solution, we are pursuing a technology which makes network management automated, reliable, and fast. Automating the negotiation of the common network communication parameters between different parties is the subject of this paper. We present the technology that enables inter-force dynamic communication resource negotiations to enable ad-hoc inter-operation in the field between force domains, without pre-planning. It also will enable a dynamic response to changing conditions within the area of operations. Our solution enables the rapid blending of intra-domain policies so that the forces involved are able to inter-operate effectively without overwhelming each other's networks with in-appropriate or un-warranted traffic. It will evaluate the policy rules and configuration data for each of the domains, then generate a compatible inter-domain policy and configuration that will update the gateway systems between the two domains.
The existing National Airspace System (NAS) communications capabilities are largely unsecured, are not designed for efficient use of spectrum and collectively are not capable of servicing the future needs of the NAS with the inclusion of new operators in Unmanned Aviation Systems (UAS) or On Demand Mobility (ODM). SNAC will provide a ubiquitous secure, network-based communications architecture that will provide new service capabilities and allow for the migration of current communications to SNAC over time. The necessary change in communication technologies to digital domains will allow for the adoption of security mechanisms, sharing of link technologies, large increase in spectrum utilization, new forms of resilience and redundancy and the possibly of spectrum reuse. SNAC consists of a long term open architectural approach with increasingly capable designs used to steer research and development and enable operating capabilities that run in parallel with current NAS systems.
The NASA sponsored Hyper-Spectral Communications and Networking for Air Traffic Management (ATM) (HSCNA) project is conducting research to improve the operational efficiency of the future National Airspace System (NAS) through diverse and secure multi-band, multi-mode, and millimeter-wave (mmWave) wireless links. Worldwide growth of air transportation and the coming of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will increase air traffic density and complexity. Safe coordination of aircraft will require more capable technologies for communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS). The HSCNA project will provide a foundation for technology and operational concepts to accommodate a significantly greater number of networked aircraft. This paper describes two of the HSCNA projects technical challenges. The first technical challenge is to develop a multi-band networking concept of operations (ConOps) for use in multiple phases of flight and all communication link types. This ConOps will integrate the advanced technologies explored by the HSCNA project and future operational concepts into a harmonized vision of future NAS communications and networking. The second technical challenge discussed is to conduct simulations of future ATM operations using multi-bandmulti-mode networking and technologies. Large-scale simulations will assess the impact, compared to todays system, of the new and integrated networks and technologies under future air traffic demand.
A survey of private sector developers, users, and interpreters of Earth resources data was conducted in an effort to encourage private investment and participation in remote sensing systems. Results indicate positive interest in participation beyond the current hardware contracting level, however, there is a substantial gap between current market levels and system costs. Issues identified include the selection process for an operating entity, the public/private interface, data collection and access policies, price and profit regulation in a subsidized system, international participation, and the responsibility for research and development. It was agreed that the cost, complexity, and security implications of integrated systems need not be an absolute bar to their private operation.
It is argued that we are on the threshold of a new multibillion dollar industry that can enhance economic development, dramatically improve disaster assessment and relief operations, improve rural health care and solve many safety and security concerns of the transportation industry. Further delays in resolving conflicts between vested interests will be extremely costly to users, providers and equipment manufacturers. Conference participants are urged to move quickly and decisively towards solving outstanding problems.
In the context of the CNES SPOT4 program CISI is particularly responsible for the development of the SPOT4 Management Centre, part of the SPOT4 ground control system located at CNES Toulouse (France) designed to provide simultaneous control over two satellites. The main operational activities are timed to synchronize with satellite visibilities (ten usable passes per day). The automatic capability of this system is achieved through agenda services (sequence of operations as defined and planned by operator). Therefore, the SPOT4 Management Centre offers limited, efficient and secure human interventions for supervision and decision making. This paper emphasizes the main system characteristics as degree of automation, level of dependability and system parameterization.
This report presents three-year accomplishments from the national program on Commercial Remote Sensing and Geospatial Technology (CRSGT) application to transportation, administered by the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) in collaboration with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The joint program was authorized under Section 5113 of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). This is the first national program of its type focusing on transportation applications of emerging commercial remote sensing technologies. U.S. DOT's Research and Special Programs Administration manages the program in coordination with NASA's Earth Science Enterprise's application programs. The program focuses on applications of CRSGT products and systems for providing smarter and more efficient transportation operations and services. The program is performed in partnership with four major National Consortia for Remote Sensing in Transportation (NCRST). Each consortium focuses on research and development of products in one of the four priority areas for transportation application, and includes technical application and demonstration projects carried out in partnership with industries and service providers in their respective areas. The report identifies products and accomplishments from each of the four consortia in meeting the goal of providing smarter and more efficient transportation services. The products and results emerging from the program are being implemented in transportation operations and services through state and local agencies. The Environmental Assessment and Application Consortium (NCRST-E) provides leadership for developing and deploying cost effective environmental and transportation planning services, and integrates CRSGT advances for achieving smarter and cost effective corridor planning. The Infrastructure Management Consortium (NCRST-I) provides leadership in technologies that achieve smarter and cheaper ways of managing transportation infrastructure assets, operation, and inspection, and integrates CRSGT advances for achieving infrastructure security. The Traffic Flow Consortium (NCRST-F) provides leadership to develop new tools for regional traffic flow management including heavy vehicles and intermodal flow of freight, and integrates CRSGT advances for complementing and extending the reach of ITS user services. The Safety, Hazards and Disasters (NCRST-H) provides leadership for deploying remote sensing technology to locate transportation hazards and improve disaster recovery, and integrates CRSGT advances for application to protect transportation systems from terrorism. The DOT-NASA team is proud to present this report of accomplishments on products and results emerging from the joint program for application to transportation practice.
The Test Laboratory at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, located inside the boundaries of 40,000 acre Redstone Arsenal military reservation, has over 50 test facilities across 400+ acres, many inside an additional secure, fenced area. About 150 Government and 250 contractor personnel operate test facilities capable of all types of propulsion and structural testing, from small components to engine systems and structural strength/dynamic and environmental testing. We have tremendous engineering expertise in research, evaluation, analysis, design and development, and test of space transportation systems, subsystems, and components.
This paper describes the development of a packaged silicon carbide (SiC) based MEMS pressure sensor system designed specifically for a conventional turbofan engine. The electronic circuit is based on a Clapp-type oscillator that incorporates a 6H-SiC MESFET, a SiCN MEMS capacitive pressure sensor, titanate MIM capacitors, wirewound inductors, and thick film resistors. The pressure sensor serves as the capacitor in the LC tank circuit, thereby linking pressure to the resonant frequency of the oscillator. The oscillator and DC bias circuitry were fabricated on an alumina substrate and secured inside a metal housing. The packaged sensing system reliably operates at 0 to 350 psi and 25 to 540C. The system has a pressure sensitivity of 6.8 x 10E-2 MHzpsi. The packaged system shows negligible difference in frequency response between 25 and 400C. The fully packaged sensor passed standard benchtop acceptance tests and was evaluated on a flight-worthy engine.
Vision: To reach for new heights and reveal the unknown so that what we do and learn will benefit all humankind. Mission: To pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research. Aeronautics Research (ARMD): Pioneer and prove new flight technologies for safer, more secure, efficient, and environmental friendly air transportation. Human Exploration and Operations (HEOMD): Focus on ISS operations; and develop new spacecraft and other capabilities for affordable, sustainable exploration beyond low Earth orbit. Science (SCMD): Explore the Earth, solar system, and universe beyond; chart best route for discovery; and reap the benefits of Earth and space exploration for society. Space Technology (STMD): Rapidly develop, demonstrate, and infuse revolutionary, high-payoff technologies through collaborative partnerships, expanding the boundaries of aerospace enterprise.
Research to determine the optimum time or season for obtaining imagery to identify and map soil limitations was conducted in the proposed Oahe irrigation project area in South Dakota. The optimum time for securing photographs or imagery is when the soil surface patterns are most apparent. For cultivated areas similar to the study area, May is the optimum time. The density slicing analysis of the May image provided additional and more accurate information than did the existing soil map. The soil boundaries were more accurately located. The use of a density analysis system for an operational soil survey has not been tested, but is obviously dependent upon securing excellent photographs for interpretation. The colors or densities of photographs will have to be corrected for sun angle effects, vignetting effects, and processing to have maximum effectiveness for mapping soil limitations. Rangeland sites were established in Bennett County, South Dakota to determine the usefulness of ERTS imagery. Imagery from these areas was interpreted for land use and drainage patterns.
Continuing demand for the use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has put increasing pressure on operations in civil airspace. The need to fly UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS) in order to perform missions vital to national security and defense, emergency management, and science is increasing at a rapid pace. In order to ensure safe operations in the NAS, operators of unmanned aircraft, like those of manned aircraft, may be required to maintain separation assurance and avoid loss of separation with other aircraft while performing their mission tasks. This experiment investigated the effects of varying levels of automation on UAS operator performance and workload while responding to conflict resolution instructions provided by the Tactical Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) during a UAS mission in high-density airspace. The purpose of this study was not to investigate the safety of using TCAS II on UAS, but rather to examine the effect of automation on the ability of operators to respond to traffic collision alerts. Six licensed pilots were recruited to act as UAS operators for this study. Operators were instructed to follow a specified mission flight path, while maintaining radio contact with Air Traffic Control and responding to TCAS II resolution advisories. Operators flew four, 45 minute, experimental missions with four different levels of automation: Manual, Knobs, Management by Exception, and Fully Automated. All missions included TCAS II Resolution Advisories (RAs) that required operator attention and rerouting. Operator compliance and reaction time to RAs was measured, and post-run NASA-TLX ratings were collected to measure workload. Results showed significantly higher compliance rates, faster responses to TCAS II alerts, as well as less preemptive operator actions when higher levels of automation are implemented. Physical and Temporal ratings of workload were significantly higher in the Manual condition than in the Management by Exception and Fully Automated conditions.