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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 235 records · Page 13

Incombustible Polymer Electrolyte Boosting Safety of Solid–State Lithium Batteries: A Review

Lithium-ion batteries with their portability, high energy density, and reusability are frequently used in today's world. Under extreme conditions, lithium-ion batteries leak, burn, and even explode. Therefore, improving the safety of lithium-ion batteries has become a focus of attention. Researchers believe using a solid electrolyte instead of a liquid one can solve the lithium battery safety issue. Due to the low price, good processability and high safety of the solid polymer electrolytes, increasing attention have been paid to them. However, polymer electrolytes can also decompose and burn under extreme conditions. Moreover, lithium dendrites are formed continuously due to the uneven charge distribution on the surface of the lithium metal anode. A short circuit caused by a lithium dendrite can cause the battery to thermal runaway. As a result, the safety of polymer solid-state batteries remains a challenge. In this review, the thermal runaway mechanism of the batteries is summarized, and the batteries abuse test standard is introduced. In addition, the recent works on the high-safety polymer electrolytes and the solution strategies of lithium anode problems in polymer batteries are reviewed. Finally, the development direction of safe polymer solid lithium batteries is prospected.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

White Paper on Case Study of Safe Installation of Second-Life Energy Storage System

This technical report provides for a case study for the safe installation of a second-life, or repurposed, battery, that has been reconfigured for use as a stationary energy storage systems (ESS). Driven by legislative requirements such as California Senate Bill 615 and projections that retired EV batteries could meet a substantial portion of U.S. grid ESS needs beginning in 2035, the repurposing of EV batteries is anticipated to grow significantly. However, safety concerns arise from the effects of aging, unknown prior usage history, and changes in thermal runaway behavior, which may increase failure risks compared to new batteries. NFPA 855, the predominant U.S. standard for ESS installation, mandates that second-life batteries meet all requirements for new batteries, with repurposers complying with UL 1974 in addition to obtaining UL 9540 and UL 1973 listings. These are certifications that few repurposers have achieved and represent a regulatory barrier to entry for the market as a whole.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Report from the Inaugural Meeting on the Opportunities at the SEEMS Facility

An Inaugural Meeting on the Opportunities at the SEEMS Facility was held at the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) on June 11 - 12, 2019. It focused on the second of the user communities - industrial and academic researchers. Indeed, the SEEMS design concept started with a Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) study conducted for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that examines test facility options for providing neutron radiation simulating that in the atmosphere originating from cosmic rays and solar particles. The study was stimulated by earlier work calling for neutron radiation facilities with increased capacity and capabilities to meet current and future needs. Regulators, aircraft producers and avionics equipment suppliers recognize the growing urgent need for SEE testing in prototypical radiation fields. Industry standards formalizing procedures to assure that critical systems are robust against SEE phenomena have been issued. Regulatory bodies including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) now requiring that updated standards are met for aircraft certification.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

ANS Standards

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 1, January-June 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Chernobyl Accident Management Actions, A. R Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 25 The IAEA-ASSET Approach to Avoiding Accidents is to Recognize the Precursors to Prevent Incidents, F. Reisch; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 36 A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion, D. F. Fletcher; 58 Analysis and Modeling of Flow-Blockage-Induced Steam Explosion Events in the High-Flux Isotope Reactor, R. P. Taleyarkhan, V. Georgevich, C. W. Nestor, U. Gat, B. L. Lepard, D. H. Cook, J. Freels, S. J. Chang, C. Luttrell, R. C. Gwaltney, and J. Kirkpatrick; 74 An Analysis of Disassembling the Radial Reflector of a Thermionic Space Nuclear Reactor Power System, M. S. El-Genk and D. V. Paramonov; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 86 Standards for High-Integrity Software, D. R. Wallace, D. R. Kuhn, L M. Ippolito, and L. Beltracchi; DESIGN FEATURES: 98 Adoption of New Design Features for the Next Generation Nuclear Power Reactors, L. S. Tong; 114 Review of Nuclear Piping Seismic Design Requirements, G. C. Slagis and S. E. Moore; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 128 PC-Based Probabilistic Safety Assessment Study for a Geological Waste Repository Placed in a Bedded Salt Formation, S. A. Khan; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 142 Managing Aging in Nuclear Power Plants: Insights from NRC’s Maintenance Team Inspection Reports, A. Fresco and M. Subudhi; 150 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 153 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 158 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 168 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31, 1993; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 177 Symposium on Radioactive and Mixed Waste—Risk as a Basis for Waste Classification; 177 1995 Incineration Conference 178 Ninth Power Plant Dynamics Control and Testing Symposium; 174 The Authors

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Progress on Light-Element Standard Cross Sections at Los Alamos [Slides]

Presenters identified the following statuses of the light-element standards: Extension of N-N scattering analysis to 200 MeV will likely come in time for ENDF/B VIII.1 and new data are to be added even in the energy range up to 100 MeV; for n- 3 He, a more recent 4 He R-matrix analysis from which updated n+ 3 He cross sections could be obtained for ENDF/B VIII.1; for n- 6 Li, more work is required to get a reasonable fit to all data up to E n = 8 MeV. Of particular concern are the t+ 4 He scattering data at E t > 14 MeV. For n- 10 B, new work on the 11 B system has not yet been started and there is much new data to add for n+ 10 B reactions, and maybe also for &#945 + 7 Li reactions. The proliferation of excited-state channels will limit the upper neutron energy of the analysis to a few MeV. For n- 12 C, new elastic and inelastic scattering data from Vanhoy support the results of the present analysis. More work is needed to extend the fit successfully above 6.5 MeV.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Feasibility Study for a Proposed Subcritical Assembly at Oak Ridge National Laboratory [Slides]

To provide additional NCS training bandwidth, a simple feasibility study was performed for a proposed, inherently safe, subcritical assembly at ORNL for the US Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) NCSP training and education (T&E) program. The NCSP performs subcritical, delayed critical and prompt supercritical experiments to support the NCSP T&E program. ORNL performed a study to examine the feasibility of a subcritical assembly with existing fuel that meets the ANSI/ANS-8.26 standard. Section 7.4 of the standard requires NCS staff to participate in hands-on experiments meant to “…demonstrate how varying the properties of a fissionable material system can affect neutron multiplication.” This training is performed to ensure NCS, and operations staff are aware of the risks involved with conducting operations with fissionable materials outside reactors.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

FY22 CritView Status & Database Expansion [Slides]

This presentation covers Fiscal Year FY22 CritView Status & Database Expansion. This presentation Provide an update for progress and current status related to the CritView digital handbook for FY22/FY23. The lecture also covers a budget summary, FY22 highlights, CritView overview, and future work for FY23.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Detection and Quantitation of Hydrogen Emissions Role and Status of Detection Technology

Hydrogen is a critical strategy to decarbonize energy and manufacturing industries. Hydrogen is nontoxic and can be handled safely, but potential for secondary greenhouse impacts. Hydrogen releases arise from a variety of mechanisms (process, design features, "leaks") that contribute to total hydrogen releases. Detection methodologies will be critical to detect and quantify hydrogen emissions. Detection is to be integrated with advanced analytics (AI) and behavior modelling to effectively identify, quantify, and source locate hydrogen releases. Modelling of emissions will contribute to facility safety and reliability. DOE is committed to develop the tools to model and mitigate the impact of hydrogen releases which include: Support modeling to elucidate released hydrogen degradation; Support the development of tools for emissions quantitation; and Support engineering advancements to minimize hydrogen losses along the value chain (including process, design features, and leaks).

detection↗

Femto-second Laser’s Enabling New Length Scale Fabrications for Rapid Post Irradiation Examination of Materials: Concluding LDRD Project Poster

Mechanical testing campaigns are required to qualify materials for advanced reactor conditions, yet economical and safety limitations restrict the number of standardized mechanical tests that can be performed. Reducing the size of the sample is one approach to addressing these challenges and to accelerating testing. Previous research has shown that smaller mechanical test samples produce higher yield and ultimate stress values compared to values measured from standard sample sizes: the “smaller is stronger” effect. Specimens used in accelerated material testing campaigns must reflect bulk material performance to enable engineering scale material property measurement. The objective of this research project was to determine if engineering scale mechanical behavior—the yield stress—could be measured with micro-tensile test samples smaller than traditional standard testing geometries. The relationship between yield stress and sample size was explored with two different nuclear-relevant structural materials: Zircaloy-4 and tungsten. Mechanical testing of both metals demonstrated decreasing yield stress values with increasing sample gauge size across three different sizes. Yield stress values from the largest gauge size, fabricated with a femto-second laser ablation system, approach bulk material yield stress values reported in published literature. Preliminary analysis of the tungsten samples indicates the yield stress value depends on the grain characteristics within the gauge section, in addition to the gauge size. Accompanying modeling efforts, including response surface generation and crystal plasticity approaches, further demonstrated that the size of the sample gauge section alone cannot explain the change in yield stress values.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Internal Collaboration on Recent Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessments

Prevention of inadvertent criticality at facilities with large quantities of fissionable materials is one of the most important requirements those facilities grapple with. Given that criticality cannot be mitigated, only eliminated, a hard line must be taken on this requirement. The facilities and sites with the possibility of such an event must abide by a plethora of requirements, most stemming from the ANSI/ANS-8 series of consensus standards. One such standard, ANSI/ANS-8.19, Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety, gives requirements and recommendations necessary for establishing a nuclear criticality safety program for a given facility or site. One of those requirements includes periodic assessments of the NCS program. To meet the assessment requirement, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) conducts periodic assessments on individual facilities and overall programmatic health aspects. The teams developed to perform these assessments include people both inside and outside the LANL NCS program. Recently, the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division and the Critical Experiments Team of the Advanced Nuclear Technology Group established a collaboration to aid in fulfilling the assessment requirement.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Performance assessment of 3D printed multi-material energy absorber for automotive bumper: pedestrian lower extremity protection

Designing an energy absorber for automotive bumpers involves balancing low-speed and high-speed impacts to ensure safety, reduce repair costs, and meet regulatory standards. Here, this study explores a novel design using multi-material 3D printing and structural optimization to fabricate a lightweight and cost-efficient energy absorber. The design effectively dissipates energy in low-speed collisions and minimizes force transmission in high-speed pedestrain impacts, helping to meet both safety and performance requirements. The energy absorber design combines 20% carbon fiber-reinforced acrylonitrile butadiene styrene (CF-ABS) and thermoplastic polyurethane (TPU) for optimal stiffness and flexibility. It uses 3D-printed lattice structures optimized through finite element simulations to help meet both low-speed and high-speed impact requirements. Full-scale energy absorbers were 3D-printed using optimized CF-ABS/TPU blends and tested under high-speed impact using the Flexible Pedestrian Legform Impactor (Flex-PLI). For fair comparison, a baseline bumper with a traditional triangular lattice structure, also 3D-printed from the same CF-ABS/TPU materials, was similarly tested. Interestingly, both the optimized and baseline 3D-printed energy absorbers showed nearly identical performance, successfully meeting injury limits. Their performances were also benchmarked against an injection-molded energy absorber. While both 3D-printed and injection-molded designs met injury limits, the 3D-printed absorber exhibited a higher tibia bending moment, indicating an opportunity for further optimization. A Techno-Economic Analysis compared the costs of producing energy absorbers using traditional manufacturing and 3D printing. The analysis highlighted that 3D printing offers cost benefits for low to medium production volumes, with the total cost per energy absorber at ∼ $\$$74, compared to traditional methods that become economical beyond 2000 units.

Additive manufacturing↗

Pressure Safety Training (Rev. 8)

This is the workbook for the Pressure Safety Training Course. It is intended as a reference manual and guide for all work with pressurized liquids or gases. This workbook contains basic references to make work with pressure safer. It is intended to supplement classroom instruction, rather than serve as a definitive text on pressure. Earlier versions of the manual were intended specifically for training at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This revision is a generic version intended for training at all DOE facilities. The information in the Standards chapter is from the LLNL Health and Safety Manual. It is included here as a convenient reference and guide for developing similar standards at your own facility.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Safety Functions and Features, Events and Processes for the E-Area Performance Assessment

The DOE Technical Standard, “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation,” (DOE 2017) recommends the use of safety functions and features, events and processes (FEPs) to support development of conceptual models and identification of scenarios to be considered in a performance assessment (PA). The FEP process provides a means to describe how a PA considers and addresses the factors that could influence the performance of key barriers. Understanding the roles of barriers in terms of limiting migration helps to focus on how changes in the system could lead to a situation where those roles cannot be fulfilled and there is the potential for compromised performance. The FEPs screening and review process was used to identify FEPs that are relevant for the EArea Low-Level Waste Facility (LLWF) and specifically those FEPs that could have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of a given safety function. For this PA, a default list of FEPs developed at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2004) and an approach implemented for PAs at the Hanford and Idaho sites (Mehta et al. 2016, DOE-ID 2019) are used to identify processes and events that could influence the effectiveness of a given safety function for the E-Area LLWF (e.g., subsidence can impact the safety function of the cover system and lead to increased infiltration). The Hanford and Idaho PAs represent two of the most recent applications of this approach. The PA evaluates the potential impacts of changes in performance of different features of the system and demonstrates that the safety functions represent multiple and redundant barriers. Barrier analyses, assuming a safety function is not present, also test the robustness of the system in the event of the loss of one or more safety functions. Such evaluations also support a qualitative illustration of the concept of defense in depth. The safety concept for closure of the E-Area LLWF (generically referred to as “E-Area”) encompasses a variety of different features (i.e., administrative controls, natural site features, and engineered barriers) that reduce the potential impacts on human health and the environment from the residual waste that will remain after closure. These features can be represented as a collection of safety functions acting independently and as a system to provide for overall safety. In some applications, there have been attempts to assign numerical expectations to specific safety functions, but that is not the intent in this case. The concept of safety functions is used more qualitatively in two ways for this PA: 1. To illustrate the robustness of the E-Area design, operational practices and closure approach by documenting features that are and are not credited in different modeling cases. 2. To identify the roles of the different features and potential processes and events that could compromise the performance of safety features and need to be considered when developing the modeling approach. This report addresses both safety functions and FEPs for the E-Area PA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Explosives Safety Office - An Overview

Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Groups (NESSG) are convened to evaluate NEOs to determine if positive measures are adequate to meet the Standards as specified in DOE O 452.2E - Nuclear Explosive Safety, DOE O 452.4E – Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons, and NA SD 452.2.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Lithium-Ion UPS Battery Research and Commentary

Lithium-ion batteries are increasingly prevalent in a variety of devices both small and large. The high level of stored energy in UPS battery racks is closely scrutinized because sudden, uncontrolled release of chemical and electrical energy could be an ignition source. With this in mind, lithium-ion battery safety is the subject of several testing standards, including UL 1642, UL 1973, and UL 9540A.The motivation for this research and commentary is the potential installation of lithium-ion batteries in a Vertiv UPS assembly for one of the buildings on the ORNL campus. The battery modules Vertiv uses are compliant with abuse survival testing, demonstrating that cells and modules are rugged. The modules are further compliant with fire propagation requirements – in the event a failure does produce a fire, it doesn’t spread. Beyond these, the rack level assemblies Vertiv sources comply with UL requirements to contain a fire within the rack.This three-tiered approach to battery safety suggests Vertiv’s lithium-ion UPS battery racks can reasonably be considered for use in a facility with appropriate fire protection provisions and an informed emergency response team.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗