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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Interfaces and Management of Information (HIMI) Challenges for “In-time” Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS)

The envisioned transformation of the National Airspace System to integrate an In-time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS)to assure safety in Advanced Air Mobility(AAM)brings unprecedented challenges to the design of human interfaces and management of safety information. Safety in design and operational safety assurance are critical factors for how humans will interact with increasingly autonomous systems. The IASMS Concept of Operations builds from traditional commercial operator safety management and scales in complexity to AAM. The transformative changes in future aviation systems pose potential new critical safety risks with novel types of aircraft and other vehicles having different performance capabilities, flying in increasingly complex airspace, and using adaptive contingencies to manage normal and non-normal operations. These changes compel development of new and emerging capabilities that enable innovative ways for humans to interact with data and manage information. In-creasing complexity of AAM corresponds with use of predictive modeling, data analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence to effectively address known hazards and emergent risks. The roles of humans will dynamically evolve in increments with this technological and operational evolution. The interfaces for how humans will interact with increasingly complex and assured systems designed to operate autonomously and how information will need to be presented are important challenges to be resolved.

Lawrence J Prinzel↗
NASA NTRS2023

In-time Safety Management Capabilities for Wildland Fire Management Aircraft Operations - A Gap Assessment

This study assesses the in-time safety management services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs)being investigated by NASA’s System Wide Safety (SWS) project to determine applicability to the project’s planned safety demonstrator (SD-1) for wildland fire management. The purpose of this work is to evaluate how effectively existing SFCs address the different hazards presented by a safety demonstrator operating in a wildland fire management scenario. This will help inform decision makers which SFCs would provide the most cost-effective solutions to fill the hazard gaps for further research. Hazards for the safety demonstrator wildland fire management scenario were collated, and the SFCs were evaluated for each hazard based on how applicable and effective the unmodified SFCs are at addressing the hazard. The SFCs are also evaluated for the gap type that needs to be addressed to improve the SFC effectiveness for the given hazard. The key finding of this assessment is that all the existing SFCs require at least some research and development to adapt to the safety demonstrator. No single SFC fully addresses any of the safety demonstrator operation hazards. The result of this study will be used to determine the performance of current SFCs and suggest strategies to adapt existing SFCs or add new SFCs.

Patricia Revolinsky↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Leveraging Human Performance Data to Change the Narrative that People are the Safety Problem

The study of errors and failure has a long and productive history in the behavioral sciences. By studying how systems fail, we rule out various mechanisms for how those systems might work, thereby refining our theories of how they actually work. Human performance, however, includes more than errors; human performance comprises both failures and successes. A systematic bias to collect and analyze data only on error affects the decisions we make as a community by promoting the narrative that “people are the safety problem.” This narrative manifests in both obvious and subtle ways in the design of systems intended for human use. When the only safety data that are available are about human failure, then “data-driven” designs can only consider that humans fail. Changing this narrative will depend on new data and new ways to examine data – specifically, data on the processes by which human create and contribute to safety. An alternate narrative is that people represent a primary source of safety, through their capability to anticipate, monitor for, respond to, and learn from expected and unexpected change. This presentation will describe research efforts to expand the range of safety-relevant events to include not just rare safety failures but frequent safety successes. These efforts include use of data from both operations and simulations to develop methods and metrics for learning from structured observation, self-report, and system data.

Jon Holbrook↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation functionspresent in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).

In-time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRS2013

Large-Scale Spacecraft Fire Safety Experiments in ISS Resupply Vehicles

Our understanding of the fire safety risk in manned spacecraft has been limited by the small scale of the testing we have been able to conduct in low-gravity. Fire growth and spread cannot be expected to scale linearly with sample size so we cannot make accurate predictions of the behavior of realistic scale fires in spacecraft based on the limited low-g testing to date. As a result, spacecraft fire safety protocols are necessarily very conservative and costly. Future crewed missions are expected to be longer in duration than previous exploration missions outside of low-earth orbit and accordingly, more complex in terms of operations, logistics, and safety. This will increase the challenge of ensuring a fire-safe environment for the crew throughout the mission. Based on our fundamental uncertainty of the behavior of fires in low-gravity, the need for realistic scale testing at reduced gravity has been demonstrated. To address this concern, a spacecraft fire safety research project is underway to reduce the uncertainty and risk in the design of spacecraft fire safety systems by testing at nearly full scale in low-gravity. This project is supported by the NASA Advanced Exploration Systems Program Office in the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. The activity of this project is supported by an international topical team of fire experts from other space agencies to maximize the utility of the data and to ensure the widest possible scrutiny of the concept. The large-scale space flight experiment will be conducted on three missions; each in an Orbital Sciences Corporation Cygnus vehicle after it has deberthed from the ISS. Although the experiment will need to meet rigorous safety requirements to ensure the carrier vehicle does not sustain damage, the absence of a crew allows the fire products to be released into the cabin. The tests will be fully automated with the data downlinked at the conclusion of the test before the Cygnus vehicle reenters the atmosphere. The international topical team is collaborating with the NASA team in the definition of the experiment requirements and performing supporting analysis, experimentation and technology development.

Combustion↗
NASA NTRS2016

Aviation Safety Concerns for the Future

The Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) is a multidisciplinary international group of aviation professionals that was established to identify possible future aviation safety hazards. The principle was adopted that future hazards are undesirable consequences of changes, and a primary activity of FAST became identification and prioritization of possible future changes affecting aviation. Since 2004, FAST has been maintaining a catalogue of "Areas of Change" (AoC) that could potentially influence aviation safety. The horizon for such changes is between 5 to 20 years. In this context, changes must be understood as broadly as possible. An AoC is a description of the change, not an identification of the hazards that result from the change. An ex-post analysis of the AoCs identified in 2004 demonstrates that changes catalogued many years previous were directly implicated in the majority of fatal aviation accidents over the past ten years. This paper presents an overview of the current content of the AoC catalogue and a subsequent discussion of aviation safety concerns related to these possible changes. Interactions among these future changes may weaken critical functions that must be maintained to ensure safe operations. Safety assessments that do not appreciate or reflect the consequences of significant interaction complexity will not be fully informative and can lead to inappropriate trade-offs and increases in other risks. The FAST strongly encourages a system-wide approach to safety risk assessment across the global aviation system, not just within the domain for which future technologies or operational concepts are being considered. The FAST advocates the use of the "Areas of Change" concept, considering that several possible future phenomena may interact with a technology or operational concept under study producing unanticipated hazards.

emerging risks↗
NASA NTRS2017

Real Time Safety Monitoring: Concept for Supporting Safe Flight Operations

A number of organizations are working on processes, procedures, regulations, and technologies to maintain or improve the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS). In this paper, we describe a Real Time Safety Monitoring (RTSM) system that benefits from these efforts to define a set of safety metrics that are automatically monitored in real-time. In addition to providing information about current potentially adverse conditions to a variety of users, from those who need a broad overview of a day's flight operations to those who need to decide on a control tactic to employ in the next five minutes, the RTSM system predicts conditions within a specified prediction horizon. Its intelligent interface alerts the user, presenting the information as appropriate considering the current context and circumstances. We illustrate the system concept with five conceptual use cases, describing which safety metrics may be of the most interest to five user groups and suggesting a multi-modal display format. We posit that having access to information about adverse conditions in time to make efficient preemptive decisions without sacrificing safety will improve the already high level of safety and aid in the expansion planned for the NAS under the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).

safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation function present in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).

IASMS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Survey Protocol to Assess Meaningfulness and Usefulness of Automated Topic Finding in the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

Context: The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary confidential aviation safety reporting system. The ASRS receives reports from pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants and other involved in aviation operations. The reports are de-identified and coded by ASRS expert safety analysts and a short descriptive synopsis is written to describe the safety issue. The de-identified reports are then disseminated to the aviation community in a number of ways including entry into an online database, Safety Alert Bulletins and For Your Information Notices, and the CALLBACK newsletter. Key to these publications are the timely processing (de-identification, coding and summarization) of new reports, which is currently done by ASRS expert safety analysts. Thus, we believe topic modelling could decrease effort in ASRS, if topics are comprehensible. Aim: We propose a methodology to evaluate whether automated topic finding using topic modelling provides meaningful and useful topics. Method: We extend the total error survey methodology to evaluate user topic comprehension of machine learning outputs. To accomplish this we performed a literature review to identify existing methods and define a construct for topic comprehension, utilizing existing ASRS synopsis writing practices to more precisely define meaningfulness and usefulness. Results: A survey protocol was created that addresses the limitations of other survey protocols found in the literature review, which we found lacking in rationale and clear protocol definition. Conclusion: The surveying of user understanding in machine learning outputs presents challenges due to the explosion of parameters to control for and the lack of systematic approach presented in the literature. More reproducible work and survey protocols are needed in the literature and our work is one step towards that direction.

topic finding↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Future of Safety Management

As the pace of aviation evolution accelerates, our approach to safety and risk management needs to evolve to cover expanded current day operations as well as participants not traditionally included in the airspace. To assure safety of an increasingly complex aviation system it is essential to leverage new processes and techniques that can more quickly identify and respond to emerging risks. The concept of an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) presents an advanced SMS framework designed to enable integrated safety management and assurance. To assure safety of future aviation operations and technologies, advanced SMS concepts must be designed such that they can evolve to keep pace as aviation continues to change and as new safety and risk management tools and techniques emerge.

safety↗
NASA NTRS1971

Why system safety programs can fail

Factors that cause system safety programs to fail are discussed from the viewpoint that in general these programs have not achieved their intended aims. The one item which is considered to contribute most to failure of a system safety program is a poor statement of work which consists of ambiguity, lack of clear definition, use of obsolete requirements, and pure typographical errors. It is pointed out that unless safety requirements are stated clearly, and where they are readily apparent as firm requirements, some of them will be overlooked by designers and contractors. The lack of clarity is stated as being a major contributing factor in system safety program failure and usually evidenced in: (1) lack of clear requirements by the procuring activity, (2) lack of clear understanding of system safety by other managers, and (3) lack of clear methodology to be employed by system safety engineers.

Willie Hammer↗
NASA NTRS1972

Investigation of Structural Factors of Safety for the Space Shuttle

A study was made of the factors governing the structural design of the fully reusable space shuttle booster to establish a rational approach to select optimum structural factors of safety. The study included trade studies of structural factors of safety versus booster service life, weight, cost, and reliability. Similar trade studies can be made on other vehicles using the procedures developed. The major structural components of a selected baseline booster were studied in depth, each being examined to determine the fatigue life, safe-life, and fail-safe capabilities of the baseline design. Each component was further examined to determine its reliability and safety requirements, and the change of structural weight with factors of safety. The apparent factors of safety resulting from fatigue, safe-life, proof test, and fail-safe requirements were identified. The feasibility of reduced factors of safety for design loads such as engine thrust, which are well defined, was examined.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1978

Study of a safety margin system for powered-lift STOL aircraft

A study was conducted to explore the feasibility of a safety margin system for powered-lift aircraft which require a backside piloting technique. The objective of the safety margin system was to present multiple safety margin criteria as a single variable which could be tracked manually or automatically and which could be monitored for the purpose of deriving safety margin status. The study involved a pilot-in-the-loop analysis of several safety margin system concepts and a simulation experiment to evaluate those concepts which showed promise of providing a good solution. A system was ultimately configured which offered reasonable compromises in controllability, status information content, and the ability to regulate the safety margin at some expense of the allowable low speed flight path envelope.

Heffley, R. K.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Annual survey of spaceflight safety systems: 11th supplement. Survey period - July 1980-June 1981

Reports in the field of space flight safety applicable to current and future operational space activities which appeared between July 1980 and June 1981 are surveyed. Subjects in the area of flight rescue and safety during launch, on-orbit, reentry and landing phases include the major activities and findings of the first Shuttle test flight, a slidewire system for emergency egress from the Space Shuttle on the launch pad, and the testing of the Spacelab engineering model. In the area of human capabilities and crew roles, attention is given to reports of repairs to the Salyut 6 space station made by a Soyuz crew, and an assessment of weightlessness effects on space worker health and safety. Safety requirements for STS payloads including pressure vessels, and the Orbiter window system and for spacecraft testing are also presented, along with those for a television system to aid in monitoring astronaut extravehicular activities. For the operation of large space structures, reports include EVA equipment for satellite servicing and the safety aspects of connectors used in construction. Finally, attention is given to safety-related criteria in a study of Shuttle interactions with the proposed Space Operations Center.

Brown, N. E.↗
NASA NTRS1990

The procedure safety system

Telerobotic operations, whether under autonomous or teleoperated control, require a much more sophisticated safety system than that needed for most industrial applications. Industrial robots generally perform very repetitive tasks in a controlled, static environment. The safety system in that case can be as simple as shutting down the robot if a human enters the work area, or even simply building a cage around the work space. Telerobotic operations, however, will take place in a dynamic, sometimes unpredictable environment, and will involve complicated and perhaps unrehearsed manipulations. This creates a much greater potential for damage to the robot or objects in its vicinity. The Procedural Safety System (PSS) collects data from external sensors and the robot, then processes it through an expert system shell to determine whether an unsafe condition or potential unsafe condition exists. Unsafe conditions could include exceeding velocity, acceleration, torque, or joint limits, imminent collision, exceeding temperature limits, and robot or sensor component failure. If a threat to safety exists, the operator is warned. If the threat is serious enough, the robot is halted. The PSS, therefore, uses expert system technology to enhance safety thus reducing operator work load, allowing him/her to focus on performing the task at hand without the distraction of worrying about violating safety criteria.

Obrien, Maureen E.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Space engine safety system

A rocket engine safety system was designed to initiate control procedures to minimize damage to the engine or vehicle or test stand in the event of an engine failure. The features and the implementation issues associated with rocket engine safety systems are discussed, as well as the specific concerns of safety systems applied to a space-based engine and long duration space missions. Examples of safety system features and architectures are given, based on recent safety monitoring investigations conducted for the Space Shuttle Main Engine and for future liquid rocket engines. Also, the general design and implementation process for rocket engine safety systems is presented.

Maul, William A.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Software safety - A user's practical perspective

Software safety assurance philosophy and practices at the NASA Ames are discussed. It is shown that, to be safe, software must be error-free. Software developments on two digital flight control systems and two ground facility systems are examined, including the overall system and software organization and function, the software-safety issues, and their resolution. The effectiveness of safety assurance methods is discussed, including conventional life-cycle practices, verification and validation testing, software safety analysis, and formal design methods. It is concluded (1) that a practical software safety technology does not yet exist, (2) that it is unlikely that a set of general-purpose analytical techniques can be developed for proving that software is safe, and (3) that successful software safety-assurance practices will have to take into account the detailed design processes employed and show that the software will execute correctly under all possible conditions.

Dunn, William R.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Space engine safety system

A rocket engine safety system is designed to initiate control procedures which will minimize damage to the engine and vehicle or test stand in the event of an engine failure. This report describes the features and the implementation issues associated with rocket engine safety systems. Specific concerns of safety systems applied to a space-based engine and long duration space missions are discussed. Examples of safety system features and architectures are given from recent safety monitoring investigations conducted for the Space Shuttle Main Engine and for future liquid rocket engines. Also, a general design and implementation process for rocket engine safety systems is presented.

Maul, William A.↗