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At least 235 records · Page 13

Applications Where Snap is BPM for Radioactive Waste Assay

Historically, the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston in the United Kingdom (UK), has used a variety of assay techniques to measure the radioactive content of a diverse range of waste packages from decommissioning, operational and legacy sources. The regulator, the Environment Agency in the UK, places conditions and limits on AWE through an authorisation within the Radioactive Substances Act (RSA93). The conditions and limits require Best Practical Means (BPM) measurements to be used to demonstrate compliance with the authorisation. Hence, the assay technique employed needs to achieve a balance between risk of exposure, environmental considerations, technological considerations, health and safety considerations and cost effectiveness, without being grossly disproportionate in terms of money, time or trouble. Recently published work has concluded that the Spectral Non-destructive Assay Platform (SNAP) assay system is BPM for Depleted Uranium (DU) waste assay at AWE (1) and low level plutonium in soft drummed waste, HEPA filters and soils (2-4). The purpose of this paper is to highlight other applications where SNAP represents BPM for radioactive waste assay. This has been done by intercomparison studies of SNAP with other assay techniques, such as Segmented Gamma Scanner (SGS) and Passive Neutron Coincidence Counter (PNCC). It has been concluded that, for a large range of waste packages encountered at AWE, SNAP is BPM. (author)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Task Order 22 – Engineering and Technical Support, Deep Borehole Field Test. AREVA Summary Review Report

Under Task Order 22 of the industry Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS) Contract to the Department of Energy (DOE) DE-NE0000291, AREVA has been tasked with providing assistance with engineering, analysis, cost estimating, and design support of a system for disposal of radioactive wastes in deep boreholes (without the use of radioactive waste). As part of this task order, AREVA was requested, through a letter of technical direction, to evaluate Sandia National Laboratory’s (SNL’s) waste package borehole emplacement system concept recommendation using input from DOE and SNL. This summary review report (SRR) documents this evaluation, with its focus on the primary input document titled: “Deep Borehole Field Test Specifications/M2FT-15SN0817091” Rev. 1 [1], hereafter referred to as the “M2 report.” The M2 report focuses on the conceptual design development for the Deep Borehole Field Test (DBFT), mainly the test waste packages (WPs) and the system for demonstrating emplacement and retrieval of those packages in the Field Test Borehole (FTB). This SRR follows the same outline as the M2 report, which allows for easy correlation between AREVA’s review comments, discussion, potential proposed alternatives, and path forward with information established in the M2 report. AREVA’s assessment focused on three primary elements of the M2 report: the conceptual design of the WPs proposed for deep borehole disposal (DBD), the mode of emplacement of the WP into DBD, and the conceptual design of the DBFT. AREVA concurs with the M2 report’s selection of the wireline emplacement mode specifically over the drill-string emplacement mode and generically over alternative emplacement modes. Table 5-1 of this SRR compares the pros and cons of each emplacement mode considered viable for DBD. The primary positive characteristics of the wireline emplacement mode include: (1) considered a mature technology; (2) operations are relatively simple; (3) probability of a radiological release due to off-normal events are relatively low; (4) costs are relatively low; and (5) maintenance activities are relatively simple. The primary drawback associated with the wireline emplacement mode for DBD is the number of emplacement trips-in to the borehole, which results in a relatively higher probability for a drop event. Fortunately, the WPs can be engineered with impact limiters that will minimize the likelihood of a breach of the WP due to a drop. The WP designs presented in the M2 report appear to be focused on compatibility with the drill-string emplacement mode (e.g., the threaded connections). With the recommendation that the wireline emplacement mode be utilized for the DBFT, some changes may be warranted to these WPs. For example, the development of a WP release connection that is more reliable than the currently credited connection, which is considered to have a high failure probability, and the integration of an impact limiter into its design. The M2 report states the engineering demonstration of the DBFT will occur in the FTB over a 4-year period. AREVA recommends development and testing of the WP emplacement handling equipment occur separately (but concurrently, if not earlier) from the FTB at a mock-up facility. The separation of this activity would prevent schedule interference between the science and engineering thrusts of the project. Performing tests in a mock-up facility would allow additional control and observation compared to the FTB. The mock-up facility could also be utilized as a training facility for future operations. Terminal velocity and impact limiter testing would require the FTB for testing, since these areas would be difficult to reproduce in a limited depth mock-up. Although only at the end of the conceptual stage of design development, DBD appears to be a viable solution for some waste forms produced by the nuclear industry. However, regulatory requirements have yet to be established for pre- and post-closure performance of DBD and should be established as soon as possible. Some of the main areas of focus from a regulatory perspective include: (1) establishing acceptable performance requirements for the long-term behavior of DBD; (2) determining acceptable borehole abandonment criteria; (3) establishing retrievability requirements; (4) developing a consensus on the factor of safety (FoS) for the emplacement mode and WP; and (5) establishing safety and safeguards performance requirements for DBD. Although conservative requirements have been utilized to provide the foundation for the conceptual design of DBD, regulatory requirements and feedback are necessary to confirm recommendations made herein and to ensure the long-term performance of DBD is acceptable. The combination of the M2 report and this SRR is intended to facilitate the completion of the conceptual design for DBD for the Cs and Sr capsules and calcined waste forms. Using the conceptual design, preliminary design activities (the second stage of a three-stage process described in the M2 report) can proceed and the DBFT utilized to support, demonstrate, and confirm engineering elements of this design.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Reduced-order modeling of near-field THMC coupled processes for nuclear waste repositories in shale

Performance assessment (PA) of geologic radioactive waste repositories requires three-dimensional simulation of highly nonlinear, thermo-hydro-mechanical-chemical (THMC), multiphase flow and transport processes across many kilometers and over tens to hundreds of thousands of years. Integrating the effects of a near-field geomechanical process (i.e. buffer swelling) into coupled THC simulations through reduced-order modeling, rather than through fully coupled geomechanics, can reduce the dimensionality of the problem and improve computational efficiency. In this study, PFLOTRAN simulations model a single waste package in a shale host rock repository, where re-saturation of a bentonite buffer causes the buffer to swell and exert stress on a highly fractured disturbed rock zone (DRZ). Three types of stress-dependent permeability functions (exponential, modified cubic, and Two-part Hooke’s law models) are implemented to describe mechanical characteristics of the system. Overall, our modeling study suggests that compressing fractures reduces DRZ permeability, which could influence the rate of radionuclide transport and exchange with corrosive species in host rock groundwater that could accelerate waste package degradation. Less permeable shale host rock delays buffer swelling, consequently retarding DRZ permeability reduction as well as chemical transport within the barrier system.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The French Geological Repository Project Cigeo - 12023

The French Agency for Radioactive Waste Management, ANDRA, was launched by law in 1991 to perform and develop the research programme for managing high level and intermediate level long-lived radioactive waste generated by the French nuclear fleet. After a 15-year intensive research programme, including the study of alternative solutions, an overall review and assessment of the results was organized, including a national public debate. As a result, the Parliament passed a Planning Act on radioactive waste management in 2006. Commissioning of a geological repository by 2025 was one of the most important decisions taken at that time. To reach this goal, a license application must be submitted and reviewed by the competent authorities by 2015. A detailed review and consultation process is, as well, defined in the Planning Act. Beside the legal framework the project needs to progress on two fronts. The first one is on siting. A significant milestone was reached in 2009 with the definition of a defined area to locate the underground repository facilities. This area was approved in March 2010 by the Government, after having collected the opinions and positions of all the interested parties, at both National and local levels. A new phase of dialogue with local players began to refine the implementation scenarios of surface facilities. The final site selection will be approved after a public debate planned for 2013. The second one is the industrial organization, planning and costing. The industrial project of this geological repository was called Cigeo (Centre Industriel de Stockage Geologique). Given the amount of work to be done to comply with the given time framework, a detailed organization with well-defined milestones must be set-up. Cigeo will be a specific nuclear facility, built and operated underground for over a hundred years. The consequence of this long duration is that the development of the repository facilities will take place in successive operational phases. The characteristics of the first waste packages received will determine the work and the corresponding investments by 2025 on the repository site. One of the main challenges will be to accommodate both activities of mining and nuclear operations at the same time and at the same location. From the technical standpoint, ventilation and fire risk cannot be managed through a simple transposition from current nuclear industry practices. The reversibility demand also leads to concrete proposals with regard to repository management flexibility and waste package retrievability. These proposals contribute to the dialogue with stakeholders to prepare for the public debate and a future law which will determine the reversibility conditions. New design developments are expected to be introduced in the application from the current studies conducted until 2014. The possibility of optimization beyond 2015 will be kept open taking into account the one hundred years operating time as well as the capability to integrate feedback gained from the first construction and operation works. The industrial committed work aims to reach the application stage by 2015. The license application procedure was defined by the 2006 Act. Subject to authorization, the construction might begin in 2017. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Remediation of Uranium Impacted Sediments in a Watercourse - 12486

In 2009, remediation was initiated for a non-operational fuel cycle facility previously used for government contract work. Between 2009 and the spring of 2011, remediation efforts were focused on demolition of contaminated buildings and removal of contaminated soil. In the late spring of 2011, the last phase of remediation commenced involving the removal of contaminated sediments from portions of a 1,200 meter long gaining stream. Planning and preparation for remediation of the stream began in 2009 with submittal of permit applications to undertake construction activities in a wetland area. The permitting process was lengthy and involved securing permits from multiple agencies. However, early and frequent communication with stakeholders played an integral role in efficiently obtaining the permit approvals. Frequent communication with stakeholders throughout the planning and remediation process also proved to be a key factor in timely completion of the project. The remediation of the stream involved the use of temporary bladder berms to divert surface water flow, water diversion piping, a sediment vacuum removal system, excavation of sediments using small front-end loaders, sediment dewatering, and waste packaging, transportation and disposal. Many safeguards were employed to protect several species of concern in the work area, water management during project activities, challenges encountered during the project, methods of Final Status Survey, and stream restoration. The planning and permitting effort for the Site Brook remediation began in May 2009 and permits were approved and in place by February 2011. The remediation and restoration of the Site Brook began in April 2011 and was completed in November 2011. The remediation of the Site Brook involved the use of temporary bladder berms to divert surface water flow, water diversion piping, a sediment vacuum removal system, excavation of sediments using small front-end loaders, sediment dewatering, and waste packaging, transportation, disposal, FSS, and restoration. Early and frequent communications with stakeholders proved to be a key factor in timely completion of the project. Challenges encountered during the remediation effort were overcome by proper planning and having preparedness procedures in place prior to executing the work. With the remediation and restoration successfully completed, the only remaining task is to monitor/maintain the restoration for 10 years. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Activation Neutronics for a Swiss PWR: Simulations and Validation - Paper 102

In Switzerland 40% of the electricity generation is produced by nuclear power. With all four NPPs being already beyond their 30. year of operation, Nagra in collaboration with the utilities periodically contributes to the Swiss NPP decommissioning cost estimation studies. The neutron induced activation of structures and components of the NPPs is of particular relevance for the planning of the dismantling actions, the waste-packaging concept, the waste-management considerations and, therefore, the estimation of decommissioning costs. In this context, Nagra has developed a calculation sequence in order to perform state-of-the-art neutron transport and activation calculations. In this paper, aspects relevant to the neutron transport calculations for estimating the residual radioactivity within a Swiss PWR are presented. More specifically, the MCNP5 modeling approach together with the use of the ADVANTG-hybrid code for accelerating the variance reduction efforts is outlined. Additionally, the validation of the neutron transport calculations with in-situ full-cycle foil activation campaigns is discussed. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Materials characterisation with the associated particle technique

Since the last past years, the Nuclear Measurement Laboratory of CEA Cadarache, France, together with Partners from European and National projects, has been studying the application of fast neutron interrogation with the Associated Particle Technique for material identification in different areas of homeland and maritime security, and for the characterisation of the materials constituting radioactive waste. Fast 14 MeV neutrons are produced from the H-3(H-2,n)alpha fusion reaction in a sealed tube neutron generator embedding an alpha detector. The alpha particle is used to tag neutron direction and emission time, thus allowing the electronic selection of neutron-induced gamma spectra in the voxels of interest. Gamma rays emitted by tagged neutron interactions on the present nuclei (C, O, N, Fe, Al, Si, Cl, etc.) are recorded with spectroscopic detectors and analysed to determine elemental proportions, thus allowing material identification. Investigations have been conducted for the detection of explosives, illicit drugs and contraband materials in cargo containers, for the inspection of objects lying on the sea floor suspected to contain explosives like mines, bombs, torpedoes, etc., for the recognition of an improvised chemical device, and for material identification in radioactive waste packages. Recently the detection of special nuclear materials is being investigated using time correlation analysis between induced fission particles, instead of gamma-ray spectroscopy. The paper presents an overview of these studies and last results. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Low-level radioactive waste management: transitioning to off-site disposal at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Facing the closure of nearly all on-site management and disposal capability for low-level radioactive waste (LLW), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is making ready to ship the majority of LLW off-site. In order to ship off-site, waste must meet the Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facility's (TSDF) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). In preparation, LANL's waste management organization must ensure LANL waste generators characterize and package waste compliantly and waste characterization documentation is complete and accurate. Key challenges that must be addressed to successfully make the shift to off-site disposal of LLW include improving the detail, accuracy, and quality of process knowledge (PK) and acceptable knowledge (AK) documentation, training waste generators and waste management staff on the higher standard of data quality and expectations, improved WAC compliance for off-site facilities, and enhanced quality assurance throughout the process. Certification of LANL generators will allow direct off-site shipping of LLW from their facilities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Enhanced Evaluation Criteria to Meet the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria - 18655

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a deep geologic repository for the disposal of Transuranic (TRU) waste and the only such disposal facility of its kind. TRU waste is radioactive mixed waste generated by the U. S. Department of Energy in support of National Defense. In 2014, the WIPP facility was shut down when two separate accidents occurred in the repository. The two accidents were a fire on a large underground haul truck that prompted evacuation and filled the mine with smoke and soot, and a radiation release that contaminated the exhaust ventilation and disposal areas of the mine. DOE performed two accident investigations in 2014 that resulted in many corrective actions. Some of the corrective actions resulted in significant changes in the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) and are required to be applied to all TRU waste upon the resumption of shipments to WIPP. WIPP re-opened and began taking shipments again in 2017 and a large backlog of over 25,000 TRU waste containers that were certified prior to the new WAC have been undergoing re-evaluation since the re-opening. This paper will focus on the new WAC criteria that TRU waste must meet above-and-beyond previous WAC criteria and the implementation of new processes for approval. The primary area for these changes is in the area of waste characterization using Acceptable Knowledge (AK) and new detailed analyses required for chemical compatibility. The accident investigation revealed that the radiation release was due to a thermal runaway and bursting of the waste container due to inadvertent mixtures of nitrates and combustibles resulting in ignitable waste forms. In other words, the TRU waste container had incompatible contents that went undiscovered and created a hazard characteristic that was prohibited at WIPP. Through detailed chemical compatibility evaluations and new oversight, the DOE should be able to prevent a similar accident (see Figure 1). The new chemical compatibility evaluations and evaluations of oxidizing chemicals combined with combustibles are complex and detailed. Chemical compatibility is not a new requirement, but a much more detailed evaluation is a new requirement. And, obtaining historical information about the generation of the final waste form for legacy packaged waste can be very challenging. Specifically, determining possible amounts of chemicals in the waste can be extremely challenging. This paper does not explore in depth, the details of oxidizing chemicals. Other papers presented will discuss oxidizing chemicals. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ANSTO Synroc's Inactive Engineering Demonstrator - 19342

As part of the strategy for delivering the SyMo facility, a first of a kind project demonstrating the use of ANSTO Synroc technology for the treatment of intermediate liquid waste derived from Molybdenum-99 production, an inactive engineering demonstrator has been constructed by ANSTO Synroc. The role of this facility is to mitigate a number of the technology risks associated with a first of a kind project by addressing process integration, process operation, process recovery, maintenance, and operator training. Further, the plant is being used to develop the quality assurance framework to ensure that the waste package produced meets the waste acceptance criteria for final disposition. The inactive engineering demonstrator is a highly automated test-platform where the process design for the SyMo facility has been validated. A risk-based approach has been used to develop a comprehensive testing program aimed at mitigating the risks associated with a first of a kind plant and increasing the technology readiness level of the design. The ultimate result of this work is to ensure that the SyMo facility is highly reliable, operable, and maintainable. This paper will deliver a brief overview of the SyMo Facility, the project delivery methodology, and the role the inactive engineering demonstrator plays in project realisation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Repackaging of High Fissile TRU Waste at the Transuranic Waste Processing Center - 13240

Twenty-six drums of high fissile transuranic (TRU) waste from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) operations were declared waste in the mid-1980's and placed in storage with the legacy TRU waste inventory for future treatment and disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Repackaging and treatment of the waste at the TRU Waste Packaging Center (TWPC) will require the installation of additional equipment and capabilities to address the hazards for handling and repackaging the waste compared to typical Contact Handled (CH) TRU waste that is processed at the TWPC, including potential hydrogen accumulation in legacy 6M/2R packaging configurations, potential presence of reactive plutonium hydrides, and significant low energy gamma radiation dose rates. All of the waste is anticipated to be repackaged at the TWPC and certified for disposal at WIPP. The waste is currently packaged in multiple layers of containers which presents additional challenges for repackaging activities due to the potential for the accumulation of hydrogen gas in the container headspace in quantities than could exceed the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL). The outer container for each waste package is a stainless steel 0.21 m{sup 3} (55-gal) drum which contains either a 0.04 m{sup 3} or 0.06 m{sup 3} (10-gal or 15-gal) 6M drum. The inner 2R container in each 6M drum is ∼12 cm (5 in) outside diameter x 30-36 cm (12-14 in) long and is considered to be a > 4 liter sealed container relative to TRU waste packaging criteria. Inside the 2R containers are multiple configurations of food pack cans, pipe nipples, and welded capsules. The waste contains significant quantities of high burn-up plutonium oxides and metals with a heavy weight percentage of higher atomic mass isotopes and the subsequent in-growth of significant quantities of americium. Significant low energy gamma radiation is expected to be present due to the americium in-growth. Radiation dose rates on inner containers are estimated to be 1-3 mSv/hr (100-300 mrem/hr) with an unshielded dose rate on the waste itself of over 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr). Additional equipment to be installed at the TWPC will include a new perma-con enclosure and a shielded/inert glovebox in the process building to repackage and stabilize the waste. All of the waste will be repackaged into Standard Pipe Overpacks. Most of the waste (21 of the 26 drums) is expected to be repackaged at the food-pack can level (i.e. the food-pack cans will not be opened). Five of the incoming waste containers are expected to be repackaged at the primary waste level. Three of the containers exceed the 200 gram Pu-239 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) limit for the Standard Pipe Overpack. These three containers will be repackaged down to the primary waste level and divided into eight Standard Pipe Overpacks for shipment to WIPP. Two containers must be stabilized to eliminate any reactive plutonium hydrides that may be present. These containers will be opened in the inert, shielded glovebox, and the remaining corroded plutonium metal converted to a stable oxide form by using a 600 deg. C tube furnace with controlled oxygen feed in a helium carrier gas. The stabilized waste will then be packaged into two Standard Pipe Overpacks. Design and build out activities for the additional repackaging capabilities at the TWPC are scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2013 with repackaging, stabilization, and certification activities scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2014. Following repackaging and stabilization activities, the Standard Pipe Overpacks will be certified for disposal at WIPP utilizing Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) to verify the absence of prohibited items and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) to verify the isotopic content under the TWPC WIPP certification program implemented by the Central Characterization Project (CCP). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Current Regulations and Guidance - New Approaches for Risk-Informed Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management

This paper presents the historical foundations and future challenges for commercial low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) management in the United States. LLRW has been managed at government facilities since the beginning of the nuclear age and in the commercial sector since the early 1960's. Over the intervening years many technical, management and regulatory changes have occurred. Significant progress has been made in waste form, waste packaging and in recognizing radionuclides important to performance of disposal technologies and disposal facilities. This presentation will examine approaches using existing regulations and risk-informed approaches to improve guidance, licensing and management of LLRW. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Management of Disused Sealed Sources in Hungary - 13077

Since 1976 the spent and disused radioactive sources arisen in Hungary are stored in a central storage facility called Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility operated by Public Limited Company for Radioactive Waste Management. The Facility is responsible for the record keeping, the waste acceptance procedure, the shipment and the storage or disposal (whether a certain source meets the waste acceptance criteria for disposal or not) of sources. Based on the more than 35 year old operation of the facility many experiences have been gathered regarding the technology for long-term storage of sources, the attitude of the users of sources, the evolution of the legislation and the national record keeping system. Recently a new legislation for the security of radioactive materials (including sources) was introduced, first in Central-Europe. It requires special security arrangements from the facility for transport and for storage. Due to the ongoing retrieval of radioactive waste formerly disposed of, partly containing sealed sources, there is a new challenge in the physical inventory control of historical waste. The paper would show the effect of the changes in the legislation system of record keeping or security on the users' attitude for discard of sources and on the management of the sources in the facility. The facility has a unique storage technology (shallow boreholes) in the narrow region. The sealed sources are placed into vertical pipes sunk into the surface. In the beginning, each of the sources were dropped into the pipe directly, recently they are placed in a metal tube first ensuring the retrieval. The lessons learned will be presented. There were several issues to introduce the new security arrangements (partly financially supported by US DOE) for storage and for transportation of sealed sources. These issues are addressed. In the past part of the sealed sources were disposed together with solid radioactive waste packaged in plastic bags. A waste retrieval campaign was fulfilled in 2008 to retrieve the sealed sources. The paper demonstrates the conditions of sealed sources after twenty-year disposal period. As a summary, the paper will share the main experiences of a 35-year old facility, managing radioactive sealed sources in Central Europe. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

WIPP Space Faces TRU Waste Disposal Limits; The Volume Reducing Solution - 18365

Transuranic (TRU) waste packaging for removal from a glovebox has for many years involved the use of bags as the primary containment. In many cases, many hydrogenous layers of bags, yards of tape, and multiple filters are added to the waste stream in order to get the TRU waste into the final 55 gallon drum package to be shipped and buried at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The WIPP is currently limited to a total finite disposed volume of Contact Handled (CH) and Remote Handled (RH) TRU waste. As of early 2014 over half of the allotted WIPP volume had been filled with mainly CH-TRU waste. Based on current bag operation packaging methods used, the Department of Energy's (DOE) remaining CH and RH waste will not fit in the remaining limited WIPP space. Bag operations, can be performed safely by good operators following tedious repetitive processes and many Administrative Safety Controls. Since the bag is the only confinement layer between the contamination and the operator, contamination incidents can occur. Bag-out operations require close proximity to the waste to perform the process. With some waste streams, this close to waste proximity increases operator radiation dose. Central Research Laboratories (CRL), based in Red Wing Minnesota, who for many decades has developed proven engineered material transfer solutions based around their Rapid Transfer Port (RTP) technology, has worked with DOE sites to develop a TRU Waste Management Solution. The solution is a single filtered large Polyethylene (PE) or Stainless Steel (SST) Rapid Transfer Port container in a standard Department of Transportation (DOT) 7A, Type A drum, which allows for loading of TRU waste directly from the operational glovebox without the use of bags, sleeves or tapes to provide leak tight containment. All operator interventions to connect and disconnect a drum to and from the glovebox are achieved in an upright ergonomic position by one (1) operator in less than three (3) minutes. Minimal As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) levels are achieved during connect and disconnect of the drum, due to the engineered safety controls of the RTP. The CRL RTP solution allows glovebox or re-packaged TRU waste to be safely transferred to the final 55 Gallon drum container without additional bags or tape. The high diffusion coefficient filter on the CRL RTP 55G container and elimination of added hydrogenous packaging, improves the Decay Heat Limit (DHL) per drum for most TRU waste types compared with bagged drums, and in most cases allows more TRU waste to be loaded per drum. Inorganic TRU waste materials can be packaged directly into the CRL RTP SST drum container to the maximum DHL and Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) allowable for a drum. This paper will show how highly efficient TRAMPAC approved TRU waste packaging of CH and RH TRU waste can be accomplished in a safer, cost effective manner without adding any additional packaging materials to the waste stream, thus increasing the chance of placing all DOE's legacy and to be generated TRU waste in the remaining WIPP space. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RH-TRU Waste Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) (Rev. 14)

The Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of RH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RH-TRAMPAC). The RH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the RH-TRU 72-B. This document is a catalog of RH-TRU 72-B authorized contents by site. A content code is defined by the following components: (1) a two-letter site abbreviation that designates the physical location of the generated/stored waste (e.g., ID for Idaho National Laboratory [INL]); and (2) a three-digit code that designates the physical and chemical form of the waste (e.g., content code 317 denotes TRU Metal Waste). For RH-TRU waste to be transported in the RH-TRU 72-B, the first number of this three-digit code is "3." The second and third numbers of the three-digit code describe the physical and chemical form of the waste. Content codes are further defined as subcodes by an alpha trailer after the three-digit code to allow segregation of wastes that differ in one or more parameters. Examples are as follows: (1) the alpha trailers of ID 322A and ID 322D differentiate waste packaging configurations; (2) the alpha trailers of OR 321F and OR 321G differentiate shipping periods for the same waste (i.e., 60 days versus 10 days); and (3) the alpha trailers of OR 321D and OR 321H differentiate generating sources and time periods from the same waste stream, resulting in different isotopic content. As detailed in the RH-TRAMPAC, compliance with flammable gas limits may be demonstrated through the evaluation of compliance with either a decay heat limit or flammable gas generation rate (FGGR) limit per container specified in approved content codes. As applicable, if a container meets the watt*year criteria specified by the RH-TRAMPAC, the decay heat limits based on the dose-dependent G value may be used as specified in an approved content code.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RH-TRU Waste Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) (Rev. 15)

The Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of RH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RH-TRAMPAC). The RH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the RH-TRU 72-B. This document is a catalog of RH-TRU 72-B authorized contents by site. A content code is defined by the following components: (1) a two-letter site abbreviation that designates the physical location of the generated/stored waste (e.g., ID for Idaho National Laboratory [INL]); and (2) a three-digit code that designates the physical and chemical form of the waste (e.g., content code 317 denotes TRU Metal Waste). For RH-TRU waste to be transported in the RH-TRU 72-B, the first number of this three-digit code is "3." The second and third numbers of the three-digit code describe the physical and chemical form of the waste. Content codes are further defined as subcodes by an alpha trailer after the three-digit code to allow segregation of wastes that differ in one or more parameters. Examples are as follows: (1) the alpha trailers of ID 322A and ID 322D differentiate waste packaging configurations; (2) the alpha trailers of OR 321F and OR 321G differentiate shipping periods for the same waste (i.e., 60 days versus 10 days); and (3) the alpha trailers of OR 321D and OR 321H differentiate generating sources and time periods from the same waste stream, resulting in different isotopic content. As detailed in the RH-TRAMPAC, compliance with flammable gas limits may be demonstrated through the evaluation of compliance with either a decay heat limit or flammable gas generation rate (FGGR) limit per container specified in approved content codes. As applicable, if a container meets the watt*year criteria specified by the RH-TRAMPAC, the decay heat limits based on the dose-dependent G value may be used as specified in an approved content code.

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RH-TRU Waste Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) (Rev. 16)

The Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of RH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RH-TRAMPAC). The RH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the RH-TRU 72-B. This document is a catalog of RH-TRU 72-B authorized contents by site. A content code is defined by the following components: (1) a two-letter site abbreviation that designates the physical location of the generated/stored waste (e.g., ID for Idaho National Laboratory [INL]); and (2) a three-digit code that designates the physical and chemical form of the waste (e.g., content code 317 denotes TRU Metal Waste). For RH-TRU waste to be transported in the RH-TRU 72-B, the first number of this three-digit code is "3." The second and third numbers of the three-digit code describe the physical and chemical form of the waste. Content codes are further defined as subcodes by an alpha trailer after the three-digit code to allow segregation of wastes that differ in one or more parameters. Examples are as follows: (1) the alpha trailers of ID 322A and ID 322D differentiate waste packaging configurations; (2) the alpha trailers of OR 321F and OR 321G differentiate shipping periods for the same waste (i.e., 60 days versus 10 days); and (3) the alpha trailers of OR 321D and OR 321H differentiate generating sources and time periods from the same waste stream, resulting in different isotopic content. As detailed in the RH-TRAMPAC, compliance with flammable gas limits may be demonstrated through the evaluation of compliance with either a decay heat limit or flammable gas generation rate (FGGR) limit per container specified in approved content codes. As applicable, if a container meets the watt*year criteria specified by the RH-TRAMPAC, the decay heat limits based on the dose-dependent G value may be used as specified in an approved content code.

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