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Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) is the process of ensuring space system performance in the presence of a space radiation environment. Herein, we present an updated NASA methodology for RHA focusing on content, deliverables and timeframes.
The Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) discipline actively participates as a project member to achieve their common objective of full mission success while also providing an independent risk assessment to the Project Manager and Office of Safety and Mission Success staff. The cornerstone element of MOA is the independent assessment of the risks the project faces in executing its mission. Especially as the project approaches critical mission events, it becomes imperative to clearly identify and assess the risks the project faces. Quite often there are competing options for the project to select from in deciding how to execute the event. An example includes choices between proven but aging hardware components and unused but unproven components. Timing of the event with respect to visual or telecommunications visibility can be a consideration in the case of Earth reentry or hazardous maneuver events. It is in such situations that MOA is called upon for a risk balance assessment or risk trade study to support their recommendation to the Project Manager for a specific option to select. In the following paragraphs we consider two such assessments, one for the Stardust capsule Earth return and the other for the choice of telecommunications system configuration for the EPOXI flyby of the comet Hartley 2. We discuss the development of the trade space for each project's scenario and characterize the risks of each possible option. The risk characterization we consider includes a determination of the severity or consequence of each risk if realized and the likelihood of its occurrence. We then examine the assessment process to arrive at a MOA recommendation. Finally we review each flight project's decision process and the outcome of their decisions.
The basic idea underlying this paper is that the conventional understanding of the role of a Software Quality Assurance (SQA) engineer is unduly limited. This is because few have asked who the customers of a SQA engineer are. Once you do this, you can better define what tasks a SQA engineer should perform, as well as identify the knowledge and skills that such a person should have. The consequence of doing this is that a SQA engineer can provide greater value to his or her customers. It is the position of this paper that a SQA engineer providing significant value to his or her customers must not only assume the role of an auditor, but also that of a software and systems engineer. This is because software engineers and their managers particularly value contributions that directly impact products and their development. These ideas are summarized as lessons learned, based on my experience at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).
This presentation is for a knowledge exchange between NASA, JAXA, and ESA on System Safety and Mission Assurance Cubesat developments and challenges.
We describe dynamic safety cases, a novel operationalization of the concept of through-life safety assurance, whose goal is to enable proactive safety management. Using an example from the aviation systems domain, we motivate our approach, its underlying principles, and a lifecycle. We then identify the key elements required to move towards a formalization of the associated framework.
This presentation describes the CCP SMA approach to assuring the approved verifications of hazard controls are in place.
Separation assurance (SA) automation has been proposed as either a ground-based or airborne paradigm. The arrival environment is complex because aircraft are being sequenced and spaced to the arrival fix. This paper examines the effect of the allocation of the SA and scheduling functions on the performance of the system. Two coordination configurations between an SA and an arrival management system are tested using both ground and airborne implementations. All configurations have a conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) system and either an integrated or separated scheduler. Performance metrics are presented for the ground and airborne systems based on arrival traffic headed to Dallas/ Fort Worth International airport. The total delay, time-spacing conformance, and schedule conformance are used to measure efficiency. The goal of the analysis is to use the metrics to identify performance differences between the configurations that are based on different function allocations. A surveillance range limitation of 100 nmi and a time delay for sharing updated trajectory intent of 30 seconds were implemented for the airborne system. Overall, these results indicate that the surveillance range and the sharing of trajectories and aircraft schedules are important factors in determining the efficiency of an airborne arrival management system. These parameters are not relevant to the ground-based system as modeled for this study because it has instantaneous access to all aircraft trajectories and intent. Creating a schedule external to the CD&R and the scheduling conformance system was seen to reduce total delays for the airborne system, and had a minor effect on the ground-based system. The effect of an external scheduler on other metrics was mixed.
Variability of the space radiation environment is investigated with regard to parts categorization for total dose hardness assurance methods. It is shown that it can have a significant impact. A modified approach is developed that uses current environment models more consistently and replaces the design margin concept with one of failure probability.
Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) consists of all activities undertaken to ensure that the electronics and materials of a space system perform to their design specifications after exposure to the mission space environment. The subset of interests for NEPP and the REAG, are EEE parts. It is important to register that all of these undertakings are in a feedback loop and require constant iteration and updating throughout the mission life. More detail can be found in the reference materials on applicable test data for usage on parts.
Use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components and emerging technologies often require space flight missions to accept elevated risk. The Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) flow includes environment definition, hazard evaluation, requirements definition, evaluation of design, and design trades to accommodate and mitigate the risk a project or program takes. Depending on the mission profile and environment, different missions may not necessarily benefit from the same risk reduction efforts or cost reduction attempts. While this poses challenges for the radiation engineer, it also presents opportunities to tailor the RHA flow to minimize risk based on the environment or design criticality while remaining within budget. This presentation will focus on an approach to RHA amidst the present challenges, using the same RHA flow as in the past, with examples from recent radiation test results. The current challenges and the types of risk will be identified. How these risks drive requirements development and realization will be explained with examples of device results and data for single event effects (SEE) and in one case total ionizing dose (TID).
This presentation will discuss in detail NASA Government Working Group government topics from NASA Electronic Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG) which require additional in-depth technical solutions.
This part of the course first outlines the conventional Single Event Effect (SEE), radiation hardness assurance (RHA) approach, which emphasizes mission success. Next, Dr. Ladbury will discuss the challenges posed by new satellite platforms (e.g., cubesats, nanosats, etc.), where cost and schedule receive emphasis equal to if not greater than mission success. These additional pressures, along with growing demands to reduce size, weight and power, coupled with increased performance, drive many projects toward expanding their use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies. While this may reduce direct parts cost and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional SEE RHA and can make radiation testing and analysis one of the most significant risks or worse, a risk neglected altogether. That section will end with some approaches for restoring balance in the troika of mission success, cost, and schedule. This is captured in SEE RHA as risk management: identify the threat, evaluate the threat, and mitigate the threat.
This part of the course first outlines the conventional Single Event Effect (SEE), radiation hardness assurance (RHA) approach, which emphasizes mission success. Next, Dr. Ladbury will discuss the challenges posed by new satellite platforms (e.g., cubesats, nanosats, etc.), where cost and schedule receive emphasis equal to if not greater than mission success. These additional pressures, along with growing demands to reduce size, weight and power, coupled with increased performance, drive many projects toward expanding their use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies. While this may reduce direct parts cost and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional SEE RHA and can make radiation testing and analysis one of the most significant risksor worse, a risk neglected altogether. That section will end with some approaches for restoring balance in the troika of mission success, cost, and schedule. This is captured in SEE RHA as risk management: identify the threat, evaluate the threat, and mitigate the threat.
This paper describes technical progress made in the application of run time assurance (RTA) methods to turbofan engines with advanced propulsion control algorithms that are employed to improve engine performance. It is assumed that the advanced algorithms cannot be fully certified using current verification and validation approaches and therefore need to be continually monitored by an RTA system that ensures safe operation. However, current turbofan engine control systems utilize engine protection logic for safe combustion dynamics and stable airflow through the engine. It was determined that the engine protection logic should continue to be used to provide system safety and should be considered as a part of the overall RTA system. The additional function that an RTA system provides is to perform diagnostics on anomalous conditions to determine if these conditions are being caused by errors in the advanced controller. If this is the case, the RTA system switches operation to a trusted reversionary controller. Initial studies were performed to demonstrate this benefit. The other focus was to improve the performance of the engine protection logic, which was deemed too conservative and reduced engine performance during transient operations. It was determined that the conservative response was due to poor tuning of one of the controller channels within the protection logic. An automatic tuning algorithm was implemented to optimize the protection logic control gains based on minimizing tracking error. Improved tracking responses were observed with no change to the existing protection logic control architecture.
NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Overview and Technology Highlights – The NEPP Program provides NASA's leadership for developing and maintaining guidance for the screening, qualification, test, and reliable use of electrical, electronic, and electromechanical parts by NASA, in collaboration with other government agencies and industry. The NASA Electronic Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG) is a core portion of NEPP. This presentation highlights key focus areas for 2019.
This paper reports an algorithm for strategic time-based metering of air traffic arriving and departing from a large ( tens of nautical miles) area (called here, the commitment region) around an airport or metroplex. The algorithm assures separation continuously in time and avoids a dictation of intent to an aircraft crew. This is accomplished by allowing an aircraft (specifically, its Flight Management System) to specify, and commit to, an intended route and ground speed profile along that route within the commitment region, and by supplying the time at which to enter the region to the aircraft crew. The airspace that comprises the commitment region need not be confined to the terminal airspace and can include some of the enroute space: the size and shape of the commitment region are parameters in the algorithm. An exact formula for including speed profile uncertainty in the algorithm is provided. The algorithm is applied to a number of data sets recorded during actual air traffic operations in the Southern California TRACON in July of 2014 and the Atlanta TRACON in November and December of 2013. The results of the numerical simulations indicate that the algorithm succeeds at keeping the aircraft separated, but introduces, in its current implementation, more separation than that observed in actual operations. This excess separation can be reduced by modeling more accurately the Visual Flight Rules separation practices, a direction for future research.
During the past decade, numerous small satellites have been launched into space, with dramatically expanded dependence on advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems required for mission success. While the radiation effects vulnerabilities of small satellites are the same as those of their larger, traditional relatives, revised approaches are needed for risk management because of differences in technical requirements and programmatic resources. While moving to COTS components and systems may reduce direct costs and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Limited resources are accompanied by a lack of radiation testing and analysis, which can pose significant risks - or worse, be neglected altogether. Small satellites have benefited from short mission durations in low Earth orbits with respect to their radiation response, but as mission objectives grow and become reliant on advanced technologies operating for longer and in harsher environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope without hindering developers that provide new capabilities.
During the past decade, government agencies, private companies and academic institutions, have launched hundreds of small satellites into space, with dramatically expanded dependence on advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems required for mission success. While the radiation effects vulnerabilities of components within small satellites are the same as those of their larger, traditional relatives, revised approaches are needed for risk management because of differences in technical requirements and programmatic resources. While moving to COTS components and systems may reduce direct costs and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Limited resources are accompanied by a lack of radiation testing and analysis, which can pose significant risks. Small satellites have benefited from short mission durations in low Earth orbits with respect to their radiation response, but as mission objectives grow and become reliant on advanced technologies operating for longer and in harsher environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope without hindering developers that provide new capabilities. In this course we suggest RHA strategies that engineers and scientists can apply to a wide range of aerospace systems, including constellations, with a focus on how to manage aggressive system scaling for smaller platforms.