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At least 235 records · Page 13

Functional Testing of the Space Station Plasma Contactor

A plasma contactor system has been baselined for the International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) to control the electrical potentials of surfaces to eliminate/mitigate damaging interactions with the space environment. The system represents a dual-use technology which is a direct outgrowth of the NASA electric propulsion program and, in particular, the technology development effort on ion thruster systems. The plasma contactor subsystems include a hollow cathode assembly, a power electronics unit, and an expellant management unit. Under a pre-flight development program these subsystems are being developed to the level of maturity appropriate for transfer to U.S. industry for final development. Development efforts for the hollow cathode assembly include design selection and refinement, validating its required lifetime, and quantifying the cathode performance and interface specifications. To date, cathode components have demonstrated over 10,000 hours lifetime, and a hollow cathode assembly has demonstrated over 3,000 ignitions. Additionally, preliminary integration testing of a hollow cathode assembly with a breadboard power electronics unit has been completed. This paper discusses test results and the development status of the plasma contactor subsystems for ISSA, and in particular, the hollow cathode assembly.

Patterson, Michael J.↗

Radiated Emissions from a Remote-Controlled Airplane-Measured in a Reverberation Chamber

A full-vehicle, subscale all-electric model airplane was tested for radiated emissions, using a reverberation chamber. The mission of the NASA model airplane is to test in-flight airframe damage diagnosis and battery prognosis algorithms, and provide experimental data for other aviation safety research. Subscale model airplanes are economical experimental tools, but assembling their systems from hobbyist and low-cost components may lead to unforseen electromagnetic compatibility problems. This report provides a guide for accommodating the on-board radio systems, so that all model airplane systems may be operated during radiated emission testing. Radiated emission data are provided for on-board systems being operated separately and together, so that potential interferors can be isolated and mitigated. The report concludes with recommendations for EMI/EMC best practices for subscale model airplanes and airships used for research.

Ely, Jay J.↗

Development and Flight Testing of a Neural Network Based Flight Control System on the NF-15B Aircraft

The Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) project at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards AFB, CA, has been investigating the use of neural network based adaptive control on a unique NF-15B test aircraft. The IFCS neural network is a software processor that stores measured aircraft response information to dynamically alter flight control gains. In 2006, the neural network was engaged and allowed to learn in real time to dynamically alter the aircraft handling qualities characteristics in the presence of actual aerodynamic failure conditions injected into the aircraft through the flight control system. The use of neural network and similar adaptive technologies in the design of highly fault and damage tolerant flight control systems shows promise in making future aircraft far more survivable than current technology allows. This paper will present the results of the IFCS flight test program conducted at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center in 2006, with emphasis on challenges encountered and lessons learned.

Bomben, Craig R.↗

Modal Test Technology as Non-Destructive Evaluation of Space Shuttle Structures

Modal test and analysis Is being used for nondestructive evaluation of Space Shuttle structures. The purpose of modal testing is to measure the dynamic characteristics of a structure to extract its resonance frequencies, damping, and mode shapes. These characteristics are later compared to subsequently acquired characteristics. Changes in the modal characteristics indicate damage in the structure. Use of modal test technology as a damage detection tool was developed at JSC during the Shuttle acoustic certification program and subsequent test programs. The Shuttle Modal Inspection System was created in order to inspect areas that are impossible or impractical to inspect with conventional methods. Areas on which this technique has been applied include control surfaces, which are covered with thermal protection tiles, and the Forward Reaction Control Module, which is a frame structure that supports various tanks, thrusters, and fluid lines, which requires major disassembly to inspect. This paper traces the development of the technology, gives a status of its implementation on the Shuttle, explains challenges involved in implementing this type of inspection program, and suggests future improvements in data analysis and interpretation. Dual-use applications of the technology include inspections of bridges, oil-platforms, and aircraft.

Micheal S Grygler↗

Performance Characterization of Digital Optical Data Transfer Systems for Use in the Space Radiation Environment

Radiation effects in photonic and microelectronic components can impact the performance of high-speed digital optical data link in a variety of ways. This segment of the short course focuses on radiation effects in digital optical data links operating in the MHz to GHz regime. (Some of the information is applicable to frequencies above and below this regime) The three basic component level effects that should be considered are Total Ionizing Dose (TID), Displacement Damage Dose (DDD) and Single Event Effects (SEE). In some cases the system performance degradation can be quantified from component level tests, while in others a more holistic characterization approach must be taken. In Section 2.0 of this segment of the Short Course we will give a brief overview of the space radiation environment follow by a summary of the basic space radiation effects important for microelectronics and photonics listed above. The last part of this section will give an example of a typical mission radiation environment requirements. Section 3.0 gives an overview of intra-satellite digital optical data link systems. It contains a discussion of the digital optical data link and it's components. Also, we discuss some of the important system performance metrics that are impacted by radiation effects degradation of optical and optoelectronic component performance. Section 4.0 discusses radiation effects in optical and optoelectronic components. While each component effect will be discussed, the focus of this section is on degradation of passive optical components and SEE in photodiodes (other mechanisms are covered in segment II of this short course entitled "Photonic Devices with Complex and Multiple Failure Modes"). Section 5.0 will focus on optical data link system response to the space radiation environment. System level SEE ground testing will be discussed. Then we give a discussion of system level assessment of data link performance when operating in the space radiation environment.

Reed, Robert A.↗

Causal Factors and Adverse Conditions of Aviation Accidents and Incidents Related to Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control

The causal factors of accidents from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database and incidents from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) database associated with loss of control (LOC) were examined for four types of operations (i.e., Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121, Part 135 Scheduled, Part 135 Nonscheduled, and Part 91) for the years 1988 to 2004. In-flight LOC is a serious aviation problem. Well over half of the LOC accidents included at least one fatality (80 percent in Part 121), and roughly half of all aviation fatalities in the studied time period occurred in conjunction with LOC. An adverse events table was updated to provide focus to the technology validation strategy of the Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Project. The table contains three types of adverse conditions: failure, damage, and upset. Thirteen different adverse condition subtypes were gleaned from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), the FAA Accident and Incident database, and the NTSB database. The severity and frequency of the damage conditions, initial test conditions, and milestones references are also provided.

Reveley, Mary S.↗

Integrating Condition Indicators and Usage Parameters for Improved Spiral Bevel Gear Health Monitoring

The objective of this study was to illustrate the importance of combining Health Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) data with usage monitoring system data when detecting rotorcraft transmission health. Six gear sets were tested in the NASA Glenn Spiral Bevel Gear Fatigue Rig. Damage was initiated and progressed on the gear and pinion teeth. Damage progression was measured by debris generation and documented with inspection photos at varying torque values. A contact fatigue analysis was applied to the gear design indicating the effect temperature, load and reliability had on gear life. Results of this study illustrated the benefits of combining HUMS data and actual usage data to indicate progression of damage for spiral bevel gears.

Dempsey, Paula J.↗

Integrating Condition Indicators and Usage Parameters for Improved Spiral Bevel Gear Health Monitoring

The objective of this study was to illustrate the importance of combining Health Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) data with usage monitoring system data when detecting rotorcraft transmission health. Three gear sets were tested in the NASA Glenn Spiral Bevel Gear Fatigue Rig. Damage was initiated and progressed on the gear and pinion teeth. Damage progression was measured by debris generation and documented with inspection photos at varying torque values. A contact fatigue analysis was applied to the gear design indicating the effect temperature, load and reliability had on gear life. Results of this study illustrated the benefits of combining HUMS data and actual usage data to indicate progression of damage for spiral bevel gears.

Dempsey, Paula J.↗

Simulating the Impact Response of Full-Scale Composite Airframe Structures

NASA Langley Research Center obtained a composite helicopter cabin structure in 2010 from the US Army's Survivable Affordable Repairable Airframe Program (SARAP) that was fabricated by Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. The cabin had been subjected to a vertical drop test in 2008 to evaluate a tilting roof concept to limit the intrusion of overhead masses into the fuselage cabin. Damage to the cabin test article was limited primarily to the roof. Consequently, the roof area was removed and the remaining structure was cut into test specimens including a large subfloor section and a forward framed fuselage section. In 2011, NASA and Sikorsky entered into a cooperative research agreement to study the impact responses of composite airframe structures and to evaluate the capabilities of the explicit transient dynamic finite element code, LS-DYNA®, to simulate these responses including damage initiation and progressive failure. Most of the test articles were manufactured of graphite unidirectional tape composite with a thermoplastic resin system. However, the framed fuselage section was constructed primarily of a plain weave graphite fabric material with a thermoset resin system. Test data were collected from accelerometers and full-field photogrammetry. The focus of this paper will be to document impact testing and simulation results for the longitudinal impact of the subfloor section and the vertical drop test of the forward framed fuselage section.

Fasanella, Edwin L.↗

The Certification of Environmental Chambers for Testing Flight Hardware

The JPL chamber certification process for ensuring that test chambers used to test flight hardware meet a minimum standard is critical to the safety of the hardware and personnel. Past history has demonstrated that this process is important due to the catastrophic incidents that could occur if the chamber is not set up correctly. Environmental testing is one of the last phases in the development of a subsystem, and it typically occurs just before integration of flight hardware into the fully assembled flight system. A seemingly insignificant -miscalculation or missed step can necessitate rebuilding or replacing a subsystem due to over-testing or damage from the test chamber. Conversely, under-testing might fail to detect weaknesses that might cause failure when the hardware is in service. This paper describes the process that identifies the many variables that comprise the testing scenario and screening of as built chambers, the training of qualified operators, and a general "what-to-look-for" in minimum standards.

Vacuum Chamber↗

The Certification of Environmental Chambers for Testing Flight Hardware

The JPL chamber certification process for ensuring that test chambers used to test flight hardware meet a minimum standard is critical to the safety of the hardware and personnel. Past history as demonstrated that this process is important due to the catastrophic incidents that could occur if the chamber is not set up correctly. Environmental testing is one of the last phases in the development of a subsystem, and it typically occurs just before integration of flight hardware into the fully assembled flight system. A seemingly insignificant -miscalculation or missed step can necessitate rebuilding or replacing a subsystem due to over-testing or damage from the test chamber. Conversely, under-testing might fail to detect weaknesses that might cause failure when the hardware is in service. This paper describes the process that identifies the many variables that comprise the testing scenario and screening of as built chambers, the training of qualified operators, and a general "what-to-look-for" in minimum standards.

Thermal↗

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

Performance Evaluation and Modeling of Erosion Resistant Turbine Engine Thermal Barrier Coatings

The erosion resistant turbine thermal barrier coating system is critical to the rotorcraft engine performance and durability. The objective of this work was to determine erosion resistance of advanced thermal barrier coating systems under simulated engine erosion and thermal gradient environments, thus validating a new thermal barrier coating turbine blade technology for future rotorcraft applications. A high velocity burner rig based erosion test approach was established and a new series of rare earth oxide- and TiO2/Ta2O5- alloyed, ZrO2-based low conductivity thermal barrier coatings were designed and processed. The low conductivity thermal barrier coating systems demonstrated significant improvements in the erosion resistance. A comprehensive model based on accumulated strain damage low cycle fatigue is formulated for blade erosion life prediction. The work is currently aiming at the simulated engine erosion testing of advanced thermal barrier coated turbine blades to establish and validate the coating life prediction models.

Miller, Robert A.↗

Controllable Solid Propulsion Combustion and Acoustic Knowledge Base Improvements

Controllable solid propulsion systems have distinctive combustion and acoustic environments that require enhanced testing and analysis techniques to progress this new technology from development to production. In a hot gas valve actuating system, the movement of the pintle through the hot gas exhibits complex acoustic disturbances and flow characteristics that can amplify induced pressure loads that can damage or detonate the rocket motor. The geometry of a controllable solid propulsion gas chamber can set up unique unsteady flow which can feed acoustic oscillations patterns that require characterization. Research in this area aids in the understanding of how best to design, test, and analyze future controllable solid rocket motors using the lessons learned from past government programs as well as university research and testing. This survey paper will give the reader a better understanding of the potentially amplifying affects propagated by a controllable solid rocket motor system and the knowledge of the tools current available to address these acoustic disturbances in a preliminary design. Finally the paper will supply lessons learned from past experiences which will allow the reader to come away with understanding of what steps need to be taken when developing a controllable solid rocket propulsion system. The focus of this survey will be on testing and analysis work published by solid rocket programs and from combustion and acoustic books, conference papers, journal articles, and additionally from subject matter experts dealing currently with controllable solid rocket acoustic analysis.

McCauley, Rachel↗

Non-isolated 30 kW class arcjet PCU

A 30 kW class arcjet Power Conditioning Unit, PCU, was built and tested during this Phase 2 SBIR contract. The PCU is an improved version of two previously developed PCU's. All of these units are 3-phase, 20 kHz buck regulators with current mode feed back to modulate the duty cycle to control the arcjet current at any selected operating point. The steady state control can assure arcjet stability despite the negative dynamic resistance of the arc discharge. The system also has a circuit to produce a high voltage start pulse to breakdown the gas and initiate the arc. The start pulse is formed by temporarily switching a short current path across the output terminals with a special solid state switching array. The switches then open rapidly, and the energy stored in the output inductors of the buck regulator produces a pulse of approximately 2500 V for approximately 500 nsec. The system was tested and modified until the transition to steady operation occurred after start up with a very small surge current overshoot. The system also can withstand a direct short circuit across the output without damage. The automatic feed back control simply reduces the duty cycle to hold the current at the set point. When the short is removed the full power output is immediately restored. This latest version arcjet PCU is conduction cooled to remove waste heat by conduction to the base plate. This unit is closer to flight a type of design than the previous functional bread boards. Waste heat is small because the PCU has a very high efficiency, 296 percent. The PCU was extensively tested with resistor loads to simulate operation with an arcjet. The unit was tested with ammonia arcjets at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Approximately 400 hours of testing were completed, with several starts. Many hours were also demonstrated with resistive loads. Some testing with hydrogen arcjets was also carried out at NASA LeRC. This system concept is now the design base for the ATTD program.

Wong, See-Pok↗

Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I

Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.

Debris↗