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Twenty-Five Year Site Plan, FY2013 - FY2037

Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Laboratory) is the nation's premier national security science laboratory. Its mission is to develop and apply science and technology to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the United States (U.S.) nuclear stockpile; reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, and terrorism; and solve national problems in defense, energy, and the environment. The fiscal year (FY) 2013-2037 Twenty-Five Year Site Plan (TYSP) is a vital component for planning to meet the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) commitment to ensure the U.S. has a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. The Laboratory also uses the TYSP as an integrated planning tool to guide development of an efficient and responsive infrastructure that effectively supports the Laboratory's missions and workforce. Emphasizing the Laboratory's core capabilities, this TYSP reflects the Laboratory's role as a prominent contributor to NNSA missions through its programs and campaigns. The Laboratory is aligned with Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) modernization activities outlined in the NNSA Strategic Plan (May 2011) which include: (1) ensuring laboratory plutonium space effectively supports pit manufacturing and enterprise-wide special nuclear materials consolidation; (2) constructing the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF); (3) establishing shared user facilities to more cost effectively manage high-value, experimental, computational and production capabilities; and (4) modernizing enduring facilities while reducing the excess facility footprint. Th is TYSP is viewed by the Laboratory as a vital planning tool to develop an effi cient and responsive infrastructure. Long range facility and infrastructure development planning are critical to assure sustainment and modernization. Out-year re-investment is essential for sustaining existing facilities, and will be re-evaluated on an annual basis. At the same time, major modernization projects will require new line-item funding. This document is, in essence, a roadmap that defines a path forward for the Laboratory to modernize, streamline, consolidate, and sustain its infrastructure to meet its national security mission.

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2011 Computation Directorate Annual Report [Slides]

From its founding in 1952 until today, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has made significant strategic investments to develop high performance computing (HPC) and its application to national security and basic science. Now, 60 years later, the Computation Directorate and its myriad resources and capabilities have become a key enabler for LLNL programs and an integral part of the effort to support our nation's nuclear deterrent and, more broadly, national security. In addition, the technological innovation HPC makes possible is seen as vital to the nation's economic vitality. LLNL, along with other national laboratories, is working to make supercomputing capabilities and expertise available to industry to boost the nation's global competitiveness.

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The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World

Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.

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2012 SARA Students Technical Report

The Service Academy Research Associates (SARA) program provides an opportunity for Midshipmen and Cadets from US Service Academies to participate in research at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratory for several weeks during the summer as part of their summer training assignments. During the summer of 2012, three Midshipmen were assigned to work with the XCP Division at LANL for approximately 5-6 weeks. As one of the nation's top national security science laboratories, LANL stretches across 36 square miles, has over 2,100 facilities, and employs over 9,000 individuals including a significant number of students and postdocs. LANL's mission is to 'apply science and technology to: ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the US nuclear deterrent, reduce global threats, and solve other emerging national security challenges.' While LANL officially operates under the US Department of Energy (DoE), fulfilling this mission requires mutual cooperation with the US Department of Defense (DoD) as well. LANL's high concentration of knowledge and experience provides interns a chance to perform research in many disciplines, and its connection with the DoD in both operation and personnel gives SARA students insight to career possibilities both during and after military service. SARA students have plenty of opportunity to enjoy hiking, camping, the Los Alamos YMCA, and many other outdoor activities in New Mexico while staying at the Buffalo Thunder Resort, located 20 miles east of the lab. XCP Division is the Computational Physics division of LANL's Weapons Department. Working with XCP Division requires individuals to be Q cleared by the DoE. This means it is significantly more convenient for SARA students to be assigned to XCP Division than their civilian counterparts as the DoD CNWDI clearance held by SARA students is easily transferred to the lab prior to the students arriving at the start of the summer. SARA students working with XCP Division were given a comprehensive introduction into nuclear engineering and physics, nuclear weapons, and radiation transport and detection via texts and lectures at various classification levels. Students also attended tours of several prominent facilities at LANL including TA-41 Ice House, TA-55 PF-4 plutonium facility, the Nicholas C. Metropolis Center for Modeling and Simulation, also known as the Secure Computing Center (SCC), and the Dual-Axis Radiological Hydro Test (DARHT) facility; in addition, SARA students accompanied by LANL staff traveled to Minot AFB in North Dakota for tours of the 5th Bomb Wing and 91st Missile Wing facilities. Students participated in a week long class on the Monte Carlo N Particle (MCNP) code to supplement their understanding of radiation transport simulations. SARA students were then tasked with using this knowledge to model radiation detectors and use MCNP to compare their models to experimental data and previously accepted models.

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Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants [Slides]

The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Reductions without Regret: Details - Avoiding Box Canyons, Roach Motels, and Wrong Turns

The United States is concurrently pursuing the goals of reducing the size of its nuclear weapons force – strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed – and of modernizing the weapons it continues to possess. Many of the existing systems were deployed 30 to 50 years ago, and the modernization process can be expected to extend over the next decade or more. Given the impossibility of predicting the future over the lifetime of systems that could extend to the end of this century, it is essential that dead ends in force development be avoided, and the flexibility and availability of options be retained that allow for: • Scalability downward in the event that further reductions are agreed upon; • Reposturing to respond to changes in threat levels and to new nuclear actors; and • Breakout response in the event that a competitor significantly increases its force size or force capability, In this paper, we examine the current motivations for reductions and modernization; review a number of historical systems and the attendant capabilities that have been eliminated in recent decades; discuss the current path forward for the U.S. nuclear force; provide a view of the evolving deterrence situation and our assessment of the uncertainties involved; and present examples of possibly problematic directions in force development. We close with our thoughts on how to maintain flexibility and the availability of options for which a need might recur in the future.

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Reductions Without Regret: Historical Perspectives

This is the first of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. This paper examines the circumstances and consequences of the elimination of The INF-range Pershing II ballistic missile and Gryphon Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), deployed by NATO under a dual-track strategy to counter Soviet intermediate-range missiles while pursuing negotiations to limit or eliminate all of these missiles. The Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM), which was actually a family of missiles including SRAM A, SRAM B (never deployed), and SRAM II and SRAM T, these last two cancelled during an over-budget/behind-schedule development phase as part of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992. The nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM/N), first limited to shore-based storage by the PNIs, and finally eliminated in deliberations surrounding the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. The Missile-X (MX), or Peacekeeper, a heavy MIRVed ICBM, deployed in fixed silos, rather than in an originally proposed mobile mode. Peacekeeper was likely intended as a bargaining chip to facilitate elimination of Russian heavy missiles. The plan failed when START II did not enter into force, and the missiles were eliminated at the end of their intended service life. The Small ICBM (SICBM), or Midgetman, a road-mobile, single-warhead missile for which per-unit costs were climbing when it was eliminated under the PNIs. Although there were liabilities associated with each of these systems, there were also unique capabilities; this paper lays out the pros and cons for each. Further, we articulate the capabilities that were eliminated with these systems.

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Reductions without Regret: Summary

This paper briefly summarizes the series in which we consider the possibilities for losing, or compromising, key capabilities of the U.S. nuclear force in the face of modernization and reductions. The first of the three papers takes an historical perspective, considering capabilities that were eliminated in past force reductions. The second paper is our attempt to define the needed capabilities looking forward in the context of the current framework for force modernization and the current picture of the evolving challenges of deterrence and assurance. The third paper then provides an example for each of our undesirable outcomes: the creation of roach motels, box canyons, and wrong turns.

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Without Testing: Stockpile Stewardship in the Second Nuclear Age

Stockpile stewardship is a topic dear to my heart. I’ve been fascinated by it, and I’ve lived it—mostly on the technical side but also on the policy side from 2009 to 2010 at Stanford University as a visiting scholar and the inaugural William J. Perry Fellow. At Stanford I worked with Perry, former secretary of defense, and Sig Hecker, former Los Alamos Lab director (1986–1997), looking at nuclear deterrence, nuclear policy, and stockpile stewardship and at where all this was headed.

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Development of a Cavity Collapse Model of Cavitation Bubbles in Water in One and Two Dimensions using the Finite Volume FLAG Hydrocode at Atmospheric Pressure and 293K (Final Report)

Los Alamos National Laboratory was established in 1943 as the home of Project Y, The Manhattan Project directed by J. Robert Oppenheimer, with the aim of developing the world’s first atomic bomb. The project was successful and on the 16 th of July 1945 the first atomic bomb was detonated at Trinity Site. This development led to the creation of Little Boy and Fat Man, the two nuclear bombs dropped in Japan to end World War II. Today the laboratory has the responsibility of ensuring that the American nuclear deterrent is safe, secure and reliable. To ensure that this important responsibility is met, the laboratory carries out science in a wide range of areas. Its responsibilities are shared with Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). All are laboratories managed by the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

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Los Alamos National Laboratory Ten-Year Site Plan FY 2016

The Los Alamos National Laboratory will continue to face a significant challenge over the next 25 years in balancing near-term needs while transforming the infrastructure to ensure long-term viability. The 2014 Los Alamos National Laboratory Strategic Plan emphasized that infrastructure must be modernized and maintained to fulfill diverse, complex, and evolving missions in a period of fl at or decreasing budgets. The large number of existing facilities will continue to age while safety, security, sustainability and compliance requirements will likely increase. The Laboratory must also continue to act as an environmental steward, reduce environmental risk, and improve sustainability. This plan identifies strategies that will enable the Laboratory to provide a flexible, responsive infrastructure within available resources. At the end of the 25 year period, the Laboratory will have achieved the following: New facilities construction and enduring facilities reinvestment to support critical capabilities; Improved energy efficiency and long-term sustainability practices; Modernized utility infrastructure to support future programmatic needs; Legacy cleanup and long-term environmental stewardship goals; Footprint reduction and nuclear infrastructure consolidation. Even in the face of new and significant pressures, the Laboratory will continue to take substantial steps to streamline operations, modernize the infrastructure, and fulfill its vision of being the premier national security science laboratory. The fiscal year (FY) 2016 Ten-Year Site Plan (TYSP) is consistent with previous TYSPs and incorporates updated information in accordance with National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) guidance. The TYSP is a vital planning component to meet the NNSA commitment to ensure the U.S. has a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. The Laboratory also uses the TYSP as an integrated planning tool to guide development of an efficient and responsive infrastructure that effectively supports the Laboratory’s missions and workforce. Emphasizing the Laboratory’s core capabilities, this TYSP reflects the Laboratory’s role as a prominent contributor to NNSA missions through its programs and campaigns.

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Los Alamos National Laboratory RD 2015 Profile

A vital, multidisciplinary national security science laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory applies science and technology to help solve the nation’s toughest challenges. Outstanding science is the foundation for the past, present, and future. A rich variety of research programs directly and indirectly support the Laboratory’s basic mission: to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear deterrent; reduce global threats; and solve emerging national security energy challenges. The Laboratory also works on nuclear nonproliferation and border security, energy and infrastructure security, and measures to counter nuclear and biological terrorist threats.

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Evaluating Moving Target Defense with PLADD

This project evaluates the effectiveness of moving target defense (MTD) techniques using a new game we have designed, called PLADD, inspired by the game FlipIt. PLADD extends FlipIt by incorporating what we believe are key MTD concepts. We have analyzed PLADD and proven the existence of a defender strategy that pushes a rational attacker out of the game, demonstrated how limited the strategies available to an attacker are in PLADD, and derived analytic expressions for the expected utility of the game’s players in multiple game variants. We have created an algorithm for finding a defender’s optimal PLADD strategy. We show that in the special case of achieving deterrence in PLADD, MTD is not always cost effective and that its optimal deployment may shift abruptly from not using MTD at all to using it as aggressively as possible. We believe our effort provides basic, fundamental insights into the use of MTD, but conclude that a truly practical analysis requires model selection and calibration based on real scenarios and empirical data. We propose several avenues for further inquiry, including (1) agents with adaptive capabilities more reflective of real world adversaries, (2) the presence of multiple, heterogeneous adversaries, (3) computational game theory-based approaches such as coevolution to allow scaling to the real world beyond the limitations of analytical analysis and classical game theory, (4) mapping the game to real-world scenarios, (5) taking player risk into account when designing a strategy (in addition to expected payoff), (6) improving our understanding of the dynamic nature of MTD-inspired games by using a martingale representation, defensive forecasting, and techniques from signal processing, and (7) using adversarial games to develop inherently resilient cyber systems.

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LANL Contributions to the B61 LIfe Extension Program

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has a long, proud heritage in science and innovation that extends 70 years. Although the Laboratory’s primary responsibility is assuring the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear deterrent, Laboratory staff work on a broad range of advanced technologies to provide the best, most effective scientific and engineering solutions to the nation’s critical security challenges. The world is rapidly changing, but this essential responsibility remains the LANL’s core mission. LANL is the Design Laboratory for the nuclear explosive package of the B61 Air Force bomb. The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) activities at LANL will increase the lifetime of the bomb and provide safety and security options to meet security environments both today and in the future. The B61’s multiple-platform functionality, unique safety features, and large number of components make the B61-12 LEP one of the most complex LEPs ever attempted. Over 230 LANL scientists, engineers, technicians, and support personnel from across the Laboratory are bringing decades of interdisciplinary knowledge, technical expertise, and leading-edge capabilities to LANL’s work on the LEP.

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SW21 Summary Report

Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories hosted the tenth annual Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century Conference (SW21) on 21 January 2016 to reinforce the national commitment to leadership and institutional excellence for nuclear deterrence. The event has been successful over the years in drawing together a diverse, high-level group of policy makers and experts from multiple disciplines to engage in informed dialogue on topics related to strategic weapons in national and international security.

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Spent fuel measurements. passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) and photon signatures

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of a diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material from peaceful activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. An important IAEA task towards meeting this objective is the ability to accurately and reliably measure spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to verify reactor operating parameters and verify that the fuel has not been removed from reactors or SNF storage facilities. This dissertation analyzes a method to improve the state-of-the-art of nuclear material safeguards measurements using two combined measurement techniques: passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) and passive spectral photon measurements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

LANL Multiyear Strategy Performance Improvement (MYSPI), Fiscal Years 2017–2021

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) protects the nation and the world using innovative science, technology, and engineering through an integrated approach that harnesses the strength of our people, capabilities, and operations. The Laboratory’s Strategic Plan and Purpose statement provide the framework for scientific excellence and operational excellence now and in the future. Our Strategic Plan and Purpose help position Los Alamos for continuing mission success that ensures the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nation’s deterrent; protects the nation from nuclear and emerging threats through our larger global security missions; provides energy security to the nation; and ensures that the nation’s scientific reputation and capabilities remain robust enough to assure our allies and deter our adversaries. Moreover, we use these principles and guidance to ensure that Los Alamos is successful in attracting, recruiting, and retaining the next generation of world-class talent, while creating an efficient, environmentally responsible workplace that provides our employees with access to modern scientific tools and resources. Using this guidance and its underlying principles, we are continuing to restore credibility and operational effectiveness to the Laboratory, deliver mission success and continuing scientific excellence, and protect our employees and the nation’s secrets.

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The Concept of Reliability and Trustworthiness

The objective of this presentation is to obtain an appreciation and understanding of human behavior as it relates to critical jobs; to understand the basics of the Department of Energy's Human Reliability Program; to understand the importance of monitoring and deterrence; and to understand the effects of "right-sized" reaction.

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