Results for “failure cause” — Page 13

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Design for Reliability (DfR) in Space Life Support

The engineering process of Design for Reliability (DfR) is well established in the automotive and aerospace industries. DfR should be useful in the future development of space life support systems. DfR is a sequence of tasks that develop system requirements and plan reliability analysis and testing. First and fundamentally, the reliability requirement is defined. Next the system reliability model is developed, often using a reliability block diagram. The overall system reliability requirement is allocated to the subsystems and an estimate of the attainable reliability is made. This expected reliability can be improved by simplifying the design by removing components or by replacing less reliable components. Improving reliability can require difficult compromises, such as reducing performance requirements, increasing budget, or extending testing. The actual system reliability can be determined only by testing, which should continue long enough to provide the required confidence in the measured value. New systems often have unexpected design errors that cause failures in early testing. The usual reliability improvement process of testing, finding the failure modes, and redesigning to remove them reduces the failure rate and is referred to as “reliability growth.” After redesign has been completed, the system should be further tested to determine the actual achieved reliability more accurately. If the final system failure rate is too high, redundant systems can be used to improve overall operational reliability. Adding redundancy simply to increase the one- or two-fault tolerance metric may sometimes reduce reliability. Reliability can be improved in three ways: redesigning the system to include more reliable subsystems and components, reliability growth testing and failure mode removal, and by using parallel redundant systems. DfR should combine these approaches to achieve the required reliability while managing performance, cost, and schedule.

Reliability↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Design for Reliability (DfR) in Space Life Support

The engineering process of Design for Reliability (DfR) is well established in the automotive and aerospace industries. DfR should be useful in the future development of space life support systems. DfR is a sequence of tasks that develop system requirements and plan reliability analysis and testing. First and fundamentally, the reliability requirement is defined. Next the system reliability model is developed, often using a reliability block diagram. The overall system reliability requirement is allocated to the subsystems and an estimate of the attainable reliability is made. This expected reliability can be improved by simplifying the design by removing components or by replacing less reliable components. Improving reliability can require difficult compromises, such as reducing performance requirements, increasing budget, or extending testing. The actual system reliability can be determined only by testing, which should continue long enough to provide the required confidence in the measured value. New systems often have unexpected design errors that cause failures in early testing. The usual reliability improvement process of testing, finding the failure modes, and redesigning to remove them reduces the failure rate and is referred to as “reliability growth.” After redesign has been completed, the system should be further tested to determine the actual achieved reliability more accurately. If the final system failure rate is too high, redundant systems can be used to improve overall operational reliability. Adding redundancy simply to increase the one- or two-fault tolerance metric may sometimes reduce reliability. Reliability can be improved in three ways: redesigning the system to include more reliable subsystems and components, reliability growth testing and failure mode removal, and by using parallel redundant systems. DfR should combine these approaches to achieve the required reliability while managing performance, cost, and schedule.

Reliability↗

NASA NTRS2024

A Phenomenological Durability Model for Environmental Barrier Coating Systems Subjected to Steam Oxidation

Environmental barrier coatings (EBC) are used to protect the silicon carbide fiber reinforced silicon carbide matrix (SiC/SiC) ceramic matrix composites (CMC) from rapid surface recession due to volatization by water vapor in a steam oxidation environment. A phenomenological modeling approach is outlined to estimate the durability of a given EBC system when exposed to steam oxidation. The report provides a step-by-step procedure to estimate the life of a given EBC system subjected to thermal loads only. Once calibrated, the methodology can predict the critical thickness of an oxide layer that will cause failure initiation/spallation as well as the remaining strength or stress that the EBC system can take for a given oxide layer thickness

Subodh K Mital↗

DOE OSTI1995

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 1, January-June 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part II: The State of the Nuclear Fuel Located Within the Chornobyl Sarcophagus, A A. Borovoi and A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 33 Nuclear Power Safety in Central and Eastern Europe, R. Wilson; 46 Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors in the Former Eastern European Countries, S. Chakraborty; 53 Technical Note: On the Definition of Common-Cause Failures, H. Paula; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 58 Modeling and Analysis of Core-Debris Recriticality During Hypothetical Severe Accidents in the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor, S.-H. Kim, V. Georgevich, D. B. Simpson, C. O. Slater, and R. P. Taleyarkhan; 68 Ignitability of Hydrogen/Oxygen/Diluent Mixtures in the Presence of Hot Surfaces, R. K. Kumar and G. W. Koroll; 94 Coupled RELAP5 and CONTAIN Accident Analysis Using PVM, K. A. Smith, A. J. Baratta, and G. E. Robinson; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 109 Application of Fuzzy Logic in Nuclear Reactor Control Part I: An Assessment of State-of-the-Art, A. S. Heger, N. K. Alang-Rashid, and M. Jamshidi; DESIGN FEATURES: 122 Twenty-Third DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, J. J. Hayes, and M. W. First; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 135 Atmospheric Dispersion and the Radiological Consequences of Normal Airborne Effluents from a Nuclear Power Plant, D. Fang, C. Z. Sun, and L. Yang; 142 Calculation of Distribution Coefficients for Radionuclides in Soils and Sediments, I. Puigdomenech and U. Bergstrom: OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 155 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 158 Operating Experience Feedback Report—Reliability of Safety-Related Steam Turbine-Driven Standby Pumps Used in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, J. R. Boardman; 166 Turbine Building Hazards, H. L Ornstein; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 169 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 175 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1994; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 32 Harvard School of Public Health In-Place Filter Testing Workshop; 134 International Conference on Advances in the Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants; 193 30th Tennessee Industries Week; 193 DOE Technical Standards Program 1995 Workshop; 194 Multiphase Flow Experiments and Instrumentation; 180 The Authors; 185 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volumes 34 and 35.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NASA NTRS1975

ATM CMG bearing failure analysis

The cause or causes for the failure of ATM CMG S/N 5 (Skylab 1) and the anomalies associated with ATM CMG S/N 6 (Skylab 2) were investigated. Skylab telemetry data were reviewed and presented in the form of parameter distributions. The theory that the problems were caused by marginal bearing lubrication was studied along with the effects of orbital conditions on lubricants. Bearing tests were performed to investigate the effect of lubricant or lack of lubricant in the ATM CMG bearings and the dispersion and migration of the lubricant. The vacuum and weightless conditions of space were simulated in the bearing tests. Analysis of the results of the tests conducted points to inadequate lubrication as the predominant factor causing the failure of ATM CMG S/N 5 (Skylab 1) and the anomalies associated with ATM CMG S/N 6 (Skylab 2).

Source record↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Going Beyond Reliability to Robustness and Resilience in Space Life Support Systems

The words reliability, robustness, and resilience are often used interchangeably to describe tough and dependable systems but the distinctions between them suggest how to design more serviceable space systems. Reliability is simply the quality of consistently performing well. A system that dependably meets its design requirements in the specified environment is reliable. The designers may not consider themselves responsible for failures under unanticipated conditions. Robustness is the capability of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions, which can go beyond the expected range to include possible off-nominal conditions. Resilience is the ability to recover from or adapt to unanticipated damaging events, such as failures, accidents, external disruptions, and repurposing. Such changes can invalidate the usual operating assumptions and cause system failure. Reliability, robustness, and resilience describe dependable performance under increasingly difficult conditions, first the specified environment, then a wider possible environment, and finally unanticipated damaging conditions. These three qualities are increasingly desirable and increasingly difficult to achieve. Engineering for resilience would design systems that can ignore or repair failures, survive accidents, and recover from unanticipated disruptions. Increasing the resilience of space systems would greatly increase space crew safety. Improving reliability and robustness requires dealing with known problems, but improving resilience requires implementing a general approach to reducing the impact of unknown future events. The need for robustness and resilience has been stated for decades but little has been done. Systems designers often assume that they understand everything they need to know. The potential failures caused by changes, failures, accidents, unknown environments, and unknown unknowns can be ignored. Such overconfidence can lead to neglect of reliability, robustness, and resilience.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Going Beyond Reliability to Robustness and Resilience in Space Life Support Systems

The words reliability, robustness, and resilience are often used interchangeably to describe tough and dependable systems but the distinctions between them suggest how to design more serviceable space systems. Reliability is simply the quality of consistently performing well. A system that dependably meets its design requirements in the specified environment is reliable. The designers may not consider themselves responsible for failures under unanticipated conditions. Robustness is the capability of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions, which can go beyond the expected range to include possible off-nominal conditions. Resilience is the ability to recover from or adapt to unanticipated damaging events, such as failures, accidents, external disruptions, and repurposing. Such changes can invalidate the usual operating assumptions and cause system failure. Reliability, robustness, and resilience describe dependable performance under increasingly difficult conditions, first the specified environment, then a wider possible environment, and finally unanticipated damaging conditions. These three qualities are increasingly desirable and increasingly difficult to achieve. Engineering for resilience would design systems that can ignore or repair failures, survive accidents, and recover from unanticipated disruptions. Increasing the resilience of space systems would greatly increase space crew safety. Improving reliability and robustness requires dealing with known problems, but improving resilience requires implementing a general approach to reducing the impact of unknown future events. The need for robustness and resilience has been stated for decades but little has been done. Systems designers often assume that they understand everything they need to know. The potential failures caused by changes, failures, accidents, unknown environments, and unknown unknowns can be ignored. Such overconfidence can lead to neglect of reliability, robustness, and resilience.

Harry W. Jones↗

DOE OSTI2024

Woody Feedstock 2022 State of Technology Report

The U.S. Department of Energy promotes production of advanced liquid transportation fuels from lignocellulosic biomass by funding fundamental and applied research that advances the state of technology (SOT). As part of its involvement in this mission, Idaho National Laboratory completes an annual SOT report for n th -plant and 1 st -plant woody biomass feedstock logistics. The purpose of the SOT is to provide the status of feedstock supply system technology development for woody biomass to biofuels relative to technical targets and cost goals from specific design cases, based on data and experimental results. Conventional feedstock supply systems need to be modified to meet the demands of conversion pathways, specifically to have the ability to adjust the quality of the raw biomass materials. Advanced systems incorporate innovative methods of material handling, preprocessing and supply chain configuration. In advanced designs, variability of the raw biomass can be reduced to produce feedstocks of a uniform format, moving toward biomass commoditization. Against this backdrop, the 2022 Woody SOT for low-ash woody feedstocks utilizes feedstock fractionation by incorporating technologies that can separate the biomass into its anatomical fractions (wood, bark, needle, and extrinsic ash) to reduce impurities and attempt to maximize the retention of usable fractions that satisfy downstream quality considerations. By using a series of air classification steps, this strategy can reduce the extrinsic ash in forest residues, separate out a majority of the incoming needles (which can be supplied to alternate markets), and maximize the retention of whitewood in the usable fraction. The fractionated forest residues are then mixed with clean-pine chips in a 50-50 blend to prepare the feedstock for the desired conversion pathway. The n th -plant analysis estimated the delivered cost for the feedstock at $\$$69.23/dry ton (2016$\$$) which represents a $\$$6.64/dry ton decrease compared to the cost estimate of the 2021 Woody SOT supply system for low-ash woody feedstocks. The quality requirements in the 2022 Woody SOT were identical to those of the 2021 Woody SOT at = 1.00 wt % ash and = 50.51 wt% carbon. The cost savings derive primarily from reductions in dry matter losses during air classification. The GHG emissions for the n th -plant analysis were estimated at 178.39 kg CO2e/dry ton compared to 178.71 kg CO 2 e/dry ton in the 2021 Woody SOT, a decrease of 0.32 kg CO2e/dry ton. The small change stems from an increase in emissions attributed to preprocessing and slightly larger savings in emissions from transportation. In the 1 st -plant analysis of the 2022 Woody SOT system, the average throughput was estimated to be approximately 2,128 dry tons/day or 96.51% of the name plate capacity. During the simulation the daily throughput ranged from 1,090 dry tons/day to 2,200 dry tons/day, or 49.43% to 99.75% of the daily nameplate capacity. After the year of operation 722,403 tons of processed feedstock were produced in total without regard to quality considerations (99.64% of the annual nameplate capacity). The variability in throughput was primarily caused by equipment failures in the system. Regular failures, downtime caused by routine maintenance per manufacturer guidelines, contributed to a majority 62.50% of failures and 62.60% of downtime. Failures due to wear were the other cause of disruption within the system, impacting the rotary shear and orbital screen and accounting for 37.50% of the failures and 37.40% of the total downtime. Ultimately the system was on stream for 87.84% during the simulation period, which is only 2.16 percentage points below the nth-plant assumption for on-stream time. The production cost of the system averaged $\$$71.66/dry ton. The costs ranged from a minimum of $\$$71.23/dry ton to a maximum of $\$$2,115.30/dry ton. When dry matter losses (disposed low-quality fractions as well as other losses such as in grinders) were considered the costs increased to an average of $\$$75.11/dry ton with a minimum of $\$$74.69/dry ton and a maximum of $\$$2,136.86/dry ton...

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Detecting and Characterizing Patterns of Failure in Complex Systems: An Ontology Development and Clustering Approach

While the causes of failures in complex engineered systems are often clear in hindsight, it can be challenging to predict failures proactively during the design of novel engineered products or systems. Identifying patterns can be useful for capturing common characteristics that may lead to failure. In this paper, we present a methodology for identifying patterns of failure from NASA’s publicly available Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS). We apply an ontology development and clustering approach to identify representative patterns leading to failures in historical lessons learned. A joint inductive-deductive approach reveals the key themes in lessons that lead to failure, which are formalized and recorded as an ontology of complex systems failure causes. Documents from the LLIS are manually tagged with relevant characteristics from the ontology. From the tagged set, clustering is used to capture co-occurring sets of characteristics that lead to failure. The primary contribution of this work is a method for extracting a set of generic failure patterns in complex engineered systems and characteristics for these patterns that can be identified at design time, knowledge of which can be used to plan mitigation strategies.

Systems Engineering↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Detecting and Characterizing Patterns of Failure in Complex Engineered Systems: an Ontology Development and Clustering Approach

While the causes of failures in complex engineered systems are often clear in hindsight, it can be challenging to predict failures proactively during the design of novel engineered products or systems. Identifying patterns can be useful for capturing common characteristics that may lead to failure. In this paper, we present a methodology for identifying patterns of failure from NASA’s publicly available Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS). We apply an ontology development and clustering approach to identify representative patterns leading to failures in historical lessons learned. A joint inductive-deductive approach reveals the key themes in lessons that lead to failure, which are formalized and recorded as an ontology of complex systems failure causes. Documents from the LLIS are manually tagged with relevant characteristics from the ontology. From the tagged set, clustering is used to capture co-occurring sets of characteristics that lead to failure. The primary contribution of this work is a method for extracting a set of generic failure patterns in complex engineered systems and characteristics for these patterns that can be identified at design time, knowledge of which can be used to plan mitigation strategies.

Systems Engineering↗

NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗

NASA NTRS1992

Short-term reversibility of ultrastructural changes in pulmonary capillaries caused by stress failure

We previously showed that when the pulmonary capillaries in anesthetized rabbits are exposed to a transmural pressure (Ptm) of approximately 40 mmHg, stress failure of the walls occurs with disruption of the capillary endothelium, alveolar epithelium, or sometimes all layers. The present study was designed to determine whether some of the ultrastructural changes are rapidly reversible when the capillary pressure is reduced. To test this, the Ptm was raised to 52.5 cmH2O for 1 min of blood perfusion and then reduced to 12.5 cmH2O for 3 min of saline-dextran perfusion, followed by intravascular fixation at the same pressure. In another group of animals, the pressure was elevated for 1 min of blood and 3 min of saline-dextran before being reduced. The results were compared with previous studies in which the capillary pressures were maintained elevated at 52.5 cmH2O during the entire procedure. Control studies were also done at sustained low pressures. The results showed that the number of endothelial and epithelial breaks per millimeter and the total fraction area of the breaks were reduced when the pressure was lowered. For example, the number of endothelial breaks per millimeter decreased from 7.1 +/- 2.1 to 2.4 +/- 0.7, and the number of epithelial breaks per millimeter fell from 11.4 +/- 3.7 to 3.4 +/- 0.7. There was evidence that the breaks that closed were those that were initially small and were associated with an intact basement membrane. The results suggest that cells can move along their underlying matrix by rapid disengagement and reattachment of cell adhesion molecules, causing breaks to open or close within minutes.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS).

Non-NASA Center↗

NASA NTRS1985

Recent materials problems relating to catastrophic balloon failures

Balloons fabricated of thin polyethylene materials have provided relatively inexpensive and reliable scientific research platforms for approximately three decades. Reliability of the modern day balloon, as launched by the U.S.A. National Scientific Balloon Facility (NSBF), has been approximately 85 percent. Recent balloon failures, coupled with an increased ocurrence of catastrophic failures, created grave concern over the integrity of the present balloon inventory of the U.S.A. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). An investigative team was established by NASA to review the circumstances surrounding the catastrophic balloon failures, determine the cause and to make recommendations to correct the problem and to prevent its reoccurrence. The most probable cause of failure as determined by the investigation was the polyethylene balloon film, although the film had passsed the established standard quality control measures of the film manufacturer. The approach, findings, and conclusions of the investigation are presented along with planned procedures to assure future quality balloon film for NASA balloons.

Smith, I. S.↗

NASA NTRS1991

The blind leading the blind: Mutual refinement of approximate theories

The mutual refinement theory, a method for refining world models in a reactive system, is described. The method detects failures, explains their causes, and repairs the approximate models which cause the failures. The approach focuses on using one approximate model to refine another.

Kedar, Smadar T.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Reliability Quantification of Advanced Stirling Convertor (ASC) Components

The Advanced Stirling Convertor, is intended to provide power for an unmanned planetary spacecraft and has an operational life requirement of 17 years. Over this 17 year mission, the ASC must provide power with desired performance and efficiency and require no corrective maintenance. Reliability demonstration testing for the ASC was found to be very limited due to schedule and resource constraints. Reliability demonstration must involve the application of analysis, system and component level testing, and simulation models, taken collectively. Therefore, computer simulation with limited test data verification is a viable approach to assess the reliability of ASC components. This approach is based on physics-of-failure mechanisms and involves the relationship among the design variables based on physics, mechanics, material behavior models, interaction of different components and their respective disciplines such as structures, materials, fluid, thermal, mechanical, electrical, etc. In addition, these models are based on the available test data, which can be updated, and analysis refined as more data and information becomes available. The failure mechanisms and causes of failure are included in the analysis, especially in light of the new information, in order to develop guidelines to improve design reliability and better operating controls to reduce the probability of failure. Quantified reliability assessment based on fundamental physical behavior of components and their relationship with other components has demonstrated itself to be a superior technique to conventional reliability approaches based on utilizing failure rates derived from similar equipment or simply expert judgment.

Shah, Ashwin R.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Battery Assessment

In 2013, the Boeing Company model 787-8 Dreamliner commercial aircraft experienced three catastrophic lithium (Li) battery failures. The cause of each failure resulted in a single-cell thermal runaway (TR) condition, which propagated to adjacent battery cells. Two of the failures involved rechargeable lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries, and the third event involved a nonrechargeable lithium-manganese dioxide (Li-MnO2) battery. In response to these Li battery failures, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) approved a technical assessment of the International Space Station Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Li non-rechargeable battery. This assessment was conducted to evaluate the SAFER Li nonrechargeable battery safety design features against Boeing 787 Dreamliner Li battery failure lessons learned. Specifically, this investigation focused on assessing the severity of a SAFER battery TR hazard conditions.

Iannello, Christopher J.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Improving Single Event Effects Testing Through Software

Radiation encountered in space environments can be damaging to microelectronics and potentially cause spacecraft failure. Single event effects (SEE) are a type of radiation effect that occur when an ion strikes a device. Single event gate rupture (SEGR) is a type of SEE that can cause failure in power transistors. Unlike other SEE rates in which a constant linear energy transfer (LET) can be used, SEGR rates sometimes require a non-uniform LET to be used to be accurate. A recent analysis shows that SEGR rates are most easily calculated when the environment is described as a stopping rate per unit volume for each ion species. Stopping rates in silicon for pertinent ions were calculated using the Stopping and Range of Ions in Matter (SRIM) software and CREME-MC software. A reference table was generated and can be used by others to calculate SEGR rates for a candidate device. Additionally, lasers can be used to simulate SEEs, providing more control and information at lower cost than heavy ion testing. The electron/hole pair generation rate from a laser pulse in a semiconductor can be related to the LET of an ion. MATLAB was used to generate a plot to easily make this comparison.

generation equation↗

NASA NTRS2005

Proper Criteria of Nonlinear Optical Crystals for Space Laser Systems and the Possible Causes for Space Laser Failures

NASA is striving to develop a scientific understanding of the universe and the Earth-Sun System and its response to natural or human-induced changes. Space lasers are vital tools for NASA's missions to advance our understanding of space research and improving our prediction capability for climate, weather, and natural hazards. Unfortunately, several past space missions that utilized lasers proved to be short-lived and unreliable. In this paper, we are reporting the results of our investigations on several nonlinear optical crystals, which are vital components in space lasers. Examples of these investigations are: The correlation of the phase diagrams of nonlinear crystals and its durability, the effect of radiating these crystals by high-energy beams of protons and gamma on their second harmonic efficiency, and measurements of the high-energy and low-energy thresholds for each crystal before and after irradiation. A set of proper criteria for these crystals will be presented. We will also discuss the possible causes of failures in a space laser and propose a solution to a contamination problem in all future space lasers.

Abdeldayem, Hossin A.↗