Results for “human system risk” — Page 13

NASA NTRS2019

Implementation of Human System Integration Workshop at NASA for Human Spaceflight

The human is a key element in the complex system of systems underlying space exploration missions. As a critical system, its operating bands and requirements need to be characterized and integrated with other systems. Optimal integration of the human system with hardware and software elements has an impact on multiple aspects of mission execution, including human health and performance, risk mitigation, effective design and functionality, enhanced safety, and reduced lifecycle costs. The field of Human Systems Integration (HSI) represents an interdisciplinary and comprehensive cross-cutting approach encompassing technical and management processes for integrating human as a system consideration and objective within and across all other system components and multiple domains. In addition to human activities, HSI covers training, operations and support dimensions. Moreover, HSI is an essential enabler to systems engineering practice, emphasizing human system aspects toward optimizing fully integrated system of systems performance while systematically infusing the needs of all users during the earliest stages of development. Consistent with the National Space Exploration Campaign, NASA is developing the Gateway, a lunar orbiting platform that will serve as astronaut habitat, support transit to deep space, validate new technologies and systems, and function as a science laboratory and communications hub, among other uses. It is an essential element of a phase that will extend human exploration into deep space through evolvable infrastructure and advanced technology, supporting assembly and logistics of other exploration architecture elements. In an effort to explore the current status and forward plan of HSI implementation in the mission (system of systems) lifecycle, the HSI Employee Resource Group conducted an HSI workshop using the Gateway Program as a case study. It revealed how different organizations at the Johnson Space Center incorporate HSI in their processes in preparation for the development and operation of the Gateway. The workshop focused on HSI methodology for implementation of the six NASA HSI domains: Human Factors Engineering, Operations Resources, Habitability and Environment, Maintainability and Supportability, Safety, and Training. Results from the workshop are reported on this paper, as well as some historical background of HSI at NASA, and the success in using an Employee Resource Group to promote technical knowledge. The authors hope that this information can be used to disseminate best practices for translational applications to other space exploration systems.

Silva-Martinez, Jackelynne↗

NASA NTRS2019

Implementation of Human System Integration Workshop at NASA for Human Spaceflight

The human is a key element in the complex system of systems underlying space exploration missions. As a critical system, its operating bands and requirements need to be characterized and integrated with other systems. Optimal integration of the human system with hardware and software elements has an impact on multiple aspects of mission execution, including human health and performance, risk mitigation, effective design and functionality, enhanced safety, and reduced lifecycle costs. The field of Human Systems Integration (HSI) represents an interdisciplinary and comprehensive cross-cutting approach encompassing technical and management processes for integrating human as a system consideration and objective within and across all other system components and multiple domains. In addition to human activities, HSI covers training, operations and support dimensions. Moreover, HSI is an essential enabler to systems engineering practice, emphasizing human system aspects toward optimizing fully integrated system of systems performance while systematically infusing the needs of all users during the earliest stages of development. Consistent with the National Space Exploration Campaign, NASA is developing the Gateway, a lunar orbiting platform that will serve as astronaut habitat, support transit to deep space, validate new technologies and systems, and function as a science laboratory and communications hub, among other uses. It is an essential element of a phase that will extend human exploration into deep space through evolvable infrastructure and advanced technology, supporting assembly and logistics of other exploration architecture elements. In an effort to explore the current status and forward plan of HSI implementation in the mission (system of systems) lifecycle, the HSI Employee Resource Group conducted an HSI workshop using the Gateway Program as a case study. It revealed how different organizations at the Johnson Space Center incorporate HSI in their processes in preparation for the development and operation of the Gateway. The workshop focused on HSI methodology for implementation of the six NASA HSI domains: Human Factors Engineering, Operations Resources, Habitability and Environment, Maintainability and Supportability, Safety, and Training. Results from the workshop are reported on this paper, as well as some historical background of HSI at NASA, and the success in using an Employee Resource Group to promote technical knowledge. The authors hope that this information can be used to disseminate best practices for translational applications to other space exploration systems.

Silva-Martinez, Jackelynne↗

NASA NTRS2014

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗

NASA NTRS2015

Identification and Evaluation of Integration and Cross Cutting Issues Across HRP Risks

The HRP Integrated Research Plan contains the research plans for the 32 risks requiring research to characterize and mitigate. These risks to human health and performance in spaceflight are identified by evidence and each one focuses on a single aspect of human physiology or performance. They are further categorized by aspects of the spaceflight environment, such as altered gravity or space radiation, that that play a major role in their likelihood and consequence. From its inception the "integrate" in the Research Plan has denoted the integrated nature of risks to human health and performance, the connectedness of physiological systems within the human body regardless of the spaceflight environment, and the integrated response of the human body to the spaceflight environment. Common characteristics of the spaceflight environment include altered gravity, atmospheres and light/dark cycles, space radiation, isolation, noise, and periods of high or low workload. Long term exposure to this unique environment produces a suite of physiological effects such as stress; vision, neurocognitive and anthropometric changes; circadian misalignment; fluid shifts, deconditioning; immune dysregulation; and altered nutritional requirements. Matrix diagraming was used to systematically identify, analyze and rate the many-to-many relationships between environmental characteristics and the suite of physiological effects. It was also to identify patterns in the relationships of common physiological effects to each other. Analyses of patterns or relationships in these diagrams help to identify issues that cut across multiple risks. Cross cutting issues benefit from a multidisciplinary approach that synthesizes concepts or data from two or more disciplines to identify and characterize risk factors or develop countermeasures relevant to multiple risks. They also help to illuminate possible problem areas that may arise when a countermeasure impacts risks other than those which it was developed to mitigate, or identify groupings of physiological changes that are likely to occur that may impact the overall risk posture.

Steinberg, S. L.↗

NASA NTRS1995

Immune Alterations in Male and Female Mice after 2-Deoxy-D-Glucose Administration

Administration of 2-deoxy-D-glucose (2-DG), an analog of glucose which inhibits glycolysis by competitive antagonism for phosphohexose isomerase, results in acute periods of intracellular glucoprivation and hyperglycemia resulting in hyperphagia. In addition to these changes in the carbohydrate metabolism, injection of 2-DG results in alterations of both the endocrine and neurological systems as suggested by modifications in oxytocin and glucocorticoid levels and norepinephrine production. Moreover, alterations of the immune response, such as a decrease in the in vitro proliferation of splenocytes after mitogen-stimulation, were observed in mice injected with 2-DG. Sex, genotype and environment are among the factors that may modulate effects of catecholamines and hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal axis on these immune changes. Sexual dimorphism in immune function resulting from the effects of sex hormones on immune effector cells has been shown in both animals and humans. These observations have important implications, especially with regard to higher incidence of many autoimmune diseases in females. Evidence exists that reproductive hormones influence the immune system and increase the risk of immunologically related disorders in both animals and humans. Indeed, immunological responses in stressful situations may also be confounded by fluctuations of sex hormones especially in females. Lymphocyte distribution, cytoldne production, and the ability of lymphocyte to proliferate in vitro were analyzed in male and female mice to determine if sex influenced 2-DG immunomodulation. In addition, the influence of hormones, especially sex hormones, on these changes were evaluated.

Dreau, Didier↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Supportability Concepts for Crewed Deep Space Exploration

Supportability—defined as the set of system characteristics that influence the logistics and support required to enable safe and effective operations—will be a much larger driver of mass, risk, and crew time for future human space exploration due to the more challenging mission context. For Mars, systems must operate in a logistically isolated environment for much longer durations than previous missions, which results in a higher probability of system failure and therefore an increased need for maintenance or contingency options. Mars missions also lack access to quick aborts, which increases the consequences of an unrecoverable system failure. Together, this higher likelihood and consequence of failure results in an increase in supportability-related risk. Supportability analysis is an important part of systems development that helps designers better understand the impacts of system and mission decisions on risk, mass, and crew time. The real-world processes that drive maintenance requirements and other supportability-related characteristics are probabilistic, and therefore they require different conceptual approaches and models than are used for more deterministic aspects of space systems. This paper provides an overview of supportability analysis, addresses key concepts, and provides examples of how supportability analysis can be incorporated into system development. Specifically, system supportability involves stochastic processes, and therefore must be evaluated using probabilistic models. These models can be used to perform sensitivity analysis even if system characteristics are not yet fully defined. Failure rates cannot be measured directly, but tests provide valuable data that can help refine those estimates. Human spaceflight architectures are complex, and exhibit coupled behavior that should be examined with integrated systems analysis that includes an assessment of supportability.

Supportability↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Supportability Concepts for Crewed Deep Space Exploration

Supportability—defined as the set of system characteristics that influence the logistics and support required to enable safe and effective operations—will be a much larger driver of mass, risk, and crew time for future human space exploration due to the more challenging mission context. For Mars, systems must operate in a logistically isolated environment for much longer durations than previous missions, which results in a higher probability of system failure and therefore an increased need for maintenance or contingency options. Mars missions also lack access to quick aborts, which increases the consequences of an unrecoverable system failure. Together, this higher likelihood and consequence of failure results in an increase in supportability-related risk. Supportability analysis is an important part of systems development that helps designers better understand the impacts of system and mission decisions on risk, mass, and crew time. The real-world processes that drive maintenance requirements and other supportability-related characteristics are probabilistic, and therefore they require different conceptual approaches and models than are used for more deterministic aspects of space systems. This paper provides an overview of supportability analysis, addresses key concepts, and provides examples of how supportability analysis can be incorporated into system development. Specifically, system supportability involves stochastic processes, and therefore must be evaluated using probabilistic models. These models can be used to perform sensitivity analysis even if system characteristics are not yet fully defined. Failure rates cannot be measured directly, but tests provide valuable data that can help refine those estimates. Human spaceflight architectures are complex, and exhibit coupled behavior that should be examined with integrated systems analysis that includes an assessment of supportability.

Supportability↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Spaceflight-Induced Changes in Microbial Virulence and the Impact to the Host Immune Response

Many microbial pathogen shave repeatedly exhibited unexpected responses relevant to infectious disease when grown in microgravity and microgravity analogue environments, including changes in final cell concentration, biofilm production, stress resistance, antibiotic sensitivity, gene expression, host-pathogen interactions, and virulence. Notably, the classic foodborne pathogen Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium displayed increased virulence in animals when cultured in either the spaceflight analogue or true spaceflight environment. Recently, Serratia marcescens also was shown to increase virulence when cultured in the spaceflight environment. In parallel, astronaut studies have characterized a persistent spaceflight-induced dysregulation of the human immune system at multiple levels, which suggests an increased risk of infectious diseases. Moreover, astronauts have some degree of clinical infectious disease incidence. However, the contribution of the microgravity environment on host-pathogen interactions and potential for clinical disease remains understudied and poorly characterized. The goal of this study is to gain insight into the breadth of other medically significant microbial pathogens that may exhibit altered virulence and pathogenesis-related responses when cultured in space flight analogue conditions. Specifically, we are characterizing the effect of spaceflight analogue culture (Low Shear Modeled Microgravity/LSMMG) on microbial pathogenesis-related stress responses, in vitro host-pathogen interactions, gene expression, and virulence potential in animals using five important model bacterial pathogens, Salmonella enterica Enteritidis, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Burkholderia cepacia, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli. Herein, we present data from one of these pathogens, the foodborne bacterium, S. enterica Enteritidis, which is closely related to S. enterica Typhimurium. Phenotypes evaluated included growth profiles, environmental stress responses(acid, oxidative, bile, and thermal stresses),and in vitro colonization of3-D biomimetic cultures of human intestinal tissue containing immune cells. Transcriptomic profiling and virulence studies are ongoing. We show that S. Enteritidis exhibited key alterations in pathogenic responses to LSMMG culture that suggest increased infection risk, including several responses which were different from those observed in the closely related pathovar S. Typhimurium. This information will provide critical mechanistic insight into the potential impact of microgravity on alterations in microbial virulence and associated infectious disease risk to crew health during spaceflight missions.

C M Ott↗

NASA NTRS2024

Spaceflight-Induced Changes in Microbial Virulence and the Impact to the Host Immune Response

Many microbial pathogen shave repeatedly exhibited unexpected responses relevant to infectious disease when grown in microgravity and microgravity analogue environments, including changes in final cell concentration, biofilm production, stress resistance, antibiotic sensitivity, gene expression, host-pathogen interactions, and virulence. Notably, the classic foodborne pathogen Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium displayed increased virulence in animals when cultured in either the spaceflight analogue or true spaceflight environment. Recently, Serratia marcescens also was shown to increase virulence when cultured in the spaceflight environment. In parallel, astronaut studies have characterized a persistent spaceflight-induced dysregulation of the human immune system at multiple levels, which suggests an increased risk of infectious diseases. Moreover, astronauts have some degree of clinical infectious disease incidence. However, the contribution of the microgravity environment on host-pathogen interactions and potential for clinical disease remains understudied and poorly characterized. The goal of this study is to gain insight into the breadth of other medically significant microbial pathogens that may exhibit altered virulence and pathogenesis-related responses when cultured in space flight analogue conditions. Specifically, we are characterizing the effect of spaceflight analogue culture (Low Shear Modeled Microgravity/LSMMG) on microbial pathogenesis-related stress responses, in vitro host-pathogen interactions, gene expression, and virulence potential in animals using five important model bacterial pathogens, Salmonella enterica Enteritidis, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Burkholderia cepacia, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli. Herein, we present data from one of these pathogens, the foodborne bacterium, S. enterica Enteritidis, which is closely related to S. enterica Typhimurium. Phenotypes evaluated included growth profiles, environmental stress responses(acid, oxidative, bile, and thermal stresses),and in vitro colonization of3-D biomimetic cultures of human intestinal tissue containing immune cells. Transcriptomic profiling and virulence studies are ongoing. We show that S. Enteritidis exhibited key alterations in pathogenic responses to LSMMG culture that suggest increased infection risk, including several responses which were different from those observed in the closely related pathovar S. Typhimurium. This information will provide critical mechanistic insight into the potential impact of microgravity on alterations in microbial virulence and associated infectious disease risk to crew health during spaceflight missions.

C.M. Ott↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

On the Moral Hazard of Autonomy

This paper describes the concept of moral hazard as applied to technologies that incorporate automation and autonomy. Moral hazard is said to exist when a party to a transaction feels more comfortable taking undue risks because another party will bear the costs if things go badly. As opposed to regular physical hazards, a moral hazard comes from within a person. In this paper, we reveal two categories of moral hazards related to autonomy. The first category of moral hazard occurs when the owner of the autonomy introduces an autonomous system without accepting the full responsibility for improper operation thereby shifting the risks from one party to another party. This category of moral hazard is similar to moral hazards experienced in other industries and can often be addressed through appropriate policy and establishing liability for irresponsible behavior. The issue becomes more complicated in cases where the operator of the autonomy may not have a full understanding of the system behavior. In the second category of moral hazard, risks are shifted from people to autonomy. In this category, the humans in proximity to the autonomous system begin to trust its behavior. Their behavior may change in that they may believe they are more insulated from harm and subsequently exhibit more risky behavior towards increasingly autonomous technologies. Mitigating this type of moral hazard may require the autonomy to possess certain design features to discourage this type of harmful human behavior so that humans do not suffer needlessly in their interactions with autonomous systems by placing inappropriate trust where that trust is neither warranted nor deserved.

Cybernetics↗

NASA NTRS2015

Mars2020 Entry, Descent, and Landing Instrumentation (MEDLI2): Science Objectives and Instrument Requirements

NASAs exploration and technology roadmaps call for capability advancements in Mars entry, descent, and landing (EDL) systems to enable increased landed mass, a higher landing precision, and a wider planetary access. It is also recognized that these ambitious EDL performance goals must be met while maintaining a low mission risk in order to pave the way for future human missions. As NASA is engaged in developing new EDL systems and technologies via testing at Earth, instrumentation of existing Mars missions is providing valuable engineering data for performance improvement, risk reduction, and an improved definition of entry loads and environment. The most notable recent example is the Mars Entry, Descent and Landing Instrument (MEDLI) suite hosted by Mars Science Laboratory for its entry in Aug 2012. The MEDLI suite provided a comprehensive dataset for Mars entry aerodynamics, aerothermodynamics and thermal protection system (TPS) performance. MEDLI data has since been used for unprecedented reconstruction of aerodynamic drag, vehicle attitude, in-situ atmospheric density, aerothermal heating, and transition to turbulence, in-depth TPS performance and TPS ablation. [1,2] In addition to validating predictive models, MEDLI data has demonstrated extra margin available in the MSL forebody TPS, which can potentially be used to reduce vehicle parasitic mass. The presentation will introduce a follow-on MEDLI instrumentation suite (called MEDLI2) that is being developed for Mars-2020 mission. MEDLI2 has an enhanced scope that includes backshell instrumentation, a wider forebody coverage, and instruments that specifically target supersonic aerodynamics. Similar to MEDLI, MEDLI2 uses thermal plugs with embedded thermocouples and ports through the TPS to measure surface pressure. MEDLI2, however, also includes heat flux sensors in the backshell and a low range pressure transducer to measure afterbody pressure.

Aerothermodynamics↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Systems Integration Relationships Between Deep Space and Deepwater Exploration Challenges

NASA pursuit of human missions Beyond Earth Orbit (BEO) to the moon and eventually Mars will pose many new challenges. These missions are characterized by increased risks to human performance due to stress, fatigue, radiation exposure, and isolation. Fundamental changes in spaceflight operations will be required as well. A very critical part of future missions will be assisting the crew with problem-solving and contingency resolution using next-generation smart spacecraft systems. Human Systems Integration (HSI) must be included as part of the systems engineering process. Gateway1 will serve as part of the proving ground for maturing technology such as autonomous systems and space operations procedures to help meet moon mission goals and prepare humans for missions to Mars. For deep space missions, risk factors affecting humans such as mission duration, distance, and physiological/psychological effects, must be considered. A human is not a simple component but rather a system in a systems-of-systems application-a system influenced by cognitive and biological factors that are difficult to model/analyze. System complexity will demand an integrated approach that requires multiple viewpoints, including the understanding of the astronauts' capabilities and limitations to enhance safety, performance, and satisfaction on the interaction between all system users in a variety of environments to achieve acceptable mission goals and performance. HSI will play a vital role in the development of these future missions. This paper provides a discussion of HSI used at NASA and the critical role human factors engineering will play in the HSI process for future missions along with the challenges. Industries such as oil and gas (O&G) could benefit from the content of this paper to help improve the safety and operations of deepwater/oil and gas exploration activities. NASA engineering and human systems subject-matter expert personnel reviewed challenges reported in space-related environments for long space duration missions and identified similarities with the challenges encountered in deepwater exploration. The researchers noted the space industry's current solutions and proposed a system development view to solve future deepwater exploration challenges using HSI principles. This paper discusses the results of the review.

George Salazar↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Improving Quantification of Medical Evacuation Risk for Human Spaceflight in the IMPACT Model

Traditionally, mission planners have used a heuristic and qualitative approach to design medical systems based on prior experience however this approach may result in high variability and implicit bias to design and could put missions and crewmembers at risk. The Informing Mission Planning through Analysis of Complex Tradespaces (IMPACT) tool is a probabilistic risk assessment tool designed by NASA to model medical risk in long duration missions outside of low earth orbit (LEO). This tool can quantify risk metrics such as risk of crewmember death, loss of crew task time, and the need for medical evacuation to better inform and augment the more traditional approach to medical system design. The risk metric of Return to Definitive Care (RTDC) represents the likelihood of requiring medical evacuation and has been difficult to quantify in a reliable and standardized manner. Initial development of the RTDC metric was constrained due to the complexity of a medical evacuation decision and the lack of prior spaceflight data and this presentation will discuss the review and improvement process used to increase model accuracy and fidelity.

Prashant Parmar↗

NASA NTRS2002

The Effect of Microgravity on the Smallest Space Travelers: Bacterial Physiology and Virulence on Earth and in Microgravity

Since the first human flights outside of Earth's gravity, crew health and well-being have been major concerns. Exposure to microgravity during spaceflight is known to affect the human immune response, possibly making the crew members more vulnerable to infectious disease. In addition, biological experiments previously flown in space have shown that bacteria grow faster in microgravity than they do on Earth. The ability of certain antibiotics to control bacterial infections may also differ greatly in microgravity. It is therefore critical to understand how spaceflight and microgravity affect bacterial virulence, which is their ability to cause disease. By utilizing spaceflight hardware provided by the European Space Agency (ESA), Dr. Barry Pyle and his team at Montana State University, Bozeman, will be performing an experiment to study the effects of microgravity on the virulence of a common soil and water bacterium, Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Importantly, these bacteria have been detected in the water supplies of previous Space Shuttle flights. The experiment will examine the effects of microgravity exposure on bacterial growth and on the bacterium's ability to form a toxin called Exotoxin A. Another goal is to evaluate the effects of microgravity on the physiology of the bacteria by analyzing their ability to respire (produce energy), by studying the condition of the plasma membrane surrounding the cell, and by determining if specific enzymes remain active. Proteins produced by the bacteria will also be assayed to see if the normal functions of the bacteria are affected. In the context of human life support in spaceflight, the results of this experiment will offer guidance in providing the highest possible water quality for the Shuttle in order to limit the risk of infection to human occupants and to minimize water system and spacecraft deterioration.

Pyle, Barry↗

NASA NTRS2015

NASA Galactic Cosmic Radiation Environment Model: Badhwar-O'Neill (2014)

The Badhwar‐O'Neill (BON) Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR) flux model is used by NASA to certify microelectronic systems and in the analysis of radiation health risks for human space flight missions. Of special interest to NASA is the kinetic energy region below 4.0 GeV/n due to the fact that exposure from GCR behind shielding (e.g., inside a space vehicle) is heavily influenced by the GCR particles from this energy domain. The BON model numerically solves the Fokker‐Planck differential equation to account for particle transport in the heliosphere due to diffusion, convection, and adiabatic deceleration under the assumption of a spherically symmetric heliosphere. The model utilizes a GCR measurements database from various particle detectors to determine the boundary conditions. By using an updated GCR database and improved model fit parameters, the new BON model (BON14) is significantly improved over the previous BON models for describing the GCR radiation environment of interest to human space flight.

O'Neill, P. M.↗

NASA NTRS2015

NASA Galactic Cosmic Radiation Environment Model: Badhwar - O'Neill (2014)

The Badhwar-O'Neill (BON) Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR) flux model has been used by NASA to certify microelectronic systems and in the analysis of radiation health risks for human space flight missions. Of special interest to NASA is the kinetic energy region below 4.0 GeV/n due to the fact that exposure from GCR behind shielding (e.g., inside a space vehicle) is heavily influenced by the GCR particles from this energy domain. The BON model numerically solves the Fokker-Planck differential equation to account for particle transport in the heliosphere due to diffusion, convection, and adiabatic deceleration under the assumption of a spherically symmetric heliosphere. The model utilizes a comprehensive database of GCR measurements from various particle detectors to determine boundary conditions. By using an updated GCR database and improved model fit parameters, the new BON model (BON14) is significantly improved over the previous BON models for describing the GCR radiation environment of interest to human space flight.

Golge, S.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Spaceflight-Induced Changes in Microbial Virulence and the Impact to the Host Immune Response

Many microbial pathogens have repeatedly exhibited unexpected responses relevant to infectious disease when grown in microgravity and microgravity analogue environments, including changes in final cell concentration, biofilm production, stress resistance, antibiotic sensitivity, gene expression, host-pathogen interactions, and virulence. Notably, the classic foodborne pathogen Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium displayed increased virulence in animals when cultured in either the spaceflight analogue or true spaceflight environment. Recently, Serratia marcescens also was shown to increase virulence when cultured in the spaceflight environment. In parallel, astronaut studies have characterized a persistent spaceflight-induced dysregulation of the human immune system at multiple levels, which suggests an increased risk of infectious diseases. Moreover, astronauts have some degree of clinical infectious disease incidence. However, the contribution of the microgravity environment on host-pathogen interactions and potential for clinical disease remains understudied and poorly characterized. The goal of this study is to gain insight into the breadth of other medically significant microbial pathogens that may exhibit altered virulence and pathogenesis-related responses when cultured in spaceflight analogue conditions. Specifically, we are characterizing the effect of spaceflight analogue culture (Low Shear Modeled Microgravity/LSMMG) on microbial pathogenesis-related stress responses, in vitro host-pathogen interactions, gene expression, and virulence potential in animals using five important model bacterial pathogens, Salmonella enterica Enteritidis, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Burkholderia cepacia, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli. The information to date is providing a better understanding into the potential impact of microgravity on alterations in microbial virulence and associated infectious disease risk to crew health during spaceflight missions.

C M Ott↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗