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NASA NTRS2002

Managing Risk for Cassini During Mission Operations and Data Analysis (MOandDA)

A Risk Management Process has been tailored for Cassini that not only satisfies the requirements of NASA and JPL, but also allows the Program to proactively identify and assess risks that threaten mission objectives. Cassini Risk Management is a team effort that involves both management and engineering staff. The process is managed and facilitated by the Mission Assurance Manager (MAM), but requires regular interactions with Program Staff and team members to instill the risk management philosophy into the day to day mission operations. While Risk Management is well defined for projects in the development phase, it is a relatively new concept for Mission Operations. The Cassini team has embraced this process and has begun using it in an effective, proactive manner, to ensure mission success. It is hoped that the Cassini Risk Management Process will form the basis by which risk management is conducted during MO&DA on future projects. proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working put into place will become visible and will be illusmted in future papers.

risk management↗

NASA NTRS2016

Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design

Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IVV) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IVV portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IVV projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management.

Fitz, Rhonda↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

EXCAP-LR: Exploration Capabilities Logistics Reduction

All human space missions require substantial logistical mass and volume. As our exploration missions increase in distance and duration, reduction of these logistics requirements becomes more important. The movement and tracking of logistics between vehicle elements are increasingly recognized as critical to crew efficiency and on-orbit mission assurance. This project targets the best opportunities to demonstrate logistics reduction, repurposing, and efficient tracking and management of logistics. These technologies and innovations will make future exploration missions more affordable. - REALM-3 (RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) Enabled Autonomous Logistics Management) – Hydra (HYper-Distributed RFID Antenna) Smart Stow: receives RFID signal from readers, use very small % of signal to self-power on-board microcontroller and RF switch, multiplex RFID signal to other nodes in a chain or to a multitude of antennas. ISS HYDRA Smart Stow is over-instrumented to allow evaluation of a branched network HYDRA chain. - UWMS (Universal Waste Management System) – provides a compact, lower mass/volume toilet for exploration missions - ACS (Advanced Clothing Systems) – investigates ways to reduce clothing mass and volume directly or through efficiently cleaning them for reuse.

Patrick Fink↗

NASA NTRS2009

The Application of a Residual Risk Evaluation Technique Used for Expendable Launch Vehicles

This presentation provides a Residual Risk Evaluation Technique (RRET) developed by Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Launch Services Division. This technique is one of many procedures used by S&MA at KSC to evaluate residual risks for each Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) mission. RRET is a straight forward technique that incorporates the proven methodology of risk management, fault tree analysis, and reliability prediction. RRET derives a system reliability impact indicator from the system baseline reliability and the system residual risk reliability values. The system reliability impact indicator provides a quantitative measure of the reduction in the system baseline reliability due to the identified residual risks associated with the designated ELV mission. An example is discussed to provide insight into the application of RRET.

Latimer, John A.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Mass and Reliability System (MaRS)

The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate is responsible for mitigating risk, providing system safety, and lowering risk for space programs from ground to space. The S&MA is divided into 4 divisions: The Space Exploration Division (NC), the International Space Station Division (NE), the Safety & Test Operations Division (NS), and the Quality and Flight Equipment Division (NT). The interns, myself and Arun Aruljothi, will be working with the Risk & Reliability Analysis Branch under the NC Division's. The mission of this division is to identify, characterize, diminish, and communicate risk by implementing an efficient and effective assurance model. The team utilizes Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to ensure decisions concerning risks are informed, vehicles are safe and reliable, and program/project requirements are realistic and realized. This project pertains to the Orion mission, so it is geared toward a long duration Human Space Flight Program(s). For space missions, payload is a critical concept; balancing what hardware can be replaced by components verse by Orbital Replacement Units (ORU) or subassemblies is key. For this effort a database was created that combines mass and reliability data, called Mass and Reliability System or MaRS. The U.S. International Space Station (ISS) components are used as reference parts in the MaRS database. Using ISS components as a platform is beneficial because of the historical context and the environment similarities to a space flight mission. MaRS uses a combination of systems: International Space Station PART for failure data, Vehicle Master Database (VMDB) for ORU & components, Maintenance & Analysis Data Set (MADS) for operation hours and other pertinent data, & Hardware History Retrieval System (HHRS) for unit weights. MaRS is populated using a Visual Basic Application. Once populated, the excel spreadsheet is comprised of information on ISS components including: operation hours, random/nonrandom failures, software/hardware failures, quantity, orbital replaceable units (ORU), date of placement, unit weight, frequency of part, etc. The motivation for creating such a database will be the development of a mass/reliability parametric model to estimate mass required for replacement parts. Once complete, engineers working on future space flight missions will have access a mean time to failures and on parts along with their mass, this will be used to make proper decisions for long duration space flight missions

Barnes, Sarah↗

NASA NTRS2010

Verification and Implementation of Operations Safety Controls for Flight Missions

Approximately eleven years ago, the International Space Station launched the first module from Russia, the Functional Cargo Block (FGB). Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Operations (Ops) Engineers played an integral part in that endeavor by executing strict flight product verification as well as continued staffing of S&MA's console in the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) for that flight mission. How were these engineers able to conduct such a complicated task? They conducted it based on product verification that consisted of ensuring that safety requirements were adequately contained in all flight products that affected crew safety. S&MA Ops engineers apply both systems engineering and project management principles in order to gain a appropriate level of technical knowledge necessary to perform thorough reviews which cover the subsystem(s) affected. They also ensured that mission priorities were carried out with a great detail and success.

Jones, Cheryl L.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Enabling Assurance in the MBSE Environment

Evans, John W.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Enabling Assurance in the MBSE Environment

A number of specific benefits that fit within the hallmarks of effective development are realized with implementation of model-based approaches to systems and assurance. Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) enabled by standardized modeling languages (e.g., SysML®) is at the core. These benefits in the context of spaceflight system challenges can include [1]: • Improved management of complex development • Reduced risk in the development process • Improved cost management • Improved design decisions With appropriate modeling techniques the assurance community also can improve early oversight and insight into project development. NASA has shown the basic constructs of SysML in an MBSE environment offer several key advantages, within a Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA) initiative [2, 3]. These include the following: • Model viewpoints that promote rapid and systematic assessment of requirements coverage, hazard tagging and risk management • Embedded safety assessments for launch vehicles • Deployment of model assisted development of reliability products - Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEAs) and Fault Trees • Test Planning • Validation and Verification of complex functions • Support of Assurance Case development for complex systems In addition, while there are benefits to be harvested, there is a realization that these do not come without effort and cost. Enabling model-based approaches requires structure, not only in an organizational context, but in a modeling context as well. There can be a steep learning curve and costs associated to train skilled modelers. But, on the other hand, not all of the assurance community need to be modelers. Models themselves must conform to ontologies that enable assurance. This places constraints upon the models and modelers. Optimums have yet to be developed where resources and constraints on modeling must be traded off in the organization and modeling efforts for projects. A number of barriers need to be overcome, as well, which pose challenges to the developers of the software that supports MBSE/MBMA. Information and data must be made to flow seamlessly through the life cycle. Because there is a wide variety of tools used in the community, to avoid the problems of the past of silos, delays, and diverging interests, information should flow among these tools to support the “single source of truth” paradigm of MBSE. This will greatly facilitate MBMA and advancement of assurance functions.

Evans, John W.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Space Mechanisms Technology Workshop Proceedings

Over the years, NASA has experienced a number of troublesome mechanism anomalies. Because of this, the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance initiated a workshop to evaluate the current space mechanism state-of-the-art and to determine the obstacles that will have to be met in order to achieve NASA's future missions goals. Seventy experts in the field attended the workshop. The experts identified current and perceived future space mechanisms obstacles. For each obstacle, the participants identified technology deficiencies, the current state-of-the-art, and applicable NASA, DOD, and industry missions. In addition, the participants at the workshop looked at technology needs for current missions, technology needs for future missions, what new technology is needed to improve the reliability of mechanisms, what can be done to improve technology development and the dissemination of information, and what do we do next.

Fusaro, Robert L.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Gyro Evaluation for the Mission to Jupiter

As an important component in NASA's New Frontiers Program, the Jupiter Polar Orbiter (Juno) mission is designed to investigate in-depth physical properties of Jupiter. It will include the giant planet's ice-rock core and atmospheric studies as well as exploration of its polar magnetosphere. It will also provide the opportunity to understand the origin of the Jovian magnetic field. Due to severe radiation environment of the Jovian system, this mission inherently presents a significant technical challenge to Attitude Control System (ACS) design since the ACS sensors must survive and function properly to reliably maneuver the spacecraft throughout the mission. Different gyro technologies and their critical performance characteristics are discussed, compared and evaluated to facilitate a choice of appropriate gyro-based inertial measurement unit to operate in a harsh Jovian environment to assure mission success.

physical properties↗

NASA NTRS2013

Acoustic Emission Health Monitoring of Fill Purge COPV's Used in Aerospace and Automotive Applications and Designed for Long Cycle Life

Cumulative composite damage in composite pressure vessels (CPVs) currently is not monitored on-orbit. Consequently, hazards due to catastrophic burst before leak (BBL) or compromised CPV reliability cannot be ascertained or mitigated, posing a risk to crew and mission assurance. The energy associated with CPV rupture can be significant, especially with high pressure gases are under containment, and the energy releases can be severe enough to cause injury, death, loss of assets or mission. Dual-Use Rationale: CPVs similar to those used by NASA on ISS, for example, are finding increasing use in automotive and transportation industry applications. These CPVs generally have a nonload sharing liner and are repeatedly filled over their service lifetime, typically with hydrogen or compressed natural gas (CNG). The same structural health monitoring equipment and software developed by NASA WSTF for evaluating, in real-time, the health of NASA CPVs on ISS will be used to evaluate the health of automotive CPVs, the only differences being the type and design of the CPV, and the in-service lifetime pressure histories. HSF Need(s)/Performance Characteristic(s) Supported: 1) Enable on-board vehicle systems management for mission critical functions at destinations with > 3 second time delay 2) Enable autonomous nominal operations and FDIR for crewed and un-crewed systems 3) Reduce on-board crew time to sustain and manage vehicle by factor of 2x at destinations with > 6 second time delay (see Crew Autonomy sheet) 4) Reduce earth-based mission ops "back room engineering" requirements for distant mission support delay (see Mission Autonomy sheet)

Waller, Jess↗

NASA NTRS2025

NASA Planetary Protection Handbook

This handbook provides guidance to mission providers and Planetary Protection (PP) practitioners on implementing PP measures for both robotic and crewed space missions. This handbook represents major updates to PP practices since a previously drafted handbook from 2010. In 2017, NASA reorganized the Office of Planetary Protection (OPP) from the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) to a Technical Authority (TA) within the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA). With this organizational change came a complete overhaul of NASA’s PP policy and technical standards. This handbook reflects the latest NASA PP policy updates in NPR 8715.24, Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions and technical requirements of NASA-STD-8719.27, Implementing Planetary Protection Requirements for Space Flight. This handbook is a companion document to the NPR and technical standard and provides guidance, best practices, background information, and advice for practitioners to consider when implementing PP on NASA missions and NASA-partnered missions.

Nick Benardini↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Use of Preliminary PRA to Inform Decisions During Initial NASA Gateway Development

How do you use Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to support a program in development before designs are even known? Traditional PRAs require detailed design information and early in a program life cycle such information is not available. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) developed a preliminary PRA for the Gateway Program based upon NASA reference designs utilizing data and models from pervious PRA studies as surrogates for the Gateway systems. Gateway will be a lunar outpost that supports missions to the moon and includes several elements/modules developed by NASA and International Partners. NASA SMA began supporting Gateway in fall 2017 during initial formulation and continues to support the Gateway Program today. This paper will explore how the NASA SMA developed preliminary PRA was used to inform Gateway Program decisions with specific examples provided.

PRA↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Use of Preliminary PRA to Inform Decisions During Initial NASA Gateway Development

How do you use Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to support a program in development before designs are even known? Traditional PRAs require detailed design information and early in a program life cycle such information is not available. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) developed a preliminary PRA for the Gateway Program based upon NASA reference designs utilizing data and models from previous PRA studies as surrogates for the Gateway systems. Gateway will be a lunar outpost that supports missions to the moon and includes several elements/modules developed by NASA and International Partners. NASA SMA began supporting Gateway in fall 2017 during initial formulation and continues to support the Gateway Program today. This paper will explore how the NASA SMA developed preliminary PRA was used to inform Gateway Program decisions with specific examples provided.

PRA↗

NASA NTRS2001

Smarter Software For Enhanced Vehicle Health Monitoring and Inter-Planetary Exploration

The existing philosophy for space mission control was born in the early days of the space program when technology did not exist to put significant control responsibility onboard the spacecraft. NASA relied on a team of ground control experts to troubleshoot systems when problems occurred. As computing capability improved, more responsibility was handed over to the systems software. However, there is still a large contingent of both launch and flight controllers supporting each mission. New technology can update this philosophy to increase mission assurance and reduce the cost of inter-planetary exploration. The advent of model-based diagnosis and intelligent planning software enables spacecraft to handle most routine problems automatically and allocate resources in a flexible way to realize mission objectives. The manifests for recent missions include multiple subsystems and complex experiments. Spacecraft must operate at longer distances from earth where communications delays make earthbound command and control impractical. NASA's Ames Research Center (ARC) has demonstrated the utility of onboard diagnosis and planning with the Remote Agent experiment in 1999. KSC has pioneered model-based diagnosis and demonstrated its utility for ground support operations. KSC and ARC are cooperating in research to improve the state of the art of this technology. This paper highlights model-based reasoning applications for Moon and Mars missions including in-situ resource utilization and enhanced vehicle health monitoring.

Larson, William E.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) Project Status

TSIS-1 studies the Sun's energy input to Earth and how solar variability affects climate. TSIS-1 will measure both the total amount of light that falls on Earth, known as the total solar irradiance (TSI), and how that light is distributed among ultraviolet, visible and infrared wavelengths, called solar spectral irradiance (SSI). TSIS-1 will provide the most accurate measurements of sunlight and continue the long-term climate data record. TSIS-1 includes two instruments: the Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM) and the Spectral Irradiance Monitor (SIM), integrated into a single payload on the International Space Station (ISS). The TSIS-1 TIM and SIM instruments are upgraded versions of the two instruments that are flying on the Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment (SORCE) mission launched in January 2003. NASA Goddard's TSIS project responsibilities include project management, system engineering, safety and mission assurance, and engineering oversight for TSIS-1. TSIS-1 was installed on the International Space Station in December 2017. At the end of the 90-day commissioning phase, responsibility for TSIS-1 operations transitions to the Earth Science Mission Operations (ESMO) project at Goddard for its 5-year operations. NASA contracts with the University of Colorado Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) for the design, development and testing of TSIS-1, support for ISS integration, science operations of the TSIS-1 instrument, data processing, data evaluation, calibration and delivery to the Goddard Earth Science Data and Information Services Center (GES DISC).

TSIS↗

NASA NTRS2006

A Predictive Approach to Eliminating Errors in Software Code

NASA s Metrics Data Program Data Repository is a database that stores problem, product, and metrics data. The primary goal of this data repository is to provide project data to the software community. In doing so, the Metrics Data Program collects artifacts from a large NASA dataset, generates metrics on the artifacts, and then generates reports that are made available to the public at no cost. The data that are made available to general users have been sanitized and authorized for publication through the Metrics Data Program Web site by officials representing the projects from which the data originated. The data repository is operated by NASA s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Facility, which is located in Fairmont, West Virginia, a high-tech hub for emerging innovation in the Mountain State. The IV&V Facility was founded in 1993, under the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, as a direct result of recommendations made by the National Research Council and the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Today, under the direction of Goddard Space Flight Center, the IV&V Facility continues its mission to provide the highest achievable levels of safety and cost-effectiveness for mission-critical software. By extending its data to public users, the facility has helped improve the safety, reliability, and quality of complex software systems throughout private industry and other government agencies. Integrated Software Metrics, Inc., is one of the organizations that has benefited from studying the metrics data. As a result, the company has evolved into a leading developer of innovative software-error prediction tools that help organizations deliver better software, on time and on budget.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2010

Constellation Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA): Design Consideration for the Crew Exploration Vehicle

Managed by NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, a pilot probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of the NASA Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) was performed in early 2006. The PRA methods used follow the general guidance provided in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners'. Phased-mission based event trees and fault trees are used to model a lunar sortie mission of the CEV - involving the following phases: launch of a cargo vessel and a crew vessel; rendezvous of these two vessels in low Earth orbit; transit to th$: moon; lunar surface activities; ascension &om the lunar surface; and return to Earth. The analysis is based upon assumptions, preliminary system diagrams, and failure data that may involve large uncertainties or may lack formal validation. Furthermore, some of the data used were based upon expert judgment or extrapolated from similar components~systemsT. his paper includes a discussion of the system-level models and provides an overview of the analysis results used to identify insights into CEV risk drivers, and trade and sensitivity studies. Lastly, the PRA model was used to determine changes in risk as the system configurations or key parameters are modified.

Prassinos, Peter G.↗