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At least 235 records · Page 13
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Seismic Performance of Deeply Embedded Conceptual Advanced Reactors: Three-Dimensional Nonlinear Soil-Structure Interaction Analyses

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s functional containment concept provides advanced nuclear power plant designers with more flexibility in terms of the civil/structural design if the appropriate set of barriers for prevention of radioactive material release exist. Some of the conceptual advanced reactor structures, without the traditional pressure boundaries of large containment structures, are proposed to be deeply embedded or buried into soil. This approach is expected to provide (1) lesser seismic demands on the structures and safety-critical structures, (2) eased regulatory efforts and overall design against other external hazards such as aircraft impact, and (3) overall cost savings. Further, one of the important aspects of assessing the technical and economic viability of deeply embedding advanced reactor buildings is to assess the seismic performance with the understanding of effects with material and geometric nonlinearities. This study investigates the seismic response of deeply embedded or buried advanced reactors by conducting three-dimensional nonlinear soil-structure interaction analyses. Although the results indicate that there is a general trend of decreased seismic response with increased embedment depths, the change in the dynamic environment with different embedment depths and the nonlinear environment under high-intensity seismic inputs may result in increased peak response at increased embedment depths.

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DOE OSTI2021

Hemicellulose and starch citrate chitosan foam adsorbents for removal of arsenic and other heavy metals from contaminated water

Arsenic and other heavy metal contaminants in water are a significant global health threat. In this study, low-cost, sulfur-free, sustainable, water-insoluble materials with heavy metal remediation properties were produced from renewable resources such as starch, xylan, citric acid, and chitosan. Synthesized starch citrate-chitosan (SCC) foam and xylan citrate-chitosan (XCC) foam were flexible, porous, and elastic. The foams’ arsenic uptake in water was significantly greater than five different commercial metal remediating agents. The mercury and lead uptakes with the synthesized foams were similar to the performance of a commercial sulfur-based product, SorbaTech 450 (ST450). However, the cadmium and selenium uptakes were comparatively lower. The complexation of arsenic with oxygen and nitrogen of the SCC foam was shown with time-of-flight secondary ion mass spectrometry (TOF-SIMS). The XCC foam was also shown to adsorb potassium iodide (KI) at a similar rate to sodium chloride. This may be used to remediate water contaminated with radioactive materials, such as iodine 131.

Materials Science↗
DOE OSTI2023

Atmospheric effects on the laser-driven avalanche-based remote detection of radiation

Here, the effect of realistic atmospheric conditions on mid-IR (λ = 3.9 µm) and long-wave-IR (λ = 10 µm) laser-induced avalanche breakdown for the remote detection of radioactive material is examined experimentally and with propagation simulations. Our short-range in-lab mid-IR laser experiments show a correlation between increasing turbulence level and a reduced number of breakdown sites associated with a reduction in the portion of the focal volume above the breakdown threshold. Simulations of propagation through turbulence are in excellent agreement with these measurements and provide code validation. We then simulate propagation through realistic atmospheric turbulence over a long range (0.1–1 km) in the long-wave-IR regime (λ = 10 µm). The avalanche threshold focal volume is found to be robust even in the presence of strong turbulence, only dropping by ~50% over a propagation length of ~0.6 km. We also experimentally assess the impact of aerosols on avalanche-based detection, finding that, while background counts increase, a useful signal is extractable even at aerosol concentrations 10 5 times greater than what is typically observed in atmospheric conditions. Our results show promise for the long-range detection of radioactive sources under realistic atmospheric conditions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

PNNL Sequim Campus Radionuclide Air Emissions Report for Calendar Year 2025 : Department of Energy – Office of Science Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science’s Pacific Northwest Site Office has oversight and stewardship duties associated with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Sequim Campus. Facility operations include radiological operations with the potential-to-emit low levels of radioactive materials. This report is prepared to document compliance with the 40 CFR Part 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities,” and Washington Administrative Code Chapter 246-247, Radiation Protection–Air Emissions. The PNNL Sequim Campus is in compliance with the federal and state 10 mrem/yr standard for 2025 operations.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗
DOE OSTI2020

Annual Site Environmental Report (2019)

Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (the Laboratory’s) annual site environmental reports are prepared by the Laboratory’s environmental organizations, as required by U.S. Department of Energy Order 231.1B, Administrative Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting, and Order 458.1, Administrative Change 3, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment. The following chapters in this report discuss our success in complying with environmental laws, regulations, and orders (Chapter 2, Compliance Summary); how we manage the Laboratory’s environmental performance (Chapter 3, Environmental Programs); how we monitor for air emissions of radioactive materials and climate conditions (Chapter 4, Air Quality); how we monitor for effects of Laboratory operations on groundwater quality (Chapter 5, Groundwater Protection); how we monitor the movement of chemicals and radionuclides by storm water runoff and the levels of chemicals and radionuclides in deposited sediment (Chapter 6, Watershed Quality); how we monitor for the presence, levels, and effects of chemicals and radionuclides in plants, animals, and soil (Chapter 7, Ecosystem Health); and finally, what radionuclide dose or risk from chemical exposure members of the public may experience as a result of Laboratory operations (Chapter 8, Public Dose and Risk Assessment).

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DOE OSTI2024

PNNL-Sequim Campus Radionuclide Air Emissions Report for Calendar Year 2023

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science (DOE-SC) Pacific Northwest Site Office has oversight and stewardship duties associated with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Sequim campus. Some research projects have the potential to emit low levels of radioactive materials. This report is prepared to document compliance with the Code of Federal Regulation, Title 40, Protection of the Environment, Part 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities” and Washington Administrative Code Chapter 246-247, "Radiation Protection–Air Emissions." Compliance is indicated by comparing the estimated effective dose equivalent (EDE) to the maximally exposed individual (MEI) member of the public with the 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standard. The PNNL-Sequim campus has only fugitive emissions sources.

40 CFR 61 Subpart H↗
DOE OSTI2020

Laboratory-Scale Melter Systems for Simulated and Real AP-107 Tank Waste - 20483

The Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will process and stabilize waste that is stored in underground tanks on the Hanford Site. At the WTP, the tank waste will be combined with glass-forming and modifying additives to form an aqueous and solid mixture called melter feed, which will then be vitrified in joule-heated melters. A small-scale melter system, the continuous laboratory-scale melter (CLSM), is designed to operate with a continuous feeding process while periodically pouring glass product and collecting off-gas. Two CLSMs were constructed: one in a non-radioactive environment for processing waste simulants and another in a fume hood capable of handling radioactive material for processing actual Hanford tank waste. The waste sample received for vitrification in the CLSM was from Hanford tank 241-AP-107. Approximately 12 liters of melter-feed slurry was vitrified into 7 kilograms of glass product over the course of 10 hours of charging to the CLSM. The partitioning of technetium-99 in the product streams was used to calculate the technetium-99 recovery and help determine when the vitrification process had reached a steady state. The average single-pass retention of technetium-99 in the glass product was then calculated for the processing of AP-107 waste in the CLSM system. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2022

H-Canyon Jumper Gasket Sealing Evaluation

H-Canyon Documented Safety Analysis approved December 2019 credits the leak integrity of HCanyon (HCA) process tanks, piping, and jumpers in preventing the release of radioactive material in a post seismic environment. Demonstration of leak tightness capability for this equipment was achieved through substantial analytical effort. However, one potential weak point that affects leak integrity exists at the gasketed joint between Hanford Connectors (HC) and nozzles. Review of the HCA Crane Log over a three-year period indicates the HCs periodically leak. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested to perform gasket compression tests that evaluate gasket relaxation characteristics, i.e., creep, and provide improvements to the HC installation process that can reduce or eliminate the frequency of leaks at HCs. A HC torque value of 312 ft-lbf is the target value used because it is the minimum torque value, with 95% confidence, when an unlubricated HC is impacted for standard sealing period of 9 seconds.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Viability of In-Drum Treatment for Transuranic Wastes Containing Nitrates and Organics - 20406

In February of 2014, a breach in a waste drum stored at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant resulted in the release of radioactive material into the immediate surroundings and outside of the plant. The waste drum contained a mixture of an organic absorbent and nitrate salts that pressurized the drum, eventually causing the drum lid to fail, leading to the adverse event. Other waste drums with similar contents exist posing both storage and treatment risks. These drums may successfully be treated by an in-drum treatment system. This paper considers the design and operation of an in-drum treatment system and the characteristics of waste containing organics and nitrates to evaluate the viability of treatment. A description of the system, how it is operated, and a summary of previous testing performed is provided. Treatment of both liquids and absorbed liquids comprised of organics and nitrates is addressed. Viability of treatment is demonstrated by presenting operational methods and design strategies to ensure successful treatment of the waste drums. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2025

A Fast Framework for Generating Radioactive Mixture Spectra and Its Application to Remote High-Performance Mixture Identification

Remote detection of radioactive materials in mixtures using handheld or portal detectors remains a challenge because of factors such as low concentration, environmental interference, sensor noise, and other complications. This work introduces a fast framework for generating realistic mixture spectra. Moreover, we present mixture isotope identification using data generated by the fast framework. Researchers have examined a range of conventional and recent algorithms within the fields of machine learning and deep learning. An application to uranium enrichment-level prediction has been included. Extensive simulation experiments validated the efficacy of the proposed framework.

GADRAS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Commercialization of the Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR)

The Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR) was developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, NA-21, Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for detection and tracking during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material. Few off-the-shelf systems for conveyance tracking offer detection of a cargo compartment breach or a removal of the cargo. Systems that do offer this capability often require permanent installation through modifying of the conveyance itself. This is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building use, storage, and transport security capacity. The development of T-STAR has moved from fielding robust prototypes deployed in countries ranging from North America, Latin America and Central Asia to a commercially produced product that can now be deployed to provide enhanced security during transit. Each prototype deployment resulted in important lessons learned, which informed the requirements for the final commercial product. T-STAR uses both cellular and Iridium satellite modems to provide redundant communications to provide the configuration, status, and alerts to a server monitoring the shipment, which is accessible using a multilanguage browser-based user interface. A wireless security system employing using Z-wave sensors for intrusion detection located in the conveyance provide low cost but effective solution for a wide range of conveyance types. Additional capabilities include the ability to monitor a vehicles’ CANBUS (Controller Area Network) system, an ethernet port for high throughput sensor information such as video cameras, and the ability to power and use advanced external sensor payloads. These features make the T-STAR a capable and expandable security gateway that can be deployed on a variety of conveyances from box trucks to open trailers. The ability to provide tracking, monitoring, and detection provide a key component in overall best practices designed to protect shipments of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000283205671)↗
DOE OSTI2020

Best Practices for Shielding Analyses of Activated Metals and Spent Resins from Reactor Operation

This report investigated best practices for performing shielding evaluations of Type B waste packages, as defined in 10 CFR Part 71 regulations on packaging and transportation of radioactive material, or packages for which the contents are not defined before loading and may include a broad range of nuclides, geometries, and non-fuel materials. The following non-fuel waste streams were analyzed: Activated metals from decommissioned commercial power reactors, including Type 304 stainless steel, reactor vessel steel, and Inconel, Control blades from boiling water reactors, Neutron-activated corrosion products on surfaces of activated metals, and Spent resins from power plant operations. Measured elemental compositions, including major constituents and impurities, for steel and Inconel samples from commercial power reactors were used in activation calculations to determine radionuclide inventories in activated metals. For a simplified cask model, 60 Co contribution to the total external package dose rate at 30 days after shutdown varied from approximately 60% to 95%, depending on the activated metal, initial cobalt impurity concentration in the metal, and the thickness of the overpack gamma shield. Its maximum contribution to the total external package dose rate of approximately 100% was reached within the time interval of 2 to 5 years after shutdown and was maintained for up to 45 to 60 years after shutdown, depending on material, initial cobalt impurity concentration, and shield thickness. Thereafter, the 60 Co contribution to external package dose rate decreased with increasing decay time. Cobalt-60 is primarily produced by neutron reactions with the cobalt impurity in steel and Inconel. Other important radionuclides in activated metals contributing to package external dose rate are radionuclides with relatively short decay times, including 51 Cr, 59 Fe, 58 Co, and 54 Mn. These radionuclides may be represented as an equivalent 60 Co activity/source because 60 Co gamma ray emissions are bounding in terms of source strength and energy to other important radionuclides identified in the analyzed activated metals. Approaches for modeling the neutron-activated corrosion products that may be attached to activated reactor components were analyzed in this report. It was demonstrated that a surface source is more conservative than a uniform volumetric source for the treatment of neutron-activated corrosion products with respect to external package dose rates. An analysis of the maximum radionuclide loadings reported on spent resins identified the radionuclides 137 Cs, 60 Co, 134 Cs, 65 Zn, and 58 Co as the primary contributors to external package dose rate. For a resin cooled for 3.08 years, the external package dose rate was entirely produced by the reported 137 Cs and 60 Co inventory. The neutron sources from actinides found on spent resins or activated metals produced negligible dose rates and may be ignored in dose rate analyses. Effects of idealized waste material, source geometry, and spatial material/source distributions on external package dose rates were determined based on dose rate results for a simplified cask model under normal conditions of transport. Type 304 stainless steel, zirconium, and aluminum with adjusted mass densities based on a maximum content weight were analyzed for material modeling effects on external package dose rate. These materials produced identical external package dose rates within the statistical uncertainties of the dose rate estimates. Among four different source geometry configurations with homogeneous material of different mass densities, uniform volumetric source distribution, and the same source strength, the geometry configuration with lowest mass density (i.e., minimum self-shielding effect among the four cases) was most conservative. Spatial source distributions that better represent localized peak 60 Co activity values were more conservative than a uniform volumetric source distribution, assuming the same weight and total source strength per package. The increase in external dose rate caused by localized source peaks can be as much as the ratio between source peak activity density to average activity density, depending on the location of the activated metal with peak activity density. Therefore, the shielding analysis may be simplified if localized peak activities and the average activity per package can be measured/determined and documented at the time of cask loading. For simplicity, external package dose rates may be determined based on average source activity and a uniform volumetric source distribution. The dose rate results from that calculation model multiplied by the ratio of peak activity density to average activity density will produce maximum dose rate values for conservative estimates.

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DOE OSTI2021

Saltstone Waste Characterization Analysis - Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) Waste Stream (Q4 CY2020)

The Saltstone Production and Disposal Facility is designed and permitted by the state of South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) to treat and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Low-level waste (LEW) aqueous streams from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP) and decontaminated solutions from the Tank Closure Cesium Removal Unit (TCCR) and the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) are stored in Tank 50 until the LEW can be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. In the past, decontaminated solution from the Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) was stored in Tank 50 until the LEW could be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. MCU is currently in a suspended operations state. LEW that meets the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) can be transferred, stored, and treated in the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) for subsequent disposal as saltstone grout in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Sampling will be conducted as new waste streams are identified for treatment and disposal at the Saltstone Industrial Wastewater Treatment Facility (IWTF) and Z-Area Industrial Solid Waste Landfill (ISWLF), Facility ID# 025500-1603, General Condition B.9 or every six years in accordance with South Carolina (SC) Regulation 61-107.19 Parti C, “Solid Waste Management: Solid Waste Landfills and Structural Fill - General Requirements.”

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DOE OSTI2025

Stabilization of Preternatural Barium Oxidation States as an Unexpected Byproduct of β-Decay: Discovery of a New Halide Semiconductor Alloy

137 Cs has a wide range of roles in the nuclear industry. The solid material, safely encapsulated in CsCl as 137 CsCl, is stored as fission product waste from nuclear power production and legacy waste from nuclear weapons production; it has also served as a radiation source in food and sewage irradiators as well as medical devices. However, because of the solubility of the chloride salt and the relatively high specific activity of 137 Cs, damaged or broken capsules can lead to severe radiological accidents. Safe capsule design and material recycling are complicated by the unclear structural evolution during β-decay, which remains ambiguous due to the differing oxidation states of Cs (1+) and Ba (2+). Here, in this study, we use first-principles calculations to investigate the evolving structure–property relationships of Cs 1–x Ba x Cl during β-decay. Despite the well-established 2+ formal oxidation state of alkali-earth metals, we find that Ba 1+ can be stabilized in the form of a mixed-valence alloy at low concentrations. Specifically, we identify three regimes for the β-decay of 137 Cs into CsCl: Ba-doped CsCl (Ba ≤ 14%), wherein Ba has the expected 2+ oxidation state; Cs–Ba–Cl alloys, where Ba has a mix of the usual Ba 2+ and highly unusual Ba 1+ oxidation state in the form of a quasi-disordered mixed-valence alloy (Ba = 25%); and phase separation into a CsCl + BaCl 2 + Ba (m) mechanical mixture, where Ba reverts to its expected 2+ oxidation state (Ba > 25%). Surprisingly, the Cs 0.75 Ba 0.25 Cl mixed-valence alloy is a narrow indirect band gap semiconductor (1.05 eV) despite the insulating nature of both CsCl and BaCl 2 . It also exhibits strongly excitonic polarized optical properties, has glass-like ultralow thermal conductivity (directional average of 0.21 W/mK at 300 K), and shows greater resistance to deformation under both tensile and volumetric strengths compared with the original CsCl structure (e.g., shear and Young’s modulus of 9.04 and 31.62 GPa, respectively). These findings imply that transmutation of 137 Cs leads to highly unusual chemical bonding that stabilizes Ba 1+ in local regions of the quasi-disordered Cs 0.25 Ba 0.75 Cl, resulting in anomalous physical properties. Moreover, this discovery provides valuable insight for safe nuclear waste capsule design, which can aid in preventing environmental or human exposure to radioactive materials.

Fuhr, Addis S. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORN↗
DOE OSTI2020

Deep Isolation-Development of the Safety Case for Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in Horizontal Boreholes - 20028

Deep Isolation has developed a safe, secure, and permanent geological disposal method for high-level waste, including spent nuclear fuel as well as sealed sources and other highly radioactive materials. The method leverages well established directional drilling technology to create horizontal repositories deep underground. The combination of great depth (1-3 km) and the ability to precisely position repositories in a horizontal orientation provides access to geologic strata that are inaccessible for typical mined and deep vertical borehole repositories. A number of potential direct and indirect safety benefits accrue including:1) greater depth below regional freshwater aquifers; 2) increased flexibility and more geologic options for siting; 3) access to deep formations with persistent and sustained reducing conditions. In addition there are a number of safety elements related specifically to the horizontal repository geometry including: 1) passive direction of thermally driven fluid and radionuclide movement away from the vertical access hole and toward the 'dead end' portion of the repository; 2) mitigation of seismic hazards by orienting repositories parallel to local and regional fault structures. In this paper we explore and discuss some of the key technologic, geologic and hydrologic elements that support the deep horizontal borehole safety case. The stalemate seen across the globe on the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste can be broken. Deep Isolation offers a novel option for safe, secure, and permanent deep geological disposal of nuclear waste that can be developed as centralized repositories or adapted to smaller regional or site-specific repositories located near waste sources. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Drop Analysis of the Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container with Heavier Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Contents

The Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container (ATR FFSC) is a rectangular stainless steel container used for shipping radioactive material. The container is described in the ATR FFSC Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Per the ATR FFSC SAR, the ATR FFSC is designated a Type AF-96 packaging per the definition of 10 CFR §71.4, and was originally designed to transport high enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel elements for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the Advanced Test Reactor Critical (ATRC) facility, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) is working with the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop and qualify new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and technologies for use in the ATR, ATRC, MITR, and MURR reactors. The LEU fuel elements will weigh significantly more than the current HEU designs and, combined with their associated Fuel Handling Enclosures for packaging, some configurations will exceed the 50 lbf used in the ATR FFSC qualifying drop tests. There are LEU versions of MITR, MURR, and ATR fuel elements. However, for this evaluation, drop analysis of the ATR FFSC with only the heavier ATR Low Enrichment (LOWE) fuel element is considered in this evaluation because the LOWE fuel element is the heaviest of the considered LEU fuel elements. The ATR HEU fuel element and the ATR LOWE fuel element are identical in every design aspect except for the fuel meat inside the 19 fuel plates. The LEU fuel meats are made using a U-10Mo high-density foil rather than uranium dispersed in aluminum in the HEU fuel elements. The high density of the uranium in the LEU fuel meat increases the LOWE fuel element weight to just under 44 lbf (versus the 22.1 lbf weight of the tested ATR HEU fuel element). ATR fuel elements are placed in a thin-gauge aluminum weldment called a "Fuel Handling Enclosure" during packaging. The Fuel Handling Enclosure is used to cover and protect the element during loading and unloading operations. The ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure weighs about 15 lbf per the drawings in the ATR FFSC SAR and the weight is accounted for in this evaluation. Transporting the heavier LEU fuel elements require evaluation of two issues. The first is the effect of the increased mass of the LEU fuel elements on the survivability of the ATR FFSC package following the requisite drop qualifications. The second is the effect of the increased mass of the fuel plates on the fuel element during the same drops. The ATR FFSC containing an ATR HEU fuel element in an ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure was physically dropped multiple times to qualify the container as a Type AF-96 package. The ATR FFSC SAR describes the drop tests performed with an actual ATR HEU fuel element weighing 22.1 lbf contained in a 14.3 lbf Fuel Handling Enclosure for a total payload of 36.4 lbf. Those drop tests showed that the ATR FFSC maintained containment of the ATR HEU fuel element and the fuel element was not significantly damaged. (Containment herein is not defined as a leak tight but is retention of the radioactive contents.) The purpose of the evaluation is to analytically show that, for a similar set of tests, the ATR FFSC maintains containment of the heavier ATR LOWE fuel element and to assess the damage to the fuel element during the drops. The approach was to create finite element analysis (FEA) models that produce the same results as the physical drops. Those models were then used as the benchmarks for the follow-on analyses using the heavier contents. FEA models of the drops of ATR FFSC using up to a 115 lbf fuel element were run and evaluated. Likewise, drops of a LOWE fuel element weighing 44 lbf in the ATR FFSC were run and evaluated. It is important to note that this report was done at the quality level necessary to be included in a nuclear facility safety basis. However, it is not the intent of this report to conclude the suitability of the ATR FFSC for transporting the heavier payloads. This report only describes the results of the FEA as related to the required drop scenarios. Incorporation of the FEA into the safety basis will be evaluated by the ATR FFSC design authority. The physical drop tests of the HEU fuel element and FEA drop analysis for the LOWE fuel element showed noteworthy damage to the fuel plates. An aluminum protective block was conceived to mitigate the damage. The concept requires the blocks to be placed in the fuel element between the end boxes and fuel plates. Additional FEA drop analyses were performed using the protective block. The addition of the blocks is primarily intended to mitigate the damage to the LOWE fuel element fuel plates. However, FEA drop analyses of the ATR HEU fuel element with the blocks were also performed and included for information.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Investigation of INL Site Implementation of ARG-US

The Packaging Certification and Life Cycle Management department at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) developed a suite of monitoring systems collectively referred to here as ARG-US. ARG-US is used to provide necessary data for nuclear facility and system operation and maintenance. ARG-US has been previously demonstrated in hot cells, radioactive material (RAM) storage areas, and RAM shipment trucks. It has also been installed directly on RAM storage and shipment containers. ARG-US offers some unique advantages over other commercially available systems by using wireless data connections, battery power supplies, and customizable monitoring methods. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been tasked with investigating applications for ARG-US at INL site facilities, which are operated by several different contractors. The initial investigation scope centered on CPP-603 Wet & Dry Fuel Storage Facility in relation to the upcoming DOE Spent (SNF) Packaging Demonstration. The investigation has been led by the Used Fuel Management Department in the Nuclear Science and Technology Directorate. This investigation is expected to recommend processes or facilities at the INL site at which to implement ARG-US systems. INL has engaged local site technical and oversite representatives, security, nuclear safeguards, and program management to identify good candidates for ARG-US test implementations. INL has identified high-level goals for any INL site implementation of ARG-US: provide unique testing environments, prompt development of new monitoring methods/techniques for the ARG-US suite, and acquire useful monitoring for the user facility. To these ends, INL suggests 3 program areas for further investigation: CPP-603 Fuel Handling Cave (FHC), legacy mixed waste storage systems at Idaho Nuclear Technology & Engineering Center (INTEC) known as the “tank farm”, and periodic and emergency environmental monitoring. This progress report relates activities undertaken in this investigation, describes the preliminary areas of interest for limited scope ARG-US testing or implementation, and relays expected actions needed to complete the task scope. This report offers an opportunity to the program sponsor, technical leads at ANL, and INL site representatives to give feedback on the initial assessment and make recommendations on the forthcoming activities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

INL Site ARG-US Implementation – FY22 Activities and FY23 Plans

The Packaging Certification and Life Cycle Management program at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) developed a suite of monitoring systems collectively referred to here as ARG-US. ARG-US provides necessary data for nuclear facility and system operation and maintenance, and has been previously demonstrated in hot cells, radioactive material (RAM) storage areas, and RAM shipment trucks. It has also been installed directly on RAM storage and shipment containers. ARG-US offers some unique advantages over other commercially available systems by using wireless data connections, battery power supplies, and customizable monitoring methods. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been tasked with investigating applications for ARG-US at INL site facilities, which are operated by several different contractors. The initial investigation scope centered on CPP-603 Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility in relation to the upcoming Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Packaging Demonstration. The investigation has been led by the Used Fuel Management Department in INL’s Nuclear Science and Technology (NS&T) directorate. This investigation is expected to recommend INL site processes or facilities in which to implement ARG-US systems. INL has engaged local site technical and oversight representatives, security, nuclear safeguards, and program management personnel to identify good candidates for ARG-US test implementations. INL has identified the following high-level goals for any INL site implementation of ARG-US: provide unique testing environments, prompt development of new monitoring methods/techniques for the ARG-US suite, and acquire useful monitoring for the user facility. As a result, INL suggests three program areas for further investigation: CPP-603 Fuel Handling Cave (FHC), legacy mixed waste storage systems at Idaho Nuclear Technology & Engineering Center (INTEC) known as the “Tank Farm,” and periodic and emergency environmental monitoring. This progress report relates activities undertaken in this investigation, describes the preliminary areas of interest for limited scope ARG-US testing or implementation, and relays expected actions for completing the task scope. This report offers an opportunity to the program sponsor, technical leads at ANL, and INL site representatives to give feedback on the initial assessment and make recommendations on the forthcoming activities.

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