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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 235 records · Page 13
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

Managing Toxicological Risks: The Legacy of Shuttle Operations

Space toxicology greatly matured as a result of research and operations associated with the Shuttle. Materials offgassing had been a manageable concern since the Apollo days, but we learned to pay careful attention to compounds that could escape containment, to combustion events, to toxic propellants, to overuse of utility compounds, and to microbial and human metabolites. We also learned that flying real-time hardware to monitor air pollutants was a pathway with unanticipated speed bumps. Each new orbiter was tested for any excess offgassing products that could pollute the air during flight. In the late 1990s toxicologists and safety experts developed a 5-level toxicity rating system to guide containment of toxic compounds. This system is now in use aboard the International Space Station (ISS). Several combustion events during Shuttle Mir and also during Shuttle free-flight impelled toxicologists to identify hardware capable of monitoring toxic products; however, rapid adaptation of the hardware for the unique conditions of spaceflight caused unexpected missteps. Current and planned combustion analyzers would be useful to commercial partners that wish to manage the risk of health effects from thermal events. Propellants received special attention during the Shuttle program because of the possibility of bringing them into the habitable volume on extravehicular activity suits. Monitors for the airlocks were developed to mitigate this risk. Utility materials, such as lubricants, posed limited toxicological problems because water was not recovered. One clearly documented case of microbial metabolites polluting the Shuttle atmosphere was noted, and this has implications for commercial flights and control of microbes. Finally, carbon dioxide, the major human metabolite, episodically presented air quality problems aboard Shuttle, especially when nominal air flows were obstructed. Commercial vehicles must maintain robust air circulation given the anticipated high density of human occupants.

James, John T.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Human Research Program Human Health Countermeasures Element Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Risk Standing Review Panel (SRP)

The Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Risk Standing Review Panel (SRP) was favorably impressed by the operational risk management approach taken by the Human Research Program (HRP) Integrated Research Plan (IRP) to address the stated life sciences issues. The life sciences community at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) seems to be focused on operational risk management. This approach is more likely to provide risk managers with the information they need at the time they need it. Concerning the information provided to the SRP by the EVA Physiology, Systems, and Performance Project (EPSP), it is obvious that a great deal of productive activity is under way. Evaluation of this information was hampered by the fact that it often was not organized in a fashion that reflects the "Gaps and Tasks" approach of the overall Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) effort, and that a substantial proportion of the briefing concerned subjects that, while interesting, are not part of the HHC Element (e.g., the pressurized rover presentation). Additionally, no information was provided on several of the tasks or how they related to work underway or already accomplished. This situation left the SRP having to guess at the efforts and relationship to other elements, and made it hard to easily map the EVA Project efforts currently underway, and the data collected thus far, to the gaps and tasks in the IRP. It seems that integration of the EPSP project into the HHC Element could be improved. Along these lines, we were concerned that our SRP was split off from the other participating SRPs at an early stage in the overall agenda for the meeting. In reality, the concerns of EPSP and other projects share much common ground. For example, the commonality of the concerns of the EVA and exercise physiology groups is obvious, both in terms of what reduced exercise capacity can do to EVA capability, and how the exercise performed during an EVA could contribute to an overall exercise countermeasure prescription.

Norfleet, William↗
NASA NTRS2018

Risk Tolerance and Safety Culture: Minimizing the Risk of Catastrophe by Bringing the Lessons of Space Home

The Johnson Space Center has pursued integrating risk management practices and techniques throughout a large organization with an extraordinarily diverse mission. Past mission and institutional failures have been used to inform NASA's safety culture and a implement a uniform risk management environment. Basics from the loss prevention industry have influenced NASA's approach to sustaining its unique, yet aging, infrastructure. Lessons learned at NASA can augment and enhance occupational safety, health and risk management capabilities within hazardous industries. By focusing on risk informed decision-making, building a pervasive safety culture, and accommodating human factors, NASA's safety capabilities have been specifically developed to minimize the risk of loss of life and loss of mission.

Loyd, David↗
NASA NTRS2018

Risk Tolerance and Safety Culture: Minimizing the Risk of Catastrophe by Bringing the Lessons of Space Home

The Johnson Space Center has pursued integrating safety culture and risk management practices and techniques throughout a large organization with an extraordinarily diverse mission. Past mission and institutional failures have been used to inform NASA's safety culture and a implement a uniform risk management environment. Basics from the loss prevention industry have influenced NASA's approach to sustaining its unique, yet aging, infrastructure. Lessons learned at NASA can augment and enhance occupational safety, health and risk management capabilities within hazardous industries. By focusing on risk informed decision-making, building a pervasive safety culture, and accommodating human factors, NASA's safety capabilities have been specifically developed to minimize the risk of loss of life and loss of mission.

Mishap↗
NASA NTRS2015

New York City Panel on Climate Change 2015 Report: Climate Observations and Projections - Chapter 1

During 2013 and 2014, numerous international (IPCC, 2013) and national (Melillo et al., 2014; Gordon, 2014) reports have concluded that human activities are changing the climate, leading to increased vulnerability and risk. Since the industrial revolution, fossil fuel burning, industrial activity, and land use changes have led to a 40% increase in heat-trapping carbon dioxide (CO2), and an approximately 150% increase in methane (CH4), another powerful greenhouse gas (GHG), has been observed. Global temperatures have increased by close to 1 C since 1880 as the upper oceans have warmed and polar ice has retreated. These and other climate changes are projected to accelerate as greenhouse gas concentrations continue to rise. In the coming decades, climate change is extremely likely to bring warmer temperatures in the New York metropolitan region (see Box. 1.1 and Fig.1.1 for key definitions and terms). Heat waves are very likely to increase; total annual precipitation will likely increase and brief, intense rainstorms are very likely to increase. Because of incomplete knowledge about exactly how much climate change will occur, choosing among policies for reducing future damages requires prudent risk management (Yohe and Leichenko, 2010; Kunreuther et al., 2013). Given differing risk tolerances among stakeholders, a risk management approach allows for a range of possible climate change outcomes to be examined with associated uncertainties surrounding their likelihoods. The New York City Panel on Climate Change 2 (NPCC2) projections can be used to inform planning across multiple governmental scales (e.g., city, county, state) in the New York metropolitan region. Such coordinated efforts can serve as test cases for successful local, state, and federal coordination for integrated climate adaptation initiatives. This chapter describes the global climate system, and presents observed temperature and precipitation trends and projections for the region. Chapter 2 (NPCC, 2015) focuses on sea level rise and possible changes in coastal storms. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 (NPCC, 2015) describe efforts to better understand the region's vulnerability to coastal flooding during coastal storms. The treatment of likelihood related to the NPCC projections is similar to that developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports (IPCC, 2007; 2013), with six likelihood categories (Box 1.1 and Fig. 1.1). The assignment of climate hazards to these categories is based on observed data, global climate model simulations, published literature, and expert judgment.

climate change↗
NASA NTRS2013

Managing the Risk of Command File Errors

Command File Error (CFE), as defined by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's (JPL) Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) is, regardless of the consequence on the spacecraft, either: an error in a command file sent to the spacecraft, an error in the process for developing and delivering a command file to the spacecraft, or the omission of a command file that should have been sent to the spacecraft. The risk consequence of a CFE can be mission ending and thus a concern to space exploration projects during their mission operations. A CFE during space mission operations is often the symptom of some kind of imbalance or inadequacy within the system that comprises the hardware & software used for command generation and the human experts involved in this endeavour. As we move into an era of enhanced collaboration with other NASA centers and commercial partners, these systems become more and more complex and hence it is all the more important to formally model and analyze CFEs in order to manage the risk of CFEs. Here we will provide a summary of the ongoing efforts at JPL in this area and also explain some more recent developments in the area of developing quantitative models for the purpose of managing CFE's.

Bayesian Belief Networks↗
NASA NTRS2010

The WISE Satellite Development: Managing the Risks and the Opportunities

NASA's Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) MIDEX mission is surveying the entire sky in four infrared bands from 3.4 to 22 micrometers. The WISE instrument consists of a 40 cm telescope, a solid hydrogen cryostat, a scan mirror mechanism, and four 1K x1K infrared detectors. The WISE spacecraft bus provides communication, data handling, and avionics including instrument pointing. A Delta 7920 successfully launched WISE into a Sun-synchronous polar orbit on December 14, 2009. WISE was competitively selected by NASA as a Medium cost Explorer mission (MIDEX) in 2002. MIDEX missions are led by the Principal Investigator who delegates day-to-day management to the Project Manager. Given the tight cost cap and relatively short development schedule, NASA chose to extend the development period one year with an option to cancel the mission if certain criteria were not met. To meet this and other challenges, the WISE management team had to learn to work seamlessly across institutional lines and to recognize risks and opportunities in order to develop the flight hardware within the project resources. In spite of significant technical issues, the WISE satellite was delivered on budget and on schedule. This paper describes our management approach and risk posture, technical issues, and critical decisions made.

Risk Management↗
NASA NTRS2013

Toward Global Drought Early Warning Capability - Expanding International Cooperation for the Development of a Framework for Monitoring and Forecasting

Drought has had a significant impact on civilization throughout history in terms of reductions in agricultural productivity, potable water supply, and economic activity, and in extreme cases this has led to famine. Every continent has semiarid areas, which are especially vulnerable to drought. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has noted that average annual river runoff and water availability are projected to decrease by 10 percent-13 percent over some dry and semiarid regions in mid and low latitudes, increasing the frequency, intensity, and duration of drought, along with its associated impacts. The sheer magnitude of the problem demands efforts to reduce vulnerability to drought by moving away from the reactive, crisis management approach of the past toward a more proactive, risk management approach that is centered on reducing vulnerability to drought as much as possible while providing early warning of evolving drought conditions and possible impacts. Many countries, unfortunately, do not have adequate resources to provide early warning, but require outside support to provide the necessary early warning information for risk management. Furthermore, in an interconnected world, the need for information on a global scale is crucial for understanding the prospect of declines in agricultural productivity and associated impacts on food prices, food security, and potential for civil conflict. This paper highlights the recent progress made toward a Global Drought Early Warning Monitoring Framework (GDEWF), an underlying partnership and framework, along with its Global Drought Early Warning System (GDEWS), which is its interoperable information system, and the organizations that have begun working together to make it a reality. The GDEWF aims to improve existing regional and national drought monitoring and forecasting capabilities by adding a global component, facilitating continental monitoring and forecasting (where lacking), and improving these tools at various scales, thereby increasing the capacity of national and regional institutions that lack drought early warning systems or complementing existing ones. A further goal is to improve coordination of information delivery for drought-related activities and relief efforts across the world. This is especially relevant for regions and nations with low capacity for drought early warning. To do this requires a global partnership that leverages the resources necessary and develops capabilities at the global level, such as global drought forecasting combined with early warning tools, global real-time monitoring, and harmonized methods to identify critical areas vulnerable to drought. Although the path to a fully functional GDEWS is challenging, multiple partners and organizations within the drought, forecasting, agricultural, and water-cycle communities are committed to working toward its success.

GDEWS↗
NASA NTRS2019

How Much Testing is Needed to Manage Supportability Risks for Beyond-LEO Missions?

Supportability will be a significantly greater driver of cost and risk for future deep-space crewed missions than it has been in the past. Spares requirements and maintenance risk mitigation in particular present an unprecedented challenge for missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), since, for the first time in human spaceflight history, crews will be weeks or months away from resupply or a safe return to Earth in the event of an abort. Under these conditions, failure rates are a critical parameter that must be well-understood in order to manage logistics and risk effectively. However, failure rates cannot be measured directly, and can only be estimated based on past experience and test results. Previous research has shown that International Space Station (ISS) operational experience has provided significant benefits to future missions by reducing uncertainty and improving accuracy in failure rate estimates, resulting in significant reductions in mass and risk for beyond-LEO missions. This paper updates and expands on that research and quantifies the potential value of continued testing for future mission supportability. Frequentist and Bayesian models for evaluating, validating, and updating failure rate estimates are described, and are combined with supportability models to examine potential impacts of additional operating experience for future missions in terms of logistics mass reduction. The implications of these results for technology development, system design, and program planning are discussed along with lessons learned and recommendations for future system development. In the end, there is no simple answer to the question of how much testing is required, but the models described in this paper provide a way to evaluate the potential impacts of testing in order to inform test planning.

Andrew C Owens↗
NASA NTRS2009

Integrated Risk and Knowledge Management Program -- IRKM-P

The NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) IRKM-P tightly couples risk management and knowledge management processes and tools to produce an effective "modern" work environment. IRKM-P objectives include: (1) to learn lessons from past and current programs (Apollo, Space Shuttle, and the International Space Station); (2) to generate and share new engineering design, operations, and management best practices through preexisting Continuous Risk Management (CRM) procedures and knowledge-management practices; and (3) to infuse those lessons and best practices into current activities. The conceptual framework of the IRKM-P is based on the assumption that risks highlight potential knowledge gaps that might be mitigated through one or more knowledge management practices or artifacts. These same risks also serve as cues for collection of knowledge particularly, knowledge of technical or programmatic challenges that might recur.

Lengyel, David M.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Simulation of Mission Phases

This position with the Simulation and Graphics Branch (ER7) at Johnson Space Center (JSC) provided an introduction to vehicle hardware, mission planning, and simulation design. ER7 supports engineering analysis and flight crew training by providing high-fidelity, real-time graphical simulations in the Systems Engineering Simulator (SES) lab. The primary project assigned by NASA mentor and SES lab manager, Meghan Daley, was to develop a graphical simulation of the rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking (RPOD) phases of flight. The simulation is to include a generic crew/cargo transportation vehicle and a target object in low-Earth orbit (LEO). Various capsule, winged, and lifting body vehicles as well as historical RPOD methods were evaluated during the project analysis phase. JSC core mission to support the International Space Station (ISS), Commercial Crew Program (CCP), and Human Space Flight (HSF) influenced the project specifications. The simulation is characterized as a 30 meter +V Bar and/or -R Bar approach to the target object's docking station. The ISS was selected as the target object and the international Low Impact Docking System (iLIDS) was selected as the docking mechanism. The location of the target object's docking station corresponds with the RPOD methods identified. The simulation design focuses on Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) system architecture models with station keeping and telemetry data processing capabilities. The optical and inertial sensors, reaction control system thrusters, and the docking mechanism selected were based on CCP vehicle manufacturer's current and proposed technologies. A significant amount of independent study and tutorial completion was required for this project. Multiple primary source materials were accessed using the NASA Technical Report Server (NTRS) and reference textbooks were borrowed from the JSC Main Library and International Space Station Library. The Trick Simulation Environment and User Training Materials version 2013.0 release was used to complete the Trick tutorial. Multiple network privilege and repository permission requests were required in order to access previous simulation models. The project was also an introduction to computer programming and the Linux operating system. Basic C++ and Python syntax was used during the completion of the Trick tutorial. Trick's engineering analysis and Monte Carlo simulation capabilities were observed and basic space mission planning procedures were applied in the conceptual design phase. Multiple professional development opportunities were completed in addition to project duties during this internship through the System for Administration, Training, and Education Resources for NASA (SATERN). Topics include: JSC Risk Management Workshop, CCP Risk Management, Basic Radiation Safety Training, X-Ray Radiation Safety, Basic Laser Safety, JSC Export Control, ISS RISE Ambassador, Basic SharePoint 2013, Space Nutrition and Biochemistry, and JSC Personal Protective Equipment. Additionally, this internship afforded the opportunity for formal project presentation and public speaking practice. This was my first experience at a NASA center. After completing this internship I have a much clearer understanding of certain aspects of the agency's processes and procedures, as well as a deeper appreciation from spaceflight simulation design and testing. I will continue to improve my technical skills so that I may have another opportunity to return to NASA and Johnson Space Center.

Carlstrom, Nicholas Mercury↗
NASA NTRS2014

Addressing the Hard Factors for Command File Errors by Probabilistic Reasoning

Command File Errors (CFE) are managed using standard risk management approaches at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Over the last few years, more emphasis has been made on the collection, organization, and analysis of these errors for the purpose of reducing the CFE rates. More recently, probabilistic modeling techniques have been used for more in depth analysis of the perceived error rates of the DAWN mission and for managing the soft factors in the upcoming phases of the mission. We broadly classify the factors that can lead to CFE's as soft factors, which relate to the cognition of the operators and hard factors which relate to the Mission System which is composed of the hardware, software and procedures used for the generation, verification & validation and execution of commands. The focus of this paper is to use probabilistic models that represent multiple missions at JPL to determine the root cause and sensitivities of the various components of the mission system and develop recommendations and techniques for addressing them. The customization of these multi-mission models to a sample interplanetary spacecraft is done for this purpose.

Meshkat, Leila↗
NASA NTRS2015

NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 2: System Safety Concepts, Guidelines, and Implementation Examples

This is the second of two volumes that collectively comprise the NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1 (NASASP-210-580) was prepared for the purpose of presenting the overall framework for System Safety and for providing the general concepts needed to implement the framework. Volume 2 provides guidance for implementing these concepts as an integral part of systems engineering and risk management. This guidance addresses the following functional areas: 1.The development of objectives that collectively define adequate safety for a system, and the safety requirements derived from these objectives that are levied on the system. 2.The conduct of system safety activities, performed to meet the safety requirements, with specific emphasis on the conduct of integrated safety analysis (ISA) as a fundamental means by which systems engineering and risk management decisions are risk-informed. 3.The development of a risk-informed safety case (RISC) at major milestone reviews to argue that the systems safety objectives are satisfied (and therefore that the system is adequately safe). 4.The evaluation of the RISC (including supporting evidence) using a defined set of evaluation criteria, to assess the veracity of the claims made therein in order to support risk acceptance decisions.

Safety Case↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This paper presents the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This presentation describes the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗
NASA NTRS1988

Fire behavior and risk analysis in spacecraft

Practical risk management for present and future spacecraft, including space stations, involves the optimization of residual risks balanced by the spacecraft operational, technological, and economic limitations. Spacecraft fire safety is approached through three strategies, in order of risk: (1) control of fire-causing elements, through exclusion of flammable materials for example; (2) response to incipient fires through detection and alarm; and (3) recovery of normal conditions through extinguishment and cleanup. Present understanding of combustion in low gravity is that, compared to normal gravity behavior, fire hazards may be reduced by the absence of buoyant gas flows yet at the same time increased by ventilation flows and hot particle expulsion. This paper discusses the application of low-gravity combustion knowledge and appropriate aircraft analogies to fire detection, fire fighting, and fire-safety decisions for eventual fire-risk management and optimization in spacecraft.

Friedman, Robert↗