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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 235 records · Page 13
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2022

Characterization of Response Times based on Voice Communication and Traffic Surveillance Data

A barrier to the integration of remotely piloted aircraft operations in the U.S. National Airspace System is the latency of voice communications between the air traffic controller and the remote pilot, and the latency of communication between the aircraft and the remote pilot. The latency can be substantial especially when satellite-based beyond-radio-line-of-sight communication and relay through the aircraft are employed. This study uses voice recordings of controller-pilot communications and aircraft track data to establish a baseline of pilot readback latencies and maneuver detection delays in the current piloted operations. A machine learning pipeline was developed to parse the contents of the air traffic control clearances including the callsigns using natural language processing. After manually validating the results obtained using the pipeline, the average pilot readback latency was found to be about 0.6 seconds. The average latency between the end of maneuver (inferred from track data), initiated by the pilot in response to the clearance, and the end of clearance was found to be about 176 seconds for altitude change commands, 69 seconds for heading change commands, and 182 seconds for speed change commands. The average latency between the beginning of maneuver and the end of clearance was found to be about 17 seconds for altitude change commands, 17seconds for heading change commands, and 25 seconds for speed change commands.

controller-pilot communication, communication late↗
NASA NTRS2022

Characterization of Response Times Based on Voice Communication and Traffic Surveillance Data

A barrier to the integration of remotely piloted aircraft operations in the U.S. National Airspace System is the latency of voice communications between the air traffic controller and the remote pilot, and the latency of communication between the aircraft and the remote pilot. The latency can be substantial especially when satellite-based beyond-radio-line-of-sight communication and relay through the aircraft are employed. This study uses voice recordings of controller-pilot communications and aircraft track data to establish a baseline of pilot readback latencies and maneuver detection delays in the current piloted operations. A machine learning pipeline was developed to parse the contents of the air traffic control clearances including the callsigns using natural language processing. After manually validating the results obtained using the pipeline, the average pilot readback latency was found to be about 0.6 seconds. The average latency between the end of maneuver (inferred from track data), initiated by the pilot in response to the clearance, and the end of clearance was found to be about 176 seconds for altitude change commands, 69 seconds for heading change commands, and 182 seconds for speed change commands. The average latency between the beginning of maneuver and the end of clearance was found to be about 17 seconds for altitude change commands, 17seconds for heading change commands, and 25 seconds for speed change commands.

controller-pilot communication↗
NASA NTRS2022

Assurance Equations: A Cost and Criticality Model for Optimizing Quality Assurance Surveillance

The cost of quality vs cost of failure correction has been a long-running topic of discussion within the Aerospace community. It leads directly to concepts of “risk tolerance”, and risk-based decision-making. It would be valuable if there was a way to compute the optimal investment in customer-executed quality assurance activities using defect significance with respect to performance objectives, the activities’ defect detection effectiveness, and the cost-penalty for late discovery of impactful defects. This optimization is particularly of interest to projects whose budget constraints significantly limit their risk management options.The cost to fix defects (i.e., failure correction) escalates as the project matures. There have been studies attempting to determine the relative cost of fixing defects discovered during various phases of a project life cycle with important implications, all of which suggest growth factors are large. The commonly referred to 1:10:100 rule represents a cost multiplier for repair/rework across the Design to Fab to Test hardware development phases. Cost premiums for QA activities also accumulate when they are treated as mandatory (due to schedule drag) or are performed later than their assigned phase.This paper describes the modeling of development phase -dependencies in the conduct of typical customer-executed quality assurance activities. Our initial modeling encompasses:• Distinct phases of the production lifecycle• Multiple kinds of Defects, each with some a-priori likelihood of being present• Each defect’s impact on performance Objectives for a type of hardware• The cost and efficacy of assurance techniques at detecting such Defects• The costs of fixing those Defects detected in a given phase of the production lifecycleThe model captures assurance activities’ abilities to Detect defects. Upon detection it is assumed that the Defect is immediately fixed. Defects that “escape” detection by some activity may thereafter be detected by a later activity, but by then the cost of fixing the Defect may have escalated. Defects are related to the performance Objectives they would detract from, were those Defects to remain present in the operating system.We have constructed and are exploring, a model that relates the importance of hardware system elements to mission objectives, the impact of types of Defects on those hardware types, the cost of customer-executed assurance activities (i.e., supplier controls) and their effectiveness towards reducing an impactful quality escape, and the cost of Defect correction across production phase. We describe the approach taken to select the key model aspects, why they are relevant to our NASA mission, and our efforts to populate it with relevant and contemporary data. We use a notional example to illustrate model design and function.

Plante, Jeannette↗
NASA NTRS2024

Findings From 9 Years of Renal Stone Surveillance of U.S. Astronauts

INTRODUCTION: Renal stones are thought to be a risk for spaceflight due to urine chemistry changes, induced by microgravity. Asymptomatic stone can have significant medical and mission impact.For9 years astronauts travelling to the International Space Station (ISS) have received pre-and post-flight renal ultrasound, according to a specialized renal ultrasound protocol, to look for renal calcifications or mineralized renal material (MRM).A new ultrasound machine was put in service halfway through the screening program. METHODS: MRM screening data from pre-and post-flight were compared, to look for changes in MRM burden. Pre-and post-flight scans from 42 subjects were compared. Studies were further stratified by old versus new machine. Measures were modeled using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) as defined by the interaction between pre-to postflight, and machine-to-machine. RESULTS: There was no observed statistical change seen in MRM burden pre-to postflight using the new higher-resolution ultrasound machine. DISCUSSION: The new machine gives more precise measurements and allows us to differentiate MRMs from other bright objects seen on ultrasound, such as small blood vessels. These data imply that spaceflight does not increase the risk of renal stone formation, at least out to the length of ISS missions. This data will be used to update NASA’s Human System Risk Board’s risk tracking documents, in-flight Concept of Operations, and our Clinical Practice Guideline.

K Cortez↗
NASA NTRS2024

Update to NASA's Clinical Practice Guideline for Renal Stone Surveillance in U.S. Astronauts

BACKGROUND: For the past 9 years all NASA astronauts received specialized renal ultrasound screening for precursors to renal stones, our so called “mineralized renal material” (MRM), to reduce the possibility of sending a person to space with a renal stone that could cause morbidity and threaten mission objectives. A recent analysis of this data shows no increased incidence of clinical or sub-clinical renal stones associated with spaceflight; thus, our clinical practice guideline has been updated. OVERVIEW: Astronauts previously received a renal ultrasound screening at selection and at every annual recertification exam. In total, 73 individuals have been scanned and 282 total studies have been performed as of April 2023.This data shows no observed statistical change seen in MRM burden pre-to postflight, therefore a reduction in the frequency of the screening exams is appropriate. DISCUSSION: Data presented in this panel have shown no direct correlation between spaceflight and development of MRM or renal stones in astronaut kidneys out to at least 6 months of spaceflight. The MRM burden does not seem to change appreciably over time and so far, has no demonstrated correlation to external factors. Therefore, we find it appropriate, in lieu of yearly exams, to reduce the frequency of screening to: initial selection, first annual exam after selection, and pre/postflight. This balances the screening frequency of our astronauts, against the potential for unnecessary medical procedures, while still serving the purpose of risk reduction.

D Reyes↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Flight Test Design and Implementation for Airspace Independent Surveillance Through a Distributed Ground Based Sensor Network

The paper presents a system architecture for distributed sensing, networking and computing, its hardware implementation, and execution of initial flight experiments to validate theoretical findings. It induces development of distributed sensing requirements, framework, and architecture, development of distributed ground node hardware prototypes, integration of all nodes and testing of baseline functionalities, integration of in-house developed perception, migration and tracking software packages, establishing flight scenario and flyable path for a selected UAS, flying the air vehicle along the path, recording sensors measurements, pre-processing them and transferring the resulting data to an optimal computing center. It also addresses the challenges related to pre-flight hardware calibration, clock synchronization, sensor registration and establishing a communication network. Sensors data processing results demonstrate the functionality of the presented distributed architecture and satisfactory performance of the applied technologies.

Target tracking↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Flight Test Design and Implementation for Independent Surveillance of an Airspace Through a Distributed Ground Sensing Network

The paper presents a system architecture for distributed sensing, networking and computing, its hardware implementation, and execution of initial flight experiments to validate theoretical findings. It induces development of distributed sensing requirements, framework, and architecture, development of distributed ground node hardware prototypes, integration of all nodes and testing of baseline functionalities, integration of in-house developed perception, migration and tracking software packages, establishing flight scenario and flyable path for a selected UAS, flying the air vehicle along the path, recording sensors measurements, pre-processing them and transferring the resulting data to an optimal computing center. It also addresses the challenges related to pre-flight hardware calibration, clock synchronization, sensor registration and establishing a communication network. Sensors data processing results demonstrate the functionality of the presented distributed architecture and satisfactory performance of the applied technologies.

Distributed sensing↗
NASA NTRS2018

[Micron]ADS-B Detect and Avoid Flight Tests on Phantom 4 Unmanned Aircraft System

Researchers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Armstrong Flight Research Center in Edwards, California and Vigilant Aerospace Systems collaborated for the flight-test demonstration of an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast based collision avoidance technology on a small unmanned aircraft system equipped with the uAvionix Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast transponder. The purpose of the testing was to demonstrate that National Aeronautics and Space Administration / Vigilant software and algorithms, commercialized as the FlightHorizon UAS"TM", are compatible with uAvionix hardware systems and the DJI Phantom 4 small unmanned aircraft system. The testing and demonstrations were necessary for both parties to further develop and certify the technology in three key areas: flights beyond visual line of sight, collision avoidance, and autonomous operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Vigilant Aerospace Systems have developed and successfully flight-tested an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Detect and Avoid system on the Phantom 4 small unmanned aircraft system. The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Detect and Avoid system architecture is especially suited for small unmanned aircraft systems because it integrates: 1) miniaturized Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast hardware; 2) radio data-link communications; 3) software algorithms for real-time Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast data integration, conflict detection, and alerting; and 4) a synthetic vision display using a fully-integrated National Aeronautics and Space Administration geobrowser for three dimensional graphical representations for ownship and air traffic situational awareness. The flight-test objectives were to evaluate the performance of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Detect and Avoid collision avoidance technology as installed on two small unmanned aircraft systems. In December 2016, four flight tests were conducted at Edwards Air Force Base. Researchers in the ground control station looking at displays were able to verify the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast target detection and collision avoidance resolutions.

avoidance↗
NASA NTRS2003

Aerospace Communications Security Technologies Demonstrated

In light of the events of September 11, 2001, NASA senior management requested an investigation of technologies and concepts to enhance aviation security. The investigation was to focus on near-term technologies that could be demonstrated within 90 days and implemented in less than 2 years. In response to this request, an internal NASA Glenn Research Center Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance Aviation Security Tiger Team was assembled. The 2-year plan developed by the team included an investigation of multiple aviation security concepts, multiple aircraft platforms, and extensively leveraged datalink communications technologies. It incorporated industry partners from NASA's Graphical Weather-in-the-Cockpit research, which is within NASA's Aviation Safety Program. Two concepts from the plan were selected for demonstration: remote "black box," and cockpit/cabin surveillance. The remote "black box" concept involves real-time downlinking of aircraft parameters for remote monitoring and archiving of aircraft data, which would assure access to the data following the loss or inaccessibility of an aircraft. The cockpit/cabin surveillance concept involves remote audio and/or visual surveillance of cockpit and cabin activity, which would allow immediate response to any security breach and would serve as a possible deterrent to such breaches. The datalink selected for the demonstrations was VDL Mode 2 (VHF digital link), the first digital datalink for air-ground communications designed for aircraft use. VDL Mode 2 is beginning to be implemented through the deployment of ground stations and aircraft avionics installations, with the goal of being operational in 2 years. The first demonstration was performed December 3, 2001, onboard the LearJet 25 at Glenn. NASA worked with Honeywell, Inc., for the broadcast VDL Mode 2 datalink capability and with actual Boeing 757 aircraft data. This demonstration used a cockpitmounted camera for video surveillance and a coupling to the intercom system for audio surveillance. Audio, video, and "black box" data were simultaneously streamed to the ground, where they were displayed to a Glenn audience of senior management and aviation security team members.

Griner, James H.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Lighter-Than-Air (LTA) "AirStation": Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Carrier Concept

Proposals for adapting modern airship technologies for military missions have mostly focused on exploiting the airships high flight endurance and low fuel requirement to conduct direct surveillance missions requiring high degrees of persistence over the areas to be observed. While this mission has value, it constrains the airship in two regards. (1) It places all the surveillance sensors, communication systems, and other mission equipment in the airship itself. (2) It requires the airship to be physically in the vicinity of the areas to be directly observed. A more advanced utilization of airship technology would be to add the capability to deploy a separate set of surveillance equipment, thereby enabling indirect and distributed observation operations. This can be undertaken by installing surveillance equipment in a squadron of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that can be carried and operated remotely from the airship, and then return to the airship as a base of support. This could be accomplished by deploying 20-30 UASs on an optionally manned (5 person crew) airship. The mission focus of the airship UAS carrier would be for support of distributed intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), close air support (CAS), maritime patrol and interdiction, electronic warfare (EW), persistent area dominance and missile defense. The logic for utilizing an airship carrier over a ground base to deploy UAS will be examined. Whether to be used as a stand-alone platform or in concert with conventional intelligence gathering techniques, the airship UAS carrier can provide the following benefits: a mobile base that will remain accessible despite political fallout which may render a ground base unavailable for use, the psychological impact of a power projection tool that has no geographical limits (imagined in the same way a naval carrier group projects power), cost-saving intelligence gathering over manned alternatives (assumption), and a wider area of influence when compared to an immobile ground base that must facilitate the transfer of UAS to other bases in order to overfly particular areas (all operations, launch, recover, etc. take place from the airship).

Hochstetler, Ron↗