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At least 253 records · Page 14

Inlet Unstart Propulsion Integration Wind Tunnel Test Program Completed for High-Speed Civil Transport

One of the propulsion system concepts to be considered for the High-Speed Civil Transport (HSCT) is an underwing, dual-propulsion, pod-per-wing installation. Adverse transient phenomena such as engine compressor stall and inlet unstart could severely degrade the performance of one of these propulsion pods. The subsequent loss of thrust and increased drag could cause aircraft stability and control problems that could lead to a catastrophic accident if countermeasures are not in place to anticipate and control these detrimental transient events. Aircraft system engineers must understand what happens during an engine compressor stall and inlet unstart so that they can design effective control systems to avoid and/or alleviate the effects of a propulsion pod engine compressor stall and inlet unstart. The objective of the Inlet Unstart Propulsion Airframe Integration test program was to assess the underwing flow field of a High-Speed Civil Transport propulsion system during an engine compressor stall and subsequent inlet unstart. Experimental research testing was conducted in the 10- by 10-Foot Supersonic Wind Tunnel at the NASA Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field. The representative propulsion pod consisted of a two-dimensional, bifurcated inlet mated to a live turbojet engine. The propulsion pod was mounted below a large flat plate that acted as a wing simulator. Because of the plate s long length (nominally 10-ft wide by 18-ft long), realistic boundary layers could form at the inlet cowl plane. Transient instrumentation was used to document the aerodynamic flow-field conditions during an unstart sequence. Acquiring these data was a significant technical challenge because a typical unstart sequence disrupts the local flow field for about only 50 msec. Flow surface information was acquired via static pressure taps installed in the wing simulator, and intrusive pressure probes were used to acquire flow-field information. These data were extensively analyzed to determine the impact of the unstart transient on the surrounding flow field. This wind tunnel test program was a success, and for the first time, researchers acquired flow-field aerodynamic data during a supersonic propulsion system engine compressor stall and inlet unstart sequence. In addition to obtaining flow-field pressure data, Glenn researchers determined other properties such as the transient flow angle and Mach number. Data are still being reduced, and a comprehensive final report will be released during calendar year 2000.

Porro, A. Robert↗

Orbiter Window Hypervelocity Impact Strength Evaluation

When the Space Shuttle Orbiter incurs damage on its windowpane during flight from particles traveling at hypervelocity speeds, it produces a distinctive damage that reduces the overall strength of the pane. This damage has the potential to increase the risk associated with a safe return to Earth. Engineers at Boeing and NASA/JSC are called to Mission Control to evaluate the damage and provide an assessment on the risk to the crew. Historically, damages like these were categorized as "accepted risk" associated with manned spaceflight, and as long as the glass was intact, engineers gave a "go ahead" for entry for the Orbiter. Since the Columbia accident, managers have given more scrutiny to these assessments, and this has caused the Orbiter window engineers to capitalize on new methods of assessments for these damages. This presentation will describe the original methodology that was used to asses the damages, and introduce a philosophy new to the Shuttle program for assessing structural damage, reliability/risk-based engineering. The presentation will also present a new, recently adopted method for assessing the damage and providing management with a reasonable assessment on the realities of the risk to the crew and vehicle for return.

Estes, Lynda R.↗

The analysis of airline flight records for winds and performance with application to the Delta 191 accident

Advanced analytical methods applied to airline digital flight records and ATC radar tracking data are providing new insights into atmospheric disturbances that cause serious operating problems for aircraft. Performance-based methods for estimating unmeasured flow angles and the possible influence of rain on lift and drag, and a state-estimation procedure for determining winds along the flightpath are reviewed. The methods are applied to data records from the Delta Flight 191 wind-shear accident at the Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport (August 2, 1985) which involved an L-1011 airliner on final approach. The results indicate that the aircraft encountered a strong downlow followed by a strong outflow accompanied by large and rapid changes in the vertical wind. This pattern of low-level winds is consistent with the model that treats a downburst as a vortex ring. Although rain was present in the downburst, the analysis showed no evidence of performance loss. The results obtained from analyses of airline turbulence encounters provide a means for simulating turbulence phenomena and for training pilots for future encounters.

Bach, R. E., Jr.↗

Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I

Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.

Debris↗

Risk to the public from carbon fibers released in civil aircraft accidents

Because carbon fibers are strong, stiff, and lightweight, they are attractive for use in composite structures. Because they also have high electrical conductivity, free carbon fibers settling on electrical conductors can cause malfunctions. If released from the composite by burning, the fibers may become a hazard to exposed electrical and electronic equipment. As part of a Federal study of the potential hazard associated with the use of carbon fibers, NASA assessed the public risk associated with crash fire accidents of civil aircraft. The NASA study projected a dramatic increase in the use of carbon composites in civil aircraft and developed technical data to support the risk assessment. Personal injury was found to be extremely unlikely. In 1993, the year chosen as a focus for the study, the expected annual cost of damage caused by released carbon fibers is only $1000. Even the worst-case carbon fiber incident simulated (costing $178,000 once in 34,000 years) was relatively low-cost compared with the usual air transport accident cost. On the basis of these observations, the NASA study concluded that exploitation of composites should continue, that additional protection of avionics is unnecessary, and that development of alternate materials specifically to overcome this problem is not justified.

Source record↗

Mechanical failure of fresh nuclear grade iron–chromium–aluminum (FeCrAl) cladding under simulated hot zero power reactivity initiated accident conditions

The reactivity initiated accident (RIA) is a postulated accident in light water reactors initiated by a rapid increase in reactivity which causes an increase in fission rate and fuel temperature. One potential mode of fuel system failure during RIA is pellet cladding mechanical interaction (PCMI) due to the rapid thermal expansion of the fuel pellet. Simulated PCMI experiments were performed by rapidly pressurizing iron-chromium-aluminum (FeCrAl) cladding tube samples using a hydraulic modified burst test system, causing the specimens to burst under a biaxial loading path. Deformation and rupture of the specimens were tracked with a telecentric lens and high-speed camera system. Outer surface strains were calculated using digital image correlation (DIC) on speckle patterns painted on the specimens’ outer surfaces. Experiments were conducted at approximately 275 °C, representative of hot zero power RIA conditions. The failure hoop strain was DIC-calculated between approximately 1.8–3.4%, corresponding to quasi-static energy depositions of approximately 110–260 calories per gram UO 2 assuming initial pellet-cladding contact. These conditions are very similar to the proposed energy deposition limit of 150 calories per gram UO 2 for unirradiated zirconium-based cladding in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Draft Regulatory Guide 1327. A very small strain rate dependence was observed in the data, with the magnitude of the failure hoop strain decreasing slightly with increasing strain rate. This observed dependence may be relevant because the FeCrAl cladding strain rate will be approximately 20% higher than in zirconium-based cladding due to the harder neutron spectrum and resultant shorter neutron generation time.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

High-burnup fuel stress analysis prior to and during a LOCA transient

High-burnup fuel fragmentation and pulverization have been experimentally observed during simulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) transient testing of high-burnup (>62 GWd/tU) nuclear fuel. The cause of this phenomenon is generally accepted to be the formation of stresses arising from the off-normal conditions. However, the primary mechanism(s) contributing to the stress formation is/are still being debated. Leading hypotheses suggest that the concurrence of fission gas bubbles and high burnup structure on the pellet periphery (i.e., the rim) leave the fuel susceptible to pulverization. Other hypotheses suggest that pulverization is artificially inflated during externally heated tests that do not reproduce prototypic fuel stresses and radial temperature profiles as the fuel transitions from full-power nuclear heating to decay heating. This work performs finite element analyses of fuel pellet temperatures and macroscopic stresses prior to and during a LOCA transient to identify (1) operating conditions that may exacerbate the fuel pellet stress state, (2) differences in predicted stresses with nuclear vs. furnace heating, and (3) how fuel cracking impacts the subsequent stress state in the pellet fragments. Analyses predict that macroscopic transient fuel stresses resulting from constrained thermal expansion will remain below the fracture stress of fresh UO 2 once the fragment size reaches ~4 mm or less. Calculated fuel stresses from simulated LOCA tests performed with representative nuclear vs. electrical heating rates are shown to be equal within 5% and essentially unchanged for all times after the first 27 seconds of the transients. Because the fuel stresses do not change once the temperature profile becomes uniform, macroscopic transient stresses would be no different than those following a normal shutdown. Because pulverization of high burnup fuel does not occur prior to a LOCA test, pulverization of high burnup UO 2 cannot be initiated by differential thermal stresses.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An Overview of the NASA Aviation Safety Program Propulsion Health Monitoring Element

The NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) has been initiated with aggressive goals to reduce the civil aviation accident rate, To meet these goals, several technology investment areas have been identified including a sub-element in propulsion health monitoring (PHM). Specific AvSP PHM objectives are to develop and validate propulsion system health monitoring technologies designed to prevent engine malfunctions from occurring in flight, and to mitigate detrimental effects in the event an in-flight malfunction does occur. A review of available propulsion system safety information was conducted to help prioritize PHM areas to focus on under the AvSP. It is noted that when a propulsion malfunction is involved in an aviation accident or incident, it is often a contributing factor rather than the sole cause for the event. Challenging aspects of the development and implementation of PHM technology such as cost, weight, robustness, and reliability are discussed. Specific technology plans are overviewed including vibration diagnostics, model-based controls and diagnostics, advanced instrumentation, and general aviation propulsion system health monitoring technology. Propulsion system health monitoring, in addition to engine design, inspection, maintenance, and pilot training and awareness, is intrinsic to enhancing aviation propulsion system safety.

Simon, Donald L.↗

Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Debris Assessment

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident revealed a fundamental problem of the Space Shuttle Program regarding debris. Prior to the tragedy, the Space Shuttle requirement stated that no debris should be liberated that would jeopardize the flight crew and/or mission success. When the accident investigation determined that a large piece of foam debris was the primary cause of the loss of the shuttle and crew, it became apparent that the risk and scope of - damage that could be caused by certain types of debris, especially - ice and foam, were not fully understood. There was no clear understanding of the materials that could become debris, the path the debris might take during flight, the structures the debris might impact or the damage the impact might cause. In addition to supporting the primary NASA and USA goal of returning the Space Shuttle to flight by understanding the SRB debris environment and capability to withstand that environment, the SRB debris assessment project was divided into four primary tasks that were required to be completed to support the RTF goal. These tasks were (1) debris environment definition, (2) impact testing, (3) model correlation and (4) hardware evaluation. Additionally, the project aligned with USA's corporate goals of safety, customer satisfaction, professional development and fiscal accountability.

Kendall, Kristin↗

Fuel Bonding and its Impact on Axial Gas Communication Behavior in Light-Water Reactor Fuel Rods

Axial gas communication concerns the flow along the axial axis of nuclear fuel rods during ramp and loss of coolant accident (LOCA) conditions. During power ramps, the higher linear heat generation rate may cause fuel-to-clad gap closure that may prevent transport of released fission gases to the plenum. Upon reduction in power the gas then can communicate to the plenum. This phenomenon has been experimentally observed by short power dips during ramp experiments completed at the Risø reactor. At higher burnups it is observed that the UO2 fuel and Zircaloy cladding forms a chemical bond. This bond results in complete closure of the gap. When these high burnup rods are subjected to a LOCA, the bond has implications on both the mechanical response (i.e., ballooning) of the cladding and subsequent fuel relocation and axial gas communication. In the LOCA scenario, gas communication is of interest in two different regimes: 1) pre-rupture communication from the plenum towards the lower pressure ballooning area and 2) the post-rupture depressurization of the plenum to the external system pressure. In both regimes the presence of a fuel-to-cladding bond will impact the rate of depressurization. In this work we present a fuel-to-clad bonding model that is coupled to an existing axial gas communication model framework in the BISON fuel performance code. The effect of considering the bond on fuel performance modeling predictions is presented through comparisons to existing experimental data. Experiments considered include several rods from the Halden IFA-650 test series. An evaluation on a full-length rod that explores the combined effect of plenum size and bonding status on axial gas communication behavior is also presented.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Visualization of Traffic Accidents

Traffic accidents have tremendous impact on society. Annually approximately 6.4 million vehicle accidents are reported by police in the US and nearly half of them result in catastrophic injuries. Visualizations of traffic accidents using geographic information systems (GIS) greatly facilitate handling and analysis of traffic accidents in many aspects. Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), Inc. is the world leader in GIS research and development. ArcGIS, a software package developed by ESRI, has the capabilities to display events associated with a road network, such as accident locations, and pavement quality. But when event locations related to a road network are processed, the existing algorithm used by ArcGIS does not utilize all the information related to the routes of the road network and produces erroneous visualization results of event locations. This software bug causes serious problems for applications in which accurate location information is critical for emergency responses, such as traffic accidents. This paper aims to address this problem and proposes an improved method that utilizes all relevant information of traffic accidents, namely, route number, direction, and mile post, and extracts correct event locations for accurate traffic accident visualization and analysis. The proposed method generates a new shape file for traffic accidents and displays them on top of the existing road network in ArcGIS. Visualization of traffic accidents along Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel is included to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

Wang, Jie↗

Going beyond reliability to robustness and resilience in space systems

The words reliability, robustness, and resilience, are often used interchangeably to describe tough and dependable systems but the distinctions between them suggest how to design more serviceable space systems. Reliability is simply the quality of consistently performing well. A system that dependably meets its design requirements in the specified environments is reliable. The designers may not consider themselves responsible for failures under unanticipated conditions. Robustness is the capability of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions, which can go beyond the expected range to include possible off-nominal conditions. Resilience is the ability to recover from or adapt to damaging events, such as failures, accidents, external disruptions, and repurposing. Such changes are usually unanticipated. They often invalidate the usual operating assumptions and cause system failure. Reliability, robustness, and resilience describe dependable performance under increasingly difficult conditions, first the specified environment, then a wider possible environment, and finally unanticipated damaging events. These three are increasingly desirable and increasingly difficult to achieve. Engineering for resilience would design systems that can ignore or repair failures, survive accidents, and recover from disruptions. Increasing the resilience of space systems, the ability to perform after unanticipated events, would greatly increase space crew safety. Improving reliability and robustness can be done by dealing with known sources of problems, but improving resilience requires implementing a general approach to reducing the impact of unknown future events. Two contrasting approaches are reducing system complexity and adding supervisory control. The need for resilience has been claimed for decades but little has been accomplished. Systems designers assume that they understand requirements, technologies, designs, architectures, integration, testing, operations, and environments. The potential problems of changes, failures, accidents, unknown environments, and unknown unknowns are ignored. Systems designers are typically overconfident and ignore the need for robustness and resilience.

Harry W Jones↗

An Approach for Defining IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using autonomous vehicles. The focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is to overcome AAM’s safety assurance challenges. The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system designs. This paper describes an approach for defining SFCs based on technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in voluntary safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach would identify potential SFCs that further expand the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M) functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS. Safety implications that will result from integration of AAM in the transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) were addressed in National Academies committees reports on AAM and IASMS. Development of a ConOps for IASMS was a top recommendation and can be represented as a reframing of safety assurance that builds on real-time alerting such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, and adds the more encompassing in-time temporal parameter in recognition of the different timelines for collecting and assessing safety data for risk mitigations. For example, mining for safety trends from data sources such as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system occurs over a longer time period. Research on AAM operations poses that SFCs can be designed to monitor the safety margin appropriate for AAM including with regards to the distance between current flight parameters and nominal ideal conditions. These in-time comparisons will become more complex as the density of operations increases at least in certain areas and can include planned and actual 4D trajectory, and in-time comparisons having implications on conflict modeling and prediction including expected and actual departure time, fix/waypoint crossing times, and arrival time. These comparisons would be integrated as part of SFCs that redefine and inform new safety margin. An increased safety margin improves management of operational risks while reducing the potential for anomalies. An increased safety margin also has implications for operator confidence in the certainty of its operations and trust in automation. Technology trends in research could be used to refine existing SFCs and define needs for additional SFCs that provide safety improvements to the design and operation of vehicles, airspace design, and operator performance requirements. NASA is developing innovative approaches to safeguard against major accidents and incidents that have occurred in the NAS and those anticipated with the inclusion of envisioned AAM operations. The innovations use operational performance data to monitor, detect, and predict flight variations exceeding safe nominal patterns, such as would be caused by navigational error, severe weather complications, or hijacking of UAS controls. These innovative approaches have high potential to prevent accidents and incidents in the new AAM era. It is anticipated that elements of the innovations will evolve into SFCs for the IASMS. Voluntary safety reports can be monitored to identify anomalies related to design or operational performance risks. Reports could be periodically monitored and assessed for specific topics. Reports might serve as weak signals or precursors indicative of emergent risk such as when combined with other safety information. The architecture could include SFCs that are based on voluntary safety reports recognizing the periodic temporal nature of data analysis. As previously mentioned, aviation accidents with their causal and contributing precursors can inform the need for SFCs in the IASMS. Accidents and incidents at San Francisco International Airport such as Asiana 214 and Air Canada 759 illustrate how combinations of different factors lead to increased risk. These types of precursors and different factors have implications on the types of SFCs that could be needed to monitor and manage different sources and types of design and operational risk. Continuing to assure the safety of AAM as designs and operations gain in complexity can be accompanied by defining SFCs that also increase in complexity. These SFCs can leverage information from findings and recommendations synthesized across on-going research, voluntary safety reports, and accident and incident reports. These SFCs can serve to refine accuracy of algorithms and resolve limitations with current practices. The IASMS architecture represents the framework for the SFCs and their critical role in safety assurance.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗

The Challenger Tradgedy was Caused by an Apollo Mistake, Terminating Risk Analysis

NASA’s attitude toward risk changed drastically between the Apollo and Space Shuttle design. [1]Apollo engineers were seriously alarmed about riskbecause of the fatal Apollo 1 fire and the fact that the estimated probability of another fatal accident was extremely high. The predictions were so appalling thatmanagement terminated risk analysis to avoid public apprehension. Because risk analysis was not done, the Space Shuttle design accepted excessively high andunknown risk. The immediate cause of the Challengertragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in coldweather that impaired the O-ring seals, but the fundamental cause was the high risk of the shuttle design. Before Challenger, management asserted that the probability of a fatal accident was 1 in 100,000.Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a shuttle failure.

Harry W Jones↗

Characterization of Space Shuttle Thermal Protection System (TPS) Materials for Return-to-Flight following the Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation

During the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation, it was determined that a large chunk of polyurethane insulating foam (= 1.67 lbs) on the External Tank (ET) came loose during Columbia's ascent on 2-1-03. The foam piece struck some of the protective Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels on the leading edge of Columbia's left wing in the mid-wing area. This impact damaged Columbia to the extent that upon re-entry to Earth, superheGed air approaching 3,000 F caused the vehicle to break up, killing all seven astronauts on board. A paper after the Columbia Accident Investigation highlighted thermal analysis testing performed on External Tank TPS materials (1). These materials included BX-250 (now BX-265) rigid polyurethane foam and SLA-561 Super Lightweight Ablator (highly-filled silicone rubber). The large chunk of foam from Columbia originated fiom the left bipod ramp of the ET. The foam in this ramp area was hand-sprayed over the SLA material and various fittings, allowed to dry, and manually shaved into a ramp shape. In Return-to-Flight (RTF) efforts following Columbia, the decision was made to remove the foam in the bipod ramp areas. During RTF efforts, further thermal analysis testing was performed on BX-265 foam by DSC and DMA. Flat panels of foam about 2-in. thick were sprayed on ET tank material (aluminum alloys). The DSC testing showed that foam material very close to the metal substrate cured more slowly than bulk foam material. All of the foam used on the ET is considered fully cured about 21 days after it is sprayed. The RTF culminated in the successful launch of Space Shuttle Discovery on 7-26-05. Although the flight was a success, there was another serious incident of foam loss fiom the ET during Shuttle ascent. This time, a rather large chunk of BX-265 foam (= 0.9 lbs) came loose from the liquid hydrogen (LH2) PAL ramp, although the foam did not strike the Shuttle Orbiter containing the crew. DMA testing was performed on foam samples taken fiom a simulated PAL ramp panel. It was found that the smooth rind on the foam facing the cable tray did significantly affect the properties of foam at the PAL ramp surface. The smooth rind increased the storage modulus E' of the foam as much as 20- 40% over a temperature range of -145 to 95 C. Because of foam loss fiom the PAL ramp, future Shuttle flights were grounded indefinitely to allow further testing to better understand foam properties. The decision was also made to remove foam from the LH2 PAL, ramp. Other RTF efforts prior to the launch of Discovery included

Wingard, Doug↗

Degradation and Failure Phenomena of Advanced Reactor Fuel Concepts: Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor Metallic Fuel

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is anticipating licensing applications and commercial use of new fuel types in advanced nuclear power reactors that would be designed and built in the United States. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is providing technical assistance to the NRC related to the newly proposed nuclear fuel and cladding designs that would be deployed in these reactors. This report focuses specifically on the metallic fuel that is being considered for sodium-cooled fast reactors and specifically on mechanisms that would cause damage or failure to the fuel under reactor operating conditions and design basis accident conditions. There is historic experience with both metallic and oxide fuels in experimental sodium-cooled fast reactors, but this report will focus solely on metallic fuel. Currently two U.S.-based reactor designers are engaged with the NRC in the application or pre-application review and considering a sodium-cooled fast reactor. TerraPower is engaged with NRC in pre-application review of its Natrium reactor. The current design for this fuel uses a sodium-bonded uranium-10wt% zirconium (U10Zr) fuel clad in HT9 stainless steel. ARC Clean Technology is engaged with NRC in pre-application review of its ARC-100 reactor. The current design for this fuel uses a sodium-bonded uranium-10wt% zirconium (U10Zr) fuel with steel cladding. This report will focus on this fuel system specifically, with broader information given regarding other metallic fuel systems with other stainless steel alloy claddings. To support the NRC’s readiness efforts, this report will identify and discuss degradation and failure modes of metallic fuel concepts for sodium-cooled fast reactors, including fuel performance characteristics that may not be addressed within existing regulatory documents.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An investigation of transitional management problems for the NSTS

Analysis and recommendations were provided to the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) on managing the transition from a research and development (R/D) structure to an operational structure. Summaries of published literature on the theory and applications of transition, or change management, and the results of interviews with additional industry personnel whose organizations either have gone through or are now going through change are contained. The issues of flight rates and the flight decision are addressed. The use of a computer simulation model to analyze the effect of varying different parameters on the flight rate was also discussed. The issue of NASA's changing demographics was examined and why this may be a cause for concern. The impact of the whole shuttle system structure on the Challenger accident was presented along with the highlights of the Rogers Commission Report. The proposed reorganization of the NSTS management structure is discussed and how this transition from R/D to operations can be performed.

Hunsucker, John L.↗

An Update on Mortality in the U.S. Astronaut Corps: 1959-2009

Although it has now been over 50 years since mankind first ventured into space, the long-term health impacts of human space flight remain largely unknown. Identifying factors that affect survival and prognosis among those who participate in space flight is vitally important, as the era of commercial space flight approaches and NASA prepares for missions to Mars. The Longitudinal Study of Astronaut Health is a prospective study designed to examine trends in astronaut morbidity and mortality. The purpose of this analysis was to describe and explore predictors of overall and cause-specific mortality among individuals selected for the U.S. astronaut corps. All U.S. astronauts (n=321), regardless of flight status, were included in this analysis. Death certificate searches were conducted to ascertain vital status and cause of death through April 2009. Data were collected from medical records and lifestyle questionnaires. Multivariable Cox regression modeling was used to calculate the mortality hazard associated with embarking on space flight, adjusted for sex, race, and age at selection. Between 1959 and 2009, there were 39 (12.1%) deaths. Of these deaths, 18 (42.2%) were due to occupational accidents; 7 (17.9%) were due to other accidents; 6 (15.4%) were attributable to cancer; 6 (15.4%) resulted from cardiovascular/circulatory diseases; and 2 (5.1%) were from other causes. Participation in space flight did not significantly increase mortality hazard over time (adjusted hazard ratio=0.57; 95% confidence interval=0.26-1.26. Because our results are based on a small sample size, future research that includes payload specialists, other space flight participants, and international crew members is warranted to maximize statistical power.

Amirian, E.↗