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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 253 records · Page 14
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Radiation Hardness Assurance: Evolving for NewSpace

During the past decade, numerous small satellites have been launched into space, with dramatically expanded dependence on advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems required for mission success. While the radiation effects vulnerabilities of small satellites are the same as those of their larger, traditional relatives, revised approaches are needed for risk management because of differences in technical requirements and programmatic resources. While moving to COTS components and systems may reduce direct costs and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Limited resources are accompanied by a lack of radiation testing and analysis, which can pose significant risks—or worse, be neglected altogether. Small satellites have benefited from short mission durations in low Earth orbits with respect to their radiation response, but as mission objectives grow and become reliant on advanced technologies operating for longer and in harsher environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope without hindering developers that provide new capabilities.

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA)↗
NASA NTRS2020

Update on Wide Bandgap (WBG) Device Radiation Hardness Assurance

This presentation provides an overview of recent wide bandgap device radiation hardness assurance activities at NASA and via NASA-funded grant vehicles. Devices include enhancement mode power GaN HEMTs, RF GaN HEMTs, and SiC MOSFETs and JBS diodes.

wide bandgap↗
NASA NTRS2019

Model-Based Radiation Assurance for Satellites with Commercial Parts

Presents a methodology for modeling radiation hardness assurance activities into MBSE throughout the NASA project life cycle. Also includes information about quantitatively and qualitatively modeling radiation-induced failures with system models.

Radiation Hardness Assurance↗
NASA NTRS2021

Avionics Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) Guidelines

Based on the need to develop and adopt timely and up-to-date guidance to ensure that natural space radiation environment threats do not compromise mission success, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was solicited to develop and publish guidance for deriving radiation hardness assurance (RHA) requirements and for evaluating avionics hardware elements with respect to total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single event effects. This document contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Guidelines↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assured Contingency Landing Management for Advanced Air Mobility

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) is quickly developing as a new air transportation system that moves people and packages in the regions previously not / less served by the current aviation systems. Such AAM must operate safely despite the potential to encounter hazards and experience anomalies and failures in-flight. It becomes especially important to have systematic auto-mitigation strategies to perform safe contingency actions in AAM flight operations, as pilots have limited Situational Awareness (SA) and limited time to make prompt decisions when encountering failures/anomalies in high-density low altitude airspace. This paper presents Assured Contingency Landing Management (ACLM) with an online landing strategy selection to decide between the following three options when a contingency landing is required: (1) Return-to-launch landing site, (2) Land immediately at a nearby clear but unprepared site, (3) Land at a prepared landing site from the approximate footprint. Our presented algorithm shows a real-time auto-mitigation loop with multiple threads that run simultaneously to check controllability, reachability, and intermediate decisions to hold/ loiter or continue the flight plan as the landing strategy solution is being computed. Case study simulation is demonstrated with the safety-critical propulsion system and battery system and shows how different failure scenarios impact the landing strategy selection.

Autonomous Mitigation↗
NASA NTRS2023

Distributed Sensing and Reasoning for Advanced Air Mobility Health Management and Mission Assurance

As envisioned, Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and Urban Air Mobility (UAM) will introduce new vehicles and operations within the national airspace, moving people and cargo safely and efficiently at a much larger scale than today. Driven by transformative technology and revolutionary aircraft, this movement must still manage technical, regulatory, operational, and policy challenges. NASA’s work in support of AAM and UAM includes, but is not limited to tools, technologies, and architectures for distributed sensing of aircraft, data & reasoning services exchange, Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT), contingency management, and vehicle health management. This paper builds upon these concepts and evaluates the use of distributed sensing and infrastructure assistance towards health management and mission assurance of UAM vehicles in specific operational scenarios. Through analysis of these example missions, aided by the data produced by the conceptual distributed sensing and reasoning infrastructure, we define opportunities for state estimation, diagnosis, and key decision points affecting the health state of the vehicle and the airspace volume. As a result, we define a number of measurable health state parameters providing relevant information to drive decision-making in contingency situations or feed automation tools in support of operators and managers.

Safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A New, Cots-Inclusive, Approach for Parts Assurance in NASA

This talk will provide insights into new options for parts assurance that are being introduced into NASA policy, which build on the results of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) COTS Phase 2 study. It will provide some of the highlights and drivers for the use of COTS and brief recommendations for how to successfully select and use COTS parts.

risk↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Formal Verification Framework for Runtime Assurance

The simplex architecture is an instance of Runtime Assurance (RTA) where a trusted component takes control of a safety-critical system when an untrusted component violates a safety property. This paper presents a formalization of the simplex RTA framework in the language of hybrid programs. A feature of this formal verification framework is that, for a given system, a specific instantiation can be created and its safety properties are guaranteed by construction. Instantiations may be kept at varying levels of generality, allowing for black box components, such as ML/AI-based controllers, to be modeled. The framework is written in the Prototype Verification System (PVS) using Plaidypvs, an embedding of differential dynamic logic in PVS. As a proof of concept, the framework is illustrated on an automatic vehicle braking system.

Runtime assurance↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assurance Issues in Developing AI/ML Components (and their Standards) for Civil Aviation

Standards development activities require a keen and deep understanding of the problem being solved by the standard as well as the technologies being deployed in any reference implementation of the solution. It is important to understand the mechanisms and limits of the fundamental, underlying science of implementation and verification technologies used to realize and assure systems. We need to understand the limits of what current process and metrics can provide with respect to new technologies. US leadership is important in this endeavor, and it is vital that we have a measured approach that yields sound results. We wish to start with simple, well-defined, non-safety critical applications and then progress to functions which have (1) clearly defined requirements, (2) means of checking the answer/output, and (3) means of intervention and mitigation of incorrect answers/outputs.

Aviation Safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

New COTS-Inclusive Parts Assurance in NASA

This talk will provide insights into new options for parts assurance that are being introduced into NASA policy, which build on the results of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) COTS Phase 2 study. It will provide some of the highlights and drivers for the use of COTS and brief recommendations for how to successfully select and use COTS parts. It will also briefly address common concerns about radiation and COTS.

risk↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Formal Verification Framework for Runtime Assurance

The simplex architecture is an instance of Runtime Assurance (RTA) where a trusted component takes control of a safety-critical system when an untrusted component violates a safety property. This paper presents a formalization of the simplex RTA framework in the language of hybrid programs. A feature of this formal verification framework is that, for a given system, a specific instantiation can be created and its safety properties are guaranteed by construction. Instantiations may be kept at varying levels of generality, allowing for black box components, such as ML/AI-based controllers, to be modeled. The framework is written in the Prototype Verification System (PVS) using Plaidypvs, an embedding of differential dynamic logic in PVS. As a proof of concept, the framework is illustrated on an automatic vehicle braking system.

Runtime assurance↗
NASA NTRS2024

Solid State Drive Radiation Assurance With Active Testing

Single-event effects (SEE) and total ionizing dose (TID) data are presented for several automotive- and industrial-grade solid-state drives, and the effects of different active test configurations on hardness assurance are explored.

dose↗
NASA NTRS1966

Product assurance

Significant principles and ground rules for establishing product assurance in Gemini launch vehicle program

LAUNCH VEHICLE↗