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At least 253 records · Page 14

Evaluating Faulty State Occurrence in Wildfire UAS Missions Using Markov Chains

As autonomous technology advances, unmanned aircraft systems are increasingly integrated into emergency response missions, such as wildfire response. These systems must be be safe with less risk than non-autonomous counter parts, yet quantifying the risk associated with present-day and future systems conventionally relies solely on expert opinion and little data. Instead, combining narrative mishap reports with probabilistic analysis can provide a method for evolutionary and timely risk analysis. In this paper, we present a framework for a data-driven probabilistic risk assessment style analysis, where hazard events and rates originate from documented UAS mishaps. The framework is applied to a UAS mapping mission in wildfire response, including a fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and probabilistic analysis using Markov Chains. The analysis provides an enumeration of hazards in the system, hazard events that can lead to faults, the probability of a mission experiencing any fault, the probability of experiencing a specific fault, and the expected time spent until faulty states occur in present-day operations.

risk analysis↗

Knowledge-based system verification and validation

The objective of this task is to develop and evaluate a methodology for verification and validation (V&V) of knowledge-based systems (KBS) for space station applications with high reliability requirements. The approach consists of three interrelated tasks. The first task is to evaluate the effectiveness of various validation methods for space station applications. The second task is to recommend requirements for KBS V&V for Space Station Freedom (SSF). The third task is to recommend modifications to the SSF to support the development of KBS using effectiveness software engineering and validation techniques. To accomplish the first task, three complementary techniques will be evaluated: (1) Sensitivity Analysis (Worchester Polytechnic Institute); (2) Formal Verification of Safety Properties (SRI International); and (3) Consistency and Completeness Checking (Lockheed AI Center). During FY89 and FY90, each contractor will independently demonstrate the user of his technique on the fault detection, isolation, and reconfiguration (FDIR) KBS or the manned maneuvering unit (MMU), a rule-based system implemented in LISP. During FY91, the application of each of the techniques to other knowledge representations and KBS architectures will be addressed. After evaluation of the results of the first task and examination of Space Station Freedom V&V requirements for conventional software, a comprehensive KBS V&V methodology will be developed and documented. Development of highly reliable KBS's cannot be accomplished without effective software engineering methods. Using the results of current in-house research to develop and assess software engineering methods for KBS's as well as assessment of techniques being developed elsewhere, an effective software engineering methodology for space station KBS's will be developed, and modification of the SSF to support these tools and methods will be addressed.

Johnson, Sally C.↗

Small Aircraft Transportation System Simulation Analysis of the HVO and ERO Concepts

It is acknowledged that the aviation and aerospace industries are primary forces influencing the industrial development and economic well being of the United States and many countries around the world. For decades the US national air transportation system has been the model of success - safely and efficiently moving people, cargo, goods and services and generating countless benefits throughout the global community; however, the finite nature of the system and many of its components is becoming apparent. Without measurable increases in the capacity of the national air transportation system, delays and service delivery failures will eventually become intolerable. Although the recent economic slowdown has lowered immediate travel demands, that trend is reversing and cargo movement remains high. Research data indicates a conservative 2.5-3.0% annual increase in aircraft operations nationwide through 2017. Such growth will place additional strains upon a system already experiencing capacity constraints. The stakeholders of the system will continue to endure ever-increasing delays and abide lesser levels of service to many lower population density areas of the country unless more efficient uses of existing and new transportation resources are implemented. NASA s Small Aircraft Transportation System program (SATS) is one of several technologies under development that are aimed at using such resources more effectively. As part of this development effort, this report is the first in a series outlining the findings and recommendations resulting from a comprehensive program of multi-level analyses and system engineering efforts undertaken by NASA Langley Research Center s Systems Analysis Branch (SAB). These efforts are guided by a commitment to provide systems-level analysis support for the SATS program. Subsequent efforts will build upon this early work to produce additional analyses and benefits studies needed to provide the technical and economic basis for national investment and policy decisions related to further development and potential deployment of a small aircraft transportation system. This report primarily serves two purposes. First, it presents results attained from an initial evaluation and analysis of the Higher Volume Operations (HVO) and EnRoute Operations (ERO) concepts - both designated operational capabilities within the SATS Program s Concept of Operations (CONOPS) document. It further outlines areas of the concepts that would benefit from follow-on analyses and system engineering efforts. It is intended that these processes will aid continued maturation of the concepts and promote additional studies of their effects and influences in combination with other designated CONOPS currently under development. In essence, it establishes a baseline of data upon which subsequent analyses and studies can be built and identifies performance characteristics the concept must exhibit in order to provide, at minimum, levels of safety and usage equal to or better than the current system.

Millsaps, Gary D.↗

Shuttle Risk Progression: Use of the Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to Show Reliability Growth

It is important to the Space Shuttle Program (SSP), as well as future manned spaceflight programs, to understand the early mission risk and progression of risk as the program gains insights into the integrated vehicle through flight. The risk progression is important to the SSP as part of the documentation of lessons learned. The risk progression is important to future programs to understand reliability growth and the first flight risk. This analysis uses the knowledge gained from 30 years of operational flights and the current Shuttle PRA to calculate the risk of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) at significant milestones beginning with the first flight. Key flights were evaluated based upon historical events and significant re-designs. The results indicated that the Shuttle risk tends to follow a step function as opposed to following a traditional reliability growth pattern where risk exponentially improves with each flight. In addition, it shows that risk can increase due to trading safety margin for increased performance or due to external events. Due to the risk drivers not being addressed, the risk did not improve appreciably during the first 25 flights. It was only after significant events occurred such as Challenger and Columbia, where the risk drivers were apparent, that risk was significantly improved. In addition, this paper will show that the SSP has reduced the risk of LOCV by almost an order of magnitude. It is easy to look back afte r 30 years and point to risks that are now obvious, however; the key is to use this knowledge to benefit other programs which are in their infancy stages. One lesson learned from the SSP is understanding risk drivers are essential in order to considerably reduce risk. This will enable the new program to focus time and resources on identifying and reducing the significant risks. A comprehensive PRA, similar to that of the Shuttle PRA, is an effective tool quantifying risk drivers if support from all of the stakeholders is given.

Hamlin, Teri L.↗

Identification of high-level functional/system requirements for future civil transports

In order to accommodate the rapid growth in commercial aviation throughout the remainder of this century, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is faced with a formidable challenge to upgrade and/or modernize the National Airspace System (NAS) without compromising safety or efficiency. A recurring theme in both the Aviation System Capital Investment Plan (CIP), which has replaced the NAS Plan, and the new FAA Plan for Research, Engineering, and Development (RE&D) rely on the application of new technologies and a greater use of automation. Identifying the high-level functional and system impacts of such modernization efforts on future civil transport operational requirements, particularly in terms of cockpit functionality and information transfer, was the primary objective of this project. The FAA planning documents for the NAS of the 2005 era and beyond were surveyed; major aircraft functional capabilities and system components required for such an operating environment were identified. A hierarchical structured analysis of the information processing and flows emanating from such functional/system components were conducted and the results documented in graphical form depicting the relationships between functions and systems.

Swink, Jay R.↗

Guidelines for Design and Analysis of Large, Brittle Spacecraft Components

There were two related parts to this work. The first, conducted at The Aerospace Corporation was to develop and define methods for integrating the statistical theory of brittle strength with conventional finite element stress analysis, and to carry out a limited laboratory test program to illustrate the methods. The second part, separately funded at Aerojet Electronic Systems Division, was to create the finite element postprocessing program for integrating the statistical strength analysis with the structural analysis. The second part was monitored by Capt. Jeff McCann of USAF/SMC, as Special Study No.11, which authorized Aerojet to support Aerospace on this work requested by NASA. This second part is documented in Appendix A. The activity at Aerojet was guided by the Aerospace methods developed in the first part of this work. This joint work of Aerospace and Aerojet stemmed from prior related work for the Defense Support Program (DSP) Program Office, to qualify the DSP sensor main mirror and corrector lens for flight as part of a shuttle payload. These large brittle components of the DSP sensor are provided by Aerojet. This document defines rational methods for addressing the structural integrity and safety of large, brittle, payload components, which have low and variable tensile strength and can suddenly break or shatter. The methods are applicable to the evaluation and validation of such components, which, because of size and configuration restrictions, cannot be validated by direct proof test.

Robinson, E. Y.↗

The Roles of Verification, Validation and Uncertainty Quantification in the NASA Standard for Models and Simulations

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recently issued an interim version of the Standard for Models and Simulations (M&S Standard) [1]. The action to develop the M&S Standard was identified in an internal assessment [2] of agency-wide changes needed in the wake of the Columbia Accident [3]. The primary goal of this standard is to ensure that the credibility of M&S results is properly conveyed to those making decisions affecting human safety or mission success criteria. The secondary goal is to assure that the credibility of the results from models and simulations meets the project requirements (for credibility). This presentation explains the motivation and key aspects of the M&S Standard, with a special focus on the requirements for verification, validation and uncertainty quantification. Some pilot applications of this standard to computational fluid dynamics applications will be provided as illustrations. The authors of this paper are the members of the team that developed the initial three drafts of the standard, the last of which benefited from extensive comments from most of the NASA Centers. The current version (number 4) incorporates modifications made by a team representing 9 of the 10 NASA Centers. A permanent version of the M&S Standard is expected by December 2007. The scope of the M&S Standard is confined to those uses of M&S that support program and project decisions that may affect human safety or mission success criteria. Such decisions occur, in decreasing order of importance, in the operations, the test & evaluation, and the design & analysis phases. Requirements are placed on (1) program and project management, (2) models, (3) simulations and analyses, (4) verification, validation and uncertainty quantification (VV&UQ), (5) recommended practices, (6) training, (7) credibility assessment, and (8) reporting results to decision makers. A key component of (7) and (8) is the use of a Credibility Assessment Scale, some of the details of which were developed in consultation with William Oberkampf, David Peercy and Timothy Trocano of Sandia National Laboratories. The focus of most of the requirements, including those for VV&UQ, is on the documentation of what was done and the reporting, using the Credibility Assessment Scale, of the level of rigor that was followed. The aspects of one option for the Credibilty Assessment Scale are (1) code verification, (2) solution verification, (3) validation, (4) predictive capability, (5) technical review, (6) process control, and (7) operator and analyst qualification.

Zang, Thomas A.↗

Flight Testing of the Space Launch System (SLS) Adaptive Augmenting Control (AAC) Algorithm on an F/A-18

The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Flight Mechanics and Analysis Division developed an adaptive augmenting control (AAC) algorithm for launch vehicles that improves robustness and performance on an as-needed basis by adapting a classical control algorithm to unexpected environments or variations in vehicle dynamics. This was baselined as part of the Space Launch System (SLS) flight control system. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was asked to partner with the SLS Program and the Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) Game Changing Development Program (GCDP) to flight test the AAC algorithm on a manned aircraft that can achieve a high level of dynamic similarity to a launch vehicle and raise the technology readiness of the algorithm early in the program. This document reports the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

Knowledge Discovery for Early Failure Assessment of Complex Engineered Systems Using Natural Language Processing

Emerging complex engineered systems may have unexpected safety issues due to novel operational environments, increasing autonomy, human-machine interaction, and other factors. To prevent failures in operation or testing that necessitate costly redesign, it is desirable to predict likely failure modes early in the design process. Text-based information about past engineering failures presents one possible solution by facilitating the retrieval of information that can inform new designs. However, identifying documents containing relevant information and extracting required information can be prohibitively time-consuming when implemented at scale. In this research, an automated natural language processing-based framework is proposed to discover relevant knowledge from documents containing failure-related design information. Documents containing usable information are filtered using sentiment analysis based on a custom lexicon specialized for engineering design and by filtering out documents containing only irrelevant topics. Next, from the identified usable documents, information relating to engineering failures, contributing factors that can be controlled at design time (“risk factors”), and recommended preventative actions are extracted. Semantic similarity is then used to group similar pieces of extracted information for improved generalizability. The proposed framework is applied to NASA’s Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS). The framework can be used to identify documents containing usable failure-related design information from other databases, extract relevant information from these documents, and generalize the acquired knowledge such that it can be applied to novel systems.

Sequoia R. Andrade↗

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Three

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's (CAIB) independent investigation into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia produced a six volume report. This is Volume III of the report. Volume III contains other technical documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the CAIB in support of its inquiry into the tragedy. Technical documents included in the report are: Appendix E.1 CoFR Endorsements; Appendix E.2 STS-107 Image Analysis Team Final Report; Appendix E.3 An Assessment of Potential Material Candidates for the 'Flight Day 2', Radar Object Observed during the NASA Mission STS-107; Appendix E.4 Columbia Early Sighting Assessment Team Final Report.

STS-107↗

Designing for Maintainability and System Availability

The final goal for a delivered system (whether a car, aircraft, avionics box or computer) should be its availability to operate and perform its intended function over its expected design life. Hence, in designing a system, we cannot think in terms of delivering the system and just walking away. The system supplier needs to provide support throughout the operating life of the product. Here, supportability requires an effective combination of reliability, maintainability, logistics and operations engineering (as well as safety engineering) to have a system that is available for its intended use throughout its designated mission lifetime. Maintainability is a key driving element in the effective support and upkeep of the system as well as providing the ability to modify and upgrade the system throughout its lifetime. This paper then, will concentrate on maintainability and its integration into the system engineering and design process. The topics to be covered include elements of maintainability, the total cost of ownership, how system availability, maintenance and logistics costs and spare parts cost effect the overall program costs. System analysis and maintainability will show how maintainability fits into the overall systems approach to project development. Maintainability processes and documents will focus on how maintainability is to be performed and what documents are typically generated for a large scale program. Maintainability analysis shows how trade-offs can be performed for various alternative components. The conclusions summarize the paper and are followed by specific problems for hands-on training.

Lalli, Vincent R.↗

Mod-5A wind turbine generator program design report. Volume 3: Final design and system description, book 2

The design, development and analysis of the 7.3MW MOD-5A wind turbine generator is documented. The report is divided into four volumes: Volume 1 summarizes the entire MOD-5A program, Volume 2 discusses the conceptual and preliminary design phases, Volume 3 describes the final design of the MOD-5A, and Volume 4 contains the drawings and specifications developed for the final design. Volume 3, book 2 describes the performance and characteristics of the MOD-5A wind turbine generator in its final configuration. The subsystem for power generation, control, and instrumentation subsystems is described in detail. The manufacturing and construction plans, and the preparation of a potential site on Oahu, Hawaii, are documented. The quality assurance and safety plan, and analyses of failure modes and effects, and reliability, availability and maintainability are presented.

Source record↗

Dynamic Open-Rotor Composite Shield Impact Test Report

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is working with the European Aviation Safety Agency to determine the certification base for proposed new engines that would not have a containment structure on large commercial aircraft. Equivalent safety to the current fleet is desired by the regulators, which means that loss of a single fan blade will not cause hazard to the aircraft. NASA Glenn and Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) China Lake collaborated with the FAA Aircraft Catastrophic Failure Prevention Program to design and test a shield that would protect the aircraft passengers and critical systems from a released blade that could impact the fuselage. This report documents the live-fire test from a full-scale rig at NAWC China Lake. NASA provided manpower and photogrammetry expertise to document the impact and damage to the shields. The test was successful: the blade was stopped from penetrating the shield, which validates the design analysis method and the parameters used in the analysis. Additional work is required to implement the shielding into the aircraft.

Shielding↗

Final Report - Regulatory Considerations for Adaptive Systems

This report documents the findings of a preliminary research study into new approaches to the software design assurance of adaptive systems. We suggest a methodology to overcome the software validation and verification difficulties posed by the underlying assumption of non-adaptive software in the requirementsbased- testing verification methods in RTCA/DO-178B and C. An analysis of the relevant RTCA/DO-178B and C objectives is presented showing the reasons for the difficulties that arise in showing satisfaction of the objectives and suggested additional means by which they could be satisfied. We suggest that the software design assurance problem for adaptive systems is principally one of developing correct and complete high level requirements and system level constraints that define the necessary system functional and safety properties to assure the safe use of adaptive systems. We show how analytical techniques such as model based design, mathematical modeling and formal or formal-like methods can be used to both validate the high level functional and safety requirements, establish necessary constraints and provide the verification evidence for the satisfaction of requirements and constraints that supplements conventional testing. Finally the report identifies the follow-on research topics needed to implement this methodology.

Wilkinson, Chris↗

Regulations, Codes, and Standards Review for Underground Hydrogen Storage

Hydrogen continues to show promise as a viable contributor to achieving energy storage goals such as energy security and decarbonization in the United States. However, many new and expanded hydrogen use applications will require identifying methods of larger-scale storage than the solutions that currently exist for smaller storage applications. One possibility is to store large quantities of gaseous hydrogen below ground level. Underground storage of other fuels such as natural gas is already currently utilized, so much of the infrastructure and basic technologies can be used as a basis for underground hydrogen storage (UHS). A few commercial UHS facilities currently exist in the United States, including salt caverns owned and operated by Air Liquide, Linde, and Conoco Philips, but UHS is still a relatively new concept that has not been widely deployed. It is necessary to understand the safety risks and hazards associated with UHS before its use can be expanded and accepted more broadly. Many of these risks are addressed through regulations, codes, and standards (RCS) issued by governing bodies and organizations with expertise in certain hazards. This report is a review of RCS documents relevant to UHS, with a particular lens on potential technical gaps in existing guidance. These gaps may be specific to the physical properties of hydrogen or due to the different technologies relevant for hydrogen vs. natural gas storage. This is meant to be a high-level review to identify relevant documents and potential gaps. Formally addressing the individual gaps identified here within the codes and standards themselves would involve a more intensive analysis and differ based on the code or standard revision processes of the various publishing organizations. Therefore, presenting specific recommendations for revising the verbiage of the documents for UHS applications is left for future work and other publications.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Loads and Structural Dynamics Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware

The purpose of this document is to establish requirements relating to the loads and structural dynamics technical discipline for NASA and commercial spaceflight launch vehicle and spacecraft hardware. Requirements are defined for the development of structural design loads and recommendations regarding methodologies and practices for the conduct of load analyses are provided. As such, this document represents an implementation of NASA STD-5002. Requirements are also defined for structural mathematical model development and verification to ensure sufficient accuracy of predicted responses. Finally, requirements for model/data delivery and exchange are specified to facilitate interactions between Launch Vehicle Providers (LVPs), Spacecraft Providers (SCPs), and the NASA Technical Authority (TA) providing insight/oversight and serving in the Independent Verification and Validation role. In addition to the analysis-related requirements described above, a set of requirements are established concerning coupling phenomena or other interaction between structural dynamics and aerodynamic environments or control or propulsion system elements. Such requirements may reasonably be considered structure or control system design criteria, since good engineering practice dictates consideration of and/or elimination of the identified conditions in the development of those subsystems. The requirements are included here, however, to ensure that such considerations are captured in the design space for launch vehicles (LV), spacecraft (SC) and the Launch Abort Vehicle (LAV). The requirements in this document are focused on analyses to be performed to develop data needed to support structural verification. As described in JSC 65828, Structural Design Requirements and Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware, implementation of the structural verification requirements is expected to be described in a Structural Verification Plan (SVP), which should describe the verification of each structural item for the applicable requirements. The requirement for and expected contents of the SVP are defined in JSC 65828. The SVP may also document unique verifications that meet or exceed these requirements with Technical Authority approval.

George James↗

A Comprehensive Analysis of the X-15 Flight 3-65 Accident

The November 15, 1967, loss of X-15 Flight 3-65-97 (hereafter referred to as Flight 3-65) was a unique incident in that it was the first and only aerospace flight accident involving loss of crew on a vehicle with an adaptive flight control system (AFCS). In addition, Flight 3-65 remains the only incidence of a single-pilot departure from controlled flight of a manned entry vehicle in a hypersonic flight regime. To mitigate risk to emerging aerospace systems, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) proposed a comprehensive review of this accident. The goal of the assessment was to resolve lingering questions regarding the failure modes of the aircraft systems (including the AFCS) and thoroughly analyze the interactions among the human agents and autonomous systems that contributed to the loss of the pilot and aircraft. This document contains the outcome of the accident review.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Two

Volume II of the Report contains appendices that were cited in Volume I. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board produced many of these appendices as working papers during the investigation into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. Other appendices were produced by other organizations (mainly NASA) in support of the Board investigation. In the case of documents that have been published by others, they are included here in the interest of establishing a complete record, but often at less than full page size. Contents include: CAIB Technical Documents Cited in the Report: Reader's Guide to Volume II; Appendix D. a Supplement to the Report; Appendix D.b Corrections to Volume I of the Report; Appendix D.1 STS-107 Training Investigation; Appendix D.2 Payload Operations Checklist 3; Appendix D.3 Fault Tree Closure Summary; Appendix D.4 Fault Tree Elements - Not Closed; Appendix D.5 Space Weather Conditions; Appendix D.6 Payload and Payload Integration; Appendix D.7 Working Scenario; Appendix D.8 Debris Transport Analysis; Appendix D.9 Data Review and Timeline Reconstruction Report; Appendix D.10 Debris Recovery; Appendix D.11 STS-107 Columbia Reconstruction Report; Appendix D.12 Impact Modeling; Appendix D.13 STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment; Appendix D.14 Orbiter Major Modification (OMM) Review; Appendix D.15 Maintenance, Material, and Management Inputs; Appendix D.16 Public Safety Analysis; Appendix D.17 MER Manager's Tiger Team Checklist; Appendix D.18 Past Reports Review; Appendix D.19 Qualification and Interpretation of Sensor Data from STS-107; Appendix D.20 Bolt Catcher Debris Analysis.

CAIB (COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD)↗