SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Engineering Risk Assessment”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 253 records · Page 14

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2005

Spinoff 2005

Topics covered include: Lighting the Way for Quicker, Safer Healing; Discovering New Drugs on the Cellular Level; Hydrogen Sensors Boost Hybrids; Today s Models Losing Gas?; 3-D Highway in the Sky; Popping a Hole in High-Speed Pursuits; Monitoring Wake Vortices for More Efficient Airports; From Rockets to Racecars; All-Terrain Intelligent Robot Braves Battlefront to Save Lives; Keeping the Air Clean and Safe--An Anthrax Smoke Detector; Lightning Often Strikes Twice; Technology That's Ready and Able to Inspect Those Cables; Secure Networks for First Responders and Special Forces; Space Suit Spins; Cooking Dinner at Home--From the Office; Nanoscale Materials Make for Large-Scale Applications; NASA s Growing Commitment: The Space Garden; Bringing Thunder and Lightning Indoors; Forty-Year-Old Foam Springs Back With New Benefits; Experiments With Small Animals Rarely Go This Well; NASA, the Fisherman's Friend; Crystal-Clear Communication a Sweet-Sounding Success; Inertial Motion-Tracking Technology for Virtual 3-D; Then Why Do They Call Earth the Blue Planet?; Valiant 'Zero-Valent' Effort Restores Contaminated Grounds; Harnessing the Power of the Sun; Water and Air Measures That Make 'PureSense'; Remote Sensing for Farmers and Flood Watching; Pesticide-Free Device a Fatal Attraction for Mosquitoes Making the Most of Waste Energy Washing Away the Worries About Germs Celestial Software Scratches More Than the Surface A Search Engine That's Aware of Your Needs Fault-Detection Tool Has Companies 'Mining' Own Business; Software to Manage the Unmanageable; Tracking Electromagnetic Energy With SQUIDs; Taking the Risk Out of Risk Assessment; Satellite and Ground System Solutions at Your Fingertips; Structural Analysis Made 'NESSUSary'; Software of Seismic Proportions Promotes Enjoyable Learning; Making a Reliable Actuator Faster and More Affordable; Cost-Cutting Powdered Lubricant NASA s Radio Frequency Bolt Monitor: A Lifetime of Spinoffs Going End to End to Deliver High-Speed Data; Advanced Joining Technology: Simple, Strong, and Secure; Big Results From a Smaller Gearbox; Low-Pressure Generator Makes Cleanrooms Cleaner; and The Space Laser Business Model.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2011

The Role of Uncertainty in Aerospace Vehicle Analysis and Design

Effective uncertainty quantification (UQ) begins at the earliest phase in the design phase for which there are adequate models and continues tightly integrated to the analysis and design cycles as the refinement of the models and the fidelity of the tools increase. It is essential that uncertainty quantification strategies provide objective information to support the processes of identifying, analyzing and accommodating for the effects of uncertainty. Assessments of uncertainty should never render the results more difficult for engineers and decision makers to comprehend, but instead provide them with critical information to assist with resource utilization decisions and risk mitigation strategies. Success would be measured by the tools to enable engineers and decision makers to effectively balance critical project resources against system requirements while accounting for the impact of uncertainty.

Kenny, Sean P.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Reliability and Failure in NASA Missions: Blunders, Normal Accidents, High Reliability, Bad Luck

NASA emphasizes crew safety and system reliability but several unfortunate failures have occurred. The Apollo 1 fire was mistakenly unanticipated. After that tragedy, the Apollo program gave much more attention to safety. The Challenger accident revealed that NASA had neglected safety and that management underestimated the high risk of shuttle. Probabilistic Risk Assessment was adopted to provide more accurate failure probabilities for shuttle and other missions. NASA's "faster, better, cheaper" initiative and government procurement reform led to deliberately dismantling traditional reliability engineering. The Columbia tragedy and Mars mission failures followed. Failures can be attributed to blunders, normal accidents, or bad luck. Achieving high reliability is difficult but possible.

accidents↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Probabilistic Blast Damage Modeling Uncertainties and Sensitivities

Blast overpressure is the predominant source of ground damage posed by potentially hazardous asteroid strikes. Estimates of the extent, severity, and likelihoods of potential blast damage regions will be one of the key metrics needed to mount civil defense or disaster response plans in the face of an impending impact. However, there are many inherent sources of uncertainty in evaluating the damage, both in characterizing the properties of the incoming object and in the approaches used to model the entry/impact and resulting damage, which make it difficult to produce a single ‘accurate’ or ‘best guess’ prediction of ground damage. The current 2021 PDC hypothetical impact scenario poses a particular challenge due to its short warning time. The need for rapid disaster response to prepare for an immanent impact, combined with lack of observational opportunities to refine basic knowledge about the object’s basic size and properties, make understanding the range and relative likelihood of consequences particularly critical. The potential damage caused by these blasts can be evaluated using a range of modeling and simulation approaches and levels of fidelity. Fast-running engineering-level models can be used to run large numbers of probabilistically sampled cases covering wide variations of uncertain properties or parameters. High-fidelity simulations, on the other hand, can capture more detailed/accurate blast physics, but can only be performed for a small selection of specific cases, requiring many assumptions to be made about the initial object and its unpredictable entry/breakup characteristics. In order to provide a more complete picture of the potential threat for effective disaster response, both types of analysis need to be employed together. In this approach, high-fidelity simulations are used to refine and anchor engineering models, and the probabilistic engineering models are used to evaluate broad parameters spaces and guide selection of the most pertinent simulation cases for a given scenario. This presentation expands upon the probabilistic asteroid impact risk assessments being performed as part of the 2021 PDC hypothetical impact exercise, focusing on key aspects of blast damage modeling uncertainties and sensitivities. We review the current modeling and simulation approaches employed in the current assessment, compare the relative levels of uncertainty stemming from each main element of the problem (i.e., knowledge of the asteroid properties, modeling of the atmospheric entry/breakup and airburst, and estimates of the ground damage from the resulting blasts waves), and highlight any notable trends and sensitivities for the current scenario case.

SMD↗

NASA NTRS2024

Control Effectiveness: Metric Development and Application to Resilient Lunar Habitat Design

System safety engineering in its bare essence involves identifying, assessing, and mitigating, or controlling, hazards. Appropriate safety controls are selected using hazard reduction precedence principles, prior experience, or by assessing their impact on residual risk (together with other factors like cost). We propose a control effectiveness metric as one way to systematically and consistently evaluate potential safety controls individually and thereby facilitate selecting a shortlist of potential controls for subsequent integrated evaluation. The control effectiveness metric considers a safety control’s availability when needed, the probability that its design is adequate in addressing the targeted hazard, the probability that the design will be implemented as intended, and the relationship between the time it takes for the safety control to address its target hazard and the time before the hazard propagates. We demonstrated the use of our metric on a lunar habitat design using a physics-based habitat simulator. High control effectiveness and safety controls result in a habitat with high resilience, while low control effectiveness results in lower resilience.

Rashi Jain↗

NASA NTRS2007

ESAS-Derived Earth Departure Stage Design for Human Mars Exploration

The Vision for Space Exploration has set the nation on a course to have humans on Mars as early as 2030. To reduce the cost and risk associated with human Mars exploration, NASA is planning for the Mars architecture to leverage the lunar architecture as fully as possible. This study takes the defined launch vehicles and system capabilities from ESAS and extends their application to DRM 3.0 to design an Earth Departure Stage suitable for the cargo and crew missions to Mars. The impact of a propellant depot in LEO was assessed and sLzed for use with the EDS. To quantitatively assess and compare the effectiveness of alternative designs, an initial baseline architecture was defined using the ESAS launch vehicles and DRM 3.0. The baseline architecture uses three NTR engines, LH2 propellant, no propellant depot in LEO, and launches on the Ares I and Ares V. The Mars transfer and surface elements from DRM 3.0 were considered to be fixed payloads in the design of the EDS. Feasible architecture alternatives were identified from previous architecture studies and anticipated capabilities and compiled in a morphological matrix. ESAS FOMs were used to determine the most critical design attributes for the effectiveness of the EDS. The ESAS-derived FOMs used in this study to assess alternative designs are effectiveness and performance, affordability, reliability, and risk. The individual FOMs were prioritized using the AHP, a method for pairwise comparison. All trades performed were evaluated with respect to the weighted FOMs, creating a Pareto frontier of equivalently ideal solutions. Additionally, each design on the frontier was evaluated based on its fulfillment of the weighted FOMs using TOPSIS, a quantitative method for ordinal ranking of the alternatives. The designs were assessed in an integrated environment using physics-based models for subsystem analysis where possible. However, for certain attributes such as engine type, historical, performance-based mass estimating relations were more easily employed. The elements from the design process were integrated into a single loop, allowing for rapid iteration of subsystem analyses and compilation of resulting designs.

Flaherty, Kevin↗

NASA NTRS1996

Uncertainty and Intelligence in Computational Stochastic Mechanics

Classical structural reliability assessment techniques are based on precise and crisp (sharp) definitions of failure and non-failure (survival) of a structure in meeting a set of strength, function and serviceability criteria. These definitions are provided in the form of performance functions and limit state equations. Thus, the criteria provide a dichotomous definition of what real physical situations represent, in the form of abrupt change from structural survival to failure. However, based on observing the failure and survival of real structures according to the serviceability and strength criteria, the transition from a survival state to a failure state and from serviceability criteria to strength criteria are continuous and gradual rather than crisp and abrupt. That is, an entire spectrum of damage or failure levels (grades) is observed during the transition to total collapse. In the process, serviceability criteria are gradually violated with monotonically increasing level of violation, and progressively lead into the strength criteria violation. Classical structural reliability methods correctly and adequately include the ambiguity sources of uncertainty (physical randomness, statistical and modeling uncertainty) by varying amounts. However, they are unable to adequately incorporate the presence of a damage spectrum, and do not consider in their mathematical framework any sources of uncertainty of the vagueness type. Vagueness can be attributed to sources of fuzziness, unclearness, indistinctiveness, sharplessness and grayness; whereas ambiguity can be attributed to nonspecificity, one-to-many relations, variety, generality, diversity and divergence. Using the nomenclature of structural reliability, vagueness and ambiguity can be accounted for in the form of realistic delineation of structural damage based on subjective judgment of engineers. For situations that require decisions under uncertainty with cost/benefit objectives, the risk of failure should depend on the underlying level of damage and the uncertainties associated with its definition. A mathematical model for structural reliability assessment that includes both ambiguity and vagueness types of uncertainty was suggested to result in the likelihood of failure over a damage spectrum. The resulting structural reliability estimates properly represent the continuous transition from serviceability to strength limit states over the ultimate time exposure of the structure. In this section, a structural reliability assessment method based on a fuzzy definition of failure is suggested to meet these practical needs. A failure definition can be developed to indicate the relationship between failure level and structural response. In this fuzzy model, a subjective index is introduced to represent all levels of damage (or failure). This index can be interpreted as either a measure of failure level or a measure of a degree of belief in the occurrence of some performance condition (e.g., failure). The index allows expressing the transition state between complete survival and complete failure for some structural response based on subjective evaluation and judgment.

Ayyub, Bilal M.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Human Factors Virtual Analysis Techniques for NASA's Space Launch System Ground Support using MSFC's Virtual Environments Lab (VEL)

Using virtual environments to assess complex large scale human tasks provides timely and cost effective results to evaluate designs and to reduce operational risks during assembly and integration of the Space Launch System (SLS). NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) uses a suite of tools to conduct integrated virtual analysis during the design phase of the SLS Program. Siemens Jack is a simulation tool that allows engineers to analyze human interaction with CAD designs by placing a digital human model into the environment to test different scenarios and assess the design's compliance to human factors requirements. Engineers at MSFC are using Jack in conjunction with motion capture and virtual reality systems in MSFC's Virtual Environments Lab (VEL). The VEL provides additional capability beyond standalone Jack to record and analyze a person performing a planned task to assemble the SLS at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The VEL integrates Vicon Blade motion capture system, Siemens Jack, Oculus Rift, and other virtual tools to perform human factors assessments. By using motion capture and virtual reality, a more accurate breakdown and understanding of how an operator will perform a task can be gained. By virtual analysis, engineers are able to determine if a specific task is capable of being safely performed by both a 5% (approx. 5ft) female and a 95% (approx. 6'1) male. In addition, the analysis will help identify any tools or other accommodations that may to help complete the task. These assessments are critical for the safety of ground support engineers and keeping launch operations on schedule. Motion capture allows engineers to save and examine human movements on a frame by frame basis, while virtual reality gives the actor (person performing a task in the VEL) an immersive view of the task environment. This presentation will discuss the need of human factors for SLS and the benefits of analyzing tasks in NASA MSFC's VEL.

Searcy, Brittani↗

NASA NTRS2013

An Assessment of Environmental Health Needs for Manned Spacecraft

Environmental health fundamentally addresses the physical, chemical, and biological risks external to the human body that can impact the health of a person by assessing and controlling these risks in order to generate and maintain a health‐supportive environment. Environmental monitoring coupled with other measures including active and passive controls and the implementation of environmental standards (SMACs, SWEGs, microbial and acoustics limits) are used to ensure environmental health in manned spacecraft. NASA scientists and engineers consider environmental monitoring a vital component to an environmental health management strategy for maintaining a healthy crew and achieving mission success. Environmental monitoring data confirms the health of ECLS systems, in addition to contributing to the management of the health of human systems. Crew health risks associated with the environment were reviewed by agency experts with the goal of determining risk-based environmental monitoring needs for future NASA manned missions. Once determined, gaps in knowledge and technology, required to address those risks, were identified for various types of Exploration missions. This agency‐wide assessment of environmental health needs will help guide the activities/hardware development efforts to close those gaps and advance the knowledge required to meet NASA manned space exploration objectives. Details of this assessment and findings are presented in this paper.

Macatangay, Ariel V.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Characterizing Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Designs

NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has the task of estimating the aleatory (randomness) and epistemic (lack of knowledge) uncertainty of launch vehicle loss of mission and crew risk, and communicating the results. Launch vehicles are complex engineered systems designed with sophisticated subsystems that are built to work together to accomplish mission success. Some of these systems or subsystems are in the form of heritage equipment, while some have never been previously launched. For these cases, characterizing the epistemic uncertainty is of foremost importance, and it is anticipated that the epistemic uncertainty of a modified launch vehicle design versus a design of well understood heritage equipment would be greater. For reasons that will be discussed, standard uncertainty propagation methods using Monte Carlo simulation produce counter intuitive results, and significantly underestimate epistemic uncertainty for launch vehicle models. Furthermore, standard PRA methods, such as Uncertainty-Importance analyses used to identify components that are significant contributors to uncertainty, are rendered obsolete, since sensitivity to uncertainty changes are not reflected in propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo methods. This paper provides a basis of the uncertainty underestimation for complex systems and especially, due to nuances of launch vehicle logic, for launch vehicles. It then suggests several alternative methods for estimating uncertainty and provides examples of estimation results. Lastly, the paper describes how to implement an Uncertainty-Importance analysis using one alternative approach, describes the results, and suggests ways to reduce epistemic uncertainty by focusing on additional data or testing of selected components.

Novack, Steven D.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Characterizing Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Designs

NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has the task of estimating the aleatory (randomness) and epistemic (lack of knowledge) uncertainty of launch vehicle loss of mission and crew risk and communicating the results. Launch vehicles are complex engineered systems designed with sophisticated subsystems that are built to work together to accomplish mission success. Some of these systems or subsystems are in the form of heritage equipment, while some have never been previously launched. For these cases, characterizing the epistemic uncertainty is of foremost importance, and it is anticipated that the epistemic uncertainty of a modified launch vehicle design versus a design of well understood heritage equipment would be greater. For reasons that will be discussed, standard uncertainty propagation methods using Monte Carlo simulation produce counter intuitive results and significantly underestimate epistemic uncertainty for launch vehicle models. Furthermore, standard PRA methods such as Uncertainty-Importance analyses used to identify components that are significant contributors to uncertainty are rendered obsolete since sensitivity to uncertainty changes are not reflected in propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo methods.This paper provides a basis of the uncertainty underestimation for complex systems and especially, due to nuances of launch vehicle logic, for launch vehicles. It then suggests several alternative methods for estimating uncertainty and provides examples of estimation results. Lastly, the paper shows how to implement an Uncertainty-Importance analysis using one alternative approach, describes the results, and suggests ways to reduce epistemic uncertainty by focusing on additional data or testing of selected components.

Novack, Steven D.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Recommendations on Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions

The NASA Electronic Parts & Packaging Program Manager, requested a NASA Engineering and Safety Center independent assessment to summarize Commercial Crew Program and NASA Centers’ current and best practices, and lessons learned, on use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) for all mission risk classifications, and provide recommendations that could lead to future NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging Program and/or Agency guidance on COTS parts. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering (REV B)

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses, GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System Safety Engineering for NASA if adequate modeling processes and environment are established.

NASA↗

NASA NTRS2011

Shuttle Propulsion System Major Events and the Final 22 Flights

Numerous lessons have been documented from the Space Shuttle Propulsion elements. Major events include loss of the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's) on STS-4 and shutdown of a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) during ascent on STS-51F. On STS-112 only half the pyrotechnics fired during release of the vehicle from the launch pad, a testament for redundancy. STS-91 exhibited freezing of a main combustion chamber pressure measurement and on STS-93 nozzle tube ruptures necessitated a low liquid level oxygen cut off of the main engines. A number of on pad aborts were experienced during the early program resulting in delays. And the two accidents, STS-51L and STS-107, had unique heritage in history from early program decisions and vehicle configuration. Following STS-51L significant resources were invested in developing fundamental physical understanding of solid rocket motor environments and material system behavior. And following STS-107, the risk of ascent debris was better characterized and controlled. Situational awareness during all mission phases improved, and the management team instituted effective risk assessment practices. The last 22 flights of the Space Shuttle, following the Columbia accident, were characterized by remarkable improvement in safety and reliability. Numerous problems were solved in addition to reduction of the ascent debris hazard. The Shuttle system, though not as operable as envisioned in the 1970's, successfully assembled the International Space Station (ISS). By the end of the program, the remarkable Space Shuttle Propulsion system achieved very high performance, was largely reusable, exhibited high reliability, and was a heavy lift earth to orbit propulsion system. During the program a number of project management and engineering processes were implemented and improved. Technical performance, schedule accountability, cost control, and risk management were effectively managed and implemented. Award fee contracting was implemented to provide performance incentives. The Certification of Flight Readiness and Mission Management processes became very effective. A key to the success of the propulsion element projects was related to relationships between the MSFC project office and support organizations with their counterpart contractor organizations. The teams worked diligently to understand and satisfy requirements and achieve mission success.

Owen, James W.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

NASA↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model Based Engineering

Model Based Engineering↗

NASA NTRS1995

Probabilistic risk assessment of the Space Shuttle. Phase 3: A study of the potential of losing the vehicle during nominal operation. Volume 4: System models and data analysis

In this volume, volume 4 (of five volumes), the discussion is focussed on the system models and related data references and has the following subsections: space shuttle main engine, integrated solid rocket booster, orbiter auxiliary power units/hydraulics, and electrical power system.

Fragola, Joseph R.↗

NASA NTRS2007

TBCC Fan Stage Operability and Performance

NASA s Fundamental Aeronautics Program is investigating turbine-based propulsion systems for access to space because it provides the potential for aircraft-like, space-launch operations that may significantly reduce launch costs and improve safety. Studies performed under NASA s NGLT and the NASP High Speed Propulsion Assessment (HiSPA) program indicated a variable cycle turbofan/ramjet was the best configuration to satisfy access-to-space mission requirements because this configuration maximizes the engine thrust-to-weight ratio while minimizing frontal area. To this end, NASA and GE teamed to design a Mach 4 variable cycle turbofan/ramjet engine for access to space. To enable the wide operating range of a Mach 4+ variable cycle turbofan ramjet required the development of a unique fan stage design capable of multi-point operation to accommodate variations in bypass ratio (10X), fan speed (7X), inlet mass flow (3.5X), inlet pressure (8X), and inlet temperature (3X). The primary goal of the fan stage was to provide a high pressure ratio level with good efficiency at takeoff through the mid range of engine operation, while avoiding stall and losses at the higher flight Mach numbers, without the use of variable inlet guide vanes. Overall fan performance and operability therefore requires major consideration, as competing goals at different operating points and aeromechanical issues become major drivers in the design. To mitigate risk of meeting the unique design requirements for the fan stage, NASA and GE teamed to design and build a 57% engine scaled fan stage to be tested in NASA s transonic compressor facility. The objectives of this test are to assess the aerodynamic and aero mechanic performance and operability characteristics of the fan stage over the entire range of engine operation including: 1) sea level static take-off, 2) transition over large swings in fan bypass ratio, 3) transition from turbofan to ramjet, and 4) fan windmilling operation at high Mach flight conditions. In addition, the fan stage design was validated by performing pre-test CFD analysis using both GE proprietary and NASA s APNASA codes. Herein we will discuss 1) the fan stage design, 2) the experiment including the unique facility and instrumentation, and 3) the comparison of pre-test CFD analysis to initial aerodynamic test results for the baseline fan stage configuration. Measurements and pre-test analysis will be compared at 37%, 50%, 80%, 90%, and 100% of design speed to assess the ability of state-of-the-art design and analysis tools to meet the fan stage performance and operability requirements for turbine based propulsion for access to space.

Suder, Kenneth L.↗