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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2014

Space Mission Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Project

The purpose of the Space Mission Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Project is to extend current ground-based HRA risk prediction techniques to a long-duration, space-based tool. Ground-based HRA methodology has been shown to be a reasonable tool for short-duration space missions, such as Space Shuttle and lunar fly-bys. However, longer-duration deep-space missions, such as asteroid and Mars missions, will require the crew to be in space for as long as 400 to 900 day missions with periods of extended autonomy and self-sufficiency. Current indications show higher risk due to fatigue, physiological effects due to extended low gravity environments, and others, may impact HRA predictions. For this project, Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) will work with Human Health & Performance (HH&P) to establish what is currently used to assess human reliabiilty for human space programs, identify human performance factors that may be sensitive to long duration space flight, collect available historical data, and update current tools to account for performance shaping factors believed to be important to such missions. This effort will also contribute data to the Human Performance Data Repository and influence the Space Human Factors Engineering research risks and gaps (part of the HRP Program). An accurate risk predictor mitigates Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission (LOM).The end result will be an updated HRA model that can effectively predict risk on long-duration missions.

Boyer, Roger↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Support for Commercial Crew Launch Capabilities

Since the earliest days of U.S. human spaceflight, NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, has played a key role in American crew launch capability, from engineering support for the first Mercury-Redstone launches, to the Saturn launches to the Moon, through Shuttle and now Artemis. Today, Marshall brings that expertise gained through decades of crewed space launches to NASA’s Commercial Crew Program (CCP), providing launch vehicle engineering and programmatic support. The team’s responsibilities have included human certification of commercial launch systems for the CCP missions, including Atlas V and Falcon 9, and verifying each launch vehicle complies with flight certification. MSFC provides expertise in nearly all aspects of launch vehicle design and performance including solid motors and liquid engines, stage propulsion, thrust vector control, structural and dynamics, safety and mission assurance. During each commercial crew launch, an engineering support team is on console at Marshall’s Huntsville Operations Support Center, which has provided launch operations support since Apollo, providing real-time oversight to safety standards for the vehicle and verifying data. Launch vehicle support for Commercial Crew has come as a paradigm shift for the MSFC team, inspiring new approaches that leverage expertise and best practices from past NASA-developed launch vehicle missions, while at the same time providing new synergies from work with commercial partners on CCP. This paper will explore the role that the Marshall launch vehicle services team plays in the Commercial Crew Program, as well as lessons learned from the program that will continue to benefit a new era of spaceflight partnerships.

Commercial Crew↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Extravehicular Activity Access Options for a Lunar Surface Habitat

NASA’s upcoming return to the moon includes a plan for longer duration lunar missions that prioritize science and surface exploration. The current Artemis Base Camp reference proposes a Surface Habitat (SH) that will support 2 to 4 crewmembers with adequate capability for living and working for 30 days or more. An important aspect of the SH’s design will be its ability to support a high frequency of Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) for scientific purposes. There are multiple airlock designs that can support EVA access from inside the SH out to the lunar surface. This paper explores three unique options for EVA access: a traditional airlock, a suitlock, and a suitport-airlock.A traditional airlock is accessed by use of a hatch, crewmembers don and doff their EVA suits inside the airlock, and it must be depressurized and repressurized for every EVA. A suitlock is also depressurized and repressurized for every EVA but thesuits are donned through a suitport attached to the airlock bulkhead. A suitport-airlock is access through suitports that are attached to the airlock bulkhead as well, but the suitport-airlock stays in vacuum, and it does not have to be depressurized and repressurized for each EVA. This study also evaluated the use of an Airlock Airsave System in the cases of a traditional airlock and suitlock. This system captures a fraction of the airlock gas instead of venting all of the gas pre-EVA. The captured gas isthen used to partially repressurize the airlock post-EVA.In this study, each option is evaluated based on seven different areas of analysis. The metrics include overhead time for EVAs, dust mitigation, consumables for resupply mass, systems mass, system power, safety and mission assurances, and programmatic considerations. The EVA access options are evaluated and compared under each area of analysis. While the baseline case assumes the SH is at 8.2 psia, the authors also investigate the impact of a 10.2 psia habitat as an alternative in this analysis. Following the conclusion of the analysis, the authors recommend the usage of a Suitport-Airlock for Lunar SH missions and detail the reasoning behind the recommendation.

EVA↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Extravehicular Activity Access Options for a Lunar Surface Habitat

NASA’s upcoming return to the moon includes a plan for longer duration lunar missions that prioritize science and surface exploration. The current Artemis Base Camp reference proposes a Surface Habitat (SH) that will support 2 to 4 crewmembers with adequate capability for living and working for 30 days or more. An important aspect of the SH’s design will be its ability to support a high frequency of Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) for scientific purposes. There are multiple airlock designs that can support EVA access from inside the SH out to the lunar surface. This paper explores three unique options for EVA access: a traditional airlock, a suitlock, and a suitport-airlock. A traditional airlock is accessed by use of a hatch, crewmembers don and doff their EVA suits inside the airlock, and it must be depressurized and repressurized for every EVA. A suitlock is also depressurized and repressurized for every EVA but the suits are donned through a suitport attached to the airlock bulkhead. A suitport-airlock is accessed through suitports that are attached to the airlock bulkhead as well, but the suitport-airlock stays in vacuum, and it does not have to be depressurized and repressurized for each EVA. This study also evaluated the use of an Airlock Airsave System in the cases of a traditional airlock and suitlock. This system captures a fraction of the airlock gas instead of venting all of the gas pre-EVA. The captured gas is then used to partially repressurize the airlock post-EVA. In this study, each option is evaluated based on seven different areas of analysis. The metrics include overhead time for EVAs, dust mitigation, consumables for resupply mass, systems mass, system power, safety and mission assurances, and programmatic considerations. The EVA access options are evaluated and compared under each area of analysis. While the baseline case assumes the SH is at 8.2 psia, the authors also investigate the impact of a 10.2 psia habitat as an alternative in this analysis. Following the conclusion of the analysis, the authors recommend the usage of a Suitport-Airlock for Lunar SH missions and detail the reasoning behind the recommendation.

EVA↗
NASA NTRS2018

Development of a Ground Test and Analysis Protocol for NASA's NextSTEP Phase 2 Habitation Concepts

The NASA Next Space Technologies for Exploration Partnerships (NextSTEP) program is a public-private partnership model that seeks commercial development of deep space exploration capabilities to support human spaceflight missions around and beyond cislunar space. NASA first issued the Phase 1 NextSTEP Broad Agency Announcement to U.S. industries in 2014, which called for innovative cislunar habitation concepts that leveraged commercialization plans for low-Earth orbit. These habitats will be part of the Deep Space Gateway (DSG), the cislunar space station planned by NASA for construction in the 2020s. In 2016, Phase 2 of the NextSTEP program selected five commercial partners to develop ground prototypes. A team of NASA research engineers and subject matter experts (SMEs) have been tasked with developing the ground-test protocol that will serve as the primary means by which these Phase 2 prototypes will be evaluated. Since 2008, this core test team has successfully conducted multiple spaceflight analog mission evaluations utilizing a consistent set of operational tools, methods, and metrics to enable the iterative development, testing, analysis, and validation of evolving exploration architectures, operations concepts, and vehicle designs. The purpose of implementing a similar evaluation process for the Phase 2 Habitation Concepts is to consistently evaluate different commercial partner ground prototypes to provide data-driven, actionable recommendations for Phase 3. This paper describes the process by which the ground test protocol was developed and the objectives, methods, and metrics by which the NextSTEP Phase 2 Habitation Concepts will be rigorously and systematically evaluated. The protocol has been developed using both a top-down and bottom-up approach. Top-down development began with the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) exploration objectives and ISS Exploration Capability Study Team (IECST) candidate flight objectives. Strategic questions and associated rationales, derived from these candidate architectural objectives, provide the framework by which the ground-test protocol will address the DSG stack elements and configurations, systems and subsystems, and habitation, science, and EVA functions. From these strategic questions, high-level functional requirements for the DSG were drafted and associated ground-test objectives and analysis protocols were established. Bottom-up development incorporated objectives from NASA SMEs in autonomy, avionics and software, communication, environmental control and life support systems, exercise, extravehicular activity, exploration medical operations, guidance navigation and control, human factors and behavioral performance, human factors and habitability, logistics, Mission Control Center operations, power, radiation, robotics, safety and mission assurance, science, simulation, structures, thermal, trash management, and vehicle health. Top-down and bottom-up objectives were integrated to form overall functional requirements - ground-test objectives and analysis mapping. From this mapping, ground-test objectives were organized into those that will be evaluated through inspection, demonstration, analysis, subsystem standalone testing, and human-in-the-loop (HITL) testing. For the HITL tests, mission-like timelines, procedures, and flight rules have been developed to directly meet ground test objectives and evaluate specific functional requirements. Data collected from these assessments will be analyzed to determine the acceptability of habitation element configurations and the combinations of capabilities that will result in the best habitation platform to be recommended by the test team for Phase 3.

Gernhardt, Michael L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗
NASA NTRS2016

[MaRS Project]

The Space Exploration Division of the Safety and Mission Assurances Directorate is responsible for reducing the risk to Human Space Flight Programs by providing system safety, reliability, and risk analysis. The Risk & Reliability Analysis branch plays a part in this by utilizing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) tools to identify possible types of failure and effective solutions. A continuous effort of this branch is MaRS, or Mass and Reliability System, a tool that was the focus of this internship. Future long duration space missions will have to find a balance between the mass and reliability of their spare parts. They will be unable take spares of everything and will have to determine what is most likely to require maintenance and spares. Currently there is no database that combines mass and reliability data of low level space-grade components. MaRS aims to be the first database to do this. The data in MaRS will be based on the hardware flown on the International Space Stations (ISS). The components on the ISS have a long history and are well documented, making them the perfect source. Currently, MaRS is a functioning excel workbook database; the backend is complete and only requires optimization. MaRS has been populated with all the assemblies and their components that are used on the ISS; the failures of these components are updated regularly. This project was a continuation on the efforts of previous intern groups. Once complete, R&M engineers working on future space flight missions will be able to quickly access failure and mass data on assemblies and components, allowing them to make important decisions and tradeoffs.

Aruljothi, Arunvenkatesh↗
NASA NTRS2016

Enabling Science and Deep Space Exploration through Space Launch System (LSL) Secondary Payload Opportunities

For the first time in almost 40 years, a NASA human-rated launch vehicle has completed its Critical Design Review (CDR). By reaching this milestone, NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion spacecraft are on the path to launch a new era of deep space exploration. NASA is making investments to expand science and exploration capability of the SLS by developing the capability to deploy small satellites during the trans-lunar phase of the mission trajectory. Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1), currently planned for launch no earlier than July 2018, will be the first mission to carry such payloads on the SLS. The EM-1 launch will include thirteen 6U Cubesat small satellites that will be deployed beyond low earth orbit. By providing an earth-escape trajectory, opportunities are created for advancement of small satellite subsystems, including deep space communications and in-space propulsion. This SLS capability also creates low-cost options for addressing existing Agency strategic knowledge gaps and affordable science missions. A new approach to payload integration and mission assurance is needed to ensure safety of the vehicle, while also maintaining reasonable costs for the small payload developer teams. SLS EM-1 will provide the framework and serve as a test flight, not only for vehicle systems, but also payload accommodations, ground processing, and on-orbit operations. Through developing the requirements and integration processes for EM-1, NASA is outlining the framework for the evolved configuration of secondary payloads on SLS Block upgrades. The lessons learned from the EM-1 mission will be applied to processes and products developed for future block upgrades. In the heavy-lift configuration of SLS, payload accommodations will increase for secondary opportunities including small satellites larger than the traditional Cubesat class payload. The payload mission concept of operations, proposed payload capacity of SLS, and the payload requirements for launch and deployment will be described to provide potential payload users an understanding of this unique exploration capability.

Singer, Jody↗
NASA NTRS2016

Secondary Payload Opportunities on NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) Enable Science and Deep Space Exploration

For the first time in almost 40 years, a NASA human-rated launch vehicle has completed its Critical Design Review (CDR). With this milestone, NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion spacecraft are on the path to launch a new era of deep space exploration. This first launch of SLS and the Orion Spacecraft is planned no later than November 2018 and will fly along a trans-lunar trajectory, testing the performance of the SLS and Orion systems for future missions. NASA is making investments to expand the science and exploration capability of the SLS by developing the capability to deploy small satellites during the trans-lunar phase of the mission trajectory. Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1) will include thirteen 6U Cubesat small satellites to be deployed beyond low earth orbit. By providing an earth-escape trajectory, opportunities are created for the advancement of small satellite subsystems, including deep space communications and in-space propulsion. This SLS capability also creates low-cost options for addressing existing Agency strategic knowledge gaps and affordable science missions. A new approach to payload integration and mission assurance is needed to ensure safety of the vehicle, while also maintaining reasonable costs for the small payload developer teams. SLS EM-1 will provide the framework and serve as a test flight, not only for vehicle systems, but also payload accommodations, ground processing, and on-orbit operations. Through developing the requirements and integration processes for EM-1, NASA is outlining the framework for the evolved configuration of secondary payloads on SLS Block upgrades. The lessons learned from the EM-1 mission will be applied to processes and products developed for future block upgrades. In the heavy-lift configuration of SLS, payload accommodations will increase for secondary opportunities including small satellites larger than the traditional Cubesat class payload. The payload mission concept of operations, proposed payload capacity of SLS, and the payload requirements for launch and deployment will be described to provide potential payload users an understanding of this unique exploration capability.

Singer, Jody↗
NASA NTRS2007

Sample Return Primer and Handbook

This three-part Sample Return Primer and Handbook provides a road map for conducting the terminal phase of a sample return mission. The main chapters describe element-by-element analyses and trade studies, as well as required operations plans, procedures, contingencies, interfaces, and corresponding documentation. Based on the experiences of the lead Stardust engineers, the topics include systems engineering (in particular range safety compliance), mission design and navigation, spacecraft hardware and entry, descent, and landing certification, flight and recovery operations, mission assurance and system safety, test and training, and the very important interactions with external support organizations (non-NASA tracking assets, landing site support, and science curation).

Stardust↗
NASA NTRS2018

GSFC Risk Assessment Process for Inherited Items

The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate is implementing an alternate process for approval of Spacecraft Inherited Items in accordance with Goddard Procedural Requirements 8730.5. A Commodity Risk Assessment Engineer is performing an Inherited Item Risk Assessment (I2RA) for the use of Spacecraft Standard Components (items generally necessary to control the spacecraft, e.g. reaction wheel assemblies) and payload flight spares or Built-to-Print items. The I2RA may take into account prior space flight performance, criticality of the component, qualification records, quality and reliability records, storage conditions, manufacturer assessments, and mission specific parameters like mission environment and duration. The I2RA provides a means to accept for the entire item materials, parts or workmanship non-conformances, that do not significantly increase risk.

Risk Assessment↗
NASA NTRS2012

An Examination of Coarse Sun Sensor Contingencies in Attitude Determination and the Sun Vector Calculation

Satellite pointing is vital to the success of a mission. One element of that entails describing the position of the sun relative to the frame of the satellite. Coarse Sun Sensors (CSS) are typically used to provide the information to calculate the sun's position in Safe Modes or contingency operations. In the OCO-2 configuration there are 13 CSS total, which provide redundant 4 celestial coverage. Failures of the individual CSS elements can introduce holes in the celestial coverage resulting in potential loss of sun knowledge. These failures must be analyzed to determine if the contingency plan is sufficient to assure mission success. First the static case was looked at and determined that at a maximum, 3 CSS failures can be sustained on the body and 1 on the array without causing coverage holes. Also array sensors are more important to mission success. The Sun Vector calculation has been transcribed to MATLAB code and failure scenarios are being examined to determine the maximum error given a set of failure scenarios. This activity indicated that if there is a loss of the sun, the sun-searching algorithm could be modified to use XZ rotation as that is guaranteed to find it whereas the design using the YZ rotation misses the sun if it is at the + or - Y orientation.

celestial bodies↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Tailoring of NASA-STD-3001 to Lunar Gateway Program Requirements

The Gateway Program must meet NASA's Agency-level human rating requirements, which are intended to accommodate human capabilities and limitations while protecting the safety of the crew, and providing to the maximum extent practical, the capability to safely recover the crew from hazardous situations. Human systems integration represents a key human rating component of Moon to Mars systems to support the execution of Artemis missions, including compliance with mandatory standards for Health and Medical, Safety and Mission Assurance, and Engineering. The human system requirements, together with the human systems integration plan, medical operations requirements, and Gateway sub-system specifications, represent the flow-down of NASA Health and Medical Standards (NASA-STD-3001, Volumes 1 and 2) into the Gateway system. This paper discusses how these documents and other human systems integration activities provide full consideration of human capabilities and limitations as part of the total system design trade space, serving as an example on how the human must be effectively integrated as part of the system in order to achieve mission success. At a bigger scale, the paper con-tributes to the application of systems engineering standards to cutting-edge space exploration initiatives and to the dialogue on how systems engineering can continue to evolve to meet the needs of such ambitious projects.

Systems engineering↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those requirements. This allows the projects leeway to meet these requirements in many forms that best suit a particular project's needs and safety risk. In other words, it tells the project what to do, not how to do it. This update also incorporated advances in the state of the practice of software safety from academia and private industry. It addresses some of the more common issues now facing software developers in the NASA environment such as the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS), Modified OTS (MOTS), Government OTS (GOTS), and reused software. A team from across NASA developed the update and it has had both NASA-wide internal reviews by software engineering, quality, safety, and project management. It has also had expert external review. This presentation and paper will discuss the new NASA Software Safety Standard, its organization, and key features. It will start with a brief discussion of some NASA mission failures and incidents that had software as one of their root causes. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Safety Process. This will include an overview of the key personnel responsibilities and functions that must be performed for safety-critical software.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Challenges in Qualification of Thermal Protection Systems in Extreme Entry Environments

Planetary entry vehicles employ ablative TPS materials to shield the aeroshell from entry aeroheating environments. To ensure mission success, it must be demonstrated that the heat shield system, including local features such as seams, does not fail at conditions that are suitably margined beyond those expected in flight. Furthermore, its thermal response must be predictable, with acceptable fidelity, by computational tools used in heat shield design. Mission assurance is accomplished through a combination of ground testing and material response modelling. A material's robustness to failure is verified through arcjet testing while its thermal response is predicted by analytical tools that are verified against experimental data. Due to limitations in flight-like ground testing capability and lack of validated high-fidelity computational models, qualification of heat shield materials is often achieved by piecing together evidence from multiple ground tests and analytical simulations, none of which fully bound the flight conditions and vehicle configuration. Extreme heating environments (>2000 W/sq. cm heat flux and >2 atm pressure), experienced during entries at Venus, Saturn and Ice Giants, further stretch the current testing and modelling capabilities for applicable TPS materials. Fully-dense Carbon Phenolic was the material of choice for these applications; however, since heritage raw materials are no longer available, future uses of re-created Carbon Phenolic will require re-qualification. To address this sustainability challenge, NASA is developing a new dual-layer material based on 3D weaving technology called Heat shield for Extreme Entry Environments (HEEET). Regardless of TPS material, extreme environments pose additional certification challenges beyond what has been typical in recent NASA missions. Scope of this presentation: This presentation will give an overview of challenges faced in verifying TPS performance at extreme heating conditions. Examples include: (1) Bounding aeroheating parameters (heat flux, pressure, shear and enthalpy) in ground facilities. How to certify TPS if environments can't be bounded or aeroheating parameters can't be simultaneously achieved. (2) Higher uncertainties in ground test environments (facility calibration and analytical predictions) at extreme conditions. (3) Testing in flows similar to planetary atmosphere composition (H2/He for Gas and Ice Giants). (4) Test sample size limitations for qualifying seam designs. (5) Lack of computational tools capable of simulating all significant aspects of TPS performance (including initiation and propagation of failures). This presentation will provide recommendations on how the EDL community can address these challenges and mitigate some of the risks involved in flying TPS materials at extreme conditions. Examples include: (1) Dedicated activity to understanding TPS failure modes. Develop computational tools capable of modelling fluid interaction with material's thermostructural response. Validate these tools through failure testing. A better understanding of failure mechanisms may eliminate the need to fully bound all aeroheating parameters in ground testing. (2) Enhancements to current testing facilities to simulate flight-like ablation mechanism (ex. testing in Nitrogen at Ames Interaction Heating Facility to limit oxidation in favor of more sublimation). (3) Improved characterization of test conditions with new diagnostic methods and determination of environment uncertainty through rigorous statistical analysis of available data. (4) Design margin policies that are directly tied to uncertainties in ground test environments and modelling fidelity

Mahzari, Milad↗
NASA NTRS2019

"Making Safety Happen" Through Probabilistic Risk Assessment at NASA

NASA is using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as one of the tools in its Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) tool belt to identify and quantify risks associated with human spaceflight. This paper discusses some of the challenges and benefits associated with developing and using PRA for NASA human space programs. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, while some have implemented PRA from the start of the program. It has been observed that the earlier a design change is made in the concept or design phase, the less impact it has on cost and schedule. Not finding risks until the operation phase yields much costlier design changes and major delays, which can result in discussions of just accepting the risk. Risk contributors identified by PRA are not just associated with hardware failures. They include but are not limited to crew fatality due to medical causes, the environment the vehicle and crew are exposed to, the software being used, and the reliability of the crew performing required actions. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, and while PRA can still provide a benefit for operations and future design trades, the benefit of implementing PRA from the start of the program provides the added benefit of informing design and reducing risk early in program development. Currently, NASA’s International Space Station (ISS) program is in its 20th year of on-orbit operations around the Earth and has several new programs in the design phase preparing to enter the operation phase all of which have active (or living) PRAs. These programs incorporate PRA as part of their Risk-Informed, Decision-Making (RIDM) process. For new NASA human spaceflight programs discussion begins with mission concept, establishing requirements, forming the PRA team, and continues through the design cycles into the operational phase. Several examples of PRA related applications and observed lessons are included.

Applications↗
NASA NTRS2013

Conformal Ablative Thermal Protection System for Planetary and Human Exploration Missions:An Overview of the Technology Maturation Effort

The Office of Chief Technologist, NASA identified the need for research and technology development in part from NASAs Strategic Goal 3.3 of the NASA Strategic Plan to develop and demonstrate the critical technologies that will make NASAs exploration, science, and discovery missions more affordable and more capable. Furthermore, the Game Changing Development Program is a primary avenue to achieve the Agencys 2011 strategic goal to Create the innovative new space technologies for our exploration, science, and economic future. The National Research Council (NRC) Space Technology Roadmaps and Priorities report highlights six challenges and they are: Mass to Surface, Surface Access, Precision Landing, Surface Hazard Detection and Avoidance, Safety and Mission Assurance, and Affordability. In order for NASA to meet these challenges, the report recommends immediate focus on Rigid and Flexible Thermal Protection Systems. Rigid TPS systems such as Avcoat or SLA are honeycomb based and PICA is in the form of tiles. The honeycomb systems are manufactured using techniques that require filling of each (38 cell) by hand, and in a limited amount of time all of the cells must be filled and the heatshield must be cured. The tile systems such as PICA pose a different challenge as the low strain-to-failure and manufacturing size limitations require large number of small tiles with gap-fillers between the tiles. Recent investments in flexible ablative systems have given rise to the potential for conformal ablative TPS. A conformal TPS over a rigid aeroshell has the potential to solve a number of challenges faced by traditional rigid TPS materials. The high strain-to-failure nature of the conformal ablative materials will allow integration of the TPS with the underlying aeroshell structure much easier and enable monolithic-like configuration and larger segments (or parts) to be used. By reducing the overall part count, the cost of installation (based on cost comparisons between blanket and tile materials on shuttle) should be significantly reduced. The conformal ablator design will include a simplified design of seams between gore panels, which should eliminate the need for gap filler design, and should accommodate a wider range of allowable carrier structure imperfections when compared to a rigid material such as PICA.The Conformal TPS development project leverages the past investments made by earlier projects with a goal to develop and deliver a TRL 5 conformal TPS capable of 250 Wcm2 for missions such as MSL or COTS missions. The capabilities goal for the conformal TPS is similar to an MSL design reference mission (250 Wcm2) with matching pressures and shear environments. Both conformal and flexible carbon-felt based materials were successfully tested in stagnation aerothermal environments above 500 Wcm2 under earlier programs. Results on a myriad of materials developed during FY11 were used to determine which materials to start with in FY12. In FY12, the conformal TPS element focused on establishing materials requirements based on MSL-type and COTS Low Earth orbit (LEO) conditions (q 250 Wcm2) to develop and deliver a Conformal Ablative TPS. In FY13, development and refining metrics for mission utilization of conformal ablator technology along with assessment for potential mission stakeholders will be carried out.

Thermal protection materials↗