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The prototype of a detector for monitoring the cosmic radiation neutron flux on ground

This work presents a comparison between the results of experimental tests and Monte Carlo simulations of the efficiency of a detector prototype for on-ground monitoring the cosmic radiation neutron flux. The experimental tests were made using one conventional {sup 241}Am-Be neutron source in several incidence angles and the results were compared to that ones obtained with a Monte Carlo simulation made with MCNPX Code.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Deep Space Test Bed for Radiation Studies

The Deep Space Test-Bed (DSTB) Facility is designed to investigate the effects of galactic cosmic rays on crews and systems during missions to the Moon or Mars. To gain access to the interplanetary ionizing radiation environment the DSTB uses high-altitude polar balloon flights. The DSTB provides a platform for measurements to validate the radiation transport codes that are used by NASA to calculate the radiation environment within crewed space systems. It is also designed to support other Exploration related investigations such as measuring the shielding effectiveness of candidate spacecraft and habitat materials, testing new radiation monitoring instrumentation and flight avionics and investigating the biological effects of deep space radiation. We describe the work completed thus far in the development of the DSTB and its current status.

Adams, James H.↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2009

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office operates the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NTS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NTS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NTS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NTS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of tritium were also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NTS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy facility to 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation not related to NTS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements or from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides. The NTS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for use on the NTS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NTS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration of each detected radionuclide at each of these locations is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. At any one location, if multiple radionuclides are detected, then compliance with NESHAP is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2009, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NTS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was a maximum of 1.69 mrem/yr, well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all six critical receptor stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values listed in Table 2 in Appendix E of 40 CFR 61. Concentrations ranged from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 17 percent of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides approximately 20 kilometers from potential release points on the NTS, concentrations at this location would be only a small fraction of that measured on the NTS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000044 mrem/yr, 230,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

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National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2013

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitations to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NNSS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NNSS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR 2010a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA for use on the NNSS in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR 2010a). For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2013, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NNSS activities, was well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all air monitoring stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 10.1% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides about 9 kilometers from potential release points on the NNSS, dose to the public would be only a small fraction of the value measured on the NNSS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000011 mrem/yr, more than 900,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

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The Main Pillar: Assessment of Space Weather Observational Asset Performance Supporting Nowcasting, Forecasting and Research to Operations

Space weather forecasting critically depends upon availability of timely and reliable observational data. It is therefore particularly important to understand how existing and newly planned observational assets perform during periods of severe space weather. Extreme space weather creates challenging conditions under which instrumentation and spacecraft may be impeded or in which parameters reach values that are outside the nominal observational range. This paper analyzes existing and upcoming observational capabilities for forecasting, and discusses how the findings may impact space weather research and its transition to operations. A single limitation to the assessment is lack of information provided to us on radiation monitor performance, which caused us not to fully assess (i.e., not assess short term) radiation storm forecasting. The assessment finds that at least two widely spaced coronagraphs including L4 would provide reliability for Earth-bound CMEs. Furthermore, all magnetic field measurements assessed fully meet requirements. However, with current or even with near term new assets in place, in the worst-case scenario there could be a near-complete lack of key near-real-time solar wind plasma data of severe disturbances heading toward and impacting Earth's magnetosphere. Models that attempt to simulate the effects of these disturbances in near real time or with archival data require solar wind plasma observations as input. Moreover, the study finds that near-future observational assets will be less capable of advancing the understanding of extreme geomagnetic disturbances at Earth, which might make the resulting space weather models unsuitable for transition to operations.

Extreme events↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2012

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NNSS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NNSS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas.

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Rapid Rebuilding of the Outer Radiation Belt

Recent observations by the radiation monitor (RDM) on the spacecraft Akebono have shown several cases of greater than 2.5 MeV radiation belt electron enhancements occurring on timescales of less than a few hours. Similar enhancements are also seen in detectors on board the NOAA/POES and TWINS 1 satellites. These intervals are shorter than typical radial diffusion or wave-particle interactions can account for. We choose two so-called "rapid rebuilding" events that occur during high speed streams (4 September 2008 and 22 July 2009) and simulated them with the Space Weather Modeling Framework configured with global magnetosphere, radiation belt, ring current, and ionosphere electrodynamics model. Our simulations produce a weaker and delayed dipolarization as compared to observations, but the associated inductive electric field in the simulations is still strong enough to rapidly transport and accelerate MeV electrons resulting in an energetic electron flux enhancement that is somewhat weaker than is observed. Nevertheless, the calculated flux enhancement and dipolarization is found to be qualitatively consistent with the observations. Taken together, the modeling results and observations support the conclusion that storm-time dipolarization events in the magnetospheric magnetic field result in strong radial transport and energization of radiation belt electrons.

Glocer, A.↗

RF radiation from lightning correlated with aircraft measurements during storm hazards-82

During the Storm Hazards Experiment 1982, the Goddard Space Flight Center monitored radiation from lightning from a site at the Wallops Flight Facility, Wallops Island, VA. Measurements were made while the NASA F106 penetrated thunderstorms to obtain data on lightning strikes to the aircraft. The objective of the ground-based measurements was to help determine if the events recorded by the F106 were part of lightning discharges. During the experiment, 53 cases were obtained in which events were recorded aboard the aircraft while reliable quality RF radiation was recorded on the ground. These cases came from 12 different storms occurring from June through August 1982. The data confirms that the aircraft was measuring events which were part of lightning and indicates that the events recorded on the aircraft tend to occur early in the flash.

Levine, D. M.↗

INTEGRAL reloaded: Spacecraft, instruments and ground system

The European Space Agency’s INTErnational Gamma-Ray Astrophysics Laboratory (ESA/INTEGRAL) was launched aboard a Proton-DM2 rocket on 17 October 2002 at 06:41 CEST, from Baikonur in Kazakhstan. Since then, INTEGRAL has been providing long, uninterrupted observations (up to about 47 h, or 170 ksec, per satellite orbit of 2.7 days) with a large field-of-view (FOV, fully coded: 100 deg), millisecond time resolution, keV energy resolution, polarization measurements, as well as additional wavelength coverage at optical wavelengths. This is realized by two main instruments in the 15 keV to 10 MeV energy range, the spectrometer SPI (spectral resolution 3 keV at 1.8 MeV) and the imager IBIS (angular resolution: 12 arcmin FWHM), complemented by X-ray (JEM-X; 3–35 keV) and optical (OMC; Johnson V-band) monitor instruments. All instruments are co-aligned to simultaneously observe the target region. A particle radiation monitor (IREM) measures charged particle fluxes near the spacecraft. The Anti-coincidence subsystems of the main instruments, built to reduce the background, are also very efficient all-sky γ-ray detectors, which provide virtually omni-directional monitoring above ~75 keV. Besides the long, scheduled observations, INTEGRAL can rapidly (within a couple of hours) re-point and conduct Target of Opportunity (ToO) observations on a large variety of sources. INTEGRAL observations and their scientific results have been building an impressive legacy: The discovery of currently more than 600 new high-energy sources; the first-ever direct detection of (56)Ni and (56)Co radio-active decay lines from a Type Ia supernova; spectroscopy of isotopes from galactic nucleo-synthesis sources; new insights on enigmatic positron annihilation in the Galactic bulge and disk; and pioneering gamma-ray polarization studies. INTEGRAL is also a successful actor in the new multi-messenger astronomy introduced by non-electromagnetic signals from gravitational waves and from neutrinos: INTEGRAL found the first prompt electromagnetic radiation in coincidence with a binary neutron star merger. Up to now more than 1750 scientific papers based on INTEGRAL data have been published in refereed journals. In this paper, we will give a comprehensive update of the satellite status after more than 18 years of operations in a harsh space environment, and an account of the successful Ground Segment.

Erik Kuulkers↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2017

Report submitted to regulators (State of Nevada and EPA Region IV). Required to document compliance with 40 CFR 61 Subpart H. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since nuclear testing ended in 1992, radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR 2010a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations because no member of the public resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR 2010a). For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2017, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by air sampling data collected at the critical receptor air monitoring stations which had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 5.7% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88) was used to model dose to the offsite public from all 2017 NNSS radionuclide emissions. The model showed the maximally exposed individual to be on the adjacent U.S. Air Force Nevada Test and Training Range; this individual received a dose of 0.07 mrem/y. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.0000098 mrem/y, over six orders of magnitude lower than the 10 mrem/y limit.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

MO-F-16A-04: Case Study: Estimation of Peak Skin Dose Following a Physician Reported “High Dose” Case and Sentinel Event Considerations

Purpose: This work offers as a teaching example a reported high dose fluoroscopy case and the workflow the institution followed to self-report a radiation overdose sentinel event to the Joint Commission. Methods: Following the completion of a clinical case in a hybrid OR room with a reported air kerma of >18 Gy at the Interventional Reference Point (IRP) the physicians involved in the case referred study to the institution's Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) for review. The RSC assigned a Diagnostic Medical Physicist (DMP) to estimate the patient's Peak Skin Dose (PSD) and analyze the case. Following the DMP's analysis and estimate of a PSD of >15 Gy the institution's adverse event committee was convened to discuss the case and to self-report the case as a radiation overdose sentinel event to the Joint Commission. The committee assigned a subgroup to perform the root cause analysis and develop institutional responses to the event. Results: The self-reporting of the sentinel event and the associated root cause analysis resulted in several institutional action items that are designed to improve process and safety. A formal reporting and analysis mechanism was adopted to review fluoroscopy cases with air kerma greater than 6 Gy at the IRP. An improved and formalized radiation safety training program for physicians using fluoroscopy equipment was implemented. Additionally efforts already under way to monitor radiation exposure in the Radiology department were expanded to include all fluoroscopy equipment capable of automated dose reporting. Conclusion: The adverse event review process and the root cause analysis following the self-reporting of the sentinel event resulted in policies and procedures that are expected to improve the quality and safe usage of fluoroscopy throughout the institution.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions (CY 2019)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this source dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

STS-81 Flight Day 2

On this second day of the STS-81 mission, the flight crew, Cmdr. Michael A. Baker, Pilot Brent W. Jett, Mission Specialists, John M. Grunsfeld, Marsha S. Ivins, Peter J.K. Wisoff, and Jerry M. Linenger, continue to close in on The Mir Space Station. Payload work involves activating a radiation monitor in addition to the Biorack multipurpose facility which is designed to investigate the effects of microgravity and radiation on plant, tissue, cell and fungus growth. Mission Specialists Jeff Wisoff and John Grunsfeld spend much of their work day setting up and performing initial work in the experiment's glove box.

Source record↗

Chandra X-Ray Observatory's Radiation Environment and the AP-8/AE-8 Model

The Chandra X-ray Observatory (CXO) was launched on July 23, 1999 and reached its final orbit on August 7, 1999. The CXO is in a highly elliptical orbit, approximately 140,000 km x 10,000 km, and has a period of roughly 63.5 hours (approx. 2.6 days). It transits the Earth's Van Allen belts once per orbit during which no science observations can be performed due to the high radiation environment. The Chandra X-ray Observatory Center (CXC) currently uses the National Space Science Data Center's "near Earth" AP-8/AE-8 radiation belt model to predict the start and end times of passage through the radiation belts. However, our scheduling software only uses a simple dipole model of the Earth's magnetic field. The resulting B, L magnet coordinates, do not always give sufficiently accurate predictions of the start and end times of transit of the Van Allen belts. We show this by comparing to the data from Chandra's on-board radiation monitor, the EPHIN (Electron, Proton, Helium Instrument particle detector) instrument. We present evidence that demonstrates this mis- of the radiation belts as well as data that also demonstrate the significant variability of one radiation belt transit to the next as experienced by the CXO. We present an explanation for why the dipole implementation of the AP-8/AE-8 gives inaccurate results. We are also investigating use of the Magnetospheric Specification and Forecast Model (MSM) - a model that also accounts for radiation belt variability and geometry.

Virani, S. N.↗

2016 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data include direct radiation exposure, as well as radiation from the air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2016 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports, developed by National Security Technologies, LLC Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2016, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 8% below average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 8% above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring on Area 5 and Area 3 RWMS cell covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 150 centimeters (cm) (5 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS. During 2016, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Forty-four percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter, which received 3 times the natural precipitation. All 2016 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs

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