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NASA NTRS2013

An Atmospheric Variability Model for Venus Aerobraking Missions

Aerobraking has proven to be an enabling technology for planetary missions to Mars and has been proposed to enable low cost missions to Venus. Aerobraking saves a significant amount of propulsion fuel mass by exploiting atmospheric drag to reduce the eccentricity of the initial orbit. The solar arrays have been used as the primary drag surface and only minor modifications have been made in the vehicle design to accommodate the relatively modest aerothermal loads. However, if atmospheric density is highly variable from orbit to orbit, the mission must either accept higher aerothermal risk, a slower pace for aerobraking, or a tighter corridor likely with increased propulsive cost. Hence, knowledge of atmospheric variability is of great interest for the design of aerobraking missions. The first planetary aerobraking was at Venus during the Magellan mission. After the primary Magellan science mission was completed, aerobraking was used to provide a more circular orbit to enhance gravity field recovery. Magellan aerobraking took place between local solar times of 1100 and 1800 hrs, and it was found that the Venusian atmospheric density during the aerobraking phase had less than 10% 1 sigma orbit to orbit variability. On the other hand, at some latitudes and seasons, Martian variability can be as high as 40% 1 sigmaFrom both the MGN and PVO mission it was known that the atmosphere, above aerobraking altitudes, showed greater variability at night, but this variability was never quantified in a systematic manner. This paper proposes a model for atmospheric variability that can be used for aerobraking mission design until more complete data sets become available.

Tolson, Robert T.↗

NASA NTRS2014

The Influence of Free Space Environment in the Mission Life Cycle: Material Selection

The natural space environment has a great influence on the ability of space systems to perform according to mission design specification. Understanding the natural space environment and its influence on space system performance is critical to the concept formulation, design, development, and operation of space systems. Compatibility with the natural space environment is a primary factor in determining the functional lifetime of the space system. Space systems being designed and developed today are growing in complexity. In many instances, the increased complexity also increases its sensitivity to space environmental effects. Sensitivities to the natural space environment can be tempered through appropriate design measures, material selection, ground processing, mitigation strategies, and/or the acceptance of known risks. The design engineer must understand the effects of the natural space environment on the space system and its components. This paper will discuss the influence of the natural space environment in the mission life cycle with a specific focus on the role of material selection.

Edwards, David L.↗

NASA NTRS2016

In-Space Structural Assembly: Applications and Technology

As NASA exploration moves beyond earth's orbit, the need exists for long duration space systems that are resilient to events that compromise safety and performance. Fortunately, technology advances in autonomy, robotic manipulators, and modular plug-and-play architectures over the past two decades have made in-space vehicle assembly and servicing possible at acceptable cost and risk. This study evaluates future space systems needed to support scientific observatories and human/robotic Mars exploration to assess key structural design considerations. The impact of in-space assembly is discussed to identify gaps in structural technology and opportunities for new vehicle designs to support NASA's future long duration missions.

Belvin, W. Keith↗

NASA NTRS2017

Real-Time Prediction of Safety Margins in the National Airspace

Underlying all operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) is the concept of safety. Safety, as defined by acceptable levels of risk, is to be maintained at all times. The real-time safety monitoring (RTSM) framework is under development to provide an automated system to quantify safety in the NAS, estimate the current level of safety, and predict the future evolution of safety and the occurrence of events that pose an increased risk to flights so that these occurrences can be managed strategically rather than mitigated reactively. This paper presents the mathematical framework, the models, and the monitoring and prediction algorithms used to achieve this. RTSM computes safety as expressed through a set of safety margins based on user-defined safety metrics, thresolds, and events. Sources of uncertainty are modeled and propagated through the predictions in order to compute the probabilistic evolution of safety and the probability of events that introduce increased risk to operations. A prototype implementation is discussed and results demonstrating feasibility are presented. The results highlight the kinds of predictions that can be computed and the fidelity that is currently achieved.

national airspace system↗

NASA NTRS2018

Safe2Ditch Autonomous Crash Management System for Small Unmanned Aerial Systems: Concept Definition and Flight Test Results

Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have the potential for a large array of highly-beneficial applications. These applications are too numerous to comprehensively list, but include search and rescue, fire spotting, precision agriculture, etc. to name a few. Typically sUAS vehicles weigh less than 55 lbs and will be performing flight operations in the National Air Space (NAS). Certain sUAS applications, such as package delivery, will include operations in the close proximity of the general public. The full benefit from sUAS is contingent upon the resolution of several technological areas in order to provide an acceptable level of risk for widespread sUAS operations. Operations of sUAS vehicles pose risks to people and property on the ground as well as manned aviation. Several of the more significant sUAS technological areas include, but are not limited to: autonomous sense and avoid and deconfliction of sUAS from other sUAS and manned aircraft, communications and interfaces between the vehicle and human operators, and the overall reliability of the sUAS and constituent subsystems. While all of the technological areas listed contribute significantly to the safe execution of the sUAS flight operations, contingency or emergency systems can greatly contribute to sUAS risk mitigations to manage situations where the vehicle is in distress. The Safe2Ditch (S2D) system is an autonomous crash management system for sUAS. Its function is to enable sUAS to execute emergency landings and avoid injuring people on the ground, damaging property, and lastly preserving the sUAS and payload. A sUAS flight test effort was performed to test the integration of sub-elements of the S2D system with a representative sUAS multi-rotor.

Glaab, Louis J.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Gateway Modeling and Simulation Plan

This plan institutes direction across the Gateway Program and the Element Projects to ensure that Cross Program M&S are produced in a manner that (1) generate the artifacts required for NASA-STD-7009 compliance, (2) ensures interoperability of M&S exchanged and integrated across the program and, (3) drives integrated development efforts to provide cross-domain integrated simulation of the Gateway elements, space environment, and operational scenarios. This direction is flowed down via contractual enforcement to prime contractors and includes both the GMS requirements specified in this plan and the NASASTD- 7009 derived requirements necessary for compliance. Grounding principles for management of Gateway Models and Simulations (M&S) are derived from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report and the Diaz team report, “A Renewed Commitment to Excellence.” As an outcome of these reports, and in response to Action 4 of the Diaz team report, the NASA Standard for Models and Simulations, NASA-STD-7009 was developed. The standard establishes M&S requirements for development and use activities to ensure proper capture and communication of M&S pedigree and credibility information to Gateway program decision makers. Through the course of the Gateway program life cycle M&S will be heavily relied upon to conduct analysis, test products, support operations activities, enable informed decision making and ultimately to certify the Gateway with an acceptable level of risk to crew and mission. To reduce risk associated with M&S influenced decisions, this plan applies the NASA-STD-7009 requirements to produce the artifacts that support credibility assessments and ensure the information is communicated to program management.

NASA-STD-7009↗

NASA NTRS2020

Artemis Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits: Human Tolerance Evidence from Apollo to ISS

The designers of the next generation of lunar landers may adopt novel, crew-body orientations outside of our flight history or applied to flight durations and environments outside of our experience. Current sustained translational acceleration requirements in NASA-STD-3001 are applicable only to crewmembers in a seated posture and are thus inadequate to address human tolerance in non-seated configurations. Initial designs for the Apollo Lunar Module (LM) included seats for both commander and pilot; however, these were subsequently removed from the vehicle due to mass constraints and a willingness to accept the unknown risks for short-duration missions given the limited human physiologic data at the time. In the years since Apollo, our evidence base has grown immensely. Initial Artemis mission timelines under consideration will be longer than the longest Apollo mission, by a significant margin, with timeframes more analogous to longer Space Shuttle missions. Given the incidence of postflight orthostatic intolerance following shuttle missions, a significant risk may exist for lander design(s) pursuing a standing crew configuration similar to Apollo LM. New sustained translational acceleration limits developed to address this risk are presented herein. These limits were derived from evaluations of Apollo biomedical and flight profile data during lunar descent and ascent operations, Soyuz and Space Shuttle flight profile and post-landing biomedical data, and analogue bed rest post-exposure data on orthostatic intolerance.

James M. Pattarini↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Introduction to the IMPACT Probabilistic Risk and Tradespace Analysis Tool for Medical System Design

Background: Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) is a method for estimating risk in complex engineered systems that, at a basic level, focuses on what can go wrong and the likelihood and consequences of those occurrences. NASA has used PRA as an integral component of medical system risk estimation and design for spaceflight. IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a novel tool to meet these goals for exploration missions. Overview: IMPACT performs hundreds of thousands of Monte Carlo simulations of missions to build aggregate pictures of medical risk. These simulations are based on 120 possible medical conditions (the IMPACT Condition List) selected in a consensus-based process because they are of highest likelihood and/or consequence for exploration spaceflight. The conditions are then tied to clinical capabilities which can be used for management (e.g., inserting an IV) and then to over 600 specific resources needed to deliver a capability (e.g., an angiocath or an ultrasound). Different mission profiles can be simulated with user-specified inputs such as mission duration, destination, number of crew and pre-existing medical conditions, and EVA frequency. While the IMPACT evidence base is designed for exploration environments, these user inputs allow the tool to be used across a broad range of missions. IMPACT’s primary outcome metrics include loss of crew life (LOCL, a measure of in-flight mortality due to medical conditions), need for evacuation (RTDC, return to definitive care), and crew disability (TTL, task time lost based on how medical conditions impact the ability to perform over 1000 specific exploration mission crew tasks). In addition to modeling medical risk, IMPACT also accepts user-specified constraints, such as limitations of mass or volume, and will output a recommended clinical capability set and specific medical resources that meet the mission constraints. Discussion: This abstract will provide an introduction to IMPACT and describe the nature of the underlying medical evidence. It will also detail potential use cases for how this tool can be utilized by NASA or commercial spaceflight providers.

Ben Easter↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Electric Propulsion Qualification Guidelines and Best Practices for NASA Small Spacecraft Missions

Electric propulsion being developed for CubeSats and other small satellites with the taught expectation that high risk is generally acceptable are resulting in devices that do not meet a minimum expectation of engineering rigor for many missions, including appropriate qualification testing. This paper proffers a preliminary set of recommended guidelines and best practices in dialogue with the smallsat community to strike a better balance between engineering rigor and cost effectiveness for the qualification of EP technologies under consideration for NASA small spacecraft.

Thomas M. Liu↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Mild Hypobaric Hypoxia on Visual Field Impairment

INTRODUCTION: The primary objective of the Exploration Atmosphere (EA) study is to validate a new prebreathe protocol necessary before exposure to a suited hypobaric environment during extravehicular activity (EVA) from a habitat ‘exploration atmosphere’ of 56.5kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2. Prebreathe protocols must be time and resource efficient while also controlling Decompression Sickness (DCS) risk to within acceptable limits. The habitat hypobaric exploration atmosphere also results in a mildly hypoxic environment (piO2 = 128mmHg). As a secondary objective of the EA study, we characterized the effects of 11-day exposure to a mild hypobaric hypoxic environment on visual performance. METHODS: Two, 11-day hypobaric chamber tests were performed (EA-1and EA-2, n=8 each) in NASA’s 20-foot chamber at Johnson Space Center where subjects lived in the exploration atmosphere. Subjects also underwent simulated 6-hour EVAs at 85% O2 and 29.6 kPa during EVA on days 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11. Visual acuity (VA), a measure of spatial resolution, and contrast sensitivity (CS), a measure of ability to distinguish ever finer increments of brightness, were assessed on non-EVA days by using gapped Landolt C testing. The luminance was controlled by using a booth, a light monitor, and a lighting rheostat. EA-1 data had revealed problems in lighting control impacting consistency of the data. Procedures were subsequently updated for the EA-2 test. RESULTS: EA-1 data revealed large variance and data recording errors and was removed from the analysis. One participant left the study at Test Day 3 during EA-2. EA-2 ANOVA results showed CS (mean change=0.010 logCSWeber) and VA (mean change, -0.016 logMAR) between pre-test and 11-day test phases; however, neither VA nor CS changes were statistically significant. There were non-statistically significant declines in VA across test phases. DISCUSSION: Overall, visual field performance did not exhibit clinically significant changes (3 lines or greater change in LogMar chart) during exposure to the mild hypoxic exploration atmosphere environment compared to pre-test baseline. The consistency and stability of VA data during EA-2 suggests that the mild hypobaric hypoxic environment did not cause clinically significant negative impacts to participants’ visual field performance.

Visual Acuity↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Mild Hypobaric Hypoxia on Visual Field Impairment

Visual Acuity↗

DOE OSTI2022

Quantitative evaluation of common cause failures in high safety-significant safety-related digital instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems at nuclear power plants (NPPs) have many advantages over analog systems. They are proven to be more reliable, cheaper, and easier to maintain given obsolescence of analog components. However, they also pose new engineering and technical challenges, such as possibility of common cause failures (CCFs) unique to digital systems. Here this paper proposes a Platform for Risk Assessment of DI&C (PRADIC) that is developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). A methodology for evaluation of software CCFs in high safety-significant safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs was developed as part of the framework. The framework integrates three stages of a typical risk assessment—qualitative hazard analysis and quantitative reliability and consequence analyses. The quantified risks compared with respective acceptance criteria provide valuable insights for system architecture alternatives allowing design optimization in terms of risk reduction and cost savings. A comprehensive case study performed to demonstrate the framework's capabilities is documented here in this paper. Results show that the PRADIC is a powerful tool capable to identify potential digital-based CCFs, estimate their probabilities, and evaluate their impacts on system and plant safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRS2013

PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessments) Participation versus Validation

Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) are performed for projects or programs where the consequences of failure are highly undesirable. PRAs primarily address the level of risk those projects or programs posed during operations. PRAs are often developed after the design has been completed. Design and operational details used to develop models include approved and accepted design information regarding equipment, components, systems and failure data. This methodology basically validates the risk parameters of the project or system design. For high risk or high dollar projects, using PRA methodologies during the design process provides new opportunities to influence the design early in the project life cycle to identify, eliminate or mitigate potential risks. Identifying risk drivers before the design has been set allows the design engineers to understand the inherent risk of their current design and consider potential risk mitigation changes. This can become an iterative process where the PRA model can be used to determine if the mitigation technique is effective in reducing risk. This can result in more efficient and cost effective design changes. PRA methodology can be used to assess the risk of design alternatives and can demonstrate how major design changes or program modifications impact the overall program or project risk. PRA has been used for the last two decades to validate risk predictions and acceptability. Providing risk information which can positively influence final system and equipment design the PRA tool can also participate in design development, providing a safe and cost effective product.

DeMott, Diana↗

DOE OSTI2022

Beryllium disease among construction trade workers at Department of Energy nuclear sites: A follow‐up

Abstract Background Construction workers at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons facilities are screened to identify DOE‐related occupational illnesses, including beryllium sensitization (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD). The study objectives were to estimate beryllium disease risks and the CBD claims acceptance rate in the energy workers' benefits program. Methods Workers diagnosed with BeS via beryllium lymphocyte proliferation test (BeLPT) included in screening examinations were interviewed about subsequent diagnosis of CBD. We estimated the proportion who developed CBD based on the ratio of CBD cases, based on self‐reported compensation claim status, to all workers with BeS interviewed. We used stratified analyses to explore trends in disease frequency by age, race, sex, DOE employment duration, site, trade group, and cigarette smoking history. Results Between 1998 and 2020, 21,854 workers received a BeLPT; 262 (1.20%) had BeS (two abnormals or one abnormal plus one borderline test); 212 (0.97%) had a single abnormal BeLPT. Of 177 BeS workers interviewed, 35 (19.8%) reported an accepted CBD compensation claim. The claims acceptance rate among BeS workers increased with years of DOE employment, from 8.4% with <5 years to 33.3% for >25 or more years. Five of 68 interviewed workers with a single positive BeLPT reported CBD claim acceptance; an additional CBD case was confirmed by chart review (8.8%). Conclusions Years of DOE work predict the risk of developing CBD among those sensitized and getting a claim for CBD accepted. Ongoing surveillance and increased awareness of the risk of beryllium exposure and CBD as an occupational disease among construction workers are needed.

Cloeren, Marianne↗

NASA NTRS2010

Occupant Protection at NASA

This slide presentation reviews NASA's efforts to arrive at protection of occupants of the ORION space craft on landing. An Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) has been developed, it is an anatomically-based, consensus-derived, global severity scoring system that classifies each injury by body region according to its relative importance on a 6-point ordinal scale. It reviews an Operationmally Relevant Injury Scale (ORIS), a classification methodology, and shows charts that detail the results of applying this ORIS to the injury databases. One chart uses NASCAR injury classification. It discusses providing a context for the level of risk inherent in the Orion landings in terms that people understand and have a sense for. For example is the risk of injury during an Orion landing roughly the same, better or worse than: An aircraft carrier landing, a NASCAR crash, or a helicopter crash, etc? The data for NASCAR and Indy Racing league (IRL) racing crash and injury data was reviewed. The risk from the Air Force, Navy, and Army injury data was also reviewed. Past NASA and the Soyuz programs injury risks are also reviewed. The work is an attempt to formulate a recommendation to the Orion Project for an acceptable level of injury risk associated with Nominal and Off-Nominal landing cases. The presentation also discusses the data mining and use of the data to Validate NASA Operationally-Relevant Injury Scale (NORIS) / Military Operationally-Relevant Injury Scale (MORIS), developing injury risk criteria, the types of data that are required, NASCAR modeling techniques and crash data, and comparison with the Brinkley model. The development of injury risk curves for each biodynamic response parameter is discussed. One of the main outcomes of this work is to establish an accurate Automated Test Dummy (ATD) that can be used to measure human tolerances.

Somers, Jeffrey↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluation of Planetary Extravehicular Activity Prebreathe Protocols using a 56.5 kPa, 34% O2, 66% N2 Saturation Cabin Atmosphere in an 11-day Hypobaric Hypoxia Study

INTRODUCTION: Apollo missions used 100% O2 cabin atmospheres which effectively eliminated the risk of decompression sickness (DCS) during Lunar extravehicular activities (EVAs, ‘spacewalks’); however, this atmosphere presented a flammability risk that is no longer acceptable to NASA. Denitrogenation prebreathe protocols used to mitigate DCS risk for Space Shuttle and International Space Station EVAs are validated for the microgravity environment, but the significantly increased risk of DCS during equivalent ambulatory surface EVAs make these protocols inapplicable to planetary/Lunar missions. A cabin/vehicle “Exploration Atmosphere” of 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2 has been recommended by NASA for future Moon and Mars missions as a compromise that balances subsequent pre-EVA prebreathe duration, hypoxia, and flammability risk, assuming a 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi) spacesuit. Prebreathe validation studies were initiated utilizing a three-story 6m diameter hypobaric chamber at NASA’s Johnson Space Center. Here, we report the results of a 11-day human-in-the-loop system checkout. METHODS: Six volunteers lived in a hyboparic chamber for 11 days with an ‘exploration atmosphere’ of 56.6kPa/34% O2 66% N2. Subjects acclimated to the exploration atmosphere for 48hrs and thereafter participated in five 6-hour simulated EVAs at 34kPa/85% O2 / 15% N2 over the course of 11 days. Prior to each simulated EVA, subjects underwent a 20-minute prebreathe at 85% O2. The EVA simulation was designed to include tasks that are physically and ergonomically representative of future planetary EVAs, proportionate to the subject’s VO2max. Decompression stress was evaluated during the simulated EVA by serial doppler and echocardiographs alternating every 15min, as well as clinical monitoring for DCS signs/symptoms. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: Venous gas emboli (VGE) were present in 3 of 6 subjects during EVAs, with peak Grade II VGE as evaluated by Doppler and a peak Eftedal-Brubakk score of 5 by cardiac ultrasonography. Two cases of DCS were diagnosed during the 11-day test chamber. No acute hypoxic symptoms were noted. Musculoskeletal and gastrointestinal complaints were noted, likely associated with the exercise load and the food system. Two cases of DCS (8%) does not cross either accept or reject pre-test criterion, so an additional study is planned for 2023 to meet our pre-test thresholds.

Alejandro Garbino↗

NASA NTRS1997

Demonstration of Oxygen and Carbon Monoxide Propellants for Mars Missions

Currently, proposed planetary exploration missions must be small, with low costs and a short development time. Relatively high-risk technologies are being accepted for such missions if they meet these guidelines. For a Mars sample-return mission, one of the higher risk technologies is the use of return propellants produced from indigenous materials such as the Martian atmosphere. This consists of 96 percent carbon dioxide, which can be processed into oxygen and carbon monoxide. This year, the NASA Lewis Research Center completed the experimental evaluation and subscale technology development of an oxygen/carbon monoxide propellant combination. Previous research included ignition characterization, combustion performance, and heat transfer characterization with gaseous propellants at room temperature. In this year s tests, we studied the ignition characteristics and combustion of oxygen and carbon monoxide at near liquid temperatures. The mixture ratio boundaries for oxygen and carbon monoxide were determined as a function of propellant temperature in a spark torch igniter. With both propellants at room temperature, the ignition range was between 0.50 and 1.44; and with both propellants chilled to near-liquid temperatures, it was between 2.4 and 3.1. Statistical analysis of the mean value of the ignition boundaries provided models that describe the combination of oxygen temperature, carbon monoxide temperature, and mixture ratio that resulted in ignition. This range is the larger boxed area shown in the figure. The smaller boxed area indicates the range at which there is a 90-percent confidence that ignition will occur. The relatively small range at only 90-percent confidence indicates that using the oxygen/carbon monoxide combination as its own ignition source may not be the best design for a remote engine operating on Mars. Tests also were performed in a simulated small rocket engine that used oxygen/hydrogen combustion gases as the ignition source for oxygen/carbon monoxide. In these experiments, the oxygen/carbon monoxide was successfully ignited in eight of eight tests at a mixture ratio of 0.52. In addition, the oxygen/carbon monoxide maintained steady combustion after the oxygen/hydrogen ignition source was removed, verifying that the oxygen/carbon monoxide rocket engine should continue to be included in mission plans as return propulsion from Mars.

Linne, Diane L.↗