Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Risk Acceptance”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 253 records · Page 14

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗

Recommended Screening Practices for Launch Collision Aviodance

The objective of this document is to assess the value of launch collision avoidance (COLA) practices and provide recommendations regarding its implementation for NASA robotic missions. The scope of this effort is limited to launch COLA screens against catalog objects that are either spacecraft or debris. No modifications to manned safety COLA practices are considered in this effort. An assessment of the value of launch COLA can be broken down into two fundamental questions: 1) Does collision during launch represent a significant risk to either the payload being launched or the space environment? 2) Can launch collision mitigation be performed in a manner that provides meaningful risk reduction at an acceptable level of operational impact? While it has been possible to piece together partial answers to these questions for some time, the first attempt to comprehensively address them is documented in reference (a), Launch COLA Operations: an Examination of Data Products, Procedures, and Thresholds, Revision A. This report is the product of an extensive study that addressed fundamental technical questions surrounding launch collision avoidance analysis and practice. The results provided in reference (a) will be cited throughout this document as these two questions are addressed. The premise of this assessment is that in order to conclude that launch COLA is a value-added activity, the answer to both of these questions must be affirmative. A "no" answer to either of these questions points toward the conclusion that launch COLA provides little or no risk mitigation benefit. The remainder of this assessment will focus on addressing these two questions.

recommended screening practicies luanch collision ↗

An Assessment of the Efficacy of Launch Collision Avoidance Analysis in Providing Risk Reduction for NASA

The objective of this document is to assess the value of collision on launch assessment (COLA, often referred to as “launch COLA”) practices and provide recommendations regarding its implementation for NASA robotic missions. The scope of this effort is limited to launch COLA screens against catalog objects that are either spacecraft or debris. No modifications to manned safety launch COLA practices are considered in this effort. An assessment of the value of launch COLA can be broken down into two fundamental questions: 1) Does collision during launch represent a significant risk to either the payload being launched or the space environment? 2) Can launch collision mitigation be performed in a manner that provides meaningful risk reduction at an acceptable level of operational impact? While it has been possible to piece together partial answers to these questions for some time, the first attempt to comprehensively address them is documented in reference (a), Launch COLA Operations: an Examination of Data Products, Procedures, and Thresholds, Revision A. This report is the product of an extensive study that addressed fundamental technical questions surrounding launch collision avoidance analysis and practice. The results provided in reference (a) will be cited throughout this document as these two questions are addressed. The premise of this assessment is that in order to conclude that launch COLA is a value-added activity, the answer to both of these questions must be affirmative. A “no” answer to either of these questions points toward the conclusion that launch COLA provides little or no risk mitigation benefit. The remainder of this assessment will focus on addressing these two questions.

launch COLA↗

An Evidenced-Based Approach for Estimating Decompression Sickness Risk in Aircraft Operations

Estimating the risk of decompression Sickness (DCS) in aircraft operations remains a challenge, making the reduction of this risk through the development of operationally acceptable denitrogenation schedules difficult. In addition, the medical recommendations which are promulgated are often not supported by rigorous evaluation of the available data, but are instead arrived at by negotiation with the aircraft operations community, are adapted from other similar aircraft operations, or are based upon the opinion of the local medical community. We present a systematic approach for defining DCS risk in aircraft operations by analyzing the data available for a specific aircraft, flight profile, and aviator population. Once the risk of DCS in a particular aircraft operation is known, appropriate steps can be taken to reduce this risk to a level acceptable to the applicable aviation community. Using this technique will allow any aviation medical community to arrive at the best estimate of DCS risk for its specific mission and aviator population and will allow systematic reevaluation of the decisions regarding DCS risk reduction when additional data are available.

Robinson, Ronald R.↗

Addressing Human System Risks to Future Space Exploration

NASA is contemplating future human exploration missions to destinations beyond low Earth orbit, including the Moon, deep-space asteroids, and Mars. While we have learned much about protecting crew health and performance during orbital space flight over the past half-century, the challenges of these future missions far exceed those within our current experience base. To ensure success in these missions, we have developed a Human System Risk Board (HSRB) to identify, quantify, and develop mitigation plans for the extraordinary risks associated with each potential mission scenario. The HSRB comprises research, technology, and operations experts in medicine, physiology, psychology, human factors, radiation, toxicology, microbiology, pharmacology, and food sciences. Methods: Owing to the wide range of potential mission characteristics, we first identified the hazards to human health and performance common to all exploration missions: altered gravity, isolation/confinement, increased radiation, distance from Earth, and hostile/closed environment. Each hazard leads to a set of risks to crew health and/or performance. For example the radiation hazard leads to risks of acute radiation syndrome, central nervous system dysfunction, soft tissue degeneration, and carcinogenesis. Some of these risks (e.g., acute radiation syndrome) could affect crew health or performance during the mission, while others (e.g., carcinogenesis) would more likely affect the crewmember well after the mission ends. We next defined a set of design reference missions (DRM) that would span the range of exploration missions currently under consideration. In addition to standard (6-month) and long-duration (1-year) missions in low Earth orbit (LEO), these DRM include deep space sortie missions of 1 month duration, lunar orbital and landing missions of 1 year duration, deep space journey and asteroid landing missions of 1 year duration, and Mars orbital and landing missions of 3 years duration. We then assessed the likelihood and consequences of each risk against each DRM, using three levels of likelihood (Low: less than or equal to 0.1%; Medium: 0.1%–1.0%; High: greater than or equal to 1.0%) and four levels of consequence ranging from Very Low (temporary or insignificant) to High (death, loss of mission, or significant reduction to length or quality of life). Quantitative evidence from clinical, operational, and research sources were used whenever available. Qualitative evidence was used when quantitative evidence was unavailable. Expert opinion was used whenever insufficient evidence was available. Results: A set of 30 risks emerged that will require further mitigation efforts before being accepted by the Agency. The likelihood by consequence risk assessment process provided a means of prioritizing among the risks identified. For each of the high priority risks, a plan was developed to perform research, technology, or standards development thought necessary to provide suitable reduction of likelihood or consequence to allow agency acceptance. Conclusion: The HSRB process has successfully identified a complete set of risks to human space travelers on planned exploration missions based on the best evidence available today. Risk mitigation plans have been established for the highest priority risks. Each risk will be reassessed annually to track the progress of our risk mitigation efforts.

Paloski, W. H.↗

The selection of imaging systems for planetary photography from space vehicles.

Discussion of the selection of a type of imaging system for a specific mission which will maximize the return of scientific data while keeping development risk and cost to acceptable limits. A representative example is given which shows that the parameters of the optimizing process range from the scientific objectives through the engineering and programming constraints of the spacecraft and mission, to the characteristics of the types of systems. The selections for all planetary missions flown to date have been imaging systems using image tube cameras. Film cameras and mechanical scan cameras, however, have unique advantages which should find application in planetary exploration.

Smokler, M. I.↗

Report to the administrator by the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel on the Skylab program. Volume 1: Summary report

Contractor and NASA technical management for the development and manufacture of the Skylab modules is reviewed with emphasis on the following management controls: configuration and interface management; vendor control; and quality control of workmanship. A review of the modified two-stage Saturn V launch vehicle which focused on modifications to accommodate the Skylab payload; resolution of prior flight anomalies; and changes in personnel and management systems is presented along with an evaluation of the possible age-life and storage problems for the Saturn 1-B launch vehicle. The NASA program management's visibility and control of contractor operations, systems engineering and integration, the review process for the evaluation of design and flight hardware, and the planning process for mission operations are investigated. It is concluded that the technical management system for development and fabrication of the modules, spacecraft, and launch vehicles, the process of design and hardware acceptance reviews, and the risk assessment activities are satisfactory. It is indicated that checkout activity, integrated testing, and preparations for and execution of mission operation require management attention.

Source record↗

Integrated Application of Active Controls (IAAC) Technology to an Advanced Subsonic Transport: Project Plan

The state of the art of active controls technology (ACT) and a recommended ACT development program plan are reviewed. The performance benefits and cost of ownership of an integrated application of ACT to civil transport aircraft is to be assessed along with the risk and laboratory and/or flight experiments designed to reduce the technical risks to a commercially acceptable level.

Source record↗

Composites for Cryotank Structures. Present and Future: MSFC Perspective

The development of reusable launch vehicle systems for a single stage to orbit vehicle requires vehicles at liftoff with 85% to 94% of its mass consisting exclusively of propellants. These dry mass requirements drive designs to utilize stronger, lighter weight materials for structures. This technology development focus has allowed the introduction of composite materials in lieu of conventional metallic materials due to their higher specific strengths. Composite materials were successfully used for the liquid hydrogen tanks for the DC-XA, and a multi-lobed liquid hydrogen tank will be employed for the X-33. Another potential non-traditional application for composite materials is for liquid oxygen tanks, which is still being investigated. Traditionally, organic materials have been avoided wherever possible, due the potential fire hazard and the fact that composites fail conventional oxygen compatibility requirements. However, the potential weight savings warrant the investigation of the use of polymeric composite materials in oxygen environments. Since composites fail the conventional, time-proven test methods because they are considered flammable by test, we have embarked on an innovative approach to oxygen compatibility testing and evaluation focused on the use environments and attempts to eliminate or "design away" all potential ignition sources. Oxygen compatibility is defined as the ability of a material to coexist with oxygen and potential ignition sources with an acceptable, manageable degree of risk.

Vaughn, Timothy P.↗

Fault Tree Analysis Application for Safety and Reliability

Many commercial software tools exist for fault tree analysis (FTA), an accepted method for mitigating risk in systems. The method embedded in the tools identifies a root as use in system components, but when software is identified as a root cause, it does not build trees into the software component. No commercial software tools have been built specifically for development and analysis of software fault trees. Research indicates that the methods of FTA could be applied to software, but the method is not practical without automated tool support. With appropriate automated tool support, software fault tree analysis (SFTA) may be a practical technique for identifying the underlying cause of software faults that may lead to critical system failures. We strive to demonstrate that existing commercial tools for FTA can be adapted for use with SFTA, and that applied to a safety-critical system, SFTA can be used to identify serious potential problems long before integrator and system testing.

Wallace, Dolores R.↗

Fission Surface Power for the Exploration and Colonization of Mars

The colonization of Mars will require abundant energy. One potential energy source is nuclear fission. Terrestrial fission systems are highly developed and have the demonstrated ability to safely produce tremendous amounts of energy. In space, fission systems not only have the potential to safely generate tremendous amounts of energy, but could also potentially be used on missions where alternatives are not practical. Programmatic risks such as cost and schedule are potential concerns with fission surface power (FSP) systems. To be mission enabling, FSP systems must be affordable and programmatic risk must be kept acceptably low to avoid jeopardizing exploration efforts that may rely on FSP. Initial FSP systems on Mars could be "workhorse" units sized to enable the establishment of a Mars base and the early growth of a colony. These systems could be nearly identical to FSP systems used on the moon. The systems could be designed to be safe, reliable, and have low development and recurring costs. Systems could also be designed to fit on relatively small landers. One potential option for an early Mars FSP system would be a 100 kWt class, NaK cooled system analogous to space reactors developed and flown under the U.S. "SNAP" program or those developed and flown by the former Soviet Union ("BUK" reactor). The systems could use highly developed fuel and materials. Water and Martian soil could be used to provide shielding. A modern, high-efficiency power conversion subsystem could be used to reduce required reactor thermal power. This, in turn, would reduce fuel burnup and radiation damage .effects by reducing "nuclear" fuels and materials development costs. A realistic, non-nuclear heated and fully integrated technology demonstration unit (TDU) could be used to reduce cost and programmatic uncertainties prior to initiating a flight program.

Houts, Mike↗

Finding Uncertainties that Cause the Age Dependence of Dose Limits to Be Immature

Space radiation permissible exposure limits (PEL) are intended to set acceptable levels of cancer risks, and avoid any clinical significant non-cancer effects. The 1989 recommendation of the National Council of Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) recommended a strong age dependence of dose limits that departed drastically from the then mature 1970 dose limits recommendations from the National Academy of Science, which were independent of age. In 2000, the NCRP recommended revised limits that showed a similar trend of risk with age to the 1989 report. In this model, the cancer risk per Sv varies by more than 2-fold for ages between 30- and 50-yr. Therefore for galactic cosmic rays exposure, astronaut age has a larger influence on risk then radiation shielding mass or material composition, vehicle propulsion method, or position in the solar cycle. For considering the control of mission costs and resources, the possibility of using astronaut age as a trade variable in mission design could be considered. However, the uncertainties in describing the age dependence on risk have not been fully explored. We discuss biological factors that influence the age dependence of radiation risks, including susceptibility, expression and latency, and radiation quality. These factors depend not only on the individual s age, but also their genetic sensitivity and interaction with other environmental factors. Epidemiological data is limited in describing the age dependence on risk. The 2005, BEIR VII report recommends an age dependence for cancer risk attributable solely to the life-table disagreeing strongly with the NCRP model. However, BEIR VII also noted the limited power of human data for concomitantly describing both age and age after exposure dependences of cancer risks. Many experimental studies have shown that high LET radiation (e.g., high charge and energy (HZE) nuclei and neutrons) display reduced latency compared to low LET radiation, suggesting distinct biological factors are important. We discuss potential molecular mechanisms that would influence the age dependence of radiation risks. A probability distribution function for the uncertainties in age-dependence of risk models is described and predictions for Mars missions discussed. Our report suggests that theoretical considerations based on new experimental studies are needed to ensure the correct age dependence in space radiation risk models and the resulting Astronaut PEL.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗

Feasibility of Conducting J-2X Engine Testing at the Glenn Research Center Plum Brook Station B-2 Facility

A trade study of the feasibility of conducting J-2X testing in the Glenn Research Center (GRC) Plum Brook Station (PBS) B-2 facility was initiated in May 2006 with results available in October 2006. The Propulsion Test Integration Group (PTIG) led the study with support from Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and Jacobs Sverdrup Engineering. The primary focus of the trade study was on facility design concepts and their capability to satisfy the J-2X altitude simulation test requirements. The propulsion systems tested in the B-2 facility were in the 30,000-pound (30K) thrust class. The J-2X thrust is approximately 10 times larger. Therefore, concepts significantly different from the current configuration are necessary for the diffuser, spray chamber subsystems, and cooling water. Steam exhaust condensation in the spray chamber is judged to be the key risk consideration relative to acceptable spray chamber pressure. Further assessment via computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and other simulation capabilities (e.g. methodology for anchoring predictions with actual test data and subscale testing to support investigation.

Schafer, Charles F.↗

Boiler and Pressure Balls Monopropellant Thermal Rocket Engine

The proposed technology is a rocket engine cycle utilizing as the propulsive fluid a low molecular weight, cryogenic fluid, typically liquid hydrogen, pressure driven, heated, and expelled through a nozzle to generate high velocity and high specific impulse discharge gas. The proposed technology feeds the propellant through the engine cycle without the use of a separate pressurization fluid and without the use of turbomachinery. Advantages of the proposed technology are found in those elements of state-of-the-art systems that it avoids. It does not require a separate pressurization fluid or a thick-walled primary propellant tank as is typically required for a classical pressure-fed system. Further, it does not require the acceptance of intrinsic reliability risks associated with the use of turbomachinery

Greene, William D.↗

From Research to Flight: Surviving the TRL Valley of Death for Robotic and Human Space Exploration

There must be a plan or opportunities for flight validation: a) To reduce the bottleneck of new technologies at the TRL Valley of Death; b) To allow frequent infusion of new technologies into flight missions. Risk must be tolerated for new technology flight experiments. Risk must also be accepted on early-adopting missions to enable new capabilities. Fundamental research is critical to taking the next giant leap in the scientific exploration of space. Technology push is often required to meet current mission requirements. Technology management requires more than issuing NRAs and overseeing contracts.

Johnson, Les↗

Why Space Technology Needs More Non-Traditional Chemical Engineers – From the Perspective of a NASA Chemical Engineering Student

Final document is attached. With planetary missions and deep space gateway on the horizon, humankind is entering a new era of space exploration. Manned mission durations will be longer than any previous flight, resupply capabilities are limited, and system robustness is more imperative than ever. Traditional space systems, especially in the realm of carbon dioxide removal and water remediation, are large in size, mass, energy consumption, and number of mechanical moving parts prone to failure. Non-traditional space exploration needs non-traditional technology solutions. Organizational psychologist Adam Grant is well-known for his studies on originality and how non-conformists can move the world. In the words of Adam Grant, "to become original, you have to try something new, which means accepting some measure of risk." As chemical engineers, we shouldn't let that measure of risk stop us from considering ingenious technology. As a part of the new generation of engineers at NASA, I believe we need a paradigm shift in space technology for this new era of exploration.

Rogers, Tanya↗

Enabling Advanced Air Mobility Operations through Appropriate Trust in Human-Autonomy Teaming: Foundational Research Approaches and Applications

Emerging Advanced Air Mobility(AAM)operations will be enabled by increasingly autonomous systems, requiring technologies to take on more responsibilities and fundamentally altering traditional human-automation interaction paradigms. The growing reliance on higher levels of automation will necessitate research to identify capabilities and principles that facilitate humans and machines working and thinking better together, i.e., human-autonomy teaming (HAT). Trust is an inherent requirement in effective teams because when members work interdependently, those agents (human, automation) must be willing to accept a level of risk to rely upon each other to reach goals and contribute to team tasks. This work provides an initial approach to enabling AAM operations through appropriate trust within HAT. The main contributions of this approach resides in connecting the construct of trust to mental models. Using the outlined mental model approach, we propose novel HAT strategies, such as Adaptive Trust Calibration, and preview planned research activities derived from this approach. Additionally, we propose several practical applications that can currently be employed by AAM development communities.

Eric T Chancey↗