Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Risk consequence”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 253 records · Page 14
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of the Suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis for Identification of Top Injury Risks in Lunar Missions and Training

A new Exploration Extravehicular Activity Suit (xEVAS) is being designed to replace the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Artemis program to return astronauts to the lunar surface. This new suit will allow for increased range of motion compared the current EMU and Apollo era suits and will have additional features that will enhance the health and safety of exploration. With the design of lunar missions and the xEVAS progressing, it is important to consider possible injuries and injury mechanisms that could occur in the suit. To address these concerns, the suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis (IMEA) was developed to outline suited injury scenarios and rank them based on risk score. The IMEA documents possible scenarios and underlying mechanisms of injury while wearing an extravehicular activity (EVA) suit. Tasks during lunar surface EVA as well as training events to prepare for lunar missions were considered as history has shown that more suit injuries occur during training than in flight. Each scenario is ranked with a consequence and likelihood scoring based on our current understanding of the suit and Artemis design reference missions to identify high-risk cases that will drive further work in suited injury. Injuries, mechanisms of injury, and mitigation strategies are evaluated within each scenario. The Suited Injury Summit was held on January 5, 2022, to vet the IMEA with external experts. This was an all-day virtual meeting with the suited injury team, ergonomists, suit engineers, safety engineers, the flight operations directorate, flight doctors, astronauts, astronaut strength, conditioning, and rehabilitation specialists (ASCRS), and external subject matter experts (SMEs). External SMEs consisted of surgeons with varying specialties. The intent of this meeting was to walk through the top injury risks identified in the analysis, identify any gaps that were not captured, and discuss mitigations. With participation from all groups, countless lessons-learned came from the Summit meeting. Using the lessons-learned and discussion from the Summit, the top 10 risks have been identified: neutral buoyancy laboratory training, hand/glove injuries, poor suit fit, field training, specific EVA tasks/design of task, boots/ankle injuries, falls from heights, background radiation, repetitive contact, and ambulation/long-distance ambulation. Mitigation steps have also been determined for each of the top risks. The IMEA and documentation of top risks is a living document. Yearly meetings are planned to update the analysis and reevaluate top risks and mitigations. The IMEA is being used to drive work in suited injury, and this work will continue to evolve with IMEA and lunar mission updates.

Tessa Reiber↗
NASA NTRS1998

Risk Management Structured for Today's Environment

Today's project management environment provides NASA with myriad challenges. We have smaller budgets and, consequently, smaller programs and shorter lead times. We have less money for development, and no money to recover from contingencies or mishaps. The NASA Administrator is leading the Agency away from operations, instilling a renewed focus on scientific research and the development and application of new cutting-edge technologies. We are using performance-based and fixed-price contracts with industry, and we are forming more and more partnerships with the international community. In addition to the environment, we have many NASA-unique conditions that challenge mission success. They include a higher level of performance requirements, limited production numbers, higher development efforts and cost, the inability to operate a space element fully under realistic conditions on the ground, limited access to the product during operation, and, of course, the need for more science for fewer dollars and on a shorter schedule.

Michael A. Greenfield↗
NASA NTRS2015

Developing Probabilistic Safety Performance Margins for Unknown and Underappreciated Risks

Probabilistic safety requirements currently formulated or proposed for space systems, nuclear reactor systems, nuclear weapon systems, and other types of systems that have a low-probability potential for high-consequence accidents depend on showing that the probability of such accidents is below a specified safety threshold or goal. Verification of compliance depends heavily upon synthetic modeling techniques such as PRA. To determine whether or not a system meets its probabilistic requirements, it is necessary to consider whether there are significant risks that are not fully considered in the PRA either because they are not known at the time or because their importance is not fully understood. The ultimate objective is to establish a reasonable margin to account for the difference between known risks and actual risks in attempting to validate compliance with a probabilistic safety threshold or goal. In this paper, we examine data accumulated over the past 60 years from the space program, from nuclear reactor experience, from aircraft systems, and from human reliability experience to formulate guidelines for estimating probabilistic margins to account for risks that are initially unknown or underappreciated. The formulation includes a review of the safety literature to identify the principal causes of such risks.

Safety Performance Margin↗
NASA NTRS2004

Muscle Research and Human Space Exploration: Current Progress and Future Challenges

Since the beginning of human space flight, there has been serious concern over the exposure of human crewmembers to the microgravity of space due to the systemic effects on terrestrially-evolved creatures that are adapted to Earth gravity. Humans in the microgravity environment of space, within our currently developed space vehicles, are exposed to various periods of skeletal muscle unloading (unweighting). Unloading of skeletal muscle both on Earth and during spaceflight results in remodeling of muscle (atrophic response) as an adaptation to the reduced loads placed upon it. As a result, there are decrements in skeletal muscle strength, fatigue resistance, motor performance, and connective tissue integrity. This normal adaptive response to the microgravity environment is for the most part of little consequence within the space vehicle per se but may become a liability resulting in an increased risk of crewmember physical failure during extravehicular activities or abrupt transitions to environments of increased gravity (such as return to Earth or landing on another planetary body).

Feedback, Daniel L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Response of Staphylococcus Aureus to a Spaceflight Analogue

The decreased gravity of the spaceflight environment creates quiescent, low fluid shear conditions. This environment can impart considerable effects on the physiology of microorganisms as well as their interactions with potential hosts. Using the rotating wall vessel (RWV), as a spaceflight analogue, the consequence of low fluid shear culture on microbial pathogenesis has provided a better understanding of the risks to the astronaut crew from infectious microorganisms. While the outcome of low fluid shear culture has been investigated for several bacterial pathogens, little has been done to understand how this environmental factor affects Staphylococcus aureus. S. aureus is an opportunistic human pathogen which presents a high level of infection risk to the crew, as it has been isolated from both the space shuttle and International Space Station. Given that approximately forty percent of the population are carriers of the bacteria, eradication of this organism from in flight environments is impractical. These reasons have lead to us to assess the response of S. aureus to a reduced fluid shear environment. Culture in the RWV demonstrated that S. aureus grown under the low-shear condition had lower cell concentrations after 10 hours when compared to the control culture. Furthermore, the low-shear cultured bacteria displayed a reduction in carotenoid production, pigments responsible for their yellow/gold coloration. When exposed to various environmental stressors, post low-shear culture, a decrease in the ability to survive oxidative assault was observed compared to control cultures. The low fluid shear environment also resulted in a decrease in hemolysin secretion, a staphylococcal toxin responsible for red blood cell lysis. When challenged by the immune components present in human whole blood, low-shear cultured S. aureus demonstrated significantly reduced survival rates as compared to the control culture. Assays to determine the duration of these alterations demonstrated that the low-shear response could be lost in as few as 2.5 hours. These changes in phenotypic properties prompted investigation into variations occurring at the genetic level. Microarray analysis of low-shear cultured S. aureus revealed the differential regulation of genes involved in metabolism, stress response, and phosphate transfer. Additional genetic analysis with quantitative real-time PCR revealed alterations in the expression of Hfq, the conserved RNA chaperone protein involved in global gene regulation. Hfq has been connected to the regulation of a spaceflight microgravity response in S. typhimurium. These findings in S. aureus suggest an evolutionary conserved response to spaceflight conditions among structurally-diverse microorganisms. Furthermore, the reduction in pigmentation, hemolysin secretion, and survival against oxidative stress and immunologically active whole blood demonstrate an overall decrease in the virulence factors of S. aureus in response to spaceflight-like conditions.

Castro, S. L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of the Suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis for Identification of Top Injury Risks in Lunar Missions and Training

A new Exploration Extravehicular Activity Services (xEVAS) suit is being designed to replace the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Artemis program to return astronauts to the lunar surface. This new suit will allow for increased range of motion compared to the current EMU and Apollo era suits and additional features will enhance the health and safety of exploration. With the design of lunar missions and the xEVAS suit progressing, it is important to consider possible injuries and injury mechanisms that could occur in the suit. To address these concerns, the suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis (IMEA) was developed to outline suited injury scenarios and rank them based on risk score. The IMEA documents possible scenarios and underlying mechanisms of injury. History has shown that more suit injuries occur during training than in flight; therefore, currently planned training events to prepare for lunar missions and tasks during lunar surface EVAs were considered. Each scenario is ranked with likelihood and consequence scorings based on our current understanding of suit and application of Artemis design reference missions. The scoring allowed identification of the high-risk cases that will drive further work in suited injury. Mechanisms of injury, injury outcomes, and mitigation strategies are evaluated within each scenario. The Suited Injury Summit was held on January 5, 2022, to vet the IMEA with external experts. This was an all-day virtual meeting with the suited injury team; ergonomists; suit engineers; safety engineers; the flight operations directorate; flight doctors; astronauts; astronaut strength, conditioning, and rehabilitation specialists (ASCRS); and external subject matter experts (SMEs). External SMEs consisted of surgeons with varying specialties. The intent of this meeting was to walk through the top injury risks identified in the analysis, identify any gaps that were not captured, and discuss mitigations. With participation from all groups, countless lessons-learned came from the Summit meeting. Using these, the top 10 risks have been identified: neutral buoyancy laboratory training, hand/glove injuries, poor suit fit, field training, specific EVA tasks/design of task, boots/ankle injuries, falls from heights, background radiation, repetitive contact, and ambulation/longdistance ambulation. Mitigation steps have also been determined for each of the top risks. The IMEA and documentation of top risks is a living document. Yearly meetings are planned to update the analysis and reevaluate top risks and mitigations. The IMEA is being used to drive work in suited injury, and this work will continue to evolve with IMEA and lunar mission updates.

Teresa Reiber↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Baseline Medical System Translation for the Impact Medical Database

NASA has developed a new evidence-based data-driven probabilistic risk assessment and tradespace analysis tool as a successor to the Integrated Medical Model (IMM). This updated decision support tool is known as IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces). Whereas IMM focuses on the resources and risks associated with International Space Station (ISS) and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) missions, IMPACT estimates the frequency and consequences of medical conditions that might arise during exploration missions. One of the services offered by IMM is a series of generic or baseline medical systems associated with typical mission types or DRMs (Design Reference Missions), such that requestors may prioritize questions pertaining to the mission itself over the medical supplies indicated by the model outputs for that DRM. In a mission focused request, the appropriate baseline medical system is used in place of a prepared or optimized medical kit. In preparation, an effort was undertaken to create baseline systems of medical resources within IMPACT suitable for typical DRMs. Using an existing baseline medical system within IMM’s Integrated Medical Evidence Database (iMED) as a starting point, the resources found within the medical kit were compared to and substituted for equivalent resources available within the IMPACT MD (Medical Database). In consultation with clinicians with knowledge of IMPACT’s MD, each resource was matched as closely as possible to a similarly purposed resource in IMPACT, seeking to preserve the treatment capabilities and procedures offered by the IMM medical system while reconciling the differences in modeled resources and medical conditions between the models. To demonstrate the efficacy of this work, a prototype ISS medical system in IMPACT was translated from the baseline used in the IMM. The appropriate medical system was then run through its associated medical model to compare and validate the resultant risks and risk mitigation provided by each baseline ISS medical kit.

S Schwartz↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Management of Jettisoned Objects in LEO

The construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) has led to the release of many objects into its orbital plane, usually during the course of an extra-vehicular activity (EVA). Such releases are often unintentional, but in a growing number of cases, the jettison has been intentional, conducted after a careful assessment of the net risk to the partnership and to other objects in space. Since its launch in 1998 the ISS has contributed on average at least one additional debris object that is simultaneously in orbit with the station, although the number varies widely from zero to eight at any one moment. All of these objects present potential risks to other objects in orbit. Whether it comes from known and tracked orbiting objects or from unknown or untrackable objects, collision with orbital debris can have disastrous consequences. Objects greater than 10cm are generally well documented and tracked, allowing orbiting spacecraft or satellites opportunities to perform evasive maneuvers (commonly known as Debris Avoidance Maneuvers, or DAMs) in the event that imminent collision is predicted. The issue with smaller debris; however, is that it is too numerous to be tracked effectively and yet still poses disastrous consequences if it intercepts a larger object. Due to the immense kinetic energy of any item in orbit, collision with debris as small as 1cm can have catastrophic consequences for many orbiting satellites or spacecraft. Faced with the growing orbital debris threat and the potentially catastrophic consequences of a collision-generated debris shower originating in an orbit crossing the ISS altitude band, in 2007 the ISS program manger asked program specialists to coordinate a multilateral jettison policy amongst the ISS partners. This policy would define the acceptable risk trade rationale for intentional release of a debris object, and other mandatory constraints on such jettisons to minimize the residual risks whenever a jettison was accepted. Although ISS-related debris often presents untenable risks to the EVA crew, IVA crew, or to a departing cargo vehicle for a controlled disposal, such released objects also present a ballistic nuisance to the visiting vehicle traffic, and a potential fragmentation threat to the hundreds of other functional and debris objects whose perigees lie below the ISS orbital altitude. Thus, every such jettison decision is a conscious risk trade.

Bacon, John B.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Nutritional Biochemistry of Spaceflight

Adequate nutrition is critical for crew health and safety during spaceflight. To ensure adequate nutrition, the nutrient requirements need to be both accurate and available from the spaceflight food system. The existing nutritional requirements for extended-duration spaceflight have been defined largely by extrapolation from ground-based research. However, nutritional requirements are influenced by most of the physiological consequences of spaceflight, including loss of lean, adipose, and bone tissue; changes in blood composition; and increased risk of renal stone formation. This review focuses on key areas where information has been gained in recent years: dietary intake and energy metabolism, bone health, fluid and electrolyte homeostasis, and hematological changes. Areas in which specific nutrients have the potential to serve as countermeasures to the negative effects of spaceflight are also reviewed. Dietary Intake

Smith, Scott M.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Interpreting Space-Mission LET Requirements for SEGR in Power MOSFETs

Single-event gate rupture (SEGR) is a potentially catastrophic failure mechanism of power MOSFETs biased in the off-state. In part due to the severity of-SEGR consequences and in part due to the difficulty of accurated SEGR rate estimation, SEGR mitigation me1hodologies emphasize risk avoidance, using heavy-ion accelerator testing to define safe operating conditions for a surface-incident linear energy transfer {LET). This "safe-operating area" (SOA) within which the device may be biased without experiencing SEGR is then often derated by a prescribed factor to ensure low risk of SEGR. Although research in 1996 indicated that such LET-based SEGR hardness requiremen1s could provide false assurance of safe operation unless one also considered· ion energy], most mission SEGR requirements are still specified in terms of surface-incident LET. Moreover, terrestrial SEGR tests at a given surface-incident LET are limited by the small number of ion species and energies available at heavy-ion accelerators. In comparison, the on-orbit radiation environment is composed of all of the naturally-occurring elements with peak fluxes at nearly GeV/nucleon energies. The primary objective of this study is to examine whether typical derating of high-energy heavy-ion accelerator test data bounds the risk for SEGR from higher-energy on-orbit ions with the mission LET requirement.

Lauenstein, Jean-Marie↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Adding a Verification View for Autonomous Real-Time Architecture

Spacecraft software systems continue to increase in complexity and must frequently operate autonomously for extended periods. Thus, the consequences of software flaws are increasing and it is necessary to improve development methods to minimize the risk of latent flaws in the operational software. Traditional software architectures place verification as one element in the development architectural view and treat verification as a later lifecycle activity that is considered complete when the system is certified for flight. The Gateway Vehicle System Manager team, recognizing the importance of verification throughout the system lifecycle, is treating verification as an additional architectural view that receives continuous attention from the requirements analysis phase and continuing for the life of the operational system. The verification view consists of two viewpoints: development and operational. We present background on the verification view and discuss the approaches the Vehicle System Manager team is taking.

James B Dabney↗
NASA NTRS2022

A Spectroscopic Measurement of High Velocity Spray Plasma from an M-Class Flare and Coronal Mass Ejection

The M1.5-class flare and associated coronal mass ejection (CME) of 16 February 2011 was observed with the Extreme ultraviolet Imaging Spectrometer on board the Hinode spacecraft. Spray plasma associated with the CME is found to exhibit a Doppler blue-shift of 850 km s−1 – one of the largest values reported from spectroscopy of the solar disk and inner corona. The observation is unusual in that the emission line (Fe xii 193.51 Å) is not observed directly, but the Doppler shift is so large that the blue-shifted component appears in a wavelength window at 192.82 Å, intended to observe lines of O v, Fe xi and Ca xvii. The Fe xii 195.12 Å emission line is used as a proxy for the rest component of 193.51 Å. The observation highlights the risks of using narrow wavelength windows for spectrometer observations when observing highly-dynamic solar phenomena. The consequences of large Doppler shifts for ultraviolet solar spectrometers, including the upcoming Multi-slit Solar Explorer (MUSE) mission, are discussed.

Solar atmosphere↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Bootstrapping Multi-Agent Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) System Integration Using Ground-Based Assets: Lessons Learned

The highly dynamic nature of UAVs imposes significant challenges when conducting initial testing ranging from safety risks posed by high-capacity lithium batteries and spinning propellers to rigorous timing demands on controllers and the consequences of failures mid-air. Flight testing of a single vehicle is time and labor intensive due to these challenges and more, and the complexity increases exponentially with the number of vehicles. While simulations and hardware-in-the-loop bench testing can provide adequate environments for preliminary validation, differences in system deployment architecture, software interfaces, and hardware infrastructure between simulation and a fleet of real UAVs create a sizable gap that must be navigated carefully during system integration. In support of the Autonomy Teaming and TRAjectories for Complex Trusted Operational Reliability (ATTRACTOR) project, which had the goal of establishing a basis of certification of trust and trustworthiness in multi-agent autonomous systems, this gap was tackled from two directions. First, a novel mixed-reality simulation environment was engineered to blur the transition from simulation to flight hardware. Second, a fleet of Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) was developed as a test and evaluation platform that more closely represented the final aerial fleet while eliminating many of the risks associated with air vehicles. This paper delves into the second element, analyzing the efficacy of the USV platform in performing system integration testing for the UAV system. In this paper we present the USV fleet and its role in reducing the aforementioned gaps in deployment architecture, software interfaces, and hardware infrastructure when moving from simulation to flight. An overview of the hardware and software onboard the vehicles will be provided along with supporting infrastructure. The system integration process will be documented including results in supporting both the overarching design reference mission (DRM) of ATTRACTOR and individual research efforts conducted during the project. Finally, we will discuss some of the practical lessons learned regarding the testing, deployment, and operation of multi-agent autonomous systems.

Matthew P Vaughan↗
NASA NTRS1997

A Comprehensive Reliability Methodology for Assessing Risk of Reusing Failed Hardware Without Corrective Actions with and Without Redundancy

This paper deals with the development of a reliability methodology to assess the consequences of using hardware, without failure analysis or corrective action, that has previously demonstrated that it did not perform per specification. The subject of this paper arose from the need to provide a detailed probabilistic analysis to calculate the change in probability of failures with respect to the base or non-failed hardware. The methodology used for the analysis is primarily based on principles of Monte Carlo simulation. The random variables in the analysis are: Maximum Time of Operation (MTO) and operation Time of each Unit (OTU) The failure of a unit is considered to happen if (OTU) is less than MTO for the Normal Operational Period (NOP) in which this unit is used. NOP as a whole uses a total of 4 units. Two cases are considered. in the first specialized scenario, the failure of any operation or system failure is considered to happen if any of the units used during the NOP fail. in the second specialized scenario, the failure of any operation or system failure is considered to happen only if any two of the units used during the MOP fail together. The probability of failure of the units and the system as a whole is determined for 3 kinds of systems - Perfect System, Imperfect System 1 and Imperfect System 2. in a Perfect System, the operation time of the failed unit is the same as that of the MTO. In an Imperfect System 1, the operation time of the failed unit is assumed as 1 percent of the MTO. In an Imperfect System 2, the operation time of the failed unit is assumed as zero. in addition, simulated operation time of failed units is assumed as 10 percent of the corresponding units before zero value. Monte Carlo simulation analysis is used for this study. Necessary software has been developed as part of this study to perform the reliability calculations. The results of the analysis showed that the predicted change in failure probability (P(sub F)) for the previously failed units is as high as 49 percent above the baseline (perfect system) for the worst case. The predicted change in system P(sub F) for the previously failed units is as high as 36% for single unit failure without any redundancy. For redundant systems, with dual unit failure, the predicted change in P(sub F) for the previously failed units is as high as 16%. These results will help management to make decisions regarding the consequences of using previously failed units without adequate failure analysis or corrective action.

Putcha, Chandra S.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

IAC Abstract for Orbital Debris Phase II Report

Orbital debris poses a growing risk for spacecraft operations. This risk has most often been measured by proxies, like the number of debris or expected collisions, but few have attempted quantify the consequences of orbital debris or the costs and benefits of different methods to address the problem. This has made it difficult to assess the trade-offs and relative value among proposed actions for the mitigation, tracking, and remediation of debris. In March of 2023, the NASA Office of Technology, Policy, and Strategy (OTPS) took a step toward quantifying these relative values when we released Cost and Benefit Analysis of Orbital Debris Remediation. Since that time, OTPS has continued to build on this work. We have increased the fidelity of our risk model. For example, we added an ensemble of risk models that use varying assumptions of debris populations and lethality, included debris as small as 1mm, and incorporated atmospheric drag to naturally deorbit debris. We have also expanded our cost-benefit calculations to include action that mitigate and track debris, both large and small. The analysis has several important findings regarding the conditions under which debris remediation is more cost-effective than mitigation and tracking, the value of increased shielding of spacecraft and faster timelines for post-mission disposal, and how changes in the portfolio have interdependent effects. This presentation summarizes the body of work, with a particular focus on the risks and benefits to the global spacecraft population.

orbital debris↗
NASA NTRS2017

Bird Strike Risk for Space Launch Vehicles

Within seconds after liftoff of the Space Shuttle during mission STS-114, a turkey vulture impacted the vehicle's external tank. The contact caused no apparent damage to the shuttle, but the incident led NASA to consider the potential consequences of bird strikes during a shuttle launch. The environment at Kennedy Space Center provides unique bird strike challenges due to the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge and the Atlantic Flyway bird migration routes. This presentation will outline an approach for estimating risk resulting from bird strikes to space launch vehicles. The migration routes, types of birds present, altitudes of those birds, exposed area of the launch vehicle, and its capability to withstand impacts all affect the risk due to bird strike. Lessons learned, challenges over lack of data, and significant risk contributors will be discussed.

Hales, Christy↗
NASA NTRS2016

Risk Considerations of Bird Strikes to Space Launch Vehicles

Within seconds after liftoff of the Space Shuttle during mission STS-114, a turkey vulture impacted the vehicle's external tank. The contact caused no apparent damage to the Shuttle, but the incident led NASA to consider the potential consequences of bird strikes during a Shuttle launch. The environment at Kennedy Space Center provides unique bird strike challenges due to the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge and the Atlantic Flyway bird migration routes. NASA is currently refining risk assessment estimates for the probability of bird strike to space launch vehicles. This paper presents an approach for analyzing the risks of bird strikes to space launch vehicles and presents an example. The migration routes, types of birds present, altitudes of those birds, exposed area of the launch vehicle, and its capability to withstand impacts affect the risk due to bird strike. A summary of significant risk contributors is discussed.

Hales, Christy↗
NASA NTRS1998

Comparative Soot Diagnostics: 1 Year Report

The motivation for the Comparative Soot Diagnostics (CSD) experiment lies in the broad practical importance of understanding combustion generated particulate. Depending upon the circumstances, particulate matter can affect the durability and performance of combustion equipment, can be a pollutant, can be used to detect fires and, in the form of soot, can be the dominant source of radiant energy from flames. Bright sooty fires are desirable for efficient energy extraction in furnaces and power equipment. In contrast, soot-enhanced radiation is undesirable in many propulsion systems (e.g. jet engines). The non-buoyant structure of most flames of practical interest (turbulent) makes understanding of soot processes in low gravity flames important to our ability to predict fire behavior on earth. These studies also have direct applications to fire safety in human-crew spacecraft, since smoke is the indicator used for automated detection in current spacecraft. In addition, recent tests conducted on MIR showed that a candle in a truly quiescent spacecraft environment can burn for tens of minutes. Consequently, this test and many earlier tests have demonstrated that fires in spacecraft can be considered a credible risk. In anticipation of this risk, NASA has included fire detectors on Skylab, smoke detectors on the Space Shuttle (STS), and smoke detectors in the design for the International Space Station (ISS). In the CSD experiment, these smoke detectors were tested using, quasi-steady, low-gravity, particulate generating materials. Samples of the particulate were also obtained from these low-gravity sources. This experiment provides the first such measurements aimed toward understanding of soot processes here on earth and for the testing and design of advanced spacecraft smoke detection systems. This paper describes the operation and preliminary results of the CSD experiment which was was conducted in the Middeck Glovebox Facility (MGBX) on USMP-3. The objectives of CSD are to examine the particulate emission from a variety of pyrolyzing and combusting sources and to quantify the performance of several particulate-sensing diagnostic techniques. This paper presents the results of the microgravity portion of the CSD experiment. The results include the temporal response of the detectors and average sizes of the primary and aggregate particles captured on the thermophoretic probes. Complete assessment of the microgravity data and its combination with the normal-gravity data are still in process.

Urban, David L.↗