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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 253 records · Page 14
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1991

A safety-based decision making architecture for autonomous systems

Engineering systems designed specifically for space applications often exhibit a high level of autonomy in the control and decision-making architecture. As the level of autonomy increases, more emphasis must be placed on assimilating the safety functions normally executed at the hardware level or by human supervisors into the control architecture of the system. The development of a decision-making structure which utilizes information on system safety is detailed. A quantitative measure of system safety, called the safety self-information, is defined. This measure is analogous to the reliability self-information defined by McInroy and Saridis, but includes weighting of task constraints to provide a measure of both reliability and cost. An example is presented in which the safety self-information is used as a decision criterion in a mobile robot controller. The safety self-information is shown to be consistent with the entropy-based Theory of Intelligent Machines defined by Saridis.

Musto, Joseph C.↗
NASA NTRS1993

NASA safety program activities in support of the Space Exploration Initiatives Nuclear Propulsion program

The activities of the joint NASA/DOE/DOD Nuclear Propulsion Program Technical Panels have been used as the basis for the current development of safety policies and requirements for the Space Exploration Initiatives (SEI) Nuclear Propulsion Technology development program. The Safety Division of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Quality has initiated efforts to develop policies for the safe use of nuclear propulsion in space through involvement in the joint agency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG), encouraged expansion of the initial policy development into proposed programmatic requirements, and suggested further expansion into the overall risk assessment and risk management process for the NASA Exploration Program. Similar efforts are underway within the Department of Energy to ensure the safe development and testing of nuclear propulsion systems on Earth. This paper describes the NASA safety policy related to requirements for the design of systems that may operate where Earth re-entry is a possibility. The expected plan of action is to support and oversee activities related to the technology development of nuclear propulsion in space, and support the overall safety and risk management program being developed for the NASA Exploration Program.

Sawyer, J. C., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1933

Engine performance with a hydrogenated safety fuel

This report presents the results of an investigation to determine the engine performance obtained with a hydrogenated safety fuel developed to eliminate fire hazard. The tests were made on a single-cylinder universal test engine at compression ratios of 5.0, 5.5, and 6.0. Most of the tests were made with a fuel-injection system, although one set of runs was made with a carburetor when using gasoline to establish comparative performance. The tests show that the b.m.e.p. obtained with safety fuel when using a fuel-injection system is slightly higher than that obtained with gasoline when using a carburetor, although the fuel consumption with safety fuel is higher. When the fuel-injection system is used with each fuel and with normal engine temperatures the b.m.e.p. with safety fuel is from 2 to 4 percent lower than with gasoline and the fuel consumption about 25 to 30 percent higher. However, a few tests at an engine coolant temperature of 250 F have shown a specific fuel consumption approximating that obtained with gasoline with only a slight reduction in power. The idling of the test engine was satisfactory with the safety fuel. Starting was difficult with a cold engine but could be readily accomplished when the jacket water was hot. It is believed that the use of the safety fuel would practically eliminate crash fires.

Schey, Oscar W↗
NASA NTRS1979

Safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle program

This publication establishes common safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle Program. NASA Centers shall use this publication both as the basis for negotiating safety, reliability, maintainability and quality requirements with Shuttle Program contractors and as the guideline for conduct of program safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities at the Centers. Centers shall assure that applicable provisions of the publication are imposed in lower tier contracts. Centers shall give due regard to other Space Shuttle Program planning in order to provide an integrated total Space Shuttle Program activity. In the implementation of safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities, consideration shall be given to hardware complexity, supplier experience, state of hardware development, unit cost, and hardware use. The approach and methods for contractor implementation shall be described in the contractors safety, reliability, maintainability and quality plans. This publication incorporates provisions of NASA documents: NHB 1700.1 'NASA Safety Manual, Vol. 1'; NHB 5300.4(IA), 'Reliability Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'; and NHB 5300.4(1B), 'Quality Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'. It has been tailored from the above documents based on experience in other programs. It is intended that this publication be reviewed and revised, as appropriate, to reflect new experience and to assure continuing viability.

M S Malkin↗
NASA NTRS1995

Software Safety Progress in NASA

NASA has developed guidelines for development and analysis of safety-critical software. These guidelines have been documented in a Guidebook for Safety Critical Software Development and Analysis. The guidelines represent a practical 'how to' approach, to assist software developers and safety analysts in cost effective methods for software safety. They provide guidance in the implementation of the recent NASA Software Safety Standard NSS-1740.13 which was released as 'Interim' version in June 1994, scheduled for formal adoption late 1995. This paper is a survey of the methods in general use, resulting in the NASA guidelines for safety critical software development and analysis.

Radley, Charles F.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Flight safety programs and enhancements for sounding rockets at Wallops Flight Facility

Sounding rocket programs are becoming larger and more complex, thus range safety personnel are required to be central to vehicle and mission design and operations planning. In response to this, the Wallops Flight Facility (VA), is upgrading range facilities, tracking systems, mobile systems and real-time safety systems. These enhancements will improve safety and reliability while augmenting mission success. Flight safety requirements and responsibilities are summarized, and the range safety's future upgrades for wind weighting, real-time analysis and displays, and the mobile safety systems for rocket programs, are considered.

Balach, Dean↗
NASA NTRS1998

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

During 1997, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) continued its safety reviews of NASA's human space flight and aeronautics programs. Efforts were focused on those areas that the Panel believed held the greatest potential to impact safety. Continuing safe Space Shuttle operations and progress in the manufacture and testing of primary components for the International Space Station (ISS) were noteworthy. The Panel has continued to monitor the safety implications of the transition of Space Shuttle operations to the United Space Alliance (USA). One area being watched closely relates to the staffing levels and skill mix in both NASA and USA. Therefore, a section of this report is devoted to personnel and other related issues that are a result of this change in NASA's way of doing business for the Space Shuttle. Attention will continue to be paid to this important topic in subsequent reports. Even though the Panel's activities for 1997 were extensive, fewer specific recommendations were formulated than has been the case in recent years. This is indicative of the current generally good state of safety of NASA programs. The Panel does, however, have several longer term concerns that have yet to develop to the level of a specific recommendation. These are covered in the introductory material for each topic area in Section 11. In another departure from past submissions, this report does not contain individual findings and recommendations for the aeronautics programs. While the Panel devoted its usual efforts to examining NASA's aeronautic centers and programs, no specific recommendations were identified for inclusion in this report. In lieu of recommendations, a summary of the Panel's observations of NASA's safety efforts in aeronautics and future Panel areas of emphasis is provided. With profound sadness the Panel notes the passing of our Chairman, Paul M. Johnstone, on December 17, 1997, and our Staff Assistant, Ms. Patricia M. Harman, on October 5, 1997. Other changes to the Panel composition during the past year were: the resignation of Mr. Dennis E. Fitch as a Consultant; the appointment of Mr. Roger D. Schaufele as a Consultant; and the assignment of Ms. Susan M. Smith as Staff Assistant.

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NASA NTRS1999

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a 5-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASAs safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are "one deep." The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting "brain drain" could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning.

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NASA NTRS2001

Interrelation Between Safety Factors and Reliability

An evaluation was performed to establish relationships between safety factors and reliability relationships. Results obtained show that the use of the safety factor is not contradictory to the employment of the probabilistic methods. In many cases the safety factors can be directly expressed by the required reliability levels. However, there is a major difference that must be emphasized: whereas the safety factors are allocated in an ad hoc manner, the probabilistic approach offers a unified mathematical framework. The establishment of the interrelation between the concepts opens an avenue to specify safety factors based on reliability. In cases where there are several forms of failure, then the allocation of safety factors should he based on having the same reliability associated with each failure mode. This immediately suggests that by the probabilistic methods the existing over-design or under-design can be eliminated. The report includes three parts: Part 1-Random Actual Stress and Deterministic Yield Stress; Part 2-Deterministic Actual Stress and Random Yield Stress; Part 3-Both Actual Stress and Yield Stress Are Random.

Elishakoff, Isaac↗
NASA NTRS2002

Range Safety Systems

The high kinetic and potential energy of a launch vehicle mandates there be a mechanism to minimize possible damage to provide adequate safety for the launch facilities, range, and, most importantly, the general public. The Range Safety System, sometimes called the Flight Termination System or Flight Safety System, provides the required level of safety. The Range Safety System section of the Avionics chapter will attempt to describe how adequate safety is provided, the system's design, operation, and it's interface with the rest of the launch vehicle.

Schrock, Kenneth W.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Software Safety Analysis of a Flight Guidance System

This document summarizes the safety analysis performed on a Flight Guidance System (FGS) requirements model. In particular, the safety properties desired of the FGS model are identified and the presence of the safety properties in the model is formally verified. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the entire project, while Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the problem domain, the nature of accidents, model based development, and the four-variable model. Chapter 3 outlines the approach. Chapter 4 presents the results of the traditional safety analysis techniques and illustrates how the hazardous conditions associated with the system trace into specific safety properties. Chapter 5 presents the results of the formal methods analysis technique model checking that was used to verify the presence of the safety properties in the requirements model. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the main conclusions of the study, first and foremost that model checking is a very effective verification technique to use on discrete models with reasonable state spaces. Additional supporting details are provided in the appendices.

Butler, Ricky W.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report presents the results of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) activities during 2002. The format of the report has been modified to capture a long-term perspective. Section II is new and highlights the Panel's view of NASA's safety progress during the year. Section III contains the pivotal safety issues facing NASA in the coming year. Section IV includes the program area findings and recommendations. The Panel has been asked by the Administrator to perform several special studies this year, and the resulting white papers appear in Appendix C. The year has been filled with significant achievements for NASA in both successful Space Shuttle operations and International Space Station (ISS) construction. Throughout the year, safety has been first and foremost in spite of many changes throughout the Agency. The relocation of the Orbiter Major Modifications (OMMs) from California to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) appears very successful. The transition of responsibilities for program management of the Space Shuttle and ISS programs from Johnson Space Center (JSC) to NASA Headquarters went smoothly. The decision to extend the life of the Space Shuttle as the primary NASA vehicle for access to space is viewed by the Panel as a prudent one. With the appropriate investments in safety improvements, in maintenance, in preserving appropriate inventories of spare parts, and in infrastructure, the Space Shuttle can provide safe and reliable support for the ISS for the foreseeable future. Indications of an aging Space Shuttle fleet occurred on more than one occasion this year. Several flaws went undetected in the early prelaunch tests and inspections. In all but one case, the problems were found prior to launch. These incidents were all handled properly and with safety as the guiding principle. Indeed, launches were postponed until the problems were fully understood and mitigating action could be taken. These incidents do, however, indicate the need to analyze the Space Shuttle certification criteria closely. Based on this analysis, NASA can determine the need to receritfy the vehicles and to incorporate more stringent inspections throughout the process to minimize launch schedule impact. A highly skilled and experience workforce will be increasingly important for safe and reliable operations as the Space Shuttle vehicles and infrastructure continue to age.

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NASA NTRS1993

Analyzing Software Requirements Errors in Safety-Critical, Embedded Systems

This paper analyzes the root causes of safety-related software errors in safety-critical, embedded systems. The results show that software errors identified as potentially hazardous to the system tend to be produced by different error mechanisms than non- safety-related software errors. Safety-related software errors are shown to arise most commonly from (1) discrepancies between the documented requirements specifications and the requirements needed for correct functioning of the system and (2) misunderstandings of the software's interface with the rest of the system. The paper uses these results to identify methods by which requirements errors can be prevented. The goal is to reduce safety-related software errors and to enhance the safety of complex, embedded systems.

Lutz, Robyn R.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Bridging the Divide between Safety and Risk Management for your Project or Program

This presentation will bridge the divide between these separate but overlapping disciplines and help explain how to use Risk Management as an effective management decision support tool that includes safety. Risk Management is an over arching communication tool used by management to prioritize and effectively mitigate potential problems before they concur. Risk Management encompasses every kind of potential problem that can occur on a program or project. Some of these are safety issues such as hazards that have a specific likelihood and consequence that need to be controlled and included to show an integrated picture of accepted) mitigated, and residual risk. Integrating safety and other assurance disciplines is paramount to accurately representing a program s or projects risk posture. Risk is made up of several components such as technical) cost, schedule, or supportability. Safety should also be a consideration for every risk. The safety component can also have an impact on the technical, cost, and schedule aspect of a given risk. The current formats used for communication of safety and risk issues are not consistent or integrated. The presentation will explore the history of these disciplines, current work to integrate them, and suggestions for integration for the future.

Lutomski, Mike↗
NASA NTRS2007

Materials Safety - Not just Flammability and Toxic Offgassing

For many years, the safety community has focused on a limited subset of materials and processes requirements as key to safety: Materials flammability, Toxic offgassing, Propellant compatibility, Oxygen compatibility, and Stress-corrosion cracking. All these items are important, but the exclusive focus on these items neglects many other items that are equally important to materials safety. Examples include (but are not limited to): 1. Materials process control -- proper qualification and execution of manufacturing processes such as structural adhesive bonding, welding, and forging are crucial to materials safety. Limitation of discussions on materials process control to an arbitrary subset of processes, known as "critical processes" is a mistake, because any process where the quality of the product cannot be verified by inspection can potentially result in unsafe hardware 2 Materials structural design allowables -- development of valid design allowables when none exist in the literature requires extensive testing of multiple lots of materials and is extremely expensive. But, without valid allowables, structural analysis cannot verify structural safety 3. Corrosion control -- All forms of corrosion, not just stress corrosion, can affect structural integrity of hardware 4. Contamination control during ground processing -- contamination control is critical to manufacturing processes such as adhesive bonding and also to elimination foreign objects and debris (FOD) that are hazardous to the crew of manned spacecraft in microgravity environments. 5. Fasteners -- Fastener design, the use of verifiable secondary locking features, and proper verification of fastener torque are essential for proper structural performance This presentation discusses some of these key factors and the importance of considering them in ensuring the safety of space hardware.

Pedley, Michael D.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Safety and Mission Assurance Knowledge Management Retention: Managing Knowledge for Successful Mission Operations

Knowledge Management is a proactive pursuit for the future success of any large organization faced with the imminent possibility that their senior managers/engineers with gained experiences and lessons learned plan to retire in the near term. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) is proactively pursuing unique mechanism to ensure knowledge learned is retained and lessons learned captured and documented. Knowledge Capture Event/Activities/Management helps to provide a gateway between future retirees and our next generation of managers/engineers. S&MA hosted two Knowledge Capture Events during 2005 featuring three of its retiring fellows (Axel Larsen, Dave Whittle and Gary Johnson). The first Knowledge Capture Event February 24, 2005 focused on two Safety and Mission Assurance Safety Panels (Space Shuttle System Safety Review Panel (SSRP); Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) and the latter event December 15, 2005 featured lessons learned during Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle which could be applicable in the newly created Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)/Constellation development program. Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and the Space Shuttle promised and delivered exciting human advances in space and benefits of space in people s everyday lives on earth. Johnson Space Center's Safety & Mission Assurance team work over the last 20 years has been mostly focused on operations we are now beginning the Exploration development program. S&MA will promote an atmosphere of knowledge sharing in its formal and informal cultures and work processes, and reward the open dissemination and sharing of information; we are asking "Why embrace relearning the "lessons learned" in the past?" On the Exploration program the focus will be on Design, Development, Test, & Evaluation (DDT&E); therefore, it is critical to understand the lessons from these past programs during the DDT&E phase.

Johnson, Teresa A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Quo Vadis Payload Safety?

As we complete the preparations for the fourth Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing mission, we note an anniversary approaching: it was 30 years ago in July that the first HST payload safety review panel meeting was held. This, in turn, was just over a year after the very first payload safety review, a Phase 0 review for the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and its Inertial Upper Stage, held in June of 1977. In adapting a process that had been used in the review and certification of earlier Skylab payloads, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) engineers sought to preserve the lessons learned in the development of technical payload safety requirements, while creating a new process that would serve the very different needs of the new space shuttle program. Their success in this undertaking is substantiated by the fact that this process and these requirements have proven to be remarkably robust, flexible, and adaptable. Furthermore, the payload safety process has, to date, served us well in the critical mission of safeguarding our astronauts, cosmonauts, and spaceflight participants. Both the technical requirements and their interpretation, as well as the associated process requirements have grown, evolved, been streamlined, and have been adapted to fit multiple programs, including the International Space Station (ISS) program, the Shuttle/Mir program, and most recently the United States Constellation program. From its earliest days, it was anticipated that the payload safety process would be international in scope, and so it has been. European Space Agency (ESA), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), German Space Agency (DLR), Canadian Space Agency (CSA), Russian Space Agency (RSA), and many additional countries have flown payloads on both the space shuttle and on the ISS. Our close cooperation and long-term working relationships have culminated in the franchising of the payload safety review process itself to our partners in ESA, which in turn will serve as a roadmap for extending the franchise to other Partners.

Fodroci, Michael P.↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Role and Quality of Software Safety in the NASA Constellation Program

In this study, we examine software safety risk in the early design phase of the NASA Constellation spaceflight program. Obtaining an accurate, program-wide picture of software safety risk is difficult across multiple, independently-developing systems. We leverage one source of safety information, hazard analysis, to provide NASA quality assurance managers with information regarding the ongoing state of software safety across the program. The goal of this research is two-fold: 1) to quantify the relative importance of software with respect to system safety; and 2) to quantify the level of risk presented by software in the hazard analysis. We examined 154 hazard reports created during the preliminary design phase of three major flight hardware systems within the Constellation program. To quantify the importance of software, we collected metrics based on the number of software-related causes and controls of hazardous conditions. To quantify the level of risk presented by software, we created a metric scheme to measure the specificity of these software causes. We found that from 49-70% of hazardous conditions in the three systems could be caused by software or software was involved in the prevention of the hazardous condition. We also found that 12-17% of the 2013 hazard causes involved software, and that 23-29% of all causes had a software control. Furthermore, 10-12% of all controls were software-based. There is potential for inaccuracy in these counts, however, as software causes are not consistently scoped, and the presence of software in a cause or control is not always clear. The application of our software specificity metrics also identified risks in the hazard reporting process. In particular, we found a number of traceability risks in the hazard reports may impede verification of software and system safety.

Layman, Lucas↗