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At least 253 records · Page 14

Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227

The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Suggestion of a Framework to Evaluate the Extent of Cyber Security Enhancements in NPP

Digital I and C systems have been developed and installed in nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, due to installation of digital I and C systems, cyber security concerns have been emerged. One of the major problems is that nuclear industry is in very early stage in dealing with cyber security issues. It is because that cyber security has received less attention compared to other safety problems. In addition, late adoption of digital I and C systems has resulted in lower level of cyber security advancements in nuclear industry than ones in other industries. With this regards, recently, international standard organizations, regulatory institutes, and research institutes have performed a number of studies addressing these cyber security issues in nuclear industries. In order to provide useful information about cyber security issues including cyber security enhancements, this paper suggests a framework to evaluate how much cyber security is improved when a specific cyber security enhancement is applied in NPPs. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

IT Security Support for Spaceport Command and Control System

During the fall 2013 semester, I worked at the Kennedy Space Center as an IT Security Intern in support of the Spaceport Command and Control System under the guidance of the IT Security Lead Engineer. Some of my responsibilities included assisting with security plan documentation collection, system hardware and software inventory, and malicious code and malware scanning. Throughout the semester, I had the opportunity to work on a wide range of security related projects. However, there are three projects in particular that stand out. The first project I completed was updating a large interactive spreadsheet that details the SANS Institutes Top 20 Critical Security Controls. My task was to add in all of the new commercial of the shelf (COTS) software listed on the SANS website that can be used to meet their Top 20 controls. In total, there are 153 unique security tools listed by SANS that meet one or more of their 20 controls. My second project was the creation of a database that will allow my mentor to keep track of the work done by the contractors that report to him in a more efficient manner by recording events as they occur throughout the quarter. Lastly, I expanded upon a security assessment of the Linux machines being used on center that I began last semester. To do this, I used a vulnerability and configuration tool that scans hosts remotely through the network and presents the user with an abundance of information detailing each machines configuration. The experience I gained from working on each of these projects has been invaluable, and I look forward to returning in the spring semester to continue working with the IT Security team.

computer security↗

Re-designing the PhEDEx Security Model

PhEDEx, the data-placement tool used by the CMS experiment at the LHC, was conceived in a more trusting time. The security model provided a safe environment for site agents and operators, but offerred little more protection than that. Data was not sufficiently protected against loss caused by operator error or software bugs or by deliberate manipulation of the database. Operators were given high levels of access to the database, beyond what was actually needed to accomplish their tasks. This exposed them to the risk of suspicion should an incident occur. Multiple implementations of the security model led to difficulties maintaining code, which can lead to degredation of security over time. In order to meet the simultaneous goals of protecting CMS data, protecting the operators from undue exposure to risk, increasing monitoring capabilities and improving maintainability of the security model, the PhEDEx security model was redesigned and re-implemented. Security was moved from the application layer into the database itself, fine-grained access roles were established, and tools and procedures created to control the evolution of the security model over time. In this paper we describe this work, we describe the deployment of the new security model, and we show how these enhancements improve security on several fronts simultaneously.

Huang, C.-H.↗

Plant security during decommissioning; challenges and lessons learned from German phase out decision

Purpose of this paper is to point out the security challenges that may occur during the decommissioning, based on the issues and lessons learned from the German phase out decision. Though national regulations may be different in other countries the basic problems and issues will be the same. Therefore presented solutions will be applicable in other countries as well. The radioactive material remaining at the NPP during decommissioning has the most influence on how the security measures have to be designed. The radioactive material defines the risk potential of the plant and this determines the needed security level. The following aspects have been challenging in Germany: - Scenarios varying from those, used for plants in operation, due to changed operating conditions - Spent fuel will stay in the spent fuel pool for a quite long period before it can be removed from the plant. Risk potential of the plant stays high and requires a high level of security measures - Security measures according to the existing operating license have to stay in place as they are, unless the first license for decommissioning is given respective the spent fuel is removed from the plant site. This even led to the question if improvements of security measures, planned and announced with focus on a plant remaining in operation for another couple of years, need to be done although they will not be required after removing the spent fuel from the plant. A further important aspect for the security design is the fact that a plant under decommissioning has completely different and strongly varying operating procedures, compared to the stable ones of an operating plant. This leads to different needs concerning workspace, infrastructure on plant site, access to buildings etc. An optimized and highly flexible security concept is needed to ensure an adequate level of security as well as an efficient decommissioning. A deep analysis of the vital plant functions, depending on the different decommissioning stages, is required to determine the vital equipment, its location and its need for protection. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Leverage demand-side policies for energy security

Energy security is a top priority for governments, companies, and households because energy systems and the critical functions that they support are threatened by disruptions from wars, pandemics, climate change, and other shocks (1). More often than not, governments rely on policies focused on energy supply to enhance energy security while generally ignoring demand-side possibilities. Further, the indicators traditionally used to measure energy security are also tilted toward the supply side; this fails to capture the full spectrum of vulnerability to energy crises. Energy security assessments need to reflect the wider benefits of security related interventions more accurately. To that end, we develop a systematic approach to measuring the energy security impacts of policy interventions that explicitly considers energy demand (buildings, transport, and industry). Here, we determine that demand-side actions outperform conventional supply-side approaches at making countries more resilient. Energy demand links more directly than supply to the satisfaction of critical social functions and human well-being that are at the core of energy security. Yet, demand-side perspectives tend to be neglected or underrepresented in analysis and policy debates on energy security. Factors that contribute to this supply-side bias include the traditional sectoral organization of industries and policy institutions along fuels (coal, oil, and gas) and energy forms (electric utilities) as well as the decentralized and multivaried activities characteristic of energy demand (from vehicles to household appliances to manufacturing and more), which leads to a multitude of actors and institutional fragmentation. The basic fundamentals of energy systems and markets, where demand and supply are intricately linked, have also not yet risen from vague awareness to a central organizing principle among policy-makers for structuring the energy security discourse.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Cyber Security Primer for DER Vendors Aggregators and Grid Operators

This report provides an introduction to cyber security for distributed energy resources (DER) - such as photovoltaic (PV) inverters and energy storage systems (ESS). This material is motivated by the need to assist DER vendors, aggregators, grid operators, and broader PV industry with cyber security resilience and describe the state-of-the-art for securing DER communications. The report outlines basic principles of cyber security, encryption, communication protocols, DER cyber security recommendations and requirements, and device-, aggregator-, and utility-level security best practices to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Example cyber security attacks, including eavesdropping, masquerading, man-in-the-middle, replay attacks, and denial-of-service are also described. A survey of communication protocols and cyber security recommendations used by the DER and power system industry are included to elucidate the cyber security standards landscape. Lastly, a roadmap is presented to harden end-to-end communications for DER with research and industry engagement.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Empirical Analysis and Automated Classification of Security Bug Reports

With the ever expanding amount of sensitive data being placed into computer systems, the need for effective cybersecurity is of utmost importance. However, there is a shortage of detailed empirical studies of security vulnerabilities from which cybersecurity metrics and best practices could be determined. This thesis has two main research goals: (1) to explore the distribution and characteristics of security vulnerabilities based on the information provided in bug tracking systems and (2) to develop data analytics approaches for automatic classification of bug reports as security or non-security related. This work is based on using three NASA datasets as case studies. The empirical analysis showed that the majority of software vulnerabilities belong only to a small number of types. Addressing these types of vulnerabilities will consequently lead to cost efficient improvement of software security. Since this analysis requires labeling of each bug report in the bug tracking system, we explored using machine learning to automate the classification of each bug report as a security or non-security related (two-class classification), as well as each security related bug report as specific security type (multiclass classification). In addition to using supervised machine learning algorithms, a novel unsupervised machine learning approach is proposed. An ac- curacy of 92%, recall of 96%, precision of 92%, probability of false alarm of 4%, F-Score of 81% and G-Score of 90% were the best results achieved during two-class classification. Furthermore, an accuracy of 80%, recall of 80%, precision of 94%, and F-score of 85% were the best results achieved during multiclass classification.

Cybersecurity↗

Perspectives on Regulatory Design and Development for Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with the State but the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes that a cornerstone in the development of a nuclear security regime is the development of regulations that address security of nuclear material and other radioactive material in transport. While the IAEA provides recommendations and guidance for security of materials in transport through Nuclear Security Series (NSS) documents, the challenge of integrating those recommendations into a Member State’s national legal framework is significant. Specifically, the development of transport security regulations requires coordination between both legal and technical experts within the country’s competent authority and multiple governmental agencies, as well as input from transport operators and other stakeholders. In addition to these interactions, the regulations must reflect the legal traditions of the Member State to fit within its overall national legal framework. Recognizing the challenge, the IAEA has requested input from international legal and technical experts to develop a methodology for drafting regulations on transport security of nuclear material and other radioactive material. This paper discusses the progress made so far in developing the methodology and provides a perspective on the need for transport security regulations and the challenges associated with their development. Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to introduce the IAEA-proposed methodology and to facilitate the discussion of this methodology with Member States that need support in developing their transport security regulations.

Ladsous, David↗

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION FOR TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO PREVENT HIJACKING, THEFT, SABOTAGE, AND MALICIOUS SECURITY EVENTS DURING TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL

The secure transportation of high-consequence materials, including nuclear and radiological assets, is a critical global priority in the face of escalating terrorism, security threats, and violent protests targeting these operations. Effective surveillance detection—the ability to identify, assess, and respond to potential threats across a continuum of scenarios—is paramount in addressing these challenges. This paper outlines a phased, multi-tiered training program designed to strengthen the surveillance detection capabilities of organizations responsible for nuclear material transport. The proposed training program adopts a progressive approach, gradually increasing in technical complexity to provide participants with comprehensive knowledge and tools for implementing robust security strategies. It targets a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including competent authorities, regulators, inspectors, shippers, carriers, law enforcement, and emergency response personnel, equipping them to plan, evaluate, and safeguard nuclear material transportation effectively. Each phase of the program emphasizes distinct elements of the surveillance detection continuum and transport security, focusing on critical topics such as threat identification, adversary task timelines, protective methodologies, and attack mitigation strategies. The training framework is anchored in technical exchanges and scenario-driven courses that reflect real-world complexities and challenges. By addressing the surveillance detection continuum comprehensively—from early threat assessment to active countermeasures—the program reinforces global efforts to secure nuclear assets. It aligns with international security objectives and fosters a strong security culture within participating organizations, ensuring personnel are prepared to counter potential threats and maintain the safe, secure movement of these materials. Ultimately, this initiative aims to enhance preparedness, security, and response capabilities, supporting the global mission to safeguard high-consequence materials against evolving threats.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Implementing an Information Security Program

The threats to information security have dramatically increased with the proliferation of information systems and the internet. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNe) facilities need to address these threats in order to protect themselves from the loss of intellectual property, theft of valuable or hazardous materials, and sabotage. Project 19 of the European Union CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative is designed to help CBRN security managers, information technology/cybersecurity managers, and other decision-makers deal with these threats through the application of cost-effective information security programs. Project 19 has developed three guidance documents that are publically available to cover information security best practices, planning for an information security management system, and implementing security controls for information security.

blended attack↗

Security and Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems

As you have seen from the previous chapters, cyber-physical systems (CPS) are broadly used across technology and industrial domains. While these systems enable process optimization and efficiency and allow previously impossible functionality, security and privacy are key concerns for their design, development, and operation. CPS have been key components utilized in some of the highest publicized security breaches over the last decade. In this chapter, we will look over the CPS described in the previous chapters from a security perspective. In this chapter, we explain classical information and physical security fundamentals in the context of CPS and contextualize them across application domains. We give examples where the interplay of functionality and diverse communication can introduce unexpected vulnerabilities and produce larger impacts. We will discuss how CPS security and privacy is inherently different from that of pure cyber or physical systems and what may be done to secure these systems, considering their emergent cyber-physical properties. Finally, we will discuss security and privacy implications of merging infrastructural and personal CPS. Our hope is to impart the knowledge of what CPS security and privacy are, why they are important, and explain existing processes and challenges.

Cyber-physical systems↗

The research challenges in security and safeguards for nuclear fission batteries

This paper discusses the nuclear security and safeguards research challenges presented by the development and deployment of nuclear fission batteries. These are defined as easily transportable and deployable nuclear systems which are designed to operate either unattended or autonomously. We start by defining the current landscape of domestic and international safeguards and security and discuss how it can be affected by the introduction these new nuclear systems. We then specifically discuss the technology gaps and technologies to be developed to facilitate their practical deployment. We find that, as expected, we can leverage conclusions from existing security and safeguards studies for small modular rectors and develop bespoke target set analyses to inform security postures based on probabilistic risk assessment. We find also that specific fission battery security economic analysis tools are needed and security by design must be applied early. However, the most important finding is that these new systems will require a new comprehensive set of cyber tools covering transportation, installation, operation, maintenance security of the fission battery systems. Altogether, we find that the development of the necessary security and safeguards requirements at the design phase of such a technology will be of great benefit in the smooth deployment of this modern nuclear energy system.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Situated Usability Testing for Security Systems

While usability testing is well established, assessing the usability of security software, tools, or methods deserves more careful consideration. It has been argued that dealing with security has become too difficult for individuals or organizations to manage effectively or to use conveniently. As difficult as it is for system administrators and developers to deal with, security is even more challenging for casual users. Indeed, it is much too easy for casual/home users to configure the security of their systems in non-optimal ways that leave their systems inadvertently insecure. This is exacerbated by the fact that casual users are focused on matters other than security, and likely would prefer not even to think about security. This brief report argues that when security and/or privacy are part of the equation, traditional methods for usability testing should be re-considered. The purpose of this brief report is to argue for and outline a method associated with a new approach to usability testing for examining usable security issues.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber security evaluation of II&C technologies

The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is a research and development program sponsored by the Department of Energy, which is conducted in close collaboration with industry to provide the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe and economical operation of current nuclear power plants The LWRS Program serves to help the US nuclear industry adopt new technologies and engineering solutions that facilitate the continued safe operation of the plants and extension of the current operating licenses. Within the LWRS Program, the Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control (II&C) Systems Technologies Pathway conducts targeted research and development (R&D) to address aging and reliability concerns with the legacy instrumentation and control and related information systems of the U.S. operating light water reactor (LWR) fleet. The II&C Pathway is conducted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Cyber security is a common concern among nuclear utilities and other nuclear industry stakeholders regarding the digital technologies that are being developed under this program. This concern extends to the point of calling into question whether these types of technologies could ever be deployed in nuclear plants given the possibility that the information in them can be compromised and the technologies themselves can potentially be exploited to serve as attack vectors for adversaries. To this end, a cyber security evaluation has been conducted of these technologies to determine whether they constitute a threat beyond what the nuclear plants already manage within their regulatory-required cyber security programs. Specifically, the evaluation is based on NEI 08-09, which is the industry’s template for cyber security programs and evaluations, accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as responsive to the requirements of the nuclear power plant cyber security regulation found in 10 CFR 73.54. The evaluation was conducted by a cyber security team with expertise in nuclear utility cyber security programs and experience in conducting these evaluations. The evaluation has determined that, for the most part, cyber security will not be a limiting factor in the application of these technologies to nuclear power plant applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Measuring Global Water Security Towards Sustainable Development Goals

Water plays an important role in underpinning equitable, stable and productive societies and ecosystems. Hence, United Nations recognized ensuring water security as one (Goal 6) of the seventeen sustainable development goals (SDGs). Many international river basins are likely to experience 'low water security' over the coming decades. Water security is rooted not only in the physical availability of freshwater resources relative to water demand, but also on social and economic factors (e.g. sound water planning and management approaches, institutional capacity to provide water services, sustainable economic policies). Until recently, advanced tools and methods are available for the assessment of water scarcity. However, quantitative and integrated-physical and socio-economic-approaches for spatial analysis of water security at global level are not available yet. In this study, we present a spatial multi-criteria analysis framework to provide a global assessment of water security. The selected indicators are based on Goal 6 of SDGs. The term 'security' is conceptualized as a function of 'availability', 'accessibility to services', 'safety and quality', and 'management'. The proposed global water security index (GWSI) is calculated by aggregating indicator values on a pixel-by-pixel basis, using the ordered weighted average method, which allows for the exploration of the sensitivity of final maps to different attitudes of hypothetical policy makers. Our assessment suggests that countries of Africa, South Asia and Middle East experience very low water security. Other areas of high water scarcity, such as some parts of United States, Australia and Southern Europe, show better GWSI values, due to good performance of management, safety and quality, and accessibility. The GWSI maps show the areas of the world in which integrated strategies are needed to achieve water related targets of the SDGs particularly in the African and Asian continents.

sustainable-development goals↗

Validating Cyber Security Requirements: A Case Study

Vulnerabilities in a system may have widely varying impacts on system security. In practice, security should not be defined as the absence of vulnerabilities. In practice, security should not be quantified by the number of vulnerabilities. Security should be managed by pursuing a policy that leads us first to the highest impact vulnerabilities. In light of these observations, we argue in favor of shifting our focus from vulnerability avoidance/removal to measurable security attributes. To this effect, we recommend a logic be used for system security, which captures/represents security properties in quantifiable, verifiable, measurable terms so that it is possible to reason about security in terms of its observable/perceptible effects rather than its hypothesized causes. This approach is orthogonal to existing techniques for vulnerability avoidance, removal, detection, and recovery, in the sense that it provides a means to assess, quantify, and combine these techniques.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Risk-informed Physical Security Using Dynamic Force-on-Force Modelling Tools (ABSTRACT)

Physical security requirement of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the US is regulated in a mainly prescriptive manner. This “one size fits all” approach may consequently overlook plant-specific characteristics which are beneficial for the inherent safety and security of the plant. Although a performance-based security measure has been promulgated in 10 CFR 73.55(r), current evaluation methods generally emphasize static and conservative assumptions on physical security uncertainties. This conservatism contributes to the overall operational and maintenance costs, which account to 70% of total operating expenditures for an NPP. This paper describes an ongoing work at the Idaho National Laboratory within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway, which aims to optimize physical protection system with regards to system effectiveness and dollar costs. To achieve this goal, a risk-informed approach to physical security is proposed. This approach leverages the Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool to model facility infiltration and Force-on-Force (FoF) engagement in a dynamic manner. The dynamic FoF analysis was conducted by coupling human performance uncertainties modeled in EMRALD to existing commercial 3-dimensional FoF software, i.e. SCRIBE3D, AVERT and Simajin. Meanwhile, risk analysis was accomplished by coupling the attack outcomes to existing plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model with FLEX strategy. This approach reduces the conservatisms in security modeling and further acknowledges the possibility for plant operators to mitigate the attack outcomes. A sabotage attack on a hypothetical NPP facility was devised to demonstrate the proposed methodology. Dynamic FoF rules were implemented in EMRALD coupled to SCRIBE3D. This dynamic evaluation revealed an additional 21% system effectiveness in protecting the target set relative to the static modelling approach. Furthermore, the conditional core damage probability could be reduced by up to 46% by crediting operator actions in mitigating the sabotage outcomes. We evaluated the relative importance of each component of the physical security posture included in the model and assessed tradeoffs between components to identify potential opportunities for cost reduction while maintaining a specific level of system effectiveness. Results of the cost analysis will be presented in the conference. This study is expected to help NPP operators in allocating resources optimally to satisfy the security requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗