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Developing interpretable models with optimized set reduction for identifying high risk software components

Applying equal testing and verification effort to all parts of a software system is not very efficient, especially when resources are limited and scheduling is tight. Therefore, one needs to be able to differentiate low/high fault frequency components so that testing/verification effort can be concentrated where needed. Such a strategy is expected to detect more faults and thus improve the resulting reliability of the overall system. This paper presents the Optimized Set Reduction approach for constructing such models, intended to fulfill specific software engineering needs. Our approach to classification is to measure the software system and build multivariate stochastic models for predicting high risk system components. We present experimental results obtained by classifying Ada components into two classes: is or is not likely to generate faults during system and acceptance test. Also, we evaluate the accuracy of the model and the insights it provides into the error making process.

Briand, Lionel C.↗

NASA Operational Simulator for Small Satellites (NOS3)

The Simulation-to-Flight 1 (STF-1) CubeSat mission aims to demonstrate how legacy simulation technologies may be adapted for flexible and effective use on missions using the CubeSat platform. These technologies, named NASA Operational Simulator (NOS), have demonstrated significant value on several missions such as James Webb Space Telescope, Global Precipitation Measurement, Juno, and Deep Space Climate Observatory in the areas of software development, mission operationstraining, verification and validation (VV), test procedure development and software systems check-out. STF-1 will demonstrate a highly portable simulation and test platform that allows seamless transition of mission development artifacts to flight products. This environment will decrease development time of future CubeSat missions by lessening the dependency on hardware resources. In addition, through a partnership between NASA GSFC, the West Virginia Space Grant Consortium and West Virginia University, the STF-1 CubeSat will hosts payloads for three secondary objectives that aim to advance engineering and physical-science research in the areas of navigation systems of small satellites, provide useful data for understanding magnetosphere-ionosphere coupling and space weather, and verify the performance and durability of III-V Nitride-based materials.

modeling simulation↗

Verification and validation of rulebased systems for Hubble Space Telescope ground support

As rulebase systems become more widely used in operational environments, the focus is on the problems and concerns of maintaining expert systems. In the conventional software model, the verification and validation of a system have two separate and distinct meanings. To validate a system means to demonstrate that the system does what is advertised. The verification process refers to investigating the actual code to identify inconsistencies and redundancies within the logic path. In current literature regarding maintaining rulebased systems, little distinction is made between these two terms. In fact, often the two terms are used interchangeably. Verification and validation of rulebased systems are discussed as separate but equally important aspects of the maintenance phase. Also described are some of the tools and methods that were developed at the Space Telescope Science Institute to aid in the maintenance of the rulebased system.

Vick, Shon↗

Apollo experience report: Guidance and control systems. Engineering simulation program

The Apollo Program experience from early 1962 to July 1969 with respect to the engineering-simulation support and the problems encountered is summarized in this report. Engineering simulation in support of the Apollo guidance and control system is discussed in terms of design analysis and verification, certification of hardware in closed-loop operation, verification of hardware/software compatibility, and verification of both software and procedures for each mission. The magnitude, time, and cost of the engineering simulations are described with respect to hardware availability, NASA and contractor facilities (for verification of the command module, the lunar module, and the primary guidance, navigation, and control system), and scheduling and planning considerations. Recommendations are made regarding implementation of similar, large-scale simulations for future programs.

Gilbert, D. W.↗

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗

PHM for Ground Support Systems Case Study: From Requirements to Integration

This session will detail the experience of members of the NASA Ames Prognostic Center of Excellence (PCoE) producing PHM tools for NASA Advanced Ground Support Systems, including the challenges in applying their research in a production environment. Specifically, we will 1) go over the systems engineering and review process used; 2) Discuss the challenges and pitfalls in this process; 3) discuss software architecting, documentation, verification and validation activities and 4) discuss challenges in communicating the benefits and limitations of PHM Technologies.

Prognostics↗

Reducing software security risk through an integrated approach research initiative model based verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Protocol

This document discusses the verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) communication protocol as a demonstration of the Model Based Verification (MBV) portion of the verification instrument set being developed under the Reducing Software Security Risk (RSSR) Trough an Integrated Approach research initiative. Code Q of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) funds this project. The NASA Goddard Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) facility manages this research program at the NASA agency level and the Assurance Technology Program Office (ATPO) manages the research locally at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (California institute of Technology) where the research is being carried out.

software security↗

Proceedings of the First NASA Formal Methods Symposium

Topics covered include: Model Checking - My 27-Year Quest to Overcome the State Explosion Problem; Applying Formal Methods to NASA Projects: Transition from Research to Practice; TLA+: Whence, Wherefore, and Whither; Formal Methods Applications in Air Transportation; Theorem Proving in Intel Hardware Design; Building a Formal Model of a Human-Interactive System: Insights into the Integration of Formal Methods and Human Factors Engineering; Model Checking for Autonomic Systems Specified with ASSL; A Game-Theoretic Approach to Branching Time Abstract-Check-Refine Process; Software Model Checking Without Source Code; Generalized Abstract Symbolic Summaries; A Comparative Study of Randomized Constraint Solvers for Random-Symbolic Testing; Component-Oriented Behavior Extraction for Autonomic System Design; Automated Verification of Design Patterns with LePUS3; A Module Language for Typing by Contracts; From Goal-Oriented Requirements to Event-B Specifications; Introduction of Virtualization Technology to Multi-Process Model Checking; Comparing Techniques for Certified Static Analysis; Towards a Framework for Generating Tests to Satisfy Complex Code Coverage in Java Pathfinder; jFuzz: A Concolic Whitebox Fuzzer for Java; Machine-Checkable Timed CSP; Stochastic Formal Correctness of Numerical Algorithms; Deductive Verification of Cryptographic Software; Coloured Petri Net Refinement Specification and Correctness Proof with Coq; Modeling Guidelines for Code Generation in the Railway Signaling Context; Tactical Synthesis Of Efficient Global Search Algorithms; Towards Co-Engineering Communicating Autonomous Cyber-Physical Systems; and Formal Methods for Automated Diagnosis of Autosub 6000.

Denney, Ewen↗

Hardware Verification and Validation for a Navigation Sensor Software Model in Support of Flight Vehicle Performance Analysis

… or, “It’s in the details, how to make complicated software perform like complicated hardware.” In attempts to minimize development time and quickly build an operational vehicle, NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) has had to be intentional about integrated testing. Constraints on budget and schedule have required balance between testing needs and the desire for an integrated flight vehicle as soon as possible. To provide key insights early in design and analysis cycles, a large amount of effort has shifted into maturing and validating models at the component level with integrated testing as a means to validate their integration. In terms of SLS Navigation, this, and the model-based design approach have pushed explicit requirements for sensor models to be validated against flight hardware to high precision. This paper covers the approach taken to verify and validate the models for the two key navigation sensors on the SLS vehicle, the Redundant Inertial Navigation Sensor and the Rate Gyro Assembly. These models are used in performance evaluation, fault detection, and operations development extensively. Using a mix of data from hardware vendor documentation and testing reports, limited in-house testing, and integration activities, these models were able to be validated against flight hardware at multiple levels, from the internal software design to statistical behavior at the raw sensor and integrated box levels. The high level of insight into the hardware elements is instrumental to support flight certification activities and building confidence in SLS Navigation capability. Focused testing enabled additional insight and validation that proved invaluable and the resulting insights were used to focus and mature models. Additionally, of having validated performance-based hardware models enables a wide breadth of activities including detailed fault detection studies and integration into future vehicle frameworks, such as an upper stage and provide a valuable asset to continued SLS analysis and design.

Evan J Anzalone↗

Hardware Verification and Validation for a Navigation Sensor Software Model in Support of Flight Vehicle Performance Analysis

… or, “It’s in the details, how to make complicated software perform like complicated hardware.” In attempts to minimize development time and quickly build an operational vehicle, NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) has had to be intentional about integrated testing. Constraints on budget and schedule have required balance between testing needs and the desire for an integrated flight vehicle as soon as possible. To provide key insights early in design and analysis cycles, a large amount of effort has shifted into maturing and validating models at the component level with integrated testing as a means to validate their integration. In terms of SLS Navigation, this, and the model-based design approach have pushed explicit requirements for sensor models to be validated against flight hardware to high precision. This paper covers the approach taken to verify and validate the models for the two key navigation sensors on the SLS vehicle, the Redundant Inertial Navigation Sensor and the Rate Gyro Assembly. These models are used in performance evaluation, fault detection, and operations development extensively. Using a mix of data from hardware vendor documentation and testing reports, limited in-house testing, and integration activities, these models were able to be validated against flight hardware at multiple levels, from the internal software design to statistical behavior at the raw sensor and integrated box levels. The high level of insight into the hardware elements is instrumental to support flight certification activities and building confidence in SLS Navigation capability. Focused testing enabled additional insight and validation that proved invaluable and the resulting insights were used to focus and mature models. Additionally, of having validated performance-based hardware models enables a wide breadth of activities including detailed fault detection studies and integration into future vehicle frameworks, such as an upper stage and provide a valuable asset to continued SLS analysis and design.

Thomas Park↗

Jet Noise Reduction

The Acoustics Branch is responsible for reducing noise levels for jet and fan components on aircraft engines. To do this, data must be measured and calibrated accurately to ensure validity of test results. This noise reduction is accomplished by modifications to hardware such as jet nozzles, and by the use of other experimental hardware such as fluidic chevrons, elliptic cores, and fluidic shields. To insure validity of data calibration, a variety of software is used. This software adjusts the sound amplitude and frequency to be consistent with data taken on another day. Both the software and the hardware help make noise reduction possible. work properly. These software programs were designed to make corrections for atmosphere, shear, attenuation, electronic, and background noise. All data can be converted to a one-foot lossless condition, using the proper software corrections, making a reading independent of weather and distance. Also, data can be transformed from model scale to full scale for noise predictions of a real flight. Other programs included calculations of Over All Sound Pressure Level (OASPL), Effective Perceived Noise Level (EPNL). OASPL is the integration of sound with respect to frequency, and EPNL is weighted for a human s response to different sound frequencies and integrated with respect to time. With the proper software correction, data taken in the NATR are useful in determining ways to reduce noise. display any difference between two or more data files. Using this program and graphs of the data, the actual and predicted data can be compared. This software was tested on data collected at the Aero Acoustic Propulsion Laboratory (AAPL) using a variety of window types and overlaps. Similarly, short scripts were written to test each individual program in the software suite for verification. Each graph displays both the original points and the adjusted points connected with lines. During this summer, data points were taken during a live experiment at the AAPL to measure Nozzle Acoustic Test Rig (NATR) background noise levels. Six condenser microphones were placed in strategic locations around the dome and the inlet tunnel to measure different noise sources. From the control room the jet was monitored with the help of video cameras and other sensors. The data points were recorded, reduced, and plotted, and will be used to plan future modifications to the NATR. The primary goal to create data reduction test programs and provide verification was completed. As a result of the internship, I learned C/C++, UNIX/LINUX, Excel, and acoustic data processing methods. I also recorded data at the AAPL, then processed and plotted it. These data would be useful to compare against existing data. In addition, I adjusted software to work on the Mac OSX platform. And I used the available training resources.

Kenny, Patrick↗

Agile Approach to Assuring the Safety-Critical Embedded Software for NASA's Orion Spacecraft

Human-rated missions like NASA's Exploration Mission - 1 (EM-1) and the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software's contribution to achieving mission objectives. The increasing complexity and inherent safety critical nature of the embedded flight software imposes a unique resource challenge to assurance providers responsible for affirming that the mission is going to fly safely. Another challenge NASA and other Government agencies are facing is that more and more software is being developed using an agile development methodology, which is divergent from the typical waterfall, iterative, and incremental development methodologies assurance providers generally observe in the development of safety-critical embedded software. Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) has addressed these challenges by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V evaluated areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the agile software development life cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer thereby imposing increased rework costs. As a result of evolving the approach to adding assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance conclusions and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This paper and presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and stimulate thinking for groups looking to add assurance to software being developed using an agile methodology.

Justin Smith↗

Man-rated flight software for the F-8 DFBW program

The design, implementation, and verification of the flight control software used in the F-8 DFBW program are discussed. Since the DFBW utilizes an Apollo computer and hardware, the procedures, controls, and basic management techniques employed are based on those developed for the Apollo software system. Program assembly control, simulator configuration control, erasable-memory load generation, change procedures and anomaly reporting are discussed. The primary verification tools are described, as well as the program test plans and their implementation on the various simulators. Failure effects analysis and the creation of special failure generating software for testing purposes are described.

Bairnsfather, R. R.↗

Rendezvous Integration Complexities of NASA Human Flight Vehicles

Propellant-optimal trajectories, relative sensors and navigation, and docking/capture mechanisms are rendezvous disciplines that receive much attention in the technical literature. However, other areas must be considered. These include absolute navigation, maneuver targeting, attitude control, power generation, software development and verification, redundancy management, thermal control, avionics integration, robotics, communications, lighting, human factors, crew timeline, procedure development, orbital debris risk mitigation, structures, plume impingement, logistics, and in some cases extravehicular activity. While current and future spaceflight programs will introduce new technologies and operations concepts, the complexity of integrating multiple systems on multiple spacecraft will remain. The systems integration task may become more difficult as increasingly complex software is used to meet current and future automation, autonomy, and robotic operation requirements.

Brazzel, Jack P.↗

IV and V Issues in Achieving High Reliability and Safety in Critical Control System Software

Risk analysis and integrated verification and validation are two important elements in a plan for ensuring the safety of critical software systems. We describe an approach we are currently developing for integrating risk analysis, and metrics analysis, and propose a fault predictor that would integrate the results of these activities. Practical difficulties associated with our approach are also discussed, as are limitations of the proposed predictor. We conclude with a discussion of what as been learned to date, and with suggestions for future work.

validation software reliability software risk asse↗

Man-rated flight software for the F-8 DFBW program

The design, implementation, and verification of the flight control software used in the F-8 DFBW program are discussed. Since the DFBW utilizes an Apollo computer and hardware, the procedures, controls, and basic management techniques employed are based on those developed for the Apollo software system. Program Assembly Control, simulator configuration control, erasable-memory load generation, change procedures and anomaly reporting are discussed. The primary verification tools--the all-digital simulator, the hybrid simulator, and the Iron Bird simulator--are described, as well as the program test plans and their implementation on the various simulators. Failure-effects analysis and the creation of special failure-generating software for testing purposes are described. The quality of the end product is evidenced by the F-8 DFBW flight test program in which 42 flights, totaling 58 hours of flight time, were successfully made without any DFCS inflight software, or hardware, failures.

Bairnsfather, R. R.↗

Theorem Proving In Higher Order Logics

The TPHOLs International Conference serves as a venue for the presentation of work in theorem proving in higher-order logics and related areas in deduction, formal specification, software and hardware verification, and other applications. Fourteen papers were submitted to Track B (Work in Progress), which are included in this volume. Authors of Track B papers gave short introductory talks that were followed by an open poster session. The FCM 2002 Workshop aimed to bring together researchers working on the formalisation of continuous mathematics in theorem proving systems with those needing such libraries for their applications. Many of the major higher order theorem proving systems now have a formalisation of the real numbers and various levels of real analysis support. This work is of interest in a number of application areas, such as formal methods development for hardware and software application and computer supported mathematics. The FCM 2002 consisted of three papers, presented by their authors at the workshop venue, and one invited talk.

Carreno, Victor A.↗