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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

A 100-Mrad (Si) JFET-based Sensing and Communications System for Extreme Nuclear Instrumentation Environments

Dry cask storage is one of two storage methods approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for spent fuel after removal from reactor cores. Dry casks consist of a stainless steel canister enclosed in a concrete overpack to contain the hazardous radioactive spent fuel rods and provide radiation shielding. Monitoring spent fuel storage casks is desired to ensure the safe containment of the enclosed spent fuel, but is very difficult due to the related harsh temperature and radiation environment. The sensors and associated electronics to monitor temperature, pressure, and/or radiation need to survive high temperatures and radiation doses for extended time periods. For this reason, there is a severe need for radiation-hardened electrical systems that survive well beyond the existing capabilities of commercially available radiation-rated electronic components, which have primarily been developed for space applications. Junction-gate field-effect transistor (JFET) devices are inherently radiation hardened [exceeding 100 Mrad (Si)]. Additionally, when JFETs are used as building blocks for sensing and communication electronics (i.e., oscillators, amplifiers, filters, and mixers), inherently radiation-hardened circuits can be achieved. To this end, JFET-based radiation-hardened electronics interfacing with cask-embedded sensors capable of driving modulated sensor signals through a stainless steel barrier were designed and tested at a dose rate of approximately 500 krad/h (Si) to beyond a 200-Mrad (Si) total ionizing dose. After 200 Mrad (Si), the sensor and communication circuit signals were correctly decoded at the receiver despite oscillator drift. The results from this experiment demonstrate the potential for creating more complex radiation-hardened JFET-based electrical systems for nuclear environments.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

System Analysis Modeling and Intermodal Transportation for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

This is a technical presentation that does not take into account contractual limitations or obligations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). For example, under the provisions of the Standard Contract, spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters is not an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Comparison of Irradiated TRISO Fuel Radioactivity from Multiple Advanced Reactor Designs

The SCALE code system was used to model, deplete, and compare several different TRISO-fueled reactor designs: a helium-cooled prismatic reactor, a helium-cooled pebble-bed reactor (PBR), and a Fluoride-Lithium-Beryllium (FLIBE) molten-salt-cooled PBR. The purpose of this comparison was to understand how differences in the reactor designs affect the radioactivity of the fuel after discharge and whether those differences are significant. First, the various reactor designs were build and depleted in the TRITON module for each design and fuel enrichment. Then, the TRITON outputs were used to create burn-up dependent reactor libraries. These libraries were then used by ORIGEN to determine the activities of discharged fuel for each reactor, which were compared to generic Westinghouse 17x17 fuel. Overall, the results showed that short term decays are dominated by reactors with higher operating powers, and the reactor type, initial fuel enrichment, and maximum burn-up are of only secondary importance. Although this analysis only focuses on activities in becquerels, these dependencies are consistent with the expected behavior of decay heat. However, analysis of long- term time periods post-irradiation shows that the reactor type and maximum burn-up have strong impacts on the activities; initial fuel enrichment has a secondary impact while operating power is inconsequential. These results would be useful for analyses, such as dose assessment and modeling in post- release scenarios; normal fuel handling operations; and spent fuel transport, storage and disposal. Of particular interest, the results in this report show that analyses that focus on spent nuclear fuel of advanced reactors need to consider each parameter carefully. Unsurprisingly, if the correct operating power is not used in short term analyses, the results will not be correct. Perhaps unexpectedly, however, if the correct reactor type is not used, then the long term results will also be incorrect, especially for areas such as permanent disposal. Even though this report focuses on the total activity of nuclear fuel, it provides initial results on the effects of various input parameters and also provides a framework to extend the work into other analyses of spent fuel from advanced reactors, especially those employing TRISO fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Spent Nuclear Fuel Exploratory Roadmaps - 20054

The U.S. Department of Energy manages nearly 2,500 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from several decades of research, testing, and production reactors [DOE 1995]. This SNF is managed at the DOE Hanford Site in Washington State (Hanford), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Savannah River Site in South Carolina (SRS). From 1995 to 2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) made several key programmatic decisions, supported by appropriate documentation in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for the management of SNF [DOE 1995]. These decisions have provided an overarching framework for SNF management, as well as site-specific and SNF-related management decisions for the past two decades. In the years since these decisions were made, with the notable exception of the successful drying and packaging of the production reactor fuel at Hanford, a majority of the decisions have been largely unimplemented. Also, since these decisions were made, a number of changes that bear on considerations relative to the path forward have occurred. A SNF Exploratory Road map activity, identified reasonable alternate pathways for DoE's inventory of SNF. Three fundamental pathways were identified in this activity for the long-term management and disposition of DOE SNF: Direct Disposal Pathway, Existing Processing Pathway and Alternate Processing Pathway. Further actions would be required (e.g., evaluation of NEPA analysis, technology maturity evaluations, refinement of cost and risks, benefits and advantages relative to other alternate paths) to define and inform many key decisions that will result in the selection of the disposition pathways that are most beneficial to the US Government in dispositioning DoE's SNF inventory. DOE is currently managing all SNF safely; however, the age of DOE-owned SNF and facilities for storing and processing SNF, coupled with the uncertainty of the storage duration, necessitates decisions and actions to ensure that the infrastructure will be in place to ensure continued safe and effective long-term management and eventual disposal. The identification of reasonable alternate pathways took these considerations into account in an effort to proactively manage conditions that could challenge the safety of storing and managing DOE SNF over the time periods now contemplated and also to ensure that flexibility is preserved to ensure that the DOE SNF remains compatible with final disposition pathways when they become available. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

SCALE 6.3 Validation: Spent Nuclear Fuel

This report is the fifth volume in a series documenting the validation of SCALE 6.3 with ENDF/B-VII.1 libraries for nuclear criticality safety, reactor physics, radiation shielding, and spent nuclear fuel applications. This fifth volume, which focuses on validating SCALE capabilities that impact spent nuclear fuel applications, provides an update of the similar validation reported for SCALE 6.2.4.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Modeling and Analysis for Spent Nuclear Fuel Seismic Testing

Note: This is the final public release version of PNNL-31671 Draft, which was previously released to the sponsor for review. The intent is the public release version will be PNNL-31671. There are no significant changes from the earlier draft version. This unlimited distribution report is the deliverable for M3SF-21PN010202014: Modeling and Analysis for Spent Nuclear Fuel Seismic Testing. This report summarizes the modeling, analysis, and test plan support completed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the spent nuclear fuel dry storage system seismic test plan through May of 2021. Test plan preparation is planned to continue until the seismic test is completed in July of 2022. This report covers preliminary structural dynamic model development and computer-aided design of test hardware. Based on preliminary modeling, the strongest earthquakes under consideration in this test program provide mechanical loading on the spent nuclear fuel that is comparable to the 30 cm cask drop scenario, although the loads do not appear to be strong enough to cause significant permanent deformation of the fuel assembly spacer grids. The potential for grid deformation during the test will be assessed when the proposed shake table motion becomes available. The weakest earthquakes considered in this test are expected to be comparable to the mechanical loads witnessed in the multimodal transportation test of 2017. The horizontal canister system is predicted to provide nearly-uniform loading condition on the fuel assemblies it contains, while the vertical cask system is predicted to cause non-uniform dynamic loads on the fuel assemblies. In the horizontal case, gravity keeps the fuel assemblies in contact with one basket wall surface unless the loads are strong enough to cause a separation. In the vertical case, the fuel assemblies are relatively long and slender, and seismic motion in the anticipated test range is predicted to cause the assemblies to lean, tilt, and impact the basket walls throughout the seismic event. These gap closures are a nonlinear force transmission condition, so the vertical system is expected to have more variation and variability than the horizontal system. While the horizontal system is expected to have a relatively more linear response than the vertical system, there is still the potential for nonlinear behavior in the horizontal system because the fuel assemblies are free to slide, bounce, and impact the basket walls if the seismic loads are strong enough. One major conclusion of this study is that the use of mixed fuel assemblies in the canister will be acceptable. There are differences in overall system response when the mass, center of gravity, or gaps are changed, but the changes in response are within the bounds of a system that contains completely homogeneous fuel assemblies. One important observation is that the loading for each individual fuel assembly within the vertical canister is expected to be different from that of the others because of nonlinearities in the system. The horizontal canister system is expected to have a more uniform and more predictable response than the vertical canister, making variations in fuel assembly characteristics easier to account for. One important recommendation that comes from this modeling work is to repeat some of the strongest shake tests at different angles, particularly for the vertical cask system. Modeling predicts that strong seismic motion will cause the fuel assemblies to close initial gaps and impact the fuel basket walls when the canister is in the vertical cask configuration. Each shake test will impose a pre-defined three-dimensional time history on the cask system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Nuclear Data Impact Assessment for the HTR-10 Pebble-Bed Reactor Using SCALE

The HTR-10 was used as a representative pebble-bed high-temperature gas-cooled reactor in this assessment of nuclear data’s impact on important reactor and spent fuel metrics, including safety-related quantities such as the effective multiplication factor (k eff ), temperature reactivity feedback, spent fuel inventory, and decay heat. Using the SCALE code system tools and ENDF/B-VII.1 nuclear data libraries, we quantify the effect of nuclear data uncertainties on these key performance metrics for both fresh fuel and equilibrium core configurations. For reactor core key parameters, important contributors to uncertainty include reactions of 235 U [$\bar{v}$, fission, (n, γ)], 238 U [elastic, (n, γ)], and graphite [elastic, (n, γ)]. Additional important contributors for the equilibrium core include reactions of higher actinides ( 239 Pu, 240 Pu) and fission products ( 135 Xe, 149 Sm). For spent fuel analysis, most nuclide inventory uncertainties remain below 5%. Higher uncertainties up to 11% are being observed for minor actinides like 243 Am and 244 Cm. Additionally, fission product uncertainties in 155 Eu and 155 Gd, of 25% and 23% respectively, are also significant and have implications for burnup credit applications. 110m Ag also shows high uncertainty of up to 11%, mainly due to fission product yield uncertainties. Decay heat relative uncertainties remain below 0.6% up to 10 years’ cooling time after fuel discharge. The highest relative uncertainty of 1.5% occurs at 500 years of cooling; however, because the decay heat value is very low at that time, the absolute uncertainty is not significant. This work demonstrates that extending assessments beyond fresh fuel k eff to include irradiated cores, nuclide inventories, and decay heat is essential in understanding the behavior of uncertainties as a function of fuel burnup and can support improvements of safety margins and spent fuel management.

Nuclear data impact↗
DOE OSTI2020

Using Resin to Reduce Silica in Borated Fluid - 20072

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) strongly recommends the concentration of silica in the reactor coolant be limited, potential ingress be carefully controlled, and frequently monitored to assess potential silica deposits on fuel cladding surfaces. Boraflex is a product with silicone rubber encasing a neutron absorber for criticality control, and it was installed in the majority of nuclear power plant spent fuel pools. Over time and in the presence of radiation, the silicone rubber lining degrades into silica (SiO{sub 2}) and hydrogen gas. Silica is somewhat soluble in water and spent fuel pool water communicates with other plant systems during refueling outages, leading to a buildup of silica in the reactor coolant and connected systems. Due to the prevalence of Boraflex racks in spent fuel pools, the presence of silica is a chronic nuclear industry concern. To address this concern, many nuclear plants have installed reverse osmosis skid systems to remove the silica from their spent fuel pools and, by extension, from reactor coolant. These skids are expensive to install and maintain. Arcadis personnel demonstrated that an iron-impregnated resin could be used to remove silica from borated systems without impacting the water quality. The resin was readily available, inexpensive, and easy to install in existing plant equipment. During a nuclear power plant's refueling outage the iron-impregnated resin proved to be effective in reducing the need for feed and bleed operations, with concurrent cost savings and reduction in required outage water management activities. Thus, the following savings were realized: - Eliminated the need to purchase, install, and maintain a reverse osmosis system avoiding more than $10 million in up-front capital cost and ongoing operating and maintenance costs. - Removed 9.57 kilograms (21 pounds) of silica dioxide from the primary system fluid. - Reduced the volume of feed and bleed from 70,000 gallons (2.65 E+05 liters) to 35,000 gallons (1.32 E+05 liters). - Saved $380,000 in water production and disposal costs. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Drying of Spent Nuclear Fuel: Considerations and Examples

A recently revised American Society for Testing and Materials consensus standard guide for drying of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) provides considerations and guidance for preparing SNF for its safe storage in a sealed dry storage system. The standard discusses (1) needs for drying, (2) techniques to dry, and (3) demonstration of adequate dryness. No specific approach is prescribed since the effective techniques and needs for drying depend on the specifics of the fuel and dry storage system. Here, this paper discusses these topics using examples for both Zr-alloy-clad commercial SNF and for aluminum-alloy-clad research reactor SNF. Residual water can include free water (liquid and/or vapor), physisorbed water bound to internal surfaces, and chemisorbed water incorporated into surface films, such as (oxy)hydroxides. The potential impacts of these residual waters are corrosion/oxidation, radiolytic breakdown into gaseous and/or reactive species, and canister pressurization. For commercial SNF, inadvertent free water, even up to large amounts (e.g., 10+ mol), is not predicted to cause adverse corrosion degradation, except possible fuel oxidation for breached SNF. For aluminum-clad SNF, the production of radiolytic hydrogen with contribution from the chemisorbed water in its hydrated oxides is a primary consideration. For both SNF systems, canister pressurization is predicted to be well within the canister design, and flammability would not pose a safety concern using an oxygen limit of 5 vol % criterion. (Flammability control can be achieved by limiting either hydrogen or oxygen, and an oxygen limit is expected to be easier to meet in the presence of radiolytic H 2 generation.) The two primary technologies for SNF drying, vacuum drying and forced-gas dehydration, are described herein, and drying tests and campaigns using these methods are cited. Dryness criteria and the methods used to detect and measure residual (free) water are also discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Verification and Validation of START: A Spent Nuclear Fuel Routing and Decision Support Tool

This is a technical presentation that does not take into account contractual limitations or obligations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). For example, under the provisions of the Standard Contract, spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters is not an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Versatile Remediation Module for Remote Repair of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste Storage Containers

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) successfully demonstrated the Versatile Remediation Module (VRM), a prototype module designed and built by ORNL for on-site remote repair of welded stainless steel storage containers for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. This paper describes the VRM prototype and its design features and components to support continued long-term storage or off-site transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste currently stored in storage containers. A remote (100 ft away from the simulated radiative environment) demonstration of the VRM was successfully performed on a full-scale mock-up welded stainless steel canister. The VRM is designed with features to accommodate remediation techniques beyond those currently selected and described in this paper. Therefore, many of the VRM’s features may benefit other remote nuclear or nonnuclear applications. The VRM is envisioned to serve as a development center to facilitate and enhance further development of new remediation technologies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

IN-SERVICE INSPECTION OF EXTENDED DRY STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, PART I: CRAWLER TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

This paper describes development and demonstration of remote crawling systems to support periodic examinations of interim dry storage system (DSS) canisters for spent nuclear fuel in the USA. Specifically, this work relates to robotic crawler developments for “canister” based DSS systems which form the majority population of DSSs, in the USA, for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. Consideration of potential degradation of the welded stainless-steel canister in these systems is required for continued usage in the period of extended operation (PEO) beyond their initial licensed or certified terms. Challenges associated with performing the periodic examinations are associated with physical access to the canister surface which is constrained due to narrow annulus spaces between the canister and the overpack, tortuous entry pathways, and high temperatures and radiation doses that can be damaging to materials and electronics. Motivations for performing periodic examinations and developing robotic crawlers for performing those examinations remotely will be presented and several activities to demonstrate robotic crawlers for different DSS systems are summarized.

nondestructive examination (NDE), Dry Cask Storage↗
DOE OSTI2024

Milestone 1.2.16. Reconciling the Impacts of Thermal Pretreatment on Radiation-Induced H2 Generation from Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Surrogate Materials

To support the technical basis for the extended dry storage of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), thermal pretreatment procedures to minimize the radiation-induced generation of molecular hydrogen (H2) have been investigated. The aim of thermal pretreatment is to eliminate the residual adsorbed water content on the ASNF’s corrosion layers, precursors for H2 generation. To date, irradiation studies in this area have found conflicting results for the effectiveness of thermal pretreatment procedures. The aim of this study was to reconcile those differences. However, the presented results, which utilized a modified in situ thermal pretreatment procedure, afforded H2 yield data that further indicates that thermal pretreatment does not significantly reduce the radiation-induced yield of H2 from gamma irradiated ASNF surrogate materials. Assessment of the differences between thermal pretreatment studies suggests that stainless-steel—present in the irradiation setup of studies that demonstrated a reduction in the yield of H2 with thermal pretreatment—may afford not only unanticipated interfacial chemistry, but also the formation and radiolytic contribution of iron oxides to the chemistry underpinning the formation of H2 in these systems. Given the Department of Energy Standard Canister—proposed for the extended dry storage of ASNF—is predominantly composed of stainless-steel, the potential contribution of stainless-steel and its corrosion layers to radiolytic H2 production should be further investigated. This research was funded by the U.S. Department of Environmental Management, Office of Technology Development, under contract DE-AC07-05ID14517.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2024

Adsorption of molecular iodine and alkyl iodides from spent-nuclear-fuel-reprocessing off-gas using reduced silver mordenite

Radioactive iodine is a hazardous byproduct of spent-nuclear-fuel reprocessing that must be removed from the off-gas stream before it can be discharged. Reduced silver mordenite (Ag 0 Z) is currently the baseline material for iodine capture in the U.S. Although the performance characteristics and capture mechanisms of I 2 and CH 3 I have been established, similar investigations into long-chain organic iodides have yet to be performed. In this study, thin beds of Ag 0 Z were loaded with I 2 , CH 3 I, C 4 H 9 I, and C 12 H 25 I (5 ppm to 50 ppm) carried in a dry air stream at 150°C. The maximum iodine capacity was 105 ± 5 mg I/g Ag 0 Z for all species. Saturated Ag 0 Z samples were characterized using scanning electron microscopy, X-ray fluorescence, X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy, diffuse reflectance UV–visible spectroscopy, pair distribution function analysis, and thermogravimetric analysis. Further, near-complete Ag utilization and similar physical/chemical properties were observed for all samples. Through a comparison with previous studies and an investigation of aged Ag 0 Z, we propose that iodine species react with Ag + at exchange sites, forming α-AgI within the mordenite channels, and with surface Ag 0 nanoparticles, yielding β-/γ-AgI. The available Ag sites in the interior (Ag + ) and exterior (Ag 0 ) of mordenite determine the adsorption capacity since α-AgI formation is limited by the total pore volume. Potential iodine uptake routes were summarized for aging and non-aging environments. A scalable predictive model was implemented for deep-bed iodine removal, and predictions were in good agreement with experimental data. Sensitivity analysis suggests that iodine uptake kinetics is governed by pore diffusion.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Power Plant Infrastructure Evaluations for Removal of Spent Nuclear Fuel

This report provides evaluations of the NPP site infrastructure and near-site transportation infrastructure for removing spent nuclear from 16 (NPP) sites. The material to be removed from the NPP sites includes both the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and the greater-than-Class C low level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) that is stored, or will be stored, at the sites.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Modeling of SRS Aluminum-clad Spent Nuclear Fuel in Standard DOE Sealed Canisters

At the Savannah River Site (SRS), approximately 7 MTHM of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel is currently in wet storage at L-basin. A significant portion of this fuel is slated to be dried and sealed in DOE standard canisters for long-term storage. This report will focus on a few fuel types, which should bound all other fuel stored at SRS. These consist of the reference fuel assembly, the MURR fuel and the HFIR fuel. These bound a hypothetical maximum scenario for MTR box fuel, a maximum for decay heat in an assembly, and a maximum for the aluminum surface area, respectively. The geometry for the packages were created from DOE specifications for storage of each of the fuels. As long as the minimum time from reactor discharge to sealed storage is 3 years, then the highest temperatures which occur within the sealed canisters do not exceed 100° C for all scenarios considered here. In the geometry considered, while the HFIR fuel has a large surface area, the packaging configuration leaves large void areas, such that the aluminum surface to free volume ratio is about 30% less than an ATR or MURR packaging configuration.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Silver Sulfide and Silver Sulfate as Aging Byproducts and Adsorbents for Gaseous Iodine Capture in Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing

While it is considered a promising adsorbent for radioiodine capture in spent nuclear fuel reprocessing off-gas, silver functionalized silica aerogel (Ag 0 -aerogel) experiences a capacity loss when exposed to other off-gas components (O 2 , H 2 O, NO, and NO 2 ) through a process known as aging. Ag 2 S and Ag 2 SO 4 were identified as major byproducts of aging, but their impact on iodine adsorption remains unclear. Thus, to further investigate aging, we loaded Ag 2 S and Ag 2 SO 4 powders with molecular iodine (I 2 ) at 150 °C and characterized their properties. The I 2 adsorption capacity of Ag 2 SO 4 was 0.12 wt % after 72 h, suggesting its formation directly reduces the capacity of the Ag 0 -aerogel. Conversely, Ag 2 S had an iodine capacity of 86.8 wt % and near total Ag utilization after 240 h. Given its high capacity and availability, we evaluated the feasibility of Ag 2 S as an I 2 adsorbent in future applications. Finally, several drawbacks need to be overcome, including the relatively slow uptake rate, potential emission of another hazardous byproduct (SO 2 ), and potential aging effects (e.g., Ag 2 S conversion to Ag 2 SO 4 ) before Ag 2 S can be applied for the radioiodine capture process.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗