Results for “UAS NAS Integration” — Page 14

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Identifying Common Coordination Procedures across Extensible Traffic Management (xTM) to Integrate xTM Operations into the National Airspace System

New categories of missions and vehicle types, such as drone delivery services, on-demand air taxi, and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) vehicles are being proposed to operate using a novel, highly automated information exchange infrastructure and a community-based, cooperative traffic management concept. Collectively, these new operations are called Extensible Traffic Management (xTM). As these xTM vehicles become more prevalent, their operations will increasingly overlap with existing conventional aircraft and with each other. In order to seamlessly co-exist with current conventional aircraft operations, new coordination procedures, tools and services will be needed to integrate xTM into the future National Airspace System (NAS). In our prior work, we have identified a set of use cases for xTM interactions with air traffic control (ATC), categorized across different xTM operations based on trigger events. Events consisted of ones such as nominal xTM vehicle transition into the ATC environment or an off-nominal emergency landing situation. In this paper, we have extended the prior work to identify commonalities in the coordination procedures across xTM, as well as differences that are specific to the individual xTM operations. The overall results showed that two types of xTM-ATC interactions were prevalent: 1) xTM vehicles transitioning between xTM and ATC operational environments; 2) xTM vehicles being allowed to continue xTM operations in areas that are normally controlled by ATC. The results also suggested that emergency and rare off-nominal events may need specialized procedures for each vehicle type. The overall results suggest that there is a pathway to define a common method of handling and integrating diverse xTM operations in the future NAS, but there need to be procedures for individualized handling of xTM vehicles in infrequent, safety-critical events.

Extensible Traffic Management (xTM)↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Concept of Operations (ConOps) of an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)

The growth of new emerging operations involving Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) necessitates developing a perspective for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). This perspective advances from the National Academies report on IASMS and its recommendation for developing a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for IASMS. A ConOps has been developed for In-time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) from which the IASMS ConOps pivots to provide a robust scope commensurate with the broad vision defined by the National Academies. The IASMS ConOps focuses on emerging operations and spans innovations in Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) and an increasingly complex ecosystem comprised of a widening mix of vehicles and technologies, Urban Air Mobility (UAM) with industry-federated services, traditional operations, as well as new supersonic aircraft and space launch systems.The challenge for the IASMS ConOps is to be broad to encompass innovations in the coming years and decades while agile to ensure levels of safety compatible with operational and certification requirements of the National Airspace System (NAS). The IASMS ConOps interweaves increasing complexity of operational safety capabilities and unlocking UAS Maturity Levels (UMLs). The relationships between increased complexity of automation and automated systems, fewer operators who are not as traditionally higher skilled, more complex operational environments, and aviation operations management with mixed aircraft and equipage pose a multi-dimensional space for IASMS capabilities essential for safety assurance and risk management. Instantiating IASMS capabilities and how they would be integral to AAM operations and increasing maturity of UAM could be accomplished through a series of Safety Demonstrators. These Safety Demonstrators could provide increased understanding and insight into use of controls for risk mitigation, means of compliance for certification, and operational experience with safety services such as in relation to contingency management. The IASMS capabilities can be viewed as initially residing with the vehicle, airspace, and Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP). For example, vehicle capabilities include communications including the command and control link, Remote Identification (ID), conflict advisory/alerting, and UAS system monitoring. These capabilities monitor and assess data such as battery health, aircraft state, and human performance. Complexity of ISAMS capabilities depends on a number of factors. These factors are intendedonly as a notional categorization with the purpose being to reflect the complexity of the AAM ecosystem that would drive up the complexity of ISSA capabilities including systems, sensors, models, standards, and controls. Factors could include the Vehicle Flight Management, Environment, Airspace, and Contingency Management. Each of these factors can be comprised of multiple sub-factors that contribute to increasing complexity. For example, Airspace at a lower level of complexity could be dedicated to UTM operations that are unmonitored, and at a higher level of complexity could involve mixed UTM and ATM operations. The IASMS concept includes safety services that provide data and information to different participants in AAM. The roles and responsibilities of participants can be defined using the Responsible-Accountable-Consulted-Informed (RACI) analysis. For example, for the safety service involving the Remote ID, the Operator would be accountable for providing the data, the Vehicle would be responsible for transmitting it, and the USS, SDSP, Vertiports, FIMS (FAA), and Public Entities such as safety services would be informed by receiving the data. The IASMS ConOps identifies the capabilities needed for risk mitigation and safety assurance in the increasingly complex national airspace. The ConOps serves as a pathway for engaging with industry to gain operational experience including through the Safety Demonstrator series, the RACI analysis, and operational complexity factors. The ConOps serves to integrate these different perspectives to build a cohesive and cogent approach to an AAM safety management system.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗

NASA NTRS2017

Considerations for an Integrated UAS CNS Architecture

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) is investigating revolutionary and advanced universal, reliable, always available, cyber secure and affordable Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS) options for all altitudes of UAS operations. In Spring 2015, NASA issued a Call for Proposals under NASA Research Announcements (NRA) NNH15ZEA001N, Amendment 7 Subtopic 2.4. Boeing was selected to conduct a study with the objective to determine the most promising candidate technologies for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) air-to-air and air-to-ground data exchange and analyze their suitability in a post-NextGen NAS environment. The overall objectives are to develop UAS CNS requirements and then develop architectures that satisfy the requirements for UAS in both controlled and uncontrolled air space. This contract is funded under NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (ARMD) Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) project and proposes technologies for the Unmanned Air Systems Traffic Management (UTM) service.There is a need for accommodating large-scale populations of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in the national air space. Scale obviously impacts capacity planning for Communication, Navitation, and Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless communications data links provide the necessary capacity for accommodating millions of small UASs (sUAS) nationwide? Does the communications network provide sufficient Internet Protocol (IP) address space to allow air traffic control to securely address both UAS teams as a whole as well as individual UAS within each team? Can navigation and surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe separation of vehicles even in crowded skies?Our objective is to identify revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives supporting UASs operating at all altitudes and in all airspace while accurately navigating in the absence of navigational aids. These CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. The approach will identify CNS technology candidates that can meet the needs of the range of UAS missions to specific air traffic management applications where they will be most beneficial and cost effective.

Templin, Fred L.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Considerations for an Integrated UAS CNS Architecture

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) is investigating revolutionary and advanced universal, reliable, always available, cyber secure and affordable Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS) options for all altitudes of UAS operations. In Spring 2015, NASA issued a Call for Proposals under NASA Research Announcements (NRA) NNH15ZEA001N, Amendment 7 Subtopic 2.4. Boeing was selected to conduct a study with the objective to determine the most promising candidate technologies for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) air-to-air and air-to-ground data exchange and analyze their suitability in a post-NextGen NAS environment. The overall objectives are to develop UAS CNS requirements and then develop architectures that satisfy the requirements for UAS in both controlled and uncontrolled air space. This contract is funded under NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (ARMD) Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) project and proposes technologies for the Unmanned Air Systems Traffic Management (UTM) service.There is a need for accommodating large-scale populations of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in the national air space. Scale obviously impacts capacity planning for Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless communications data links provide the necessary capacity for accommodating millions of small UASs (sUAS) nationwide? Does the communications network provide sufficient Internet Protocol (IP) address space to allow air traffic control to securely address both UAS teams as a whole as well as individual UAS within each team? Can navigation and surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe separation of vehicles even in crowded skies?Our objective is to identify revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives supporting UASs operating at all altitudes and in all airspace while accurately navigating in the absence of navigational aids. These CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. The approach will identify CNS technology candidates that can meet the needs of the range of UAS missions to specific air traffic management applications where they will be most beneficial and cost effective.

Templin, Fred L.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Simulation and Flight Test Data Collection Review for Supporting Phase 1 Detect and Avoid MOPS

RTCA Special Committee 228 is a consortium of government, industry, and academic organizations tasked to develop minimum operational performance standards for UAS detect and avoid systems. The UAS in the NAS (National Airspace System) project is studying the minimum operational performance standards for unmanned aerial systems (UAS's) detect-and-avoid (DAA) system in order to operate in the National Airspace System. Over the past 3 years, the project has executed a series of fast-time simulation, human-in-the-loop experiments, and flight tests in support of this effort. The purpose of this briefing is to summarize the models developed and data collected to overcome UAS integration barriers, so UAS can remain well clear of all traffic.

Santiago, Confesor↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

UAS Pilot Assessments of Display and Alerting for the Airborne Collision Avoidance System XU

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) must comply with specific standards to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). Among the requirements are the detect and avoid (DAA) capabilities, which include display, alerting, and guidance specifications. Previous studies have queried pilots for their subjective feedback on these display elements on earlier systems; the present study sought pilot evaluations with an initial iteration of the unmanned variant of a Next Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS XU). Sixteen participants piloted simulated aircraft with both standalone and integrated DAA displays. Their opinions were gathered using post-block and post-simulation questionnaires as well as guided debriefs. The data showed pilots had better understanding and comfort with the system when using an integrated display. Pilots also rated ACAS Xu alerting and guidance as generally acceptable and effective. Implications for further development of ACAS XU and DAA displays are discussed.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

NASA NTRS2020

UAS Pilot Assessments of Display and Alerting for the Next Generation Airborne Avoidance System

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) must comply with specific standards to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). Among the requirements are the detect and avoid (DAA) capabilities, which include display, alerting, and guidance specifications. Previous studies have queried pilots for their subjective feedback on these display elements on earlier systems; the present study sought pilot evaluations with an initial iteration of the unmanned variant of a Next Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS XU). Sixteen participants piloted simulated aircraft with both standalone and integrated DAA displays. Their opinions were gathered using post-block and post-simulation questionnaires as well as guided debriefs. The data showed pilots had better understanding and comfort with the system when using an integrated display. Pilots also rated ACAS Xu alerting and guidance as generally acceptable and effective. Implications for further development of ACAS XU and DAA displays are discussed.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

UAS Pilot Assessments of Display and Alerting for the Next Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xu

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) must comply with specific standards to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). Among the requirements are the detect and avoid (DAA) capabilities, which include display, alerting, and guidance specifications. Previous studies have queried pilots for their subjective feedback on these display elements on earlier systems; the present study sought pilot evaluations with an initial iteration of the unmanned variant of a Next Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS XU). Sixteen participants piloted simulated aircraft with both standalone and integrated DAA displays. Their opinions were gathered using post-block and post-simulation questionnaires as well as guided debriefs. The data showed pilots had better understanding and comfort with the system when using an integrated display. Pilots also rated ACAS Xu alerting and guidance as generally acceptable and effective. Implications for further development of ACAS XU and DAA displays are discussed.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

NASA NTRS2016

Overview of Sense and Avoid/Separation Assurance Interoperability (SSI)

The UAS in the NAS project is studying the minimum operational performance standards for unmanned aerial systems (UAS's) detect-and-avoid (DAA) system in order to operate in the National Airspace System. The project is executing a series of fast-time simulation, human-in-the-loop experiments, and flight test in support of this effort. Officials of the Swiss Government (Peter Winter, Director of Aeronautical Systems, and Michel Godinat, Head of the Certification Office) are visiting NASA to become more familiar with the advances being made to integrate UAS into civilian airspace. This briefing will review the activities and results over the past 3 years within the Separation AssuranceSense-and-Avoid Interoperability team.

Santiago, Confesor↗

NASA NTRS2017

Progress on the Development of the UAS C2 Link and Supporting Spectrum - from LOS to BLOS

In order to provide for the safe integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System, the control and non-payload communications (CNPC) link connecting the ground-based pilot with the unmanned aircraft must be highly reliable and robust, based upon standards that enable certification. Both line-of-sight (LOS) links using terrestrial-based communications and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) links using satellite communications are required to support UAS operations. The development of standards has been undertaken by RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228), with supporting technical data developed by NASA under the UAS in the National Airspace (NAS) Project. As a result of this work minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) have been completed and published for the LOS CNPC system. The second phase of work, for both NASA and RTCA involves the BLOS CNPC systems. The development of technical data to support MOPS development for UAS BLOS satellite-based CNPC links has now been initiated by NASA, and RTCA SC-228 has organized itself to begin the MOPS development process. This paper will provide an overview of the work that has been completed to date by the Communications Subproject in support of LOS C2 communications for UAS followed by an update of plans and progress for the BLOS phase of the project, with the focus on the UAS C2 spectrum aspects.

Pilotless aircraft↗

NASA NTRS2014

Investigating the Impacts of a Separation Standard for UAS Operations in Enroute and Transition Airspace

Unmanned aircraft systems will be required to equip with a detect and avoid system in order to satisfy the federal aviation regulations to remain well clear of other aircraft. To comply with regulations in today’s operations manned aircraft must “see and avoid” other aircraft and use subjective judgment to determine whether those aircraft are well clear. For a detect-and- avoid (DAA) system to satisfy the requirement to stay well clear, a quantitative definition of well clear needs to be defined and evaluated. Definitions for the boundary of well clear have been proposed by the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Executive Committee Science and Research Panel (SaRP) and the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 228 on Detect and Avoid Systems. This study investigates the interoperability implications of UAS using proposed well clear definitions as a separation standard for conducting operations in the national airspace system. The first analysis in the study focuses on the effect of variations in well clear definition parameters on the rate of losses of well clear per flight hour. The second analysis considers three well clear definitions and presents the relative state conditions of intruder aircraft as they encroach upon the well clear boundary. The third analysis focuses on the definition of the alerting criteria needed to inform the UAS operator of a potential loss of well clear. All three analyses are conducted in a NAS-wide fast-time simulation environment using UAS aircraft models, proposed UAS missions, and historical air defense radar data to populate the background traffic operating under visual flight rules. The results from the three analyses presented in this study inform the safety case, requirements development, and the operational environment for the DAA minimum operational performance standards.

UAS Seperation Standard↗

NASA NTRS2020

Urban Air Mobility System Testbed Using CAVE Virtual Reality Environment

Urban Air Mobility (UAM) refers to a system of air passenger and small cargo transportation within an urban area. The UAM framework also includes other urban Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) services that will be supported by a mix of onboard, ground, piloted, and autonomous operations. Over the past few years UAM research has gained wide interest from companies and federal agencies as an on-demand innovative transportation option that can help reduce traffic congestion and pollution as well as increase mobility in metropolitan areas. The concepts of UAM/UAS operation in the National Airspace System (NAS) remains an active area of research to ensure safe and efficient operations. With new developments in smart vehicle design and infrastructure for air traffic management, there is a need for methods to integrate and test various components of the UAM framework. In this work, we report on the development of a virtual reality (VR) testbed using the Cave Automatic Virtual Environment (CAVE) technology for human-automation teaming and airspace operation research of UAM. Using a four-wall projection system with motion capture, the CAVE provides an immersive virtual environment with real-time full body tracking capability. We created a virtual environment consisting of San Francisco city and a vertical take-off-and-landing passenger aircraft that can fly between a downtown location and the San Francisco International Airport. The aircraft can be operated autonomously or manually by a single pilot who maneuvers the aircraft using a flight control joystick. The interior of the aircraft includes a virtual cockpit display with vehicle heading, location, and speed information. The system can record simulation events and flight data for post-processing. The system parameters are customizable for different flight scenarios; hence, the CAVE VR testbed provides a flexible method for development and evaluation of UAM framework.

Marayong, Panadda↗

NASA NTRS2017

Development of a High-Fidelity Simulation Environment for Shadow-Mode Assessments of Air Traffic Concepts

This paper will describe the purpose, architecture, and implementation of a gate-to-gate, high-fidelity air traffic simulation environment called the Shadow Mode Assessment using Realistic Technologies for the National Airspace System (SMART-NAS) Test Bed.The overarching purpose of the SMART-NAS Test Bed (SNTB) is to conduct high-fidelity, real-time, human-in-the-loop and automation-in-the-loop simulations of current and proposed future air traffic concepts for the Next Generation Air Transportation System of the United States, called NextGen. SNTB is intended to enable simulations that are currently impractical or impossible for three major areas of NextGen research and development: Concepts across multiple operational domains such as the gate-to-gate trajectory-based operations concept; Concepts related to revolutionary operations such as the seamless and widespread integration of large and small Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) vehicles throughout U.S. airspace; Real-time system-wide safety assurance technologies to allow safe, increasingly autonomous aviation operations. SNTB is primarily accessed through a web browser. A set of secure support services are provided to simplify all aspects of real-time, human-in-the-loop and automation-in-the-loop simulations from design (i.e., prior to execution) through analysis (i.e., after execution). These services include simulation architecture and asset configuration; scenario generation; command, control and monitoring; and analysis support.

human-in-the-loop↗

NASA NTRS2016

Integrated Test and Evaluation (ITE) Flight Test Series 4

The integrated Flight Test 4 (FT4) will gather data for the UAS researchers Sense and Avoid systems (referred to as Detect and Avoid in the RTCA SC 228 ToR) algorithms and pilot displays for candidate UAS systems in a relevant environment. The technical goals of FT4 are to: 1) perform end-to-end traffic encounter test of pilot guidance generated by DAA algorithms; 2) collect data to inform the initial Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Detect and Avoid systems. FT4 objectives and test infrastructure builds from previous UAS project simulations and flight tests. NASA Ames (ARC), NASA Armstrong (AFRC), and NASA Langley (LaRC) Research Centers will share responsibility for conducting the tests, each providing a test lab and critical functionality. UAS-NAS project support and participation on the 2014 flight test of ACAS Xu and DAA Self Separation (SS) significantly contributed to building up infrastructure and procedures for FT3 as well. The DAA Scripted flight test (FT4) will be conducted out of NASA Armstrong over an eight-week period beginning in April 2016.

ITE↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Strategic Approach for Dense, Integrated, Vehicle Navigation

Drone usage has been on the rise in recent years with applications that include parcel delivery, wildlife protection, precision farming, law enforcement, and industrial inspection, just to name a few. Once regulations and safety policies are put in place to allow for the widespread use of unmanned drones, the number of aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS) is expected to skyrocket to millions, potentially congesting the airspace which increases the likelihood of separation violations and possibly incidents. Currently, flight infrastructure can only support a few thousand aircraft flying over the United States National Airspace System (NAS) at any given time. A delay at one airport can send ripple effects throughout the system, causing more delays and missed connections. In air traffic control, separation is the concept of keeping an “ownship” aircraft outside a minimum distance from “intruder” aircraft to reduce the risk of the aircraft colliding, as well as preventing accidents due to secondary factors, such as wake turbulence. Maintaining proper separation is often a safety critical property for fixed-wing drones in the airspace. This paper addresses drone separation in time and distance for high volume corridors (en route) and lanes (on ground), merging as well as crossing intersections of multiple corridors/lanes. In this paper, the term drone is applied to both Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and small Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) vehicles operating autonomously. There exists a gamut of approaches to the merging and crossing problems. At one end of the extreme are the conservative yet low cost and verifiable solutions of today that deal with two drones at a time. At the other end are complex Machine Learning-based solutions with high computing requirements for fully autonomous drones of the future that are expected to handle all contentions. This paper presents a feasible and verifiable strategic approach to these problems that is based on distributed cooperation between the drones and the infrastructure. Three phases of the strategic approach (Prepare, Adjust, Commit) are presented. Simulation results are presented that show the proposed approach is stable and resilient to induced perturbations and guarantees a set of fixed-wing drones to merge and cross intersections by adjusting their speed based on their distance to the aircraft in front of them while remaining in the equilibrium state. The equilibrium state is defined as the state when a set of n aircraft move at a relatively constant speed and uniform spacing from each other in a congested system. A congested system is defined as the state when at least one aircraft cannot move at its maximum allowed speed. Unlike existing centralized and pre-planned approaches, the proposed solution is fully distributed and enables autonomous aircraft to decide to adjust their speed and distance with respect to the preceding aircraft, dynamically. Simulation results are presented that assess the feasibility of the approach.

Distributed↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Defining IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using autonomous vehicles. The focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is to overcome AAM’s safety assurance challenges. The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system designs. This paper describes an approach for defining SFCs based on technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in voluntary safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach would identify potential SFCs that further expand the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M) functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS. Safety implications that will result from integration of AAM in the transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) were addressed in National Academies committees reports on AAM and IASMS. Development of a ConOps for IASMS was a top recommendation and can be represented as a reframing of safety assurance that builds on real-time alerting such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, and adds the more encompassing in-time temporal parameter in recognition of the different timelines for collecting and assessing safety data for risk mitigations. For example, mining for safety trends from data sources such as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system occurs over a longer time period. Research on AAM operations poses that SFCs can be designed to monitor the safety margin appropriate for AAM including with regards to the distance between current flight parameters and nominal ideal conditions. These in-time comparisons will become more complex as the density of operations increases at least in certain areas and can include planned and actual 4D trajectory, and in-time comparisons having implications on conflict modeling and prediction including expected and actual departure time, fix/waypoint crossing times, and arrival time. These comparisons would be integrated as part of SFCs that redefine and inform new safety margin. An increased safety margin improves management of operational risks while reducing the potential for anomalies. An increased safety margin also has implications for operator confidence in the certainty of its operations and trust in automation. Technology trends in research could be used to refine existing SFCs and define needs for additional SFCs that provide safety improvements to the design and operation of vehicles, airspace design, and operator performance requirements. NASA is developing innovative approaches to safeguard against major accidents and incidents that have occurred in the NAS and those anticipated with the inclusion of envisioned AAM operations. The innovations use operational performance data to monitor, detect, and predict flight variations exceeding safe nominal patterns, such as would be caused by navigational error, severe weather complications, or hijacking of UAS controls. These innovative approaches have high potential to prevent accidents and incidents in the new AAM era. It is anticipated that elements of the innovations will evolve into SFCs for the IASMS. Voluntary safety reports can be monitored to identify anomalies related to design or operational performance risks. Reports could be periodically monitored and assessed for specific topics. Reports might serve as weak signals or precursors indicative of emergent risk such as when combined with other safety information. The architecture could include SFCs that are based on voluntary safety reports recognizing the periodic temporal nature of data analysis. As previously mentioned, aviation accidents with their causal and contributing precursors can inform the need for SFCs in the IASMS. Accidents and incidents at San Francisco International Airport such as Asiana 214 and Air Canada 759 illustrate how combinations of different factors lead to increased risk. These types of precursors and different factors have implications on the types of SFCs that could be needed to monitor and manage different sources and types of design and operational risk. Continuing to assure the safety of AAM as designs and operations gain in complexity can be accompanied by defining SFCs that also increase in complexity. These SFCs can leverage information from findings and recommendations synthesized across on-going research, voluntary safety reports, and accident and incident reports. These SFCs can serve to refine accuracy of algorithms and resolve limitations with current practices. The IASMS architecture represents the framework for the SFCs and their critical role in safety assurance.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Strategic Approach for Dense, Integrated, Vehicle Navigation

Drone usage has been on the rise in recent years with applications that include parcel delivery, wildlife protection, precision farming, law enforcement, and industrial inspection, just to name a few. Once regulations and safety policies are put in place to allow for the widespread use of unmanned drones, the number of aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS) is expected to skyrocket to millions, potentially congesting the airspace which increases the likelihood of separation violations and possibly incidents. Currently, flight infrastructure can only support a few thousand aircraft flying over the United States National Airspace System (NAS) at any given time. A delay at one airport can send ripple effects throughout the system, causing more delays and missed connections. In air traffic control, separation is the concept of keeping an “ownship” aircraft outside a minimum distance from “intruder” aircraft to reduce the risk of the aircraft colliding, as well as preventing accidents due to secondary factors, such as wake turbulence. Maintaining proper separation is often a safety critical property for fixed-wing drones in the airspace. This paper addresses drone separation in time and distance for high volume corridors (en route) and lanes (on ground), merging as well as crossing intersections of multiple corridors/lanes. In this paper, the term drone is applied to both Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and small Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) vehicles operating autonomously. There exists a gamut of approaches to the merging and crossing problems. At one end of the extreme are the conservative yet low cost and verifiable solutions of today that deal with two drones at a time. At the other end are complex Machine Learning-based solutions with high computing requirements for fully autonomous drones of the future that are expected to handle all contentions. This paper presents a feasible and verifiable strategic approach to these problems that is based on distributed cooperation between the drones and the infrastructure. Three phases of the strategic approach (Prepare, Adjust, Commit) are presented. Simulation results are presented that show the proposed approach is stable and resilient to induced perturbations and guarantees a set of fixed-wing drones to merge and cross intersections by adjusting their speed based on their distance to the aircraft in front of them while remaining in the equilibrium state. The equilibrium state is defined as the state when a set of n aircraft move at a relatively constant speed and uniform spacing from each other in a congested system. A congested system is defined as the state when at least one aircraft cannot move at its maximum allowed speed. Unlike existing centralized and pre-planned approaches, the proposed solution is fully distributed and enables autonomous aircraft to decide to adjust their speed and distance with respect to the preceding aircraft, dynamically. Simulation results are presented that assess the feasibility of the approach.

Distributed↗

NASA NTRS2017

Flight Test Evaluation of an Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management (UTM) Concept for Multiple Beyond-Visual-Line-of-Sight Operations

This study evaluates a traffic management concept designed to enable simultaneous operations of multiple small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the national airspace system (NAS). A five-day flight-test activity is described that examined the feasibility of operating multiple UAS beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) of their respective operators in the same airspace. Over the five-day campaign, three groups of five flight crews operated a total of eleven different aircraft. Each group participated in four flight scenarios involving five simultaneous missions. Each vehicle was operated BVLOS up to 1.5 miles from the pilot in command. Findings and recommendations are presented to support the feasibility and safety of routine BVLOS operations for small UAS.

UTM↗