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At least 253 records · Page 14
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NASA NTRS2018

Rapid Trajectory Prediction for a Fixed-Wing UAS in a Uniform Wind Field with Specified Arrival Times

This paper presents an algorithm to rapidly generate trajectories for a kinematic fixed-wing Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) model flying at constant altitude in a uniform wind field. Arrival times are specified by operators and rapid generation is accomplished via an elliptic integral problem formulation. Simulations are provided that illustrate this approach in the context of NASA's UAS Traffic Management Project.

trajectory↗
NASA NTRS2019

Detect-and-Avoid Alerting Performance for High-Speed UAS and Non-Cooperative Aircraft

This paper presents a set of experiments designed to assess the viability of using a smaller Detect and Avoid (DAA) volume for large Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when they are trying to remain well clear of non-cooperative visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft, in compliance with Federal regulations. The current DAA volume was defined for both cooperative and non-cooperative VFR traffic by the work of RTCA Special Committee 228 in 2017, in what is referred to in this paper as the Phase 1 standards. Subsequent work by the committee has been focused on enabling operations by smaller UAS that cannot carry the heavy radars required for the Phase 1 DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). The work discussed in this paper will explore whether a Phase 1 UAS using a Phase 1 radar can use the reduced non-cooperative DAA alerting volume being studied for smaller, slower Phase 2 UAS without significantly degrading system safety. The study uses UAS models and background traffic from previous Phase 1 and Phase 2 research to run an unmitigated simulation that will examine alerting performance using different DAA well clear definitions. The primary metrics are also tied to the alerting performance of the DAA system, and include average alerting times, probabilities of missed and late alerts, and the probability of a near mid-air collision given a loss of "well clear," as defined by the DAA system. Results are expected to help RTCA make the determination whether or not the DAA well clear definition for Phase 1 UAS can be reduced for non-cooperative VFR aircraft.

Cone, Andrew C.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Detect-and-Avoid Alerting Performance for High-Speed UAS and Non-Cooperative Aircraft

This paper presents a set of experiments designed to assess the viability of using a smaller Detect and Avoid (DAA) volume for large Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when they are trying to remain well clear of non-cooperative visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft, in compliance with Federal regulations. The current DAA volume was defined for both cooperative and non-cooperative VFR traffic by the work of RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Special Committee 228 in 2017, in what is referred to in this paper as the Phase 1 standards. Subsequent work by the committee has been focused on enabling operations by smaller UAS that cannot carry the heavy radars required for the Phase 1 DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). The work discussed in this paper will explore whether a Phase 1 UAS using a Phase 1 radar can use the reduced non-cooperative DAA alerting volume being studied for smaller, slower Phase 2 UAS without significantly degrading system safety. The study uses UAS models and background traffic from previous Phase 1 and Phase 2 research to run an unmitigated simulation that will examine alerting performance using different DAA well clear definitions. The primary metrics are also tied to the alerting performance of the DAA system, and include average alerting times, probabilities of missed and late alerts, and the probability of a near mid-air collision given a loss of "well clear," as defined by the DAA system. Results are expected to help RTCA make the determination whether or not the DAA well clear definition for Phase 1 UAS can be reduced for non-cooperative VFR aircraft.

UAS↗
NASA NTRS2015

Unmitigated ACES Simulation Supporting Draft DAA MOPS Alerting

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of performance standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements for DAA alerting system performance. A recent study conducted using NASA's ACES (Airspace Concept Evaluation System) simulation capability begins to address questions surrounding the development of draft MOPS for DAA alerting systems. ACES simulations were conducted to study the performance of an alerting scheme proposed by the SC-228 DAA Alerting sub-group. Analysis included but was not limited to: 1) correct alert (and their timeliness), 2) false alert (and their severity and duration), 3) missed alert, and 4) probability of an alert type at the time of loss of well clear. The results will be used by SC-228 to inform decisions about the alerting aspect of UAS DAA systems and future requirements development and validation efforts.

alerting↗
NASA NTRS2018

Towards a Rigorous Basis for Specific Operations Risk Assessment of UAS

The Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) guidance represents the consensus of various national aviation authorities on a common process to identify, qualitatively assess, and manage the safety risk posed by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), when preparing the safety case required for regulatory approval to conduct certain types of operations. As such, it can be considered a de facto standard, being increasingly adopted by various relevant stakeholders. This paper first gives an overview of the SORA process and associated methods, identifying a number of inconsistencies in risk identification and assessment, also discussing plausible strategies to close the associated gaps. Then, we give a well-founded basis for the applicable concepts, such as barrier integrity, assurance, and robustness, following which we present a preliminary and simple probabilistic formalization of the underpinning barrier-based safety model. We illustrate our overall approach through a worked example, also discussing how a Bayesian framework can facilitate extending and enhancing our initial formalization. We conclude with a discussion of the opportunities afforded by our approach, such as a well-founded basis for barrier selection, whilst addressing the associated challenges. The main objective of this work is to complement the current SORA guidance through a principled, mathematicallybased approach to risk assessment, particularly when it is applied to higher-risk operational concepts that warrant greater rigor in safety assessment and assurance.

Safety Cases↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Evaluation of UAS Pilot Workload and Acceptability Ratings with Four Simulated Radar Declaration Ranges

Currently, minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) are being developed for a broader range of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) platforms, including smaller UAS that will feature onboard sensors that are low in size, weight, and power, otherwise known as low SWaP. The low SWaP sensors used to detect non-cooperative traffic will have limited declaration ranges compared to those designed for medium-to-large UAS. A human-in-the-loop (HITL) study was conducted examining four possible radar declaration ranges (i.e., 1.5 NM, 2 NM, 2.5 NM, and 3 NM) for a potential low SWaP sensor with a detect and avoid (DAA) system encountering various non-cooperative encounters in Oakland Center airspace. Participants had lower workload, particularly workload associated with temporal demand and effort, in scenarios that featured larger declaration ranges. Furthermore, participants reported better ability to remain DAA well clear within the larger declaration range conditions, specifically with the 2.5 NM and 3 NM conditions.

UAS↗
NASA NTRS2020

An Evaluation of UAS Pilot Workload and Acceptability Ratings with Four Simulated Radar Declaration Ranges

Currently, minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) are being developed for a broader range of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) platforms, including smaller UAS that will feature onboard sensors that are low in size, weight, and power, otherwise known as low SWaP. The low SWaP sensors used to detect non-cooperative traffic will have limited declaration ranges compared to those designed for medium-to-large UAS. A human-in-the-loop (HITL) study was conducted examining four possible radar declaration ranges (i.e., 1.5 NM, 2 NM, 2.5 NM, and 3 NM) for a potential low SWaP sensor with a detect and avoid (DAA) system encountering various non-cooperative encounters in Oakland Center airspace. Participants had lower workload, particularly workload associated with temporal demand and effort, in scenarios that featured larger declaration ranges. Furthermore, participants reported better ability to remain DAA well clear within the larger declaration range conditions, specifically with the 2.5 NM and 3 NM conditions.

UAS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

STEReO Combining NASA Technologies and Partnerships to Transform Current-day Emergency Response Operations

STEReO brings together several technologies in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM), Autonomy, Communications, Human Factors, and Domain Expertise & Tools, aimed at providing scalability and flexibility, as well as operational resiliency to dynamic changes during a disaster event. Some of the concepts STEReO explores are: collaborative tools to ingest remote sensing information and distribute a common mission operating picture, apply ad-hoc communication networks to facilitate timely information sharing and communication of changes, vehicle-to-vehicle and onboard autonomy technologies ensure the safety and resiliency of operations, and apply NASA’s UAS traffic management system (UTM) as a public safety UAS Service Supplier (USS) to access and coordinate use of the airspace by both manned and unmanned operations. The potential benefits of STEReO include: standardized, cross-platform communication means increased interoperability and ease of cooperation/collaboration, increased situation awareness and common operating picture allow for earlier detection and decision making, and scalable to size and complexity of environment, operations, and mission objectives. This presentation serves as a status update to the activities within the STEReO project, detailing progress made in the past year, to attendees of the Tactical Fire Remote Sensing Advisory Committee (TFRSAC) spring workshop. Presentation includes two videos which are included as downloadable files, video play time for NASTA_adsb_+_UAS_v2.mp4 1 min 55 secs, for NASTA_eng315_v2.mp4 1 min 34 secs.

emergency response operations↗
NASA NTRS2013

Security Risk Assessment Process for UAS in the NAS CNPC Architecture

This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper.

Iannicca, Dennis C.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Initial Experimental Airworthiness Certification Guidance for UAS. UAS Experimental Certification Process and Guidance

This paper addresses the regulatory processes and requirements already in place by which an applicant might obtain experimental airworthiness certification for a civil Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). It is more extensive and subsequent to an earlier, similar deliverable, PD007, which was an interim study of the same topic. Since few regulatory airworthiness and operating standards exist for UAS like those for traditional manned aircraft and since most UAS have historically been developed and operated under military auspices, civil use of UAS in the NAS is a new and unfamiliar challenge requiring specific and unique considerations. Experimental certification is the most basic level of FAA approval toward routine UAS operation in the NAS. The paper reviews and explains existing FAA requirements for an applicant seeking experimental airworthiness approval and details the process for submission of necessary information. It summarizes the limited purposes for which experimental aircraft may be used and addresses pertinent aspects of UAS design, construction and operation in the NAS in harmony with traditional manned aircraft. Policy IPT position is that UAS, while different from manned aircraft, can use the same initial processes to gain civil operating experience under the experimental approval. Particular note is taken of those UAS-unique characteristics which require extra attention to assure equivalent safety of operation, such as the UAS control station and sense-and-avoid. The paper also provides "best practices" guidance for UAS manufacturers and FAA personnel in two appendices. The material in Appendix A is intended to provide guidance on assuring UAS safety to FAA, and provides FAA personnel with a suggested list of items to review, with a focus on UAS unique factors, prior to issuance of an experimental airworthiness certificate. Appendix B provides an outline for a program letter which a manufacturer could use in preparing the application for an UAS experimental airworthiness certificate.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2018

UAS-Based P-Band Signals of Opportunity for Remote Sensing of Snow and Root Zone Soil Moisture

We have developed the P-band Signals of Opportunity (SoOp) sensor based on the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) to remotely sense Snow Water Equivalent (SWE) and Root Zone Soil Moisture (RZSM). The P-band UAS SoOp sensor for Hydrology (UASHydro) would operate on the S2 aircraft developed by Black Swift Technologies for sensing of SWE and RZSM with a spatial resolution of about 10m. Root-zone soil moisture and snow water storage in land are critical parameters of the water cycle. The long-term goal of our development would be to use small UAS to perform regional high resolution observation of two key hydrological measurements to improve the estimation of terrestrial water storage for water management, crop production and forecasts of natural hazard. The UASHydro concept utilizes passive receivers to detect the reflection of strong existing P-band radio signals at the 360-380 MHz band from geostationary Mobile Use Objective System (MUOS) communication satellites launched by the US Navy. The SWE remote sensing measurement principle using the P-band SoOp is based on the propagation delay (or phase change) of radio signals through the snowpack. The time delay of the reflected signal due to the snowpack with respect to snow-free conditions is directly proportional to the snowpack SWE, while the soil moisture can be retrieved from the reflectivity at the P-band frequencies for MUOS. We have been conducting ground-based campaigns to test the instrumentation and data processing methods at the Fraser Experimental Forest in Colorado since February 2016. The field campaign data has provided support to the measurement concept. To install the SoOp technologies on the UAS, a lightweight antenna has been built and interfaces with the S2 built by Black Swift Technologies have been completed. A set of flights have been planned starting April 2018 through the end of 2018 in Colorado.

Elston, Jack↗
NASA NTRS2016

UAS Traffic Management (UTM) Simulation Capabilities and Laboratory Environment

NASA has engaged in collaborative research with the FAA to explore the concepts and requirements necessary to enable the safe and scalable application of small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in low-altitude airspace. In this effort, the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project has developed a multi-faceted simulation component that supports near-term live flight testing in addition to further term concept exploration. This paper provides an overview of the simulation capabilities currently available as part of the UTM project and the laboratory environment in which they are applied.

Homola, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS2006

Functional Requirements Document for HALE UAS Operations in the NAS: Step 1. Version 3

The purpose of this Functional Requirements Document (FRD) is to compile the functional requirements needed to achieve the Access 5 Vision of "operating High Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) routinely, safely, and reliably in the national airspace system (NAS)" for Step 1. These functional requirements could support the development of a minimum set of policies, procedures and standards by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and various standards organizations. It is envisioned that this comprehensive body of work will enable the FAA to establish and approve regulations to govern safe operation of UAS in the NAS on a routine or daily "file and fly" basis. The approach used to derive the functional requirements found within this FRD was to decompose the operational requirements and objectives identified within the Access 5 Concept of Operations (CONOPS) into the functions needed to routinely and safely operate a HALE UAS in the NAS. As a result, four major functional areas evolved to enable routine and safe UAS operations for an on-demand basis in the NAS. These four major functions are: Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, and Avoid Hazards. All of the functional requirements within this document can be directly traceable to one of these four major functions. Some functions, however, are traceable to several, or even all, of these four major functions. These cross-cutting functional requirements support the "Command / Control: function as well as the "Manage Contingencies" function. The requirements associated to these high-level functions and all of their supporting low-level functions are addressed in subsequent sections of this document.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2015

Airspace Safety Threshold Study: NAS-Wide Encounter Rate Evaluation Using Historical Radar Data and ACES

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of performance standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements as well as the safety substantiation and end-to-end assessment of DAA system performance. With regard to the safety aspect being studied by the SC-228 DAA Safety sub-group, NASA has conducted a study using the ACES (Airspace Concept Evaluation System) simulation capability to determine: 1) the rate at which IFR aircraft encounter other IFR and VFR aircraft, and 2) the rate at which UAS aircraft encounter VFR aircraft as well as the corresponding encounter geometries. Five different separation thresholds were used (two for encounter and one each for well-clear, near mid-air collision, and closest point of approach). The results will be used by the SC-228 DAA Safety sub-group to inform decisions about the safety aspect of UAS DAA systems and future requirements development and validation efforts.

encounter geometry↗
NASA NTRS2019

Demonstrating Next Generation High-Altitude, Long Endurance Aircraft for Earth Science

This paper will address NASA activities to monitor and study Earth processes from long-duration unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). NASA is currently supporting both large and small UAS development and demonstration. In a follow-on to previous work, NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center is hosting test flights of a large AeroVironment solar-powered aircraft, while NASA Ames Research Center is supporting the demonstration of a light-weight solar powered aircraft by Swift Engineering. Both are designed for long duration, multi-day flight. NASA Earth Science and Aeronautics researchers have been involved in the development and use of High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) UAS since the 1990's. The NASA Environmental Research Aircraft Sensor and Technology Program (ERAST) demonstrated the promise of HALE aircraft for providing observations while also proving the importance of triple-redundant avionics to improve system reliability for large unmanned aircraft. Early efforts to develop an operational HALE capability for earth observations languished for nearly two decades owing to insufficient solar panel efficiency, battery power density, and light-weight, yet strong, materials. During this time NASA researchers focused on using the Global Hawk to demonstrate the utility of providing diurnal measurements over severe storms (i.e. HS3) and to track stratospheric water vapor transport (ATTREX). Recent significant commercial investments are now leading to the realization of a long-held goal of week- to month-long sustained observations and measurements from the stratosphere. In addition to a historical review of NASA use and interest in HALE aircraft, this paper will present current concepts for exploiting current and planned HALE aircraft capabilities including in situ characterization of atmospheric composition and dynamics as well as imagery collection and internet connectivity. NASA researchers anticipate HALE will also provide a useful means to test smallsat instruments and components. Observations from HALE-based instruments might also provide useful gap-filler observations to flagship satellite missions where the repeat time doesn't allow for measurements of quickly changing phenomenon. HALE will likely also provide measurements and communications relay to facilitate other aircraft in multi-aircraft campaigns. We will also report on progress towards a NASA-supported flight tests solar electric vehicles planned for 2019. One is the Swift Engineering UAS designed to carry 7kg (15lbs) for 30 days at 20km altitude. The other is the AeroVironment Hawk 30, also designed for multi-day flight.

high-altitude↗
NASA NTRS2017

UAS Well Clear Recovery Against Non-Cooperative Intruders Using Vertical Maneuvers

This paper documents a study that drove the development of a mathematical expression in the detect-and-avoid (DAA) minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This equation describes the conditions under which vertical maneuver guidance should be provided during recovery of DAA well clear separation with a non-cooperative VFR aircraft. Although the original hypothesis was that vertical maneuvers for DAA well clear recovery should only be offered when sensor vertical rate errors are small, this paper suggests that UAS climb and descent performance should be considered-in addition to sensor errors for vertical position and vertical rate-when determining whether to offer vertical guidance. A fast-time simulation study involving 108,000 encounters between a UAS and a non-cooperative visual-flight-rules aircraft was conducted. Results are presented showing that, when vertical maneuver guidance for DAA well clear recovery was suppressed, the minimum vertical separation increased by roughly 50 feet (or horizontal separation by 500 to 800 feet). However, the percentage of encounters that had a risk of collision when performing vertical well clear recovery maneuvers was reduced as UAS vertical rate performance increased and sensor vertical rate errors decreased. A class of encounter is identified for which vertical-rate error had a large effect on the efficacy of horizontal maneuvers due to the difficulty of making the correct left/right turn decision: crossing conflict with intruder changing altitude. Overall, these results support logic that would allow vertical maneuvers when UAS vertical performance is sufficient to avoid the intruder, based on the intruder's estimated vertical position and vertical rate, as well as the vertical rate error of the UAS' sensor.

UAS in the NAS↗
NASA NTRS2017

UAS Well Clear Recovery Against Non-Cooperative Intruders Using Vertical Maneuvers

This paper documents a study that drove the development of a mathematical expression in the minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) of detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This equation describes the conditions under which vertical maneuver guidance could be provided during recovery of well clear separation with a non-cooperative VFR aircraft in addition to horizontal maneuver guidance. Although suppressing vertical maneuver guidance in these situations increased the minimum horizontal separation from 500 to 800 feet, the maximum severity of loss of well clear increased in about 35 of the encounters compared to when a vertical maneuver was preferred and allowed. Additionally, analysis of individual cases led to the identification of a class of encounter where vertical rate error had a large effect on horizontal maneuvers due to the difficulty of making the correct left-right turn decision: crossing conflict with intruder changing altitude. These results supported allowing vertical maneuvers when UAS vertical performance exceeds the relative vertical position and velocity accuracy of the DAA tracker given the current velocity of the UAS and the relative vertical position and velocity estimated by the DAA tracker. Looking ahead, these results indicate a need to improve guidance algorithms by utilizing maneuver stability and near mid-air collision risk when determining maneuver guidance to regain well clear separation.

detect and avoid↗