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The development of guidelines for dynamic design and test criteria has recently been ititiated under the sponsorship of the Office of Safety and Mission Quality, NASA Headquarters.
In the 23'd Annual SFCG meeting in San Diego, CA, the SFCG created SFCG Action Item No. 23/10 to provide a readable summary of the work done by the Mars Interim Working Group (MIWG). The SFCG created the MIWG to develop a frequency plan for future Mars missions. The working group has produced a number of documents resulting in a recommendation, SFCG Rec 22-1 [1], titled Frequency Assignment Guidelines for Communications in Mars Region, including a frequency plan for the Mars Region. This document is prepared in response to the SFCG Action Item to provide an overview of the considerations taken when selecting the frequencies and to point out where detailed information of the considerations can be found.
This document provides guidance to the FAA and manufacturers on how to develop UAS Pilot Vehicle Interfaces to safely and effectively integrate UASs into the NAS. Preliminary guidelines are provided for Aviate, Communicate, Navigate and Avoid Hazard functions. The pilot shall have information and control capability so that pilot-UA interactions are not adverse, unfavorable, nor compromise safety. Unfavorable interactions include anomalous aircraft-pilot coupling (APC) interactions (closed loop), pilot-involved oscillations (categories I, II or III), and non-oscillatory APC events (e.g., divergence). - Human Systems Integration Pilot-Technology Interface Requirements for Command, Control, and Communications (C3)
This document presents guidelines for the design of quiet fans and pumps of the class used on space vehicles. A simple procedure is presented for the prediction of fan noise over the meaningful frequency spectrum. A section also presents general design criteria for axial flow fans, squirrel cage fans, centrifugal fans, and centrifugal pumps. The basis for this report is an experimental program conducted by Hamilton Standard under NASA Contract NAS 9-12457. The derivations of the noise predicting methods used in this document are explained in Hamilton Standard Report SVHSER 6183, "Fan and Pump Noise Control," dated May 1973 (6).
In-plane tensile stress-strain, tensile creep, and after-creep retained tensile properties of melt-infiltrated SiC-SiC composites reinforced with different fiber types were evaluated with an emphasis on obtaining simple or first-order microstructural design guidelines for these in-plane mechanical properties. Using the mini-matrix approach to model stress-strain behavior and the results of this study, three basic general design criteria for stress and strain limits are formulated, namely a design stress limit, a design total strain limit, and an after-creep design retained strength limit. It is shown that these criteria can be useful for designing components for high temperature applications.
As the protection of crew health is a primary focus of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Space and Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) is vigilant in setting potable water limits for spaceflight that are health protective. Additional it is important that exposure limits not be set so stringently that water purification systems are unnecessarily over designed. With these considerations in mind, NASA has partnered with the National Research Council on Toxicology (NRCCOT) to develop spacecraft water exposure guidelines (SWEGs) for application in spaceflight systems. Based on documented guidance (NRC, 2000) NASA has established 28 SWEGs for chemical components that are particularly relevant to water systems on the International Space Station, the Shuttle and looking forward to Constellation.
This guideline discusses a standard approach for defining, determining, and addressing safety, handling, and qualification standards for lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries to help the implementation of the technology in aerospace applications. Information from a variety of other sources relating to Li-ion batteries and their aerospace uses has been collected and included in this document. The sources used are listed in the reference section at the end of this document. The Li-Ion chemistry is highly energetic due to its inherent high specific energy and its flammable electrolyte. Due to the extreme importance of appropriate design, test, and hazard control of Li-ion batteries, it is recommended that all Government and industry users and vendors of this technology for space applications, especially involving humans, use this document for appropriate guidance prior to implementing the technology.
Recently a set of guidelines, or cookbook, has been developed for modelling and refinement of control problems in Event-B. The Event-B formal method is used for system-level modelling by defining states of a system and events which act on these states. It also supports refinement of models. This cookbook is intended to systematize the process of modelling and refining a control problem system by distinguishing environment, controller and command phenomena. Our main objective in this paper is to investigate and evaluate the usefulness and effectiveness of this cookbook by following it throughout the formal modelling of cruise control system found in cars. The outcomes are identifying the benefits of the cookbook and also giving guidance to its future users.
The intent of this document is to provide guidance on when and what type of SEE tests should be performed on a device under test (DUT) based on orbit, technology, existing data, and application. It is NOT intended to provide a detailed guideline for how to perform proton SEE radiation tests on electronics.
This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This report contains the Appendices to the findings from the first year of the program's operations.
This document has been developed in the course of NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) program and is not an official endorsement of the insertion of commercial capacitors in space programs or an established set of requirements for their testing. The purpose of this document is to suggest possible ways for selection, screening, and qualification of commercial capacitors for NASA projects and open discussions in the parts engineering community related to the use of COTS ceramic capacitors. This guideline is applicable to commercial surface mount chip, simple parallel plate design, multi-layer ceramic capacitors (MLCCs) rated to voltages of 100V and less. Parts with different design, e.g. low inductance ceramic capacitors (LICA), land grid array (LGA) etc., might need additional testing and tailoring of the requirements described in this document. Although the focus of this document is on commercial MLCCs, many procedures discussed below would be beneficial for military-grade capacitors
NASA operates two Global Hawk unmanned aircraft systems for Earth Science research projects. In particular, they are used in the Hurricane and Severe Storm Sentinel (HS3) project during 2012, 2013, and 2014 to take measurements from the environment around tropical cyclones, and from directly above tropical cyclones. There is concern that strict adherence to the weather avoidance rules used in 2012 may sacrifice the ability to observe important science targets. We have proposed modifications to these weather avoidance rules that we believe will improve the ability to observe science targets without compromising aircraft safety. The previous guidelines, used in 2012, specified: Do not approach thunderstorms within 25 nm during flight at FL500 or below. When flying above FL500: Do not approach reported lightning within 25NM in areas where cloud tops are reported at FL500 or higher. Aircraft should maintain at least 10000 ft vertical separation from reported lightning if cloud tops are below FL500. No over-flight of cumulus tops higher than FL500. No flight into forecast or reported icing conditions. No flight into forecast or reported moderate or severe turbulence Based on past experience with high-altitude flights over tropical cyclones, we have recommended changing this guidance to: Do not approach thunderstorms within 25 nm during flight at FL500 or below. Aircraft should maintain at least 5000 ft vertical separation from significant convective cloud tops except: a) When cloud tops above FL500: In the event of reported significant lightning activity or indicators of significant overshooting tops, do not approach within 10-25 nm, depending on pilot discretion and advice from Mission Scientist. b) When cloud tops are below FL500, maintain 10000 ft separation from reported significant lightning or indicators of significant overshooting tops. No flight into forecasted or reported icing conditions. No flight into forecasted or reported moderate or severe turbulence The key changes have to do with overflight of high convective cloud tops and those producing lightning. Experience shows that most tropical oceanic convection (including that in tropical cyclones) is relatively gentle even if the cloud tops are quite high, and can be safely overflown. Exceptions are convective elements producing elevated lightning flash rates (more than just the occasional flash, which would trigger avoidance under the previous rules) and significant overshooting cloud tops.
Heritage is important for both cost and risk related issues and as such, it is heavily discussed in NASA proposal evaluations. If used and communicated efficiently, heritage can lower both the perception of risk and the associated costs. Definitions of heritage vary between engineering, cost, and scientific communities, but when applied appropriately, heritage provides a benefit to the proposed mission. By making an instrument at least once before, the cost of producing it again can be reduced. The time and effort needed to develop the instrument concept and test the product represent an expense that can be lowered through the use of a previously built and developed instrument. This same thought can be applied when using a flight spare or build-to-print model of the heritage instrument. The lowered perception of risk is a result of the confidence gained in the instrument through successful use in the target environment. This is extremely important in early mission development to the evaluation board. This analysis will use JPL-managed proposals from 2003 to 2011, including Discovery, New Frontiers, and Mars Scout missions. Through the examination of these proposals and their associated debriefs, a set of guidelines have been created for successful use and communication of instrument heritage in early mission development
The Cassini spacecraft was launched on October 15, 1997 and arrived at Saturn on June 30, 2004. It has performed detailed observations and remote sensing of Saturn, its rings, and its satellites since that time. Cassini deployed the European-built Huygens probe, which descended through the Titan atmosphere (Saturn's largest moon) and landed on its surface on January 14, 2005. The Cassini mission has recently been approved by NASA to continue through September of 2017. This 7-year extension is called the Solstice mission and it presents challenges to the spacecraft operations team and its ability to maintain the health of the spacecraft. To keep the spacecraft healthy for 7 more years, the spacecraft team must carefully manage hydrazine use (about 48% of the 132 kg launch load remains as of January 2011). A vital part of conserving hydrazine is to use the reaction wheel assembly (RWA) control system for precise pointing and slews wherever possible. In any given week, the Cassini spacecraft is commanded to use RWA control about 99% of the time, with about 1% of the time requiring reaction control system (RCS) thruster control (to perform Delta V course corrections or to bias the RWA momentum). Such extensive use of the RWA hardware throughout the mission requires that the RWAs be operated in a way that minimizes degradation in the RWA electronics, DC motor, and spin bearing for each reaction wheel. Three consumables in particular have been identified for the RWAs: (1) Total number of revolutions for each RWA. (2) Time spent at very low wheel speeds. At these low speeds, good elasto-hydrodynamic (EHD) film lubrication may be compromised. (3) Total number of on/off power cycles. The second of these consumables, minimizing the time spent at very low wheel speeds, is especially important to keep the spin bearing healthy and well-lubricated. These consumables are actively managed by the attitude control operations team throughout the mission. One vital management technique is to predict individual RWA momentum (given the pointing and slews that are needed to collect the best science) and to bias the RWA momentum in a way that reduces both the total number of revolutions as well as the time spent below EHD wheel speed. Another strategy to protect RWA health is to alter the planned pointing of the spacecraft (which can affect science collection) so that the RWA consumables are conserved. This paper focuses on why this second technique is needed, and discusses how guidelines have been developed by the attitude control team which affects the planned science pointing, so that science data can be most optimally collected while still minimizing RWA consumable usage.
The Columbia Scientific Balloon Facility is responsible for ensuring that science payloads meet the appropriate design requirements. The ultimate goal is to ensure that payloads stay within the allowable launch limits as well as survive the termination event. The purpose of this presentation is to provide some general guidelines for Gondola Design. These include rules and reasons on why CSBF has a certain preference and location for certain components within the gondola as well as other suggestions. Additionally, some recommendations are given on how to avoid common pitfalls.
This presentation describes aerodynamics and performance X-plane airworthiness guidelines and best practices.
Today's launch vehicles complex electronic and avionics systems heavily utilize Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) integrated circuits (IC) for their superb speed and reconfiguration capabilities. Consequently, FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols such as MILSTD- 1553B and in control signal commands such as in solenoid valve actuations. This paper will identify reliability concerns and high level guidelines to estimate FPGA total failure rates in a launch vehicle application. The paper will discuss hardware, hardware description language, and radiation induced failures. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the IC. The hardware description language portion will discuss the high level FPGA programming languages and software/code reliability growth. The radiation portion will discuss FPGA susceptibility to space environment radiation.
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) integrated circuits (IC) are one of the key electronic components in today's sophisticated launch and space vehicle complex avionic systems, largely due to their superb reprogrammable and reconfigurable capabilities combined with relatively low non-recurring engineering costs (NRE) and short design cycle. Consequently, FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols and control signal commands. This paper will identify reliability concerns and high level guidelines to estimate FPGA total failure rates in a launch vehicle application. The paper will discuss hardware, hardware description language, and radiation induced failures. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the IC. The hardware description language portion will discuss the high level FPGA programming languages and software/code reliability growth. The radiation portion will discuss FPGA susceptibility to space environment radiation.