Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “hardware failure”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 253 records · Page 14

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the reaction control system, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Reaction Control System (RCS). The RCS is situated in three independent modules, one forward in the orbiter nose and one in each OMS/RCS pod. Each RCS module consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization Subsystem; Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem; Thruster Subsystem; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and the potential critical items list.

Burkemper, V. J.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power generation/fuel cell powerplant subsystem FMEA/CIL

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Fuel Cell Powerplant (EPG/FCP) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPG/FCP hardware.

Brown, K. L.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbiter main propulsion system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. The Orbiter MPS is composed of the Propellant Management Subsystem (PMS) consisting of the liquid oxygen (LO2) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) subsystems and the helium subsystem. The PMS is a system of manifolds, distribution lines, and valves by which the liquid propellants pass from the External Tank to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The helium subsystem consists of a series of helium supply tanks and their associated regulators, control valves, and distribution lines. Volume 1 contains the MPS description, assessment results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Slaughter, B. C.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and includes the potential critical items list.

Holden, K. A.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 4

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 4 contains the IOA analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Slaughter, B. C.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the life support and airlock support systems, volume 2

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Life Support and Airlock Support Systems (LSS and ALSS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. The discrepancies were flagged for potential future resolution. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LSS and ALSS hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Barickman, K.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the atmospheric revitalization pressure control subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL proposed Post 51-L updates based upon the CCB/PRCB presentations and an informal criticality summary listing. A discussion of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ARPCS hardware.

Saiidi, M. J.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the purge, vent and drain subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Purge, Vent and Drain (PV and D) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter PV and D hardware. The PV and D Subsystem controls the environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities, senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET disconnect.

Bynum, M. C., III↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem, Volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

Getting expert systems off the ground: Lessons learned from integrating model-based diagnostics with prototype flight hardware

As an initial attempt to introduce expert system technology into an onboard environment, a model based diagnostic system using the TRW MARPLE software tool was integrated with prototype flight hardware and its corresponding control software. Because this experiment was designed primarily to test the effectiveness of the model based reasoning technique used, the expert system ran on a separate hardware platform, and interactions between the control software and the model based diagnostics were limited. While this project met its objective of showing that model based reasoning can effectively isolate failures in flight hardware, it also identified the need for an integrated development path for expert system and control software for onboard applications. In developing expert systems that are ready for flight, artificial intelligence techniques must be evaluated to determine whether they offer a real advantage onboard, identify which diagnostic functions should be performed by the expert systems and which are better left to the procedural software, and work closely with both the hardware and the software developers from the beginning of a project to produce a well designed and thoroughly integrated application.

Stephan, Amy↗

Spacecraft Software Maintenance: An Effective Approach to Reducing Costs and Increasing Science Return

Flight software is a mission critical element of spacecraft functionality and performance. When ground operations personnel interface to a spacecraft, they are typically dealing almost entirely with the capabilities of onboard software. This software, even more than critical ground/flight communications systems, is expected to perform perfectly during all phases of spacecraft life. Due to the fact that it can be reprogrammed on-orbit to accommodate degradations or failures in flight hardware, new insights into spacecraft characteristics, new control options which permit enhanced science options, etc., the on- orbit flight software maintenance team is usually significantly responsible for the long term success of a science mission. Failure of flight software to perform as needed can result in very expensive operations work-around costs and lost science opportunities. There are three basic approaches to maintaining spacecraft software--namely using the original developers, using the mission operations personnel, or assembling a center of excellence for multi-spacecraft software maintenance. Not planning properly for flight software maintenance can lead to unnecessarily high on-orbit costs and/or unacceptably long delays, or errors, in patch installations. A common approach for flight software maintenance is to access the original development staff. The argument for utilizing the development staff is that the people who developed the software will be the best people to modify the software on-orbit. However, it can quickly becomes a challenge to obtain the services of these key people. They may no longer be available to the organization. They may have a more urgent job to perform, quite likely on another project under different project management. If they havn't worked on the software for a long time, they may need precious time for refamiliarization to the software, testbeds and tools. Further, a lack of insight into issues related to flight software in its on-orbit environment, may find the developer unprepared for the challenges. The second approach is to train a member of the flight operations team to maintain the spacecraft software. This can prove to be a costly and inflexible solution. The person assigned to this duty may not have enough work to do during a problem free period and may have too much to do when a problem arises. If the person is a talented software engineer, he/she may not enjoy the limited software opportunities available in this position; and may eventually leave for newer technology computer science opportunities. Training replacement flight software personnel can be a difficult and lengthy process. The third approach is to assemble a center of excellence for on-orbit spacecraft software maintenance. Personnel in this specialty center can be managed to support flight software of multiple missions at once. The variety of challenges among a set of on-orbit missions, can result in a dedicated, talented staff which is fully trained and available to support each mission's needs. Such staff are not software developers but are rather spacecraft software systems engineers. The cost to any one mission is extremely low because the software staff works and charges, minimally on missions with no current operations issues; and their professional insight into on-orbit software troubleshooting and maintenance methods ensures low risk, effective and minimal-cost solutions to on-orbit issues.

Shell, Elaine M.↗

Pyrotechnic system failures: Causes and prevention

Although pyrotechnics have successfully accomplished many critical mechanical spacecraft functions, such as ignition, severance, jettisoning and valving (excluding propulsion), failures continue to occur. Provided is a listing of 84 failures of pyrotechnic hardware with completed design over a 23-year period, compiled informally by experts from every NASA Center, as well as the Air Force Space Division and the Naval Surface Warfare Center. Analyses are presented as to when and where these failures occurred, their technical source or cause, followed by the reasons why and how these kinds of failures persist. The major contributor is a fundamental lack of understanding of the functional mechanisms of pyrotechnic devices and systems, followed by not recognizing pyrotechnics as an engineering technology, insufficient manpower with hands-on experience, too few test facilities, and inadequate guidelines and specifications for design, development, qualification and acceptance. Recommendations are made on both a managerial and technical basis to prevent failures, increase reliability, improve existing and future designs, and develop the technology to meet future requirements.

Bement, Laurence J.↗

The Certification of Environmental Chambers for Testing Flight Hardware

The JPL chamber certification process for ensuring that test chambers used to test flight hardware meet a minimum standard is critical to the safety of the hardware and personnel. Past history has demonstrated that this process is important due to the catastrophic incidents that could occur if the chamber is not set up correctly. Environmental testing is one of the last phases in the development of a subsystem, and it typically occurs just before integration of flight hardware into the fully assembled flight system. A seemingly insignificant -miscalculation or missed step can necessitate rebuilding or replacing a subsystem due to over-testing or damage from the test chamber. Conversely, under-testing might fail to detect weaknesses that might cause failure when the hardware is in service. This paper describes the process that identifies the many variables that comprise the testing scenario and screening of as built chambers, the training of qualified operators, and a general "what-to-look-for" in minimum standards.

Vacuum Chamber↗

The Certification of Environmental Chambers for Testing Flight Hardware

The JPL chamber certification process for ensuring that test chambers used to test flight hardware meet a minimum standard is critical to the safety of the hardware and personnel. Past history as demonstrated that this process is important due to the catastrophic incidents that could occur if the chamber is not set up correctly. Environmental testing is one of the last phases in the development of a subsystem, and it typically occurs just before integration of flight hardware into the fully assembled flight system. A seemingly insignificant -miscalculation or missed step can necessitate rebuilding or replacing a subsystem due to over-testing or damage from the test chamber. Conversely, under-testing might fail to detect weaknesses that might cause failure when the hardware is in service. This paper describes the process that identifies the many variables that comprise the testing scenario and screening of as built chambers, the training of qualified operators, and a general "what-to-look-for" in minimum standards.

Thermal↗

High availability through full redundancy of the CMS detector controls system

The CMS detector control system (DCS) is responsible for controlling and monitoring the detector status and for the operation of all CMS sub detectors and infrastructure. This is required to ensure safe and efficient data taking so that high quality physics data can be recorded. The current system architecture is composed of more than 100 servers in order to provide the required processing resources. An optimization of the system software and hardware architecture is under development to ensure redundancy of all the controlled subsystems and to reduce any downtime due to hardware or software failures. The new optimized structure is based mainly on powerful and highly reliable blade servers and makes use of a fully redundant approach, guaranteeing high availability and reliability. The analysis of the requirements, the challenges, the improvements and the optimized system architecture as well as its specific hardware and software solutions are presented.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Prototype part task trainer: A remote manipulator system simulator

The Part Task Trainer program (PTT) is a kinematic simulation of the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) for the orbiter. The purpose of the PTT is to supply a low cost man-in-the-loop simulator, allowing the student to learn operational procedures which then can be used in the more expensive full scale simulators. PTT will allow the crew members to work on their arm operation skills without the need for other people running the simulation. The controlling algorithms for the arm were coded out of the Functional Subsystem Requirements Document to ensure realistic operation of the simulation. Relying on the hardware of the workstation to provide fast refresh rates for full shaded images allows the simulation to be run on small low cost stand alone work stations, removing the need to be tied into a multi-million dollar computer for the simulation. PTT will allow the student to make errors which in full scale mock up simulators might cause failures or damage hardware. On the screen the user is shown a graphical representation of the RMS control panel in the aft cockpit of the orbiter, along with a main view window and up to six trunion and guide windows. The dials drawn on the panel may be turned to select the desired mode of operation. The inputs controlling the arm are read from a chair with a Translational Hand Controller (THC) and a Rotational Hand Controller (RHC) attached to it.

Shores, David↗

Integrating renewal process modeling with Probabilistic Physics-of-Failure: Application to Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) frequency estimations in nuclear power plants

Renewal process modeling is used for the failure prediction of hardware components under periodic maintenance. While most studies utilized data-driven approaches to estimate the input parameters for renewal process models, this paper initiates a line of research to integrate renewal process modeling with probabilistic models of underlying mechanisms associated with physical degradation and maintenance. At this stage of the research, the methodology integrates Markov modeling with Probabilistic Physics-of-Failure (PPoF) models of degradation, while maintenance is treated by a data-driven approach. This methodology is valuable to obtain a more accurate estimation of component reliability and availablity, especially when (i) components are highly reliable, and failure data are limited, (ii) historical data are unreliable due to changes in design, operation, and maintenance, or (iii) advanced technologies have emerged limiting operational data. The methodology explicitly incorporates the underlying spatiotemporal causes of failure into the renewal model, allowing to rank the criticality of causal factors to improve maintenance and mitigation strategies. Although the new methodology is applicable for component reliability and availability analysis in diverse industries, this report demonstrates its value for estimating frequencies of a Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (LOCA), which is an initiating event in Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs).

42 ENGINEERING↗