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At least 253 records · Page 14

High Reliability Requires More than Providing Spares

It is sometimes optimistically hoped that a space life support system can be kept working throughout a long duration mission by repairing failed components, as long as sufficient spares are flown. It is usually assumed that the components have constant known failure rates. Then the needed numbers of spares can be computed to have any particular probability that all failed components can be replaced by available spares. This approach can provide high reliability if its favorable assumptions, including constant known failure rates, are satisfied. Other favorable assumptions are that the failures are statistically independent, repair will be successful without causing further failures, and all failures are due to internal component failures. These assumptions are not usually justified. The failure rates may be estimates that are inadequately verified because of insufficient testing. Failure rates may change due to materials substitutions, manufacturing changes, redesigns to fix failures, and new failures caused by redesigns. Failures that are not statistically independent may result from one common cause, such as a design or manufacturing error or a cascade of cause and effect, possibly caused by an external event such as a power outage. Repair may be unsuccessful or cause damage. Many failures occur at component interfaces or at the overall systems level, not within isolated components. Other failures causes are completely external to the system, due to assembly, maintenance, and operational errors or to unexpected environmental challenges. Replacement with sufficient spares can compensate for expected internal component failures but may not be able to cope with unpredictable design and manufacturing flaws, human errors, and environmental impacts. Reliability estimates based on providing sufficient spares to compensate for expected failures may be far too high. They are essentially upper bounds on reliability that might be approached if many frequent but often unconsidered failure causes can be eliminated.

spares↗

Human Factors Engineering Guidelines for Overhead Cranes

This guideline provides standards for overhead crane cabs that can be applied to the design and modification of crane cabs to reduce the potential for human error due to design. This guideline serves as an aid during the development of a specification for purchases of cranes or for an engineering support request for crane design modification. It aids human factors engineers in evaluating existing cranes during accident investigations or safety reviews.

Chandler, Faith↗

The problem of automation: Inappropriate feedback and interaction, not overautomation

As automation increasingly takes its place in industry, especially high-risk industry, it is often blamed for causing harm and increasing the chance of human error when failures occur. It is proposed that the problem is not the presence of automation, but rather its inappropriate design. The problem is that the operations are performed appropriately under normal conditions, but there is inadequate feedback and interaction with the humans who must control the overall conduct of the task. When the situations exceed the capabilities of the automatic equipment, then the inadequate feedback leads to difficulties for the human controllers. The problem is that the automation is at an intermediate level of intelligence, powerful enough to take over control that which used to be done by people, but not powerful enough to handle all abnormalities. Moreover, its level of intelligence is insufficient to provide the continual, appropriate feedback that occurs naturally among human operators. To solve this problem, the automation should either be made less intelligent or more so, but the current level is quite inappropriate. The overall message is that it is possible to reduce error through appropriate design considerations.

Norman, Donald A.↗

The 'problem' with automation - Inappropriate feedback and interaction, not 'over-automation'

Automation in high-risk industry is often blamed for causing harm and increasing the chance of human error when failures occur. It is proposed that the problem is not the presence of automation, but rather its inappropriate design. The problem is that the operations are performed appropriately under normal conditions, but there is inadequate feedback and interaction with the humans who must control the overall conduct of the task. The problem is that the automation is at an intermediate level of intelligence, powerful enough to take over control which used to be done by people, but not powerful enough to handle all abnormalities. Moreover, its level of intelligence is insufficient to provide the continual, appropriate feedback that occurs naturally among human operators. To solve this problem, the automation should either be made less intelligent or more so, but the current level is quite inappropriate. The overall message is that it is possible to reduce error through appropriate design considerations.

Norman, D. A.↗

Planned Investigations to Address Acute Central Nervous System Effects of Space Radiation Exposure with Human Performance Data

This work intends to generate evidence of acute, incremental human performance decrement similar to that due to space radiation andits impacts on the brain, to accompany ongoing human performance modeling work. The planned work will explore the boundaries of human behavioral and performance decrement after exposure to stress, which may be expected based in part on rodent responses found afterexposure to ionizing radiation. The collection of evidence via simulation studies can characterize real human errors toward determining what stress levels lead to significantly-low levels of performance (below permissible outcome limits) which would imperilmission accomplishment. If mission-relevant animal-study-linked tasks are used, human and animal performance levels may be aligned to enable quantitative assignment of permissible exposure limits based on animal exposure studies. Ultimately, a transfer function between the performances of exposed rodents and humans under stress can be developed using shared impairment mechanisms.

human performance↗

Non-Traditional Displays for Mission Monitoring

Advances in automation capability and reliability have changed the role of humans from operating and controlling processes to simply monitoring them for anomalies. However, humans are traditionally bad monitors of highly reliable systems over time. Thus, the human is assigned a task for which he is ill equipped. We believe that this has led to the dominance of human error in process control activities such as operating transportation systems (aircraft and trains), monitoring patient health in the medical industry, and controlling plant operations. Research has shown, though, that an automated monitor can assist humans in recognizing and dealing with failures. One possible solution to this predicament is to use a polar-star display that will show deviations from normal states based on parameters that are most indicative of mission health.

Trujillo, Anna C.↗

Reliability Assessment of Safety-Critical Network Communication in a Digitalized Nuclear Power Plant

In analog instrumentation and control (I and C) systems for nuclear power plants (NPPs), most connections are comprised of hardwired point-to-point types. Since they are based on analog technologies, they are fragile to noise and require analog-to-digital conversion time. Therefore, many NPPs have adopted communication network for the exchange of safety-critical data between programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in digital I and C systems to effectively accommodate a huge number of field controllers. However, the primary issue of digital network communication in a safety-critical system involves potential hazards, such as partial or total loss of communication between PLCs, which may result in a failure of safety critical signal generation when it is needed. Therefore, the probability that a safety-critical system in digitalized NPP becomes unsafe due to a network failure must be evaluated to quantify the risk of digital I and C system. In Korea, the Engineered Safety Feature-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) was developed as one of the digital safety-critical system in Advanced Power Reactor- 1400 (APR-1400). The function of a digital engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation system and field actuator controllers of conventional NPPs are performed by the ESF-CCS. In this system, safety-critical network, High Reliable- Safety Data Network (HR-SDN), was employed for the safety-critical data transmission from group controllers (GCs) to loop controllers (LCs). In this study, a framework for assessing the reliability of a HR-SDN network communication between GCs and LCs in the ESF-CCS in addition to a fault-tree model for ESF components considering network failure between GCs and LCs were developed to assess the plant risk effect of a newly developed digitalized ESF-CCS. Based on the case studies and cut set analysis, the risk effect of network failure on plant risk and the important risk contributors of network failure were quantitatively addressed. A framework for identifying the potential hazardous states of network communication in the ESFCCS was proposed. In addition, a fault-tree model for network communication failure was developed to estimate the risk effects of network failure between the GCs and LCs on ESF-CCS signal failure. The developed fault-tree model was then applied to several case studies. The fault-tree model of ESF-CCS signal failure for ESF components required for various mitigation actions regarding NPP DBAs was designed by considering the identified hazardous states of network failure that would result in a failure to provide input signals to the corresponding LC. As a sensitivity study, three case studies were performed based on the periodic test methods for hardware components in HR-SDN module and their test intervals in this study. The quantitative results for three case studies demonstrated that the probability of overall network communication failure, which was calculated as the sum of the failure probability associated with each failure cause, contributed up to 1.58% on the Small-LOCA CD frequency. The results also revealed the important basic events related to network failure in the case studies which included CCF of hardware and software in HR-SDN module. This study is expected to provide insight into the development of the fault-tree model for the network failure in digital I and C system and into the quantification of the risk effect of network failure for safety-critical data transmission in NPPs. As a further study, the risk effects of network failure in the ESF-CCS on the plant risk can be estimated in a more detailed manner by analyzing the failure modes and causes in a sub-component level and the fault detection coverage of the fault tolerance techniques for network failure implemented in ESF-CCS after the detailed configuration of ESF-CCS is decided. In terms of the failure of manual ESF actuation, the relationship among the human action failures must be investigated to consider multiple human error condition since ESF-CCS provides multiple manual actuation to assure the diversity of the system. Since the conventional HEP method cannot accommodate the multiple conditions in a fault tree, condition-based human reliability assessment (CBHRA) method or the dynamic human reliability modeling approach can be applied to include a complex relationship among the automated safety signal generation and the human operator's manual actuation, avoiding the optimistic estimation of HEP of the human action failure.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Planned Investigations to Address Acute Central Nervous System Effects of Space Radiation Exposure with Human Performance Data

This work intends to generate evidence of acute, incremental human performance decrement similar to that due to space radiation and its impacts on the brain, to accompany ongoing human performance modeling work. The planned work will explore the boundaries of human behavioral and performance decrement after expo-sure to stress, which may be expected based in part on rodent responses found after exposure to ionizing radiation. The collection of evidence via simulation studies can characterize real human errors toward determining what stress levels lead to significantly-low levels of performance (below permissible outcome limits) which would imperil mission accomplishment. If mission-relevant yet animal-study-linked tasks are used, human and animal performance levels may be aligned to enable quantitative assignment of permissible exposure limits based on animal exposure studies. Ultimately, a transfer function between the performances of exposed rodents and humans under stress can be developed using shared impairment mechanisms.

human performance↗

An Analysis of Grid Operator Survey Responses: Inexperience, Workload and Fatigue in the Control Room

Although a wide array of tools and technologies have been developed over the last decade to support power grid operators, deployment of these tools has been less successful. One reason for unsuccessful deployment may be an inadequate understanding of the factors that contribute to operator error in the control room. An analysis of operators’ current vulnerabilities may provide the baseline understanding needed to inform new technology integration. In an attempt to learn more about these vulnerabilities and their perceived impact on human error we collected and analyzed survey data from 20 electric grid control room operators. We asked survey respondents to consider the various operator, technology and interaction vulnerabilities that may arise during work in the control room and record their attitudes and experiences toward each. Results suggest operator inexperience, high mental workload and fatigue are the most common vulnerabilities experienced during a shift. Survey results were analyzed to explore these vulnerabilities in greater depth.

Inexperience, Workload, Fatigue↗

Data-Enabled Fusion Technology (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

Advancing Scientific Understanding in Fusion Energy and Machine Learning This research represented a significant step forward in machine learning (ML) applications for fusion energy experiments. The project integrated advanced data-driven modeling, optimization techniques, and artificial intelligence to enhance the predictive capabilities and operational efficiency of plasma-based fusion systems. Specifically, tasks focused on ML-enhanced diagnostics, operator guidance tools, and predictive modeling helped improve the ability to interpret complex fusion experiments. Key areas of advancement included: 1) data-driven plasma control, i.e., using ML algorithms to optimize experimental conditions and classify plasma behaviors based on historical data; 2) spectroscopy and diagnostics, i.e., applying AI models to extract previously inaccessible insights from experimental spectroscopy data; and 3) configuration mapping and operator guidance, i.e., developing a predictive framework to assist scientists in identifying the most effective experimental parameters, reducing reliance on manual adjustments. By refining these ML-driven techniques, the project contributed to the broader scientific community’s understanding of plasma dynamics and fusion energy viability. Technical Effectiveness and Economic Feasibility The methods investigated demonstrated high technical effectiveness, as reflected in milestones assessing the predictive accuracy, performance, and optimization of fusion configurations. The development of an Operator Guidance Tool (OGT), for example, led to more precise control of plasma conditions by learning from experimental data and offering real-time adjustments. From an economic standpoint, DeFT provided: 1) the ability to reduce trial-and-error experimentation, which lowered operational costs; 2) improved data interpretation methods, which enabled more efficient resource allocation in large-scale fusion research projects; and 3) the automation of key diagnostic tasks, which reduced manual labor and human error, increasing overall efficiency. 13 The final assessments of predictive models and optimization strategies demonstrated that these approaches were scalable and could be implemented across multiple fusion energy research programs. Public Benefit and Societal Impact This project contributed directly to the broader goal of achieving sustainable and commercially viable fusion energy, which had profound implications for clean energy production and climate change mitigation. The integration of AI-driven solutions into fusion research: 1) sped up scientific discovery, accelerating progress towards achieving energy breakthroughs; 2) reduced the cost of experimentation, making fusion research more accessible; and 3) provided a framework for future AI applications in high-energy physics, benefiting adjacent fields like space exploration, material science, and renewable energy. Additionally, by fostering collaborations between AI researchers and plasma physicists, this project promoted interdisciplinary innovation that could lead to broader applications beyond fusion research.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Human Factors Throughout the Life Cycle: Lessons Learned from the Shuttle Program

With the ending of the Space Shuttle Program, it is critical that we not forget the Human Factors lessons we have learned over the years. At every phase of the life cycle, from manufacturing, processing and integrating vehicle and payload, to launch, flight operations, mission control and landing, hundreds of teams have worked together to achieve mission success in one of the most complex, high-risk socio-technical enterprises ever designed. Just as there was great diversity in the types of operations performed at every stage, there was a myriad of human factors that could further complicate these human systems. A single mishap or close call could point to issues at the individual level (perceptual or workload limitations, training, fatigue, human error susceptibilities), the task level (design of tools, procedures and aspects of the workplace), as well as the organizational level (appropriate resources, safety policies, information access and communication channels). While we have often had to learn through human mistakes and technological failures, we have also begun to understand how to design human systems in which individuals can excel, where tasks and procedures are not only safe but efficient, and how organizations can foster a proactive approach to managing risk and supporting human enterprises. Panelists will talk about their experiences as they relate human factors to a particular phase of the shuttle life cycle. They will conclude with a framework for tying together human factors lessons-learned into system-level risk management strategies.

human factors↗

Blind photovoltaic modeling intercomparison: A multidimensional data analysis and lessons learned

The Photovoltaic (PV) Performance Modeling Collaborative (PVPMC) organized a blind PV performance modeling intercomparison to allow PV modelers to blindly test their models and modeling ability against real system data. Measured weather and irradiance data were provided along with detailed descriptions of PV systems from two locations (Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA, and Roskilde, Denmark). Participants were asked to simulate the plane-of-array irradiance, module temperature, and DC power output from six systems and submit their results to Sandia for processing. The results showed overall median mean bias (i.e., the average error per participant) of 0.6% in annual irradiation and –3.3% in annual energy yield. While most PV performance modeling results seem to exhibit higher precision and accuracy as compared to an earlier blind PV modeling study in 2010, human errors, modeling skills, and derates were found to still cause significant errors in the estimates.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Demonstration of a Safety Analysis on a Complex System

For the past 17 years, Professor Leveson and her graduate students have been developing a theoretical foundation for safety in complex systems and building a methodology upon that foundation. The methodology includes special management structures and procedures, system hazard analyses, software hazard analysis, requirements modeling and analysis for completeness and safety, special software design techniques including the design of human-machine interaction, verification, operational feedback, and change analysis. The Safeware methodology is based on system safety techniques that are extended to deal with software and human error. Automation is used to enhance our ability to cope with complex systems. Identification, classification, and evaluation of hazards is done using modeling and analysis. To be effective, the models and analysis tools must consider the hardware, software, and human components in these systems. They also need to include a variety of analysis techniques and orthogonal approaches: There exists no single safety analysis or evaluation technique that can handle all aspects of complex systems. Applying only one or two may make us feel satisfied, but will produce limited results. We report here on a demonstration, performed as part of a contract with NASA Langley Research Center, of the Safeware methodology on the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) portion of the air traffic control (ATC) system and procedures currently employed at the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol). CTAS is an automated system to assist controllers in handling arrival traffic in the DFW area. Safety is a system property, not a component property, so our safety analysis considers the entire system and not simply the automated components. Because safety analysis of a complex system is an interdisciplinary effort, our team included system engineers, software engineers, human factors experts, and cognitive psychologists.

Leveson, Nancy↗

Cognition in Space Workshop: Metrics and Models - 1

"Cognition in Space Workshop I: Metrics and Models" was the first in a series of workshops sponsored by NASA to develop an integrated research and development plan supporting human cognition in space exploration. The workshop was held in Chandler, Arizona, October 25-27, 2004. The participants represented academia, government agencies, and medical centers. This workshop addressed the following goal of the NASA Human System Integration Program for Exploration: to develop a program to manage risks due to human performance and human error, specifically ones tied to cognition. Risks range from catastrophic error to degradation of efficiency and failure to accomplish mission goals. Cognition itself includes memory, decision making, initiation of motor responses, sensation, and perception. Four subgoals were also defined at the workshop as follows: (1) NASA needs to develop a human-centered design process that incorporates standards for human cognition, human performance, and assessment of human interfaces; (2) NASA needs to identify and assess factors that increase risks associated with cognition; (3) NASA needs to predict risks associated with cognition; and (4) NASA needs to mitigate risk, both prior to actual missions and in real time. This report develops the material relating to these four subgoals.

Woolford, Barbara↗

Considerations in Assuring Safety of Increasingly Autonomous Systems

Recent technological advances have accelerated the development and application of increasingly autonomous (IA) systems in civil and military aviation. IA systems can provide automation of complex mission tasks-ranging across reduced crew operations, air-traffic management, and unmanned, autonomous aircraft-with most applications calling for collaboration and teaming among humans and IA agents. IA systems are expected to provide benefits in terms of safety, reliability, efficiency, affordability, and previously unattainable mission capability. There is also a potential for improving safety by removal of human errors. There are, however, several challenges in the safety assurance of these systems due to the highly adaptive and non-deterministic behavior of these systems, and vulnerabilities due to potential divergence of airplane state awareness between the IA system and humans. These systems must deal with external sensors and actuators, and they must respond in time commensurate with the activities of the system in its environment. One of the main challenges is that safety assurance, currently relying upon authority transfer from an autonomous function to a human to mitigate safety concerns, will need to address their mitigation by automation in a collaborative dynamic context. These challenges have a fundamental, multidimensional impact on the safety assurance methods, system architecture, and V&V capabilities to be employed. The goal of this report is to identify relevant issues to be addressed in these areas, the potential gaps in the current safety assurance techniques, and critical questions that would need to be answered to assure safety of IA systems. We focus on a scenario of reduced crew operation when an IA system is employed which reduces, changes or eliminates a human's role in transition from two-pilot operations.

Alves, Erin E.↗

Automated work packages architecture: An initial set of human factors and instrumentation and controls requirements

The work management process in current fleets of national nuclear power plants is so highly dependent on large technical staffs and quality of work instruction, i.e., paper-based, that this puts nuclear energy at somewhat of a long-term economic disadvantage and increase the possibility of human errors. Technologies like mobile portable devices and computer-based procedures can play a key role in improving the plant work management process, thereby increasing productivity and decreasing cost. Automated work packages are a fundamentally an enabling technology for improving worker productivity and human performance in nuclear power plants work activities because virtually every plant work activity is accomplished using some form of a work package. As part of this year’s research effort, automated work packages architecture is identified and an initial set of requirements identified, that are essential and necessary for implementation of automated work packages in nuclear power plants.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

EPRI/NRC-RES fire human reliability analysis guidelines.

During the 1990s, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed methods for fire risk analysis to support its utility members in the preparation of responses to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, 'Individual Plant Examination - External Events' (IPEEE). This effort produced a Fire Risk Assessment methodology for operations at power that was used by the majority of U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) in support of the IPEEE program and several NPPs overseas. Although these methods were acceptable for accomplishing the objectives of the IPEEE, EPRI and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognized that they required upgrades to support current requirements for risk-informed, performance-based (RI/PB) applications. In 2001, EPRI and the USNRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) embarked on a cooperative project to improve the state-of-the-art in fire risk assessment to support a new risk-informed environment in fire protection. This project produced a consensus document, NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989), entitled 'Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities' which addressed fire risk for at power operations. NUREG/CR-6850 developed high level guidance on the process for identification and inclusion of human failure events (HFEs) into the fire PRA (FPRA), and a methodology for assigning quantitative screening values to these HFEs. It outlined the initial considerations of performance shaping factors (PSFs) and related fire effects that may need to be addressed in developing best-estimate human error probabilities (HEPs). However, NUREG/CR-6850 did not describe a methodology to develop best-estimate HEPs given the PSFs and the fire-related effects. In 2007, EPRI and RES embarked on another cooperative project to develop explicit guidance for estimating HEPs for human failure events under fire generated conditions, building upon existing human reliability analysis (HRA) methods. This document provides a methodology and guidance for conducting a fire HRA. This process includes identification and definition of post-fire human failure events, qualitative analysis, quantification, recovery, dependency, and uncertainty. This document provides three approaches to quantification: screening, scoping, and detailed HRA. Screening is based on the guidance in NUREG/CR-6850, with some additional guidance for scenarios with long time windows. Scoping is a new approach to quantification developed specifically to support the iterative nature of fire PRA quantification. Scoping is intended to provide less conservative HEPs than screening, but requires fewer resources than a detailed HRA analysis. For detailed HRA quantification, guidance has been developed on how to apply existing methods to assess post-fire fire HEPs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗