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Scaled melter testing of alternative reductants for Low-Activity Waste vitrification: Melter feed properties and processing behavior

This study examines the use of boron nitride (BN) and coke dust as alternative reductants for low-activity waste vitrification in scaled melter systems, intended to enhance operational flexibility at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. The baseline reductant, sucrose, while widely considered advantageous for glass production rates, produces challenging off gas emissions during processing. Early crucible-scale testing indicated that BN and coke effectively control foaming and glass redox, while significantly reducing acetonitrile emissions. Both real tank waste and simulant waste melter feeds were tested with BN and coke in this study. Rheological properties for melter feeds with both reductants were within operational limits, although the particle size of coke should be controlled and sufficient agitation is necessary to ensure smooth operations. While promising for handling and reduction of emissions, both simulant melter feeds demonstrated lower average glass production rates in the simulant melter system compared with sucrose. In the radioactive system, the rates were more comparable to previously measured low activity waste feeds on the order of 1285 kg m 2 day −1 for BN and 1671 kg m −2 day −1 for coke. Further scale-up testing is required to interpret the processing rates in the context of the full scale melter systems and evaluate the cost-benefit impact of these reductants on efficiency and sustainability.

Rigby, Jessica C. [Pacific Northwest National Labo↗

Issue Resolution During the Development of the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20125

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Tank 11H Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution and Inhalation Dose Potential Analyses at Savannah River Site – 26018

Currently, there is approximately 34 million gallons of high-level radioactive tank waste in the Tank Farm at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The ultimate goal of operations at the Tank Farm is to remove the high level waste (HLW) from the tanks followed by stabilization of the waste through vitrification of the HLW into glass or grouting the decontaminated waste into saltstone. After bulk removal of the HLW consisting of sludge, saltcake, and supernatant, further efforts are made to reduce the residual waste present in the tank in order to declare preliminary cease waste removal (PCWR) signifying completion of HLW removal. These reduction efforts can include tank washing to remove soluble salts and radioisotopes and dissolution of solids including aluminum. Aluminum in the form of gibbsite and boehmite is relatively insoluble in water. Through addition of aqueous sodium hydroxide, the aluminum can be dissolved at mild temperatures. In order for the waste tank to meet closure mode requirements of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF), which includes the Tank Farm, Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), a component of the safety basis, the inhalation dose potential (IDP) and the radiolytic hydrogen generation rate of the stored waste must be demonstrated to be lower than their respective designated limits. These parameters are calculated from measured radiochemical analyses of isotopes that emit a high amount of radioactivity including Cs-137, Sr-90, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Am-241, and Cm-244. Following the low temperature aluminum dissolution (LTAD) process, Tank 11H slurry samples were pulled from the tank and sent to Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to measure the extent of aluminum dissolution, hydroxide concentration, densities of slurry and supernatant, weight percent solids analyses, and radionuclide activities. The analyses of the composite sample found that approximately 90% of the total aluminum in the slurry was dissolved, indicating successful reduction of the insoluble aluminum in the waste tank. Additionally, the weight percent insoluble solids (slurry basis) measurement of the composite sample was found to be approximately 1%, demonstrating that minimal solids still remain in the tank. Finally, the radiochemical analyses of the composite sample determined that the waste contents of the tank met the IDP and radiolytic hydrogen generation rate requirements of the CSTF DSA. These measurements have shown that the LTAD process in Tank 11H was successful in waste reduction efforts and a positive step towards declaring PCWR and tank closure at SRS.

Dekarske, John [Savannah River National Laboratory↗

Product Consistency Test Results for the Environmental Management Headquarters (EMHQ) Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Glasses

This report provides the results of the Product Consistency Test leachates from the Environmental Management Headquarters Low-Activity Waste glasses, a series of simulated nuclear waste glasses designed and fabricated at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The series included quenched versions of the glasses. These data will be used in the development, validation, and implementation of enhanced property/composition models for waste glass vitrification at Hanford. The measured concentrations of the analytes in the test blank samples were below detection limits. The measured concentrations of B, Li, Na, and Si in the Approved Reference Material-1 samples included with the Product Consistency Tests fell within control chart values indicating proper test performance. The measured glass compositions for the study glasses were close to target values: therefore, little difference was seen when evaluating the normalized values using the targeted or measured glass compositions. The $NC_B$, $NC_{Na}$, and $NC_{Si}$ values were less than the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant low-activity waste constraint of 4 g/L for all glasses.

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Annual Summary Report (FY 2025) Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site

In accordance with DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, requirements, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Field Office (HFO) prepared this Annual Summary Report (ASR) for fiscal year (FY) 2025 for the Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA) reported in DOE/RL-2019-52, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Hanford Site Central Plateau (FY 2020) (hereinafter referred to as the Hanford Site Composite Analysis). The preparation of this ASR follows the technical specifications provided in DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Data Summary Report for Soil and Slab Sampling at Former Building 175

Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are in the process of returning the area where Building 175 existed to beneficial use for future site development. The completed assessment will help LLNS and DOE to outline project scope and costs associated with the removal, characterization, and disposal of materials generated when the concrete slab for the former building and any associated remaining subsurface structures are demolished. Slab removal under the Transition & Disposition process requires full screening for potential site contamination to determine appropriate future land use. Borehole locations and depths were designed to correctly assess DOE’s future liability for characterizing residual vadose zone contamination. If a residual source area is identified at depth, DOE will need to evaluate the additional cost of future subsurface cleanup (with limited access) due to planned development. This is necessary to leave the location in a “ready-to-build” status. As a result, Phase II sampling requirements may in some cases extend beyond the construction zone required for slab removal to ensure the necessary due diligence. To avoid the potential spread of contamination and/or the creation of an environmental release by impacting the integrity of known contamination areas (e.g., pit within room 102 and the east to west boundary seam), these locations were not sampled for this project. During demolition of the slab, these locations and their underlying soils should be further evaluated. The assessment was conducted in accord with the May 2022 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Former Building 175 Assessment Soil Sampling and Analysis Plan / Quality Assurance Plan. Thirty-six, direct-push borings were advanced, along with collecting concrete (where present) and soil samples for laboratory analyses. Thirty-two of the borings were advanced to a depth of 25 feet below ground (bgs), and four borings were advanced to a depth of 55 feet bgs. The concrete slab for former Building 175 ranged from approximately 8 inches to over two feet in thickness. Soils encountered during the investigation consisted primarily of clayey silt, with interbeds of sandy gravel and silty sand to the total depth explored of 55 feet bgs. Field photoionization detector readings – checking for volatile organic compound (VOC) vapors in soils, ranged from zero (0) to a peak of 33 parts per million at 25 feet bgs in boring PC-B175- 028. The cause for the peak reading is unknown, however, no visually discolored or odorous soils were encountered during the assessment and all VOC results were below Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL’s) Soil Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) soil screening levels (SSL). Groundwater was not encountered during the assessment and is expected to occur at roughly 65 feet bgs in the project area. No metals were detected at concentrations of concern in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. Low gross alpha and beta activity concentrations were detected in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The detected activity concentrations would appear to be from naturally occurring radioactive isotopes, i.e., potassium 40, present in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Tritium was not detected above the testing laboratory's Method Detection Limit (MDL) in any of the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 214, lead 212, lead 214, potassium 40, radium 226, radium 228, and thallium 208, were detected at low activity concentrations in the concrete core samples analyzed. Based on the detected activity concentrations, the isotopes would appear to be naturally occurring in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Acetone – a common laboratory contaminant, was detected in nine of the soil samples collected and analyzed. Concentrations of two other volatile organic compounds (benzene and tetrachloroethene) were detected in five of the soil samples analyzed. All concentrations were below SSLs. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel range organics were detected at 43.9 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as motor oil were detected at 7.20 mg/kg in the 15-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-001, and at 20.7 mg/kg in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. The SSL for diesel-range TPHs is 260 mg/kg. LLNL does not have an SSL for motor oil range TPHs. No indications of a release, e.g., visibly stained, or odorous soil, were present at the boring locations. No samples collected contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in concentrations above the laboratory reporting limit. Arsenic was detected above its SSL of 8.51 mg/kg in the 25-foot bgs routine sample collected from boring PC-B175-023. Nickel was detected above its SSL of 86.0 mg/kg in the 10-foot bgs routine sample from boing PC-B175-005, the 20-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-025, and the 25-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-034. The detected concentrations, however, were well below ten times (10x) their respective STLCs. Gross alpha and/or gross beta were detected above their respective SSL activity concentrations in three routine soil samples. Retesting (two per sample) of the samples showed that the initial reported activity concentrations were anomalous. Tritium was not detected in any of the routine or duplicate soil samples collected and analyzed during the investigation. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 212 and 214, lead 212 and 214, potassium 40, radium 224, 226 and 228, thallium 208, thorium 234 and uranium, were detected at low activity concentrations in the soil samples analyzed for radioactive constituents. The detected isotopes and their associated activity concentrations are typical of those naturally occurring in the marine-type sedimentary deposits underlying the Livermore Valley. No radiological controls are necessary for the soil evaluated.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2024

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA), and associated operating disposal- authorization statement (ODAS) technical-basis documents for the Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2024, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility-closure design, or institutional controls. Nineteen waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and all nineteen waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗

Analysis of Using a Hybrid ZIRCEX Process to Generate High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) - 20158

Idaho National Lab (INL) is investigating the feasibility of providing High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) by recovering Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and downblending the HEU with natural, low-enriched, or depleted uranium (NU, LEU, or DU). That investigation identified that significant quantities of HALEU could be produced with a Hybrid ZIRCEX process to further advanced reactor research while reducing INL's environmental liability. Many new advanced reactor designs are being developed with improved safety, efficiency, and economics. Most require nuclear fuel with U-235 enrichment between 5% and 20%, which is defined as HALEU. Although technically feasible, there is no current domestic capability to make HALEU in the US. While it is anticipated that industry will provide HALEU through commercial enrichment once advanced reactors mature, until a market is established, an interim source of HALEU is needed to enable research and demonstration. An interim source of HALEU could be provided by recovering the HEU in some DOE-managed SNF and downblending it to between 5% and 20% using the Hybrid ZIRCEX Process. ZIRCEX is a dry head-end process to remove cladding (zirconium or aluminum) from SNF. Drying of the SNF is needed prior to introduction to ZIRCEX. After cladding removal, uranium and fission products in the bed material are oxidized and elutriated. In a Hybrid ZIRCEX process, the HEU process stream is sent to a very compact, modular solvent extraction process for uranium purification. The uranyl nitrate from solvent extraction is denitrated and calcined to produce a HALEU product ready for fuel fabrication. The long-lived fission products from solvent extraction are immobilized in glass using a small in-can melt. By removing the cladding before dissolution, the volume of glass waste is reduced by a factor of up to 300 times (when compared to not removing the cladding from the fuel). Other radioactive wastes from the process could be disposed of as Class A or Class B low-level waste. In addition to producing HALEU for advanced reactors, consumption of SNF would reduce DoE's environmental liability. Incorporating low-enriched spent fuel (versus exclusive use of LEU, DU, or NU) into the downblending scheme could reduce the SNF inventory even further. Several downblending and enrichment scenarios using INL fuels were investigated in this study. The results of this analysis show that the Hybrid ZIRCEX process could make a significant contribution to needed HALEU feedstock and reduce the environmental liability of managing SNF at INL. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Update to the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20124

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance. In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. In accordance with the guidance and recommendations in US DoE's technical standard for DAS, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate the SDF system, which includes the engineered cover system, the SDUs, the waste form, and the natural features of the site, provides a reasonable expectation that saltstone disposal will meet performance objectives. Post-closure doses to future members of the public (MOP) were evaluated; dose estimates from the air pathway were well below the 1.0 E-04 Sv/yr (10 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years, and the calculated doses to the MOP from all exposure pathways, including the groundwater and air pathways, were well below the 2.5 E-04 Sv/yr (25 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years. Doses following an assumed intrusion event within the facility boundaries were well below the IHI performance objectives, where the acute IHI dose was below the acute IHI dose performance objective of 5.0 E-03 Sv (500 mrem) and the chronic IHI dose was below the chronic IHI dose performance objective of 1.0 E-03 Sv/yr (100 mrem/yr) within 1,000 years. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of local-power-free, remote α -particle detection using optical fibers

We demonstrate the application of fluorescence optical fiber coupled to a telecom grade fiber as a sensor for alpha particles using alpha-specific ZnS(Ag) scintillation materials whose wavelength is down-shifted into a low-loss region of the telecom grade fiber transmission band. Telecom-grade fiber optics offer a solution for sensing alpha radiation in deep repositories and cask storage for radioactive materials due to the stability of SiO 2 under normal environmental conditions and its relative radiation hardness at low radiation doses. Long-term nuclear waste storage facilities require sensors for the detection of leakage of radioactive materials that are maintenance-free, do not require power and can survive with no ‘wear out’ mechanisms for decades. By accomplishing the wavelength transformation, we maximize efficiencies in the detection of α-particles and signal transport and can detect alpha scintillation at distances on the order of >1 km with a sensor that is ~3% efficient and can be easily scaled as a sensor array. This paper describes the construction and testing of the sensor including manufacture of the controlled thickness films, verification of the wavelength shift from 450 to 620 nm and optimization of the sensitivity as a function of thickness. We also model the relative sensitivity of the film as a function of film thickness, and we demonstrate a signal-to-noise ratio of 10 at a range of greater than 1 km.

alpha particles↗

Model 9975 O Ring Fixture LongTerm Leak Performance (FY2021 Status Report)

Leak testing experiments to monitor the aging performance of Viton® GLT and GLT-S O-rings used in the model 9975 shipping package has been ongoing since 2004 at Savannah River National Laboratory. Seventy tests using mock-up 9975 primary containment vessels (PCVs) with GLT O-rings were assembled and heated to temperatures ranging from 200 to 450 °F. Due to material substitution, fourteen tests with GLT-S O-rings were initiated in 2008 and heated to temperatures ranging from 200 to 400 °F. The conditioning temperatures are elevated compared to the calculated maximum O-ring temperature in a 9975 package in storage, 158 °F, to accelerate aging and enable observations of O-ring failures in a reasonable time frame. The fixtures are leak tested periodically and all GLT O-ring fixtures aging at 350 °F or above have failed to maintain a leak-tight seal. Eight GLT O-ring fixtures aging at 300 °F have failed after 2.8 to 5.7 years at temperature while the remaining fixtures at 300 °F were retired from testing following more than five years without failure. There has been one GLT O-ring fixture which failed after 13.4 years aging at 200 °F. However, 19 other GLT O-rings aging at 200 °F have remained leak-tight for over 14 years and remain in test. No failures have yet been observed in GLT O-ring fixtures aging at 270 °F for 9.5 years. All GLT-S O-ring fixtures aging at 300 °F or above have failed their leak test. No failures have yet been observed in GLT-S O-ring fixtures aging at 200 and 250 °F for 11.5 years. Data from the O-ring fixtures are generally consistent with results from compression stress-relaxation testing, and provide confidence in the predictive models based on those results. However, uncertainty exists in extrapolating these elevated temperature results to the lower temperatures of interest for normal storage in K-Area Complex (KAC). Oxygen consumption testing, which includes results from temperatures near KAC normal storage temperatures, is ongoing to provide further confidence and corroborate these extrapolations. The collective data from these test efforts suggest the minimum O-ring service life at KAC normal storage conditions should be at least 34 years for GLT and GLT-S O-rings. Measurement of compression set in O-rings removed from failed fixtures, compared to that from KAC surveillance O-rings, indicate significant margin remains for O-rings still in service in 9975 packages in KAC. Aging and periodic leak testing will continue for the remaining 26 mock-up PCV fixtures.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fiberboard Properties and Degradation Rates for Storage of 9975 Shipping Packages in KAC (2021 Status Report)

Thermal, mechanical, and physical properties have been measured on fiberboard samples following accelerated aging for up to 16 years. The aging environments include elevated temperature up to 250 ºF (the maximum allowed service temperature for fiberboard in 9975 packages) and elevated humidity. Accelerated aging results have been analyzed and used to build aging models. Correlations relating several properties (thermal conductivity, energy absorption, weight, dimensions, and density) to their rate of change in potential storage environments have been developed. Combined with an estimate of the actual conditions the fiberboard experiences in K-Area Complex (KAC), these models allow development of service life predictions. KAC completed calculations that supported extending the service life of 9975 packages with 3013 and non3013 containers in storage from 15 years to 20 years. These calculations addressed the potential for degraded fiberboard properties following 20 years in storage using degradation models developed previously. The updated degradation models developed in this report have been compared to the assumptions in these calculations, and the current results for fiberboard dimensions, density, radial thermal conductivity, and energy absorption remain consistent with those calculations. The axial thermal conductivity degradation rate slightly exceeds calculations estimate of 0.5% per year between 130 and 160 °F. Additional data will continue to be collected to permit future refinements to the models and assumptions. Some of the predicted degradation rates presented in this report are extreme. However, these relate to environments that do not exist within KAC or would be postulated only as upset conditions that would not likely persist for an extended period. For a typical package stored in KAC with approximately 10-12 watts internal heat load or less, and ambient temperatures below 90 ºF, the fiberboard assemblies experience storage conditions less severe than any of the aging environments. Fiberboard in conforming packages with lower internal heat loads should experience little or no degradation and is expected to provide a service life beyond the currently approved 20 year storage period. Packages with higher internal heat loads may not continue to perform their required safety functions beyond 20 years. Ultimately, service life will be determined by the cumulative effect of degradation from all the conditions these packages might encounter. The results and model predictions presented in this report are applicable to 9975 packages with cane or softwood fiberboard overpack assemblies. These degradation models do not address the effects of nonconforming conditions such as the presence of excess moisture and mold or beetle infestations.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Methodological Overview of Seismic Analysis for Nuclear Event Detection

Underground explosions generate potentially detectable signatures, including energy waves that travel through the Earth’s subsurface (i.e., seismic waves), low-frequency sound waves (i.e., infrasound and hydroacoustic waves), and radioactive gases and/or particles that might leak from the test cavity (if the event was nuclear). There can also be intelligence indicators of a test, such as observations of modified patterns of life and activity at a suspected test site. If all of these detectable signatures and intelligence indicators are present and self-consistent, then analysts have high confidence in classifying a signature generating event as an explosion. However, because only partial information about an event is likely to be available, determining whether an event was natural (e.g., an earthquake or landslide) or manmade (e.g., a chemical or nuclear explosion) is much more challenging. This primer describes how one category of event signatures—seismic signatures—can augment event analyses. While universities and government organizations have generated detailed technical descriptions of seismic analytic techniques, we seek to translate seismic event analysis for a broad, non-technical audience. When the geologic conditions near an event are well-characterized, seismic data can be used to calculate critical information, such as event location and depth, with relatively high accuracy. Moreover, specific features within seismic datasets can help determine whether an event was an explosion. However, a key challenge in seismic analysis is that geologic site conditions are often poorly characterized, complicating the ability to discern the true nature of the event. To overcome this challenge, geologists answer a series of questions (discussed in section 1) to guide seismic event analysis and determine the most probable nature of an event. As more information is gathered during each analytic step, confidence grows regarding the nature of the event. Section 2 addresses uncertainties in seismic analysis and the vital nature of high-fidelity geologic data for accurate seismic event analysis.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Destructive Examination of Shipping Package 9975-02731

Destructive and non-destructive examinations were performed on the components of the package 9975-02731 as part of a comprehensive Savannah River Site surveillance program for plutonium materials stored in the K-Area Complex (KAC). The package stored nuclear materials in KAC for 13.8 years. Inspection of the package during opening in KAC noted one non-conforming condition: a large discolored area on the upper fiberboard subassembly. The package was subsequently transferred to Savannah River National Laboratory for more detailed examination. In addition to the observation noted in KAC, the following conditions were observed: (1) Axial gap of 1.021 inch slightly exceeded the 1 inch maximum criterion, and (2) Lead shield height exceeded drawing tolerance of 24.7 inch by 0.019 inch. Visual examination of the upper fiberboard assembly and analysis of the discolored fiberboard indicate the discoloration was due to wood glue residue. The physical, thermal, and mechanical properties of the fiberboard met the acceptance criteria and/or were within the range of previously tested fiberboard and baseline samples. The visual, microscopic and tensile testing results were consistent with previous O-ring and baseline Viton results. The lead shield surface was covered with corrosion product as observed on other shields but there was no evidence of excessive blistering, flaking, or spalling. Besides minor and expected corrosion, no evidence of a degraded condition was found in this package. Examination of the 9975-02731 corroborates existing evidence that the 9975 package is robust and the components can perform their expected functions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TinyTPC: A TEST STAND FOR LAr DOPING

TinyTPC is a small scale liquid-argon time projection chamber (LArTPC) that studies how photosensitive dopants can improve the energy resolution of low energy events in LArTPCs. Bench tests to resolve high voltage breakdown issues and to improve the low voltage system readout are described. Experimental data with a radioactive source of Th-228 for the calibration of the pixelated readout and the characterization of TinyTPC's energy resolution is explained. Provisional results from the addition of isobutylene (photosensitive dopant) and xenon (wavelength shifter) to liquid-argon (LAr) are also presented. Further steps to improve voltage system and enhance the data collection are discussed.

Rodriguez Thorne, Paloma↗

Regulatory Decision-Making Process Using 'Weight of Evidence: An Evidence Integration Approach' by the State of Washington at the Hanford Site - 20163

Performance Assessment and Environmental Impact Statement Modeling, Human and Ecological Risk Assessments are the tools used by the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) to make regulatory decisions for permitting and cleanup. These efforts all inherently have large amounts of uncertainty no matter how many alternative approaches are attempted. Professional feedback from tribal governments, stakeholders, federal and state regulators, the public and independent peer review groups are taken into account in this process of informed decision making. The process also includes full evaluation of the comments and the associated reviews made by the various peer review groups such as the Low -Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group (DOE order 435.1) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The evolution of technology has produced quicker and more efficient fate and transport modeling tools with related quantification of uncertainties and their significance. Groundwater and vadose zone models have been expanded across the entire Hanford site. Many of the technical approaches identified in the Washington State Regulations are updated using current knowledge to better understand the complexities of the Hanford Site using the latest state of the art tools for risk assessment and modeling. More emphasis and time are directed on defining uncertainty and then managing the uncertainty. One added tool is to run sensitivity cases based on informed decision making. The weight of evidence approach considers all relevant information in an integrative assessment that takes into account the kinds of evidence available, the quality and quantity, the uncertainty and error associated with each type, and how they fit together. Evidence of integration involves looking at systematic reviews and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. In conclusion, Ecology, Washington State's lead regulatory agency at the Hanford site, has had to modify its site closure approach compared to the rest of the state. A more holistic approach dealing with the Hanford site as an integrated system has evolved leading to a defensible informed approach for regulatory closure decisions. (authors)

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Electrolytically Assisted Surface Decontamination (EASD{sup TM}) for POCO Operations - 20282

NNL in collaboration with C-Tech Innovation Ltd and Sellafield Ltd has been exploring innovative technologies to enable a significant reduction of radiological hazards within facilities during the Post Operational Clean Out (POCO) phase of a nuclear plant's life cycle. Reducing the hazard by effectively decontaminating plants in-situ during POCO delivers huge cost reductions for future decommissioning operations. These cost reduction benefits are realized by reducing the number and complexity of remote operations as well as lowering the long-term waste disposal costs. Whilst chemical decontamination can achieve the desired level of decontamination, applying aggressive chemical reagents is hazardous, potentially difficult to control and requires there to be complimentary effluent treatment and waste routes. This work has aimed to develop flexible and controllable decontamination processes which could be operated without the additional complexity and issues associated with chemical decontamination. The processes needed to be relatively fast and effective to minimize the time operators would spend in an active area. In addition, there was a driver to produce decontamination methodologies which generated a secondary waste compatible with current routes and which takes advantage of current waste capacity. The strategy therefore was to come up with a solution that works with, rather than against, the science and engineering behind process plants at Sellafield. Electrolytically Assisted Surface Decontamination (EASD{sup TM}) is an innovative electrochemical decontamination process (developed by NNL and C-Tech Innovation Ltd) that can remove activity from contaminated metal in very short time periods. Application of the patented electric waveform to the surface when treating contaminated metal with nitric acid has been shown to significantly enhance the decontamination performance. When compared to proposed baseline washout procedures at Sellafield, the only change to the process is the applied electrical waveform which is temporary and controllable. The current causes dissolution of the metal surface being decontaminated which leads to activity transferring from the plant item into the nitric acid effluent stream. This innovation has the potential to transform the POCO process and allow a nitric acid based washout approach to deliver POCO quickly and cost effectively within the existing infrastructure. Several devices have now been designed that incorporate this EASD{sup TM} technology and enable the decontamination process to be applied to a range items commonly identified as being contaminated during nuclear decommissioning programmes such as pipework, tanks and hotspots of walls/floors. Inactive and active laboratory-scale testing has been completed using both simulated and 'real-life' contaminated (low level waste) metallic items retrieved from different nuclear sites. Active trials demonstrated that contaminated items could be treated to free release levels within minutes. Engineering scale tests are currently being performed, with guidance from Sellafield's system engineers and plant managers, to provide the necessary re-assurance the designed devices could be successfully deployed in an on-plant scenario. The final stage of this development work is to carry out an active demonstration of the decontamination technology on Thorp at Sellafield. This paper aims to highlight progress made to date with the EASD{sup TM} technology and, more specifically, the development of an in-situ decontamination device for deployment within radioactive pipework. (authors)

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Key Technical Issues for Greater-Than-Class-C (GTCC) Waste Disposal - 20164

Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) waste is low-level waste (LLW) that exceeds the Class C concentrations tabulated in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 61. Disposal of GTCC waste in the near surface (i.e. upper 30 m of the earth's surface) is prohibited in the United States. Though GTCC waste disposal is generally prohibited, the Commission can approve disposal according to 10 CFR 61.55(a)(2)(iv) on a case-by-case basis. The waste classification tables, developed in the early 1980's, were based on model projections of dose to an inadvertent intruder in agricultural, construction, and discovery exposure scenarios. The assumptions and parameters used were documented in a series of public reports. Though different disposal facility designs and site conditions were considered, the waste classification tables were based on a disposal facility design located in a specific environment. The tables were based on shallow (i.e., top few meters) trench facility designs and did not consider deeper facilities. To determine the suitability of GTCC waste disposal in the near-surface, site-specific analyses must account for differences between GTCC waste and Class A, B, and C LLW (hereafter, traditional LLW). GTCC waste can have concentrations of radionuclides that are much higher than traditional LLW. Because of these higher concentrations, processes that are typically not significant for traditional LLW may be significant with respect to disposal of GTCC waste. These processes include, but are not limited to, heat generation, criticality, and radiolysis. The form of the waste as well as the barriers to release of the waste (e.g. waste package) could be substantially different than they are for traditional LLW. These barriers need to be considered when assessing the impacts of accidents during receipt and placement and in evaluating long-term performance. Some GTCC radioactivity is either embedded in stainless steel or contained in stainless steel barriers. Stainless steel can have very low corrosion rates under a variety of environmental conditions. Finally, and possibly most importantly, GTCC waste would likely need to be disposed deeper than traditional LLW to reduce the probability of disturbance. The waste classification table values of traditional LLW are based on an inadvertent intruder excavating into the waste and bringing some of the material to the land surface. If waste is deeper than approximately 5 m, the excavation scenario becomes very unlikely. Therefore, other intruder scenarios, such as drilling exposure scenarios, need to be evaluated. This paper summarizes key technical issues for the disposal of GTCC waste. Our previous study shows that certain GTCC waste may be suitable for near surface disposal whereas others may not. This study may support ongoing technical analyses assessing potential disposal of GTCC in a near surface disposal facility. (authors)

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