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NASA NTRS2003

(CICT) Computing, Information, and Communications Technology Overview

The goal of the Computing, Information, and Communications Technology (CICT) program is to enable NASA's Scientific Research, Space Exploration, and Aerospace Technology Missions with greater mission assurance, for less cost, with increased science return through the development and use of advanced computing, information and communications technologies. This viewgraph presentation includes diagrams of how the political guidance behind CICT is structured. The presentation profiles each part of the NASA Mission in detail, and relates the Mission to the activities of CICT. CICT's Integrated Capability Goal is illustrated, and hypothetical missions which could be enabled by CICT are profiled. CICT technology development is profiled.

VanDalsem, William R.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Environmental Conditions for Space Flight Hardware: A Survey

Interest in generalization of the physical environment experienced by NASA hardware from the natural Earth environment (on the launch pad), man-made environment on Earth (storage acceptance an d qualification testing), the launch environment, and the space environment, is ed to find commonality among our hardware in an effort to reduce cost and complexity. NASA is entering a period of increase in its number of planetary missions and it is important to understand how our qualification requirements will evolve with and track these new environments. Environmental conditions are described for NASA projects in several ways for the different periods of the mission life cycle. At the beginning, the mission manager defines survivability requirements based on the mission length, orbit, launch date, launch vehicle, and other factors . such as the use of reactor engines. Margins are then applied to these values (temperature extremes, vibration extremes, radiation tolerances, etc,) and a new set of conditions is generalized for design requirements. Mission assurance documents will then assign an additional margin for reliability, and a third set of values is provided for during testing. A fourth set of environmental condition values may evolve intermittently from heritage hardware that has been tested to a level beyond the actual mission requirement. These various sets of environment figures can make it quite confusing and difficult to capture common hardware environmental requirements. Environmental requirement information can be found in a wide variety of places. The most obvious is with the individual projects. We can easily get answers to questions about temperature extremes being used and radiation tolerance goals, but it is more difficult to map the answers to the process that created these requirements: for design, for qualification, and for actual environment with no margin applied. Not everyone assigned to a NASA project may have that kind of insight, as many have only the environmental requirement numbers needed to do their jobs but do not necessarily have a programmatic-level understanding of how all of the environmental requirements fit together.

Plante, Jeannette↗

NASA NTRS2004

Evaluation of Open-Source Hard Real Time Software Packages

Reliable software is, at times, hard to find. No piece of software can be guaranteed to work in every situation that may arise during its use here at Glenn Research Center or in space. The job of the Software Assurance (SA) group in the Risk Management Office is to rigorously test the software in an effort to ensure it matches the contract specifications. In some cases the SA team also researches new alternatives for selected software packages. This testing and research is an integral part of the department of Safety and Mission Assurance. Real Time operation in reference to a computer system is a particular style of handing the timing and manner with which inputs and outputs are handled. A real time system executes these commands and appropriate processing within a defined timing constraint. Within this definition there are two other classifications of real time systems: hard and soft. A soft real time system is one in which if the particular timing constraints are not rigidly met there will be no critical results. On the other hand, a hard real time system is one in which if the timing constraints are not met the results could be catastrophic. An example of a soft real time system is a DVD decoder. If the particular piece of data from the input is not decoded and displayed to the screen at exactly the correct moment nothing critical will become of it, the user may not even notice it. However, a hard real time system is needed to control the timing of fuel injections or steering on the Space Shuttle; a delay of even a fraction of a second could be catastrophic in such a complex system. The current real time system employed by most NASA projects is Wind River's VxWorks operating system. This is a proprietary operating system that can be configured to work with many of NASA s needs and it provides very accurate and reliable hard real time performance. The down side is that since it is a proprietary operating system it is also costly to implement. The prospect of replacing this somewhat costly implementation is the focus of one of the SA group s current research projects. The explosion of open source software in the last ten years has led to the development of a multitude of software solutions which were once only produced by major corporations. The benefits of these open projects include faster release and bug patching cycles as well as inexpensive if not free software solutions. The main packages for hard real time solutions under Linux are Real Time Application Interface (RTAI) and two varieties of Real Time Linux (RTL), RTLFree and RTLPro. During my time here at NASA I have been testing various hard real time solutions operating as layers on the Linux Operating System. All testing is being run on an Intel SBC 2590 which is a common embedded hardware platform. The test plan was provided to me by the Software Assurance group at the start of my internship and my job has been to test the systems by developing and executing the test cases on the hardware. These tests are constructed so that the Software Assurance group can get hard test data for a comparison between the open source and proprietary implementations of hard real time solutions.

Mattei, Nicholas S.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Deep Impact Delta II Launch Vehicle Cracked Thick Film Coating on Electronic Packages Technical Consultation Report

The Deep Impact spacecraft was launched on a Boeing Delta II rocket from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) on January 12, 2005. Prior to the launch, the Director of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OS&MA) requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) lead a team to render an independent opinion on the rationale for flight and the risk code assignments for the hazard of cracked Thick Film Assemblies (TFAs) in the E-packages of the Delta II launch vehicle for the Deep Impact Mission. The results of the evaluation are contained in this report.

Cameron, Kenneth D.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Rapid Response Risk Assessment in New Project Development

A capability for rapidly performing quantitative risk assessments has been developed by JSC Safety and Mission Assurance for use on project design trade studies early in the project life cycle, i.e., concept development through preliminary design phases. A risk assessment tool set has been developed consisting of interactive and integrated software modules that allow a user/project designer to assess the impact of alternative design or programmatic options on the probability of mission success or other risk metrics. The risk and design trade space includes interactive options for selecting parameters and/or metrics for numerous design characteristics including component reliability characteristics, functional redundancy levels, item or system technology readiness levels, and mission event characteristics. This capability is intended for use on any project or system development with a defined mission, and an example project will used for demonstration and descriptive purposes, e.g., landing a robot on the moon. The effects of various alternative design considerations and their impact of these decisions on mission success (or failure) can be measured in real time on a personal computer. This capability provides a high degree of efficiency for quickly providing information in NASA s evolving risk-based decision environment

Graber, Robert R.↗

NASA NTRS2022

Unlocking the Spacecraft and Human Habitat Microbiome to Enable the Next Generation of Space Exploration

Planetary protection is the discipline that prevents harmful contamination of the solar system during exploration activities. The current international guidelines and NASA policy addressing biological contamination on spacecraft surfaces contains prescriptive guidelines of spore requirements (e.g., 300 spores/m2, 5×105 spores per spacecraft) applicable to spacecraft bound for Mars. To verify these requirements spacecraft engineers sample spacecraft surfaces throughout the assembly, test and launch operations phase of the mission using damp water cotton swabs and polyester wipes. After sampling, the potential biological contamination is enumerated using a series of traditional microbiology techniques to include sonication, heat shocking at 80°C for 15min to select for spores, and growth on tryptic soy agar at 32°C for 72 hours. To enable crewed missions to Mars and robotic exploration of the Ocean Worlds a risk informed decision making / performance-based approach to assess biological contamination offers a promising solution in the trade space. Recognizing the need for a performance-based approach, NASA’s new Planetary Protection policies now incorporate the agility for missions to be able to leverage a performance or prescriptive approach. One of top contenders in the option space is a coupled quantitative, descriptive and functional based approach to be able to assess the quantity, types and capabilities of the biological contamination present on spacecraft surfaces. A tailored, mission by mission assurance case could then be formulated by building an argument around the target body, projected capabilities surrounding the types of organisms their potential for survival and proliferation, and ability to be transported on the target body to contaminate an area of biological interest. A performance-based requirement would then be used to demonstrate the mission’s compliance in protecting the planetary environment safety objectives. This symposium talk will showcase the background and need case for NASA to develop such a capability as well as provide an update on the efforts underway in developing a transparent and responsible performance-based approach to biological contamination assessments on spacecraft surfaces.

Habitat Microbiome↗

NASA NTRS2004

How Systems Engineering and Risk Management Defend Against Murphy's Law and Human Error

Systems Engineering and Risk Management processes can work synergistically to defend against the causes of many mission ending failures. Defending against mission ending failures is facilitated by fostering a team that has a healthy respect for Murphy's Law and a team with a of curiosity for how things work, how they can fail, and what they need to know. This curiosity is channeled into making the unknowns known or what is uncertain more certain. Efforts to assure mission success require the expenditure of energy in the following areas: 1. Understanding what defines Mission Success as guided by the customer's needs, objectives and constraints. 2. Understanding how the system is supposed to work and how the system is to be produced, fueled by the curiosity of how the system should work and how it should be produced. 3. Understanding how the system can fail and how the system might not be produced on time and within cost, fueled by the curiosity of how the system might fail and how production might be difficult. 4. Understanding what we need to know and what we need learn for proper completion of the above three items, fueled by the curiosity of what we might not know in order to make the best decisions.

Bay, Michael↗

NASA NTRS2016

Station Program Note Pull Automation

Upon commencement of my internship, I was in charge of maintaining the CoFR (Certificate of Flight Readiness) Tool. The tool acquires data from existing Excel workbooks on NASA's and Boeing's databases to create a new spreadsheet listing out all the potential safety concerns for upcoming flights and software transitions. Since the application was written in Visual Basic, I had to learn a new programming language and prepare to handle any malfunctions within the program. Shortly afterwards, I was given the assignment to automate the Station Program Note (SPN) Pull process. I developed an application, in Python, that generated a GUI (Graphical User Interface) that will be used by the International Space Station Safety & Mission Assurance team here at Johnson Space Center. The application will allow its users to download online files with the click of a button, import SPN's based on three different pulls, instantly manipulate and filter spreadsheets, and compare the three sources to determine which active SPN's (Station Program Notes) must be reviewed for any upcoming flights, missions, and/or software transitions. Initially, to perform the NASA SPN pull (one of three), I had created the program to allow the user to login to a secure webpage that stores data, input specific parameters, and retrieve the desired SPN's based on their inputs. However, to avoid any conflicts with sustainment, I altered it so that the user may login and download the NASA file independently. After the user has downloaded the file with the click of a button, I defined the program to check for any outdated or pre-existing files, for successful downloads, to acquire the spreadsheet, convert it from a text file to a comma separated file and finally into an Excel spreadsheet to be filtered and later scrutinized for specific SPN numbers. Once this file has been automatically manipulated to provide only the SPN numbers that are desired, they are stored in a global variable, shown on the GUI, and transferred over to a new Excel worksheet for comparison. I managed to get my application to acquire the CSWG (Computer Safety Working Group) and the SPNWG (Space Station Working Group) SPN's with just two mouse clicks for each pull, as opposed to several from the original process. When all three pulls are performed, an Excel sheet containing all three different results will be generated for the user to compare and determine which SPN's will be presented or reviewed the following month. The experience from this internship has been spectacular. As a high school senior who will begin attending college in the fall, this internship has been both educationally and occupationally beneficial. The internship has allowed me the opportunities to learn new programming languages, effectively network with NASA personnel from a variety of departments at JSC, and allowed me to learn new professional skills and etiquette. My internship at NASA's Johnson Space Center has further motivated me to pursue a Master's degree in Software Engineering and strive for a prosperous career with NASA as a civil servant.

Delgado, Ivan↗

NASA NTRS2014

Space Mission Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Project

The purpose of the Space Mission Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Project is to extend current ground-based HRA risk prediction techniques to a long-duration, space-based tool. Ground-based HRA methodology has been shown to be a reasonable tool for short-duration space missions, such as Space Shuttle and lunar fly-bys. However, longer-duration deep-space missions, such as asteroid and Mars missions, will require the crew to be in space for as long as 400 to 900 day missions with periods of extended autonomy and self-sufficiency. Current indications show higher risk due to fatigue, physiological effects due to extended low gravity environments, and others, may impact HRA predictions. For this project, Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) will work with Human Health & Performance (HH&P) to establish what is currently used to assess human reliabiilty for human space programs, identify human performance factors that may be sensitive to long duration space flight, collect available historical data, and update current tools to account for performance shaping factors believed to be important to such missions. This effort will also contribute data to the Human Performance Data Repository and influence the Space Human Factors Engineering research risks and gaps (part of the HRP Program). An accurate risk predictor mitigates Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission (LOM).The end result will be an updated HRA model that can effectively predict risk on long-duration missions.

Boyer, Roger↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Support for Commercial Crew Launch Capabilities

Since the earliest days of U.S. human spaceflight, NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, has played a key role in American crew launch capability, from engineering support for the first Mercury-Redstone launches, to the Saturn launches to the Moon, through Shuttle and now Artemis. Today, Marshall brings that expertise gained through decades of crewed space launches to NASA’s Commercial Crew Program (CCP), providing launch vehicle engineering and programmatic support. The team’s responsibilities have included human certification of commercial launch systems for the CCP missions, including Atlas V and Falcon 9, and verifying each launch vehicle complies with flight certification. MSFC provides expertise in nearly all aspects of launch vehicle design and performance including solid motors and liquid engines, stage propulsion, thrust vector control, structural and dynamics, safety and mission assurance. During each commercial crew launch, an engineering support team is on console at Marshall’s Huntsville Operations Support Center, which has provided launch operations support since Apollo, providing real-time oversight to safety standards for the vehicle and verifying data. Launch vehicle support for Commercial Crew has come as a paradigm shift for the MSFC team, inspiring new approaches that leverage expertise and best practices from past NASA-developed launch vehicle missions, while at the same time providing new synergies from work with commercial partners on CCP. This paper will explore the role that the Marshall launch vehicle services team plays in the Commercial Crew Program, as well as lessons learned from the program that will continue to benefit a new era of spaceflight partnerships.

Commercial Crew↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Extravehicular Activity Access Options for a Lunar Surface Habitat

NASA’s upcoming return to the moon includes a plan for longer duration lunar missions that prioritize science and surface exploration. The current Artemis Base Camp reference proposes a Surface Habitat (SH) that will support 2 to 4 crewmembers with adequate capability for living and working for 30 days or more. An important aspect of the SH’s design will be its ability to support a high frequency of Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) for scientific purposes. There are multiple airlock designs that can support EVA access from inside the SH out to the lunar surface. This paper explores three unique options for EVA access: a traditional airlock, a suitlock, and a suitport-airlock.A traditional airlock is accessed by use of a hatch, crewmembers don and doff their EVA suits inside the airlock, and it must be depressurized and repressurized for every EVA. A suitlock is also depressurized and repressurized for every EVA but thesuits are donned through a suitport attached to the airlock bulkhead. A suitport-airlock is access through suitports that are attached to the airlock bulkhead as well, but the suitport-airlock stays in vacuum, and it does not have to be depressurized and repressurized for each EVA. This study also evaluated the use of an Airlock Airsave System in the cases of a traditional airlock and suitlock. This system captures a fraction of the airlock gas instead of venting all of the gas pre-EVA. The captured gas isthen used to partially repressurize the airlock post-EVA.In this study, each option is evaluated based on seven different areas of analysis. The metrics include overhead time for EVAs, dust mitigation, consumables for resupply mass, systems mass, system power, safety and mission assurances, and programmatic considerations. The EVA access options are evaluated and compared under each area of analysis. While the baseline case assumes the SH is at 8.2 psia, the authors also investigate the impact of a 10.2 psia habitat as an alternative in this analysis. Following the conclusion of the analysis, the authors recommend the usage of a Suitport-Airlock for Lunar SH missions and detail the reasoning behind the recommendation.

EVA↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Extravehicular Activity Access Options for a Lunar Surface Habitat

NASA’s upcoming return to the moon includes a plan for longer duration lunar missions that prioritize science and surface exploration. The current Artemis Base Camp reference proposes a Surface Habitat (SH) that will support 2 to 4 crewmembers with adequate capability for living and working for 30 days or more. An important aspect of the SH’s design will be its ability to support a high frequency of Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) for scientific purposes. There are multiple airlock designs that can support EVA access from inside the SH out to the lunar surface. This paper explores three unique options for EVA access: a traditional airlock, a suitlock, and a suitport-airlock. A traditional airlock is accessed by use of a hatch, crewmembers don and doff their EVA suits inside the airlock, and it must be depressurized and repressurized for every EVA. A suitlock is also depressurized and repressurized for every EVA but the suits are donned through a suitport attached to the airlock bulkhead. A suitport-airlock is accessed through suitports that are attached to the airlock bulkhead as well, but the suitport-airlock stays in vacuum, and it does not have to be depressurized and repressurized for each EVA. This study also evaluated the use of an Airlock Airsave System in the cases of a traditional airlock and suitlock. This system captures a fraction of the airlock gas instead of venting all of the gas pre-EVA. The captured gas is then used to partially repressurize the airlock post-EVA. In this study, each option is evaluated based on seven different areas of analysis. The metrics include overhead time for EVAs, dust mitigation, consumables for resupply mass, systems mass, system power, safety and mission assurances, and programmatic considerations. The EVA access options are evaluated and compared under each area of analysis. While the baseline case assumes the SH is at 8.2 psia, the authors also investigate the impact of a 10.2 psia habitat as an alternative in this analysis. Following the conclusion of the analysis, the authors recommend the usage of a Suitport-Airlock for Lunar SH missions and detail the reasoning behind the recommendation.

EVA↗

NASA NTRS2018

Development of a Ground Test and Analysis Protocol for NASA's NextSTEP Phase 2 Habitation Concepts

The NASA Next Space Technologies for Exploration Partnerships (NextSTEP) program is a public-private partnership model that seeks commercial development of deep space exploration capabilities to support human spaceflight missions around and beyond cislunar space. NASA first issued the Phase 1 NextSTEP Broad Agency Announcement to U.S. industries in 2014, which called for innovative cislunar habitation concepts that leveraged commercialization plans for low-Earth orbit. These habitats will be part of the Deep Space Gateway (DSG), the cislunar space station planned by NASA for construction in the 2020s. In 2016, Phase 2 of the NextSTEP program selected five commercial partners to develop ground prototypes. A team of NASA research engineers and subject matter experts (SMEs) have been tasked with developing the ground-test protocol that will serve as the primary means by which these Phase 2 prototypes will be evaluated. Since 2008, this core test team has successfully conducted multiple spaceflight analog mission evaluations utilizing a consistent set of operational tools, methods, and metrics to enable the iterative development, testing, analysis, and validation of evolving exploration architectures, operations concepts, and vehicle designs. The purpose of implementing a similar evaluation process for the Phase 2 Habitation Concepts is to consistently evaluate different commercial partner ground prototypes to provide data-driven, actionable recommendations for Phase 3. This paper describes the process by which the ground test protocol was developed and the objectives, methods, and metrics by which the NextSTEP Phase 2 Habitation Concepts will be rigorously and systematically evaluated. The protocol has been developed using both a top-down and bottom-up approach. Top-down development began with the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) exploration objectives and ISS Exploration Capability Study Team (IECST) candidate flight objectives. Strategic questions and associated rationales, derived from these candidate architectural objectives, provide the framework by which the ground-test protocol will address the DSG stack elements and configurations, systems and subsystems, and habitation, science, and EVA functions. From these strategic questions, high-level functional requirements for the DSG were drafted and associated ground-test objectives and analysis protocols were established. Bottom-up development incorporated objectives from NASA SMEs in autonomy, avionics and software, communication, environmental control and life support systems, exercise, extravehicular activity, exploration medical operations, guidance navigation and control, human factors and behavioral performance, human factors and habitability, logistics, Mission Control Center operations, power, radiation, robotics, safety and mission assurance, science, simulation, structures, thermal, trash management, and vehicle health. Top-down and bottom-up objectives were integrated to form overall functional requirements - ground-test objectives and analysis mapping. From this mapping, ground-test objectives were organized into those that will be evaluated through inspection, demonstration, analysis, subsystem standalone testing, and human-in-the-loop (HITL) testing. For the HITL tests, mission-like timelines, procedures, and flight rules have been developed to directly meet ground test objectives and evaluate specific functional requirements. Data collected from these assessments will be analyzed to determine the acceptability of habitation element configurations and the combinations of capabilities that will result in the best habitation platform to be recommended by the test team for Phase 3.

Gernhardt, Michael L.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

human spaceflight safety↗

NASA NTRS2016

[MaRS Project]

The Space Exploration Division of the Safety and Mission Assurances Directorate is responsible for reducing the risk to Human Space Flight Programs by providing system safety, reliability, and risk analysis. The Risk & Reliability Analysis branch plays a part in this by utilizing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) tools to identify possible types of failure and effective solutions. A continuous effort of this branch is MaRS, or Mass and Reliability System, a tool that was the focus of this internship. Future long duration space missions will have to find a balance between the mass and reliability of their spare parts. They will be unable take spares of everything and will have to determine what is most likely to require maintenance and spares. Currently there is no database that combines mass and reliability data of low level space-grade components. MaRS aims to be the first database to do this. The data in MaRS will be based on the hardware flown on the International Space Stations (ISS). The components on the ISS have a long history and are well documented, making them the perfect source. Currently, MaRS is a functioning excel workbook database; the backend is complete and only requires optimization. MaRS has been populated with all the assemblies and their components that are used on the ISS; the failures of these components are updated regularly. This project was a continuation on the efforts of previous intern groups. Once complete, R&M engineers working on future space flight missions will be able to quickly access failure and mass data on assemblies and components, allowing them to make important decisions and tradeoffs.

Aruljothi, Arunvenkatesh↗

NASA NTRS2016

Enabling Science and Deep Space Exploration through Space Launch System (LSL) Secondary Payload Opportunities

For the first time in almost 40 years, a NASA human-rated launch vehicle has completed its Critical Design Review (CDR). By reaching this milestone, NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion spacecraft are on the path to launch a new era of deep space exploration. NASA is making investments to expand science and exploration capability of the SLS by developing the capability to deploy small satellites during the trans-lunar phase of the mission trajectory. Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1), currently planned for launch no earlier than July 2018, will be the first mission to carry such payloads on the SLS. The EM-1 launch will include thirteen 6U Cubesat small satellites that will be deployed beyond low earth orbit. By providing an earth-escape trajectory, opportunities are created for advancement of small satellite subsystems, including deep space communications and in-space propulsion. This SLS capability also creates low-cost options for addressing existing Agency strategic knowledge gaps and affordable science missions. A new approach to payload integration and mission assurance is needed to ensure safety of the vehicle, while also maintaining reasonable costs for the small payload developer teams. SLS EM-1 will provide the framework and serve as a test flight, not only for vehicle systems, but also payload accommodations, ground processing, and on-orbit operations. Through developing the requirements and integration processes for EM-1, NASA is outlining the framework for the evolved configuration of secondary payloads on SLS Block upgrades. The lessons learned from the EM-1 mission will be applied to processes and products developed for future block upgrades. In the heavy-lift configuration of SLS, payload accommodations will increase for secondary opportunities including small satellites larger than the traditional Cubesat class payload. The payload mission concept of operations, proposed payload capacity of SLS, and the payload requirements for launch and deployment will be described to provide potential payload users an understanding of this unique exploration capability.

Singer, Jody↗

NASA NTRS2016

Secondary Payload Opportunities on NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) Enable Science and Deep Space Exploration

For the first time in almost 40 years, a NASA human-rated launch vehicle has completed its Critical Design Review (CDR). With this milestone, NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion spacecraft are on the path to launch a new era of deep space exploration. This first launch of SLS and the Orion Spacecraft is planned no later than November 2018 and will fly along a trans-lunar trajectory, testing the performance of the SLS and Orion systems for future missions. NASA is making investments to expand the science and exploration capability of the SLS by developing the capability to deploy small satellites during the trans-lunar phase of the mission trajectory. Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1) will include thirteen 6U Cubesat small satellites to be deployed beyond low earth orbit. By providing an earth-escape trajectory, opportunities are created for the advancement of small satellite subsystems, including deep space communications and in-space propulsion. This SLS capability also creates low-cost options for addressing existing Agency strategic knowledge gaps and affordable science missions. A new approach to payload integration and mission assurance is needed to ensure safety of the vehicle, while also maintaining reasonable costs for the small payload developer teams. SLS EM-1 will provide the framework and serve as a test flight, not only for vehicle systems, but also payload accommodations, ground processing, and on-orbit operations. Through developing the requirements and integration processes for EM-1, NASA is outlining the framework for the evolved configuration of secondary payloads on SLS Block upgrades. The lessons learned from the EM-1 mission will be applied to processes and products developed for future block upgrades. In the heavy-lift configuration of SLS, payload accommodations will increase for secondary opportunities including small satellites larger than the traditional Cubesat class payload. The payload mission concept of operations, proposed payload capacity of SLS, and the payload requirements for launch and deployment will be described to provide potential payload users an understanding of this unique exploration capability.

Singer, Jody↗