Planetary Protection Metagenomics Study: Characterization of NASA Cleanrooms
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Chelsi Cassilly↗
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Ultrashort Pulse Laser Surface Processing Techniques for Sterilization of Surfaces for Planetary Protection
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Craig Zuhlke↗
Ultrashort Pulse Laser Surface Processing Techniques for Sterilization of Metal Surfaces for Planetary Protection
To prevent forward contamination from microbes aboard spacecraft intended to search for extraterrestrial life, there is a need for effective sterilization methods. However, current techniques are both time-consuming and expensive. For example, dry heat sterilization requires removal from the assembly site and several days of treatment. Furthermore, some components such as optics and electronics are not compatible with current sterilization techniques. Here, we report the latest results in our development of a novel femtosecond laser processing technique for the rapid sterilization of spacecraft hardware. Femtosecond lasers produce extremely high photon fluxes (10^29 photons/sec*cm^2, ~0.03 J/cm^2) in extremely short pulses, which can inactivate even stress-tolerant microbial spores with minimal damage to the spacecraft surface. Aluminum coupons were inoculated with specific densities of Bacillus subtilis bacterial endospores. These coupons were treated with various laser illumination parameters. Afterward, metal coupon samples were assayed for viable spores using a polyvinyl alcohol (PVA) peel, serial dilution, and plating for colony-forming units (CFU). Results indicate that with high enough energy density and pulse counts, most bacterial spores are inactivated with minimal damage to the metal. The sterilization is dependent on both the fluence and pulse count. In addition, femtosecond pulses are more effective than longer pulses for inactivation. These experiments have consistently achieved 4-log reduction in viable spores. Sterilization has been achieved on both flat metal coupons and non-flat surfaces with microchannels, with a slight reduction in sterilization efficiency on the uneven surface. The application of air flow during laser processing was also investigated as a way to remove spores that are dislodged from the surface by the laser illumination, which would contribute to the reduction of spacecraft bioburden. With laser processing technology rapidly evolving, our results support the possibility of an extremely rapid, in-situ surface sterilization method for use in spacecraft assembly clean rooms.
Kaleb McQuillan↗
Europa Clipper planetary protection probabilistic risk assessment summary
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Kelli J. McCoy↗
Resurfacing: An Approach to Planetary Protection for Geologically Active Ocean Worlds
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Michael DiNicola↗
What Is the OPP Approach to the Next Generation of Laboratory Requirements
Planetary Protection Quality Management System NASA’s Office of Planetary Protection uses a quality-based process evaluation approach to verify planetary protection bioburden compliance over a project’s life cycle. The verification strategy shifts from a comparative direct assay approach validating hardware bioburden at a “moment in time,” to one that implements a continual quality assurance demonstration of the analytical process via established data requirements, laboratory operational, and management parameters throughout the mission’s entire assembly process. Laboratory quality-based systems and management strategies are standardized and implemented across government and industry. A standardized laboratory quality system approach increases transparency throughout the project’s life cycle and aligns planetary protection analytical approaches with government and industry practices to support both NASA and commercial endeavors. Strategies include the implementation of a laboratory quality management structure that documents and routinely validates parameters critical to experimental design and data collection, provides data quality assessment parameters, and ultimately validates that the collected data is of sufficient quality and quantity to meet the specified technical goals. Planetary protection can draw on these practices to provide a systematic process-based quality approach to support planetary protection validation and compliance requirements. Quality approaches including data quality objectives, method performance, data acceptance criteria and the associated laboratory quality management system are presented to provide an overview and framework for a planetary protection laboratory quality management system.
Amy Baker↗
Robotic Mars Sample Return: Risk Assessment and Analysis Report
A comparison of the risk associated with two alternative scenarios for a robotic Mars sample return mission was conducted. Two alternative mission scenarios were identified, the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) reference Mission and a mission proposed by Johnson Space Center (JSC). The JPL mission was characterized by two landers and an orbiter, and a Mars orbit rendezvous to retrieve the samples. The JSC mission (Direct/SEP) involves a solar electric propulsion (SEP) return to earth followed by a rendezvous with the space shuttle in earth orbit. A qualitative risk assessment to identify and characterize the risks, and a risk analysis to quantify the risks were conducted on these missions. Technical descriptions of the competing scenarios were developed in conjunction with NASA engineers and the sequence of events for each candidate mission was developed. Risk distributions associated with individual and combinations of events were consolidated using event tree analysis in conjunction with Monte Carlo techniques to develop probabilities of mission success for each of the various alternatives. The results were the probability of success of various end states for each candidate scenario. These end states ranged from complete success through various levels of partial success to complete failure. Overall probability of success for the Direct/SEP mission was determined to be 66% for the return of at least one sample and 58% for the JPL mission for the return of at least one sample cache. Values were also determined for intermediate events and end states as well as for the probability of violation of planetary protection. Overall mission planetary protection event probabilities of occurrence were determined to be 0.002% and 1.3% for the Direct/SEP and JPL Reference missions respectively.
Lalk, Thomas R.↗
Does the International Space Station Leak DNA? Preliminary Results from the ISS External Microorganisms Payload
Existing crewed spacecraft like the ISS (International Space Station) leak by design. The ISS routinely releases gas to maintain life support systems and when astronauts exit the station to perform space walks. The chemical component of this leakage is well characterized, but the biological components are not. The ISS is not subject to planetary protection requirements, but planned missions to Mars will use similar systems and will be subject to planetary protection requirements. If detectable microorganisms are escaping through vents and or airlocks we may need to redesign our crewed habitats to minimize this type of contamination. To test the hypothesis that microorganisms from inside ISS are detectable on exterior surfaces an astronaut used the ISS External Microorganisms sampling kit (Rucker et al. 2018) to sample exterior surfaces of the ISS during an EVA (Extra Vehicular Activity) in January of 2025. These samples were returned to Earth for DNA extraction and sequencing. We successfully, extracted and sequenced bacterial, fungal and viral DNA from these samples that was not present in the negative controls. These results should help NASA refine the planetary protection requirements for crewed missions. Methods: The samples were collected using sterile, DNA free, buccal swabs (23 mm. diameter) housed in custom canisters. Each canister uses a 0.2 μm Teflon filter to maintain sterility as the caddy, holding 8 swabs moves in and out of vacuum. The astronaut sampled the: 1) airlock vestibule, 2) airlock thermal cover, 3) a gap in the micrometeorite shielding near the airlock, 4) a handrail near the airlock, 5) the Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly vent, and 6) the Vacuum Exhaust System vent. The seventh swab was exposed to vacuum during the EVA without touching it to a surface. The eighth swab, a negative control, was not opened until the caddy returned to Earth. DNA was extracted from the swabs using a QIamp UCP Pathogen kit and prepared for sequencing on an Aviti (Element Biosciences) sequencer (Arslan et al. 2024). The resulting sequences were analyzed using the EDGE Bioinformatics platform (Li et al. 2017). The sequences were analyzed individually using tools like BLAST, GOTTCHA2, Kraken2, and PanGIA. The data were also assembled into metagenome assembled genomes) using tools like CONCOCT, MaxBin2 and MetaBAT2. Results: We successfully extracted and sequenced bacterial, archaeal, fungal and viral DNA from all seven samples. The handrail swab had the lowest number of reads (768,651) and the airlock thermal cover had the highest number of reads (8,819,230). These samples contain DNA from human associated bacteria (e.g. Crynebacterium riegelii ), fungi (.e.g. Penicillium rubens ), and viruses (e.g Alphapapillomavirus ). Conclusion: Preliminary interpretation suggest that the airlock and the space suits themselves are the largest sources of contaminant DNA. Most if not all of the DNA is from organisms known to be present inside the ISS. Vents attached to life support systems may be a lesser source of biological contamination. Further analysis should help NASA address planetary protection knowledge gaps for crewed missions.
Aaron B Regberg↗
Susceptibility of extremophiles to far-UVC light for bioburden reduction in spacecraft assembly facilities
The prevention and reduction of microbial species entering and leaving Earth's biosphere is a critical aspect of planetary protection research. While various decontamination methods exist and are currently utilized for planetary protection purposes, the use of far-UVC light (200–230 nm) as a means for microbial reduction remains underexplored. Unlike conventional germicidal ultraviolet at 254 nm, which can pose a health risk to humans even with small exposure doses, far-UVC light poses minimal health hazard making it a suitable candidate for implementation in occupied areas of spacecraft assembly facilities. This study investigates the efficacy of far-UVC 222-nm light to inactivate bacteria using microbial species which are relevant to planetary protection either in vegetative cell or spore form. All the tested vegetative cells demonstrated susceptibility to 222-nm exposure, although susceptibility varied among the tested species. Notably, Deinococcus radiodurans, a species highly tolerant to extreme environmental conditions, exhibited the most resistance to far-UVC exposure with a dose of 112 mJ/cm 2 required for a 1-log reduction in survival. While spore susceptibility was similar across the species tested, Bacillus pumilus spores were the most resistant of the tested spores when analyzed with a bi-exponential cell killing model (D 90 of 6.8 mJ/cm 2 ). Overall, these results demonstrate the efficacy of far-UVC light for reducing microbial bioburden to help ensure the success and safety of future space exploration missions.
Ultraviolet light↗
Human Mars Surface Science Operations
Human missions to the surface of Mars will have challenging science operations. This paper will explore some of those challenges, based on science operations considerations as part of more general operational concepts being developed by NASA's Human Spaceflight Architecture (HAT) Mars Destination Operations Team (DOT). The HAT Mars DOT has been developing comprehensive surface operations concepts with an initial emphasis on a multi-phased mission that includes a 500-day surface stay. This paper will address crew science activities, operational details and potential architectural and system implications in the areas of (a) traverse planning and execution, (b) sample acquisition and sample handling, (c) in-situ science analysis, and (d) planetary protection. Three cross-cutting themes will also be explored in this paper: (a) contamination control, (b) low-latency telerobotic science, and (c) crew autonomy. The present traverses under consideration are based on the report, Planning for the Scientific Exploration of Mars by Humans1, by the Mars Exploration Planning and Analysis Group (MEPAG) Human Exploration of Mars-Science Analysis Group (HEM-SAG). The traverses are ambitious and the role of science in those traverses is a key component that will be discussed in this paper. The process of obtaining, handling, and analyzing samples will be an important part of ensuring acceptable science return. Meeting planetary protection protocols will be a key challenge and this paper will explore operational strategies and system designs to meet the challenges of planetary protection, particularly with respect to the exploration of "special regions." A significant challenge for Mars surface science operations with crew is preserving science sample integrity in what will likely be an uncertain environment. Crewed mission surface assets -- such as habitats, spacesuits, and pressurized rovers -- could be a significant source of contamination due to venting, out-gassing and cleanliness levels associated with crew presence. Low-latency telerobotic science operations has the potential to address a number of contamination control and planetary protection issues and will be explored in this paper. Crew autonomy is another key cross-cutting challenge regarding Mars surface science operations, because the communications delay between earth and Mars could as high as 20 minutes one way, likely requiring the crew to perform many science tasks without direct timely intervention from ground support on earth. Striking the operational balance between crew autonomy and earth support will be a key challenge that this paper will address.
Bobskill, Marianne R.↗
MSL Lessons Learned and Knowledge Capture
The Mars Program has recently been informed of the Planetary Protection Subcommittee (PPS) recommendation, which was endorsed by the NAC, concerning Mars Science Lab (MSL) lessons learned and knowledge capture. The Mars Program has not had an opportunity to consider any decisions specific to the PPS recommendation. Some of the activities recommended by the PPS would involve members of the MSL flight team who are focused on cruise, entry descent & landing, and early surface operations; those activities would have to wait. Members of the MSL planetary protection team at JPL are still available to support MSL lessons learned and knowledge capture; some of the specifically recommended activities have already begun. The Mars Program shares the PPS/NAC concerns about loss of potential information & expertise in planetary protection practice.
planetary protection↗
The Need for Earth-Based Experiments to Inform Microbial Evolution on Planetary Surfaces
Introduction: Historically, the focus of planetary protection at NASA has been on unmanned, robotic missions. Such missions have paved the way for understanding how to implement planetary protection in a feasible and cost-sensitive way. However, with the introduction of crewed missions to Mars in the not-sodistant future, there is a need to better define and understand how to implement planetary protection under new circumstances, as well as understand the risk of contaminating Mars. One unavoidable fact is that microbes will go where humans go. Therefore, it is critical to understand how these microbes may (and will) impact our ability to conduct meaningful, reliable astrobiological science. Microorganisms have spent millions of years evolving to survive in extreme environments here on Earth. Already there are indications that microbes aboard the International Space Station evolve and adapt to life in low earth orbit. The microbes that are eventually taken to Mars with humans will also adapt, potentially causing harmful effects to crew and/or the planetary or astrobiological science conducted. Therefore, it is of critical interest that we evaluate and characterize the potential risks of microbial evolution on Mars. It is expected that microbes carried by humans will begin to evolve to new environments even before landing on Mars, during the several month cruise phase. Once landed, microbes will encounter different stressors within the crew habitats on Mars. During extravehicular activities, venting, or other release events, microbes will find their way out onto the Martian surface. The induced environments around crewed systems will create potentially-favorable conditions for microbes to continue evolving on Mars. Eventually, microbes may find their way beyond the close confines of the crewed area and continue evolving so as to fill new or distant niches on the Martian surface. It is challenging to replicate Martian environments here on Earth, making it nearly impossible to predict the evolutionary changes that microbes would undergo on Mars. But this work is critical. Serial passaging experiments performed by Richard Lenski on E. coli show the dramatic changes microbes can undergo even within a laboratory setting. Furthermore, experiments performed by Michael Baym also demonstrate the power of single mutations in microbial development of antibiotic resistance [3]. Long duration experiments should be performed on a suite of microbes exposed to environments likely to be experienced on the Martian surface. While simulating space environments can be challenging, facilities exist that can achieve individual and combinatorial environmental conditions to simulate space and planetary conditions. Such chambers should be employed for microbial studies. Currently, at the Marshall Space Flight Center, we have used various stressors like drying, vacuum, proton radiation, and ultraviolet light both separately and in combination, to evaluate the survival of cleanroom microbes. Shockingly, several non-spore forming isolates have demonstrated the ability to survive many extreme conditions (manuscript in preparation). These short duration exposures must be augmented with larger and more gradual studies to replicate what microbes might experience in the transition from cruise, to surface habitats, to induced surface environments, and finally true Martian environments. While no Earth-based experiment can perfectly replicate the Martian environment, nor could we test every possible microbe in simulation experimental regimes, efforts should be made to examine the evolutionary potential of the “usual suspects” seen on the ISS or in other crewed environments to begin to fill this important knowledge gap.
Chelsi D. Cassilly↗
Recommendation on Orbiting Sample Cleanliness
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration-European Space Agency (NASA-ESA) Mars Sample Return (MSR) campaign involves the collection of samples on Mars by the Perseverance (Mars 2020) rover and their return to Earth. To accomplish this, the Orbiting Sample container (OS) will be sent to Mars to accommodate the collected samples then launched from Mars and returned to Earth, where the samples will be removed for examination in the Sample Return Facility (SRF). Crucial to this entire sequence will be establishment of the required level of cleanliness inside the OS. In February 2021, the NASA Headquarters' Mars Sample Return Program and Office of Planetary Protection assembled an MSR OS Tiger Team (OSTT) to discuss the appropriate cleanliness level options of the interior of the OS. The team's remit was primarily focused on evaluating the trade-offs between Planetary Protection cleanliness levels 4a and 4b. These cleanliness levels are determined by the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) planetary protection regulations, where 4a requires <300 bacterial spores/m^2 and <3 x 10^5 bacterial spores on the spacecraft (in this case, the interior of the OS) and 4b mandates the more stringent requirement of <30 bacterial spores on the spacecraft. This report documents the consensus opinion submitted by the OSTT that recommended the interior of the OS be cleaned to a 4a requirement with any feasible added effort toward 4b. This report provides, as well, the rationale for that decision.
Charles S. Cockell↗
Purifying, Separating, and Concentrating Cells From a Sample Low in Biomass
Frequently there is an inability to process and analyze samples of low biomass due to limiting amounts of relevant biomaterial in the sample. Furthermore, molecular biological protocols geared towards increasing the density of recovered cells and biomolecules of interest, by their very nature, also concentrate unwanted inhibitory humic acids and other particulates that have an adversarial effect on downstream analysis. A novel and robust fluorescence-activated cell-sorting (FACS)-based technology has been developed for purifying (removing cells from sampling matrices), separating (based on size, density, morphology), and concentrating cells (spores, prokaryotic, eukaryotic) from a sample low in biomass. The technology capitalizes on fluorescent cell-sorting technologies to purify and concentrate bacterial cells from a low-biomass, high-volume sample. Over the past decade, cell-sorting detection systems have undergone enhancements and increased sensitivity, making bacterial cell sorting a feasible concept. Although there are many unknown limitations with regard to the applicability of this technology to environmental samples (smaller cells, few cells, mixed populations), dogmatic principles support the theoretical effectiveness of this technique upon thorough testing and proper optimization. Furthermore, the pilot study from which this report is based proved effective and demonstrated this technology capable of sorting and concentrating bacterial endospore and bacterial cells of varying size and morphology. Two commercial off-the-shelf bacterial counting kits were used to optimize a bacterial stain/dye FACS protocol. A LIVE/DEAD BacLight Viability and Counting Kit was used to distinguish between the live and dead cells. A Bacterial Counting Kit comprising SYTO BC (mixture of SYTO dyes) was employed as a broad-spectrum bacterial counting agent. Optimization using epifluorescence microscopy was performed with these two dye/stains. This refined protocol was further validated using varying ratios and mixtures of cells to ensure homogenous staining compared to that of individual cells, and were utilized for flow analyzer and FACS labeling. This technology focuses on the purification and concentration of cells from low-biomass spacecraft assembly facility samples. Currently, purification and concentration of low-biomass samples plague planetary protection downstream analyses. Having a capability to use flow cytometry to concentrate cells out of low-biomass, high-volume spacecraft/ facility sample extracts will be of extreme benefit to the fields of planetary protection and astrobiology. Successful research and development of this novel methodology will significantly increase the knowledge base for designing more effective cleaning protocols, and ultimately lead to a more empirical and true account of the microbial diversity present on spacecraft surfaces. Refined cleaning and an enhanced ability to resolve microbial diversity may decrease the overall cost of spacecraft assembly and/or provide a means to begin to assess challenging planetary protection missions.
Benardini, James N.↗
Report of the Workshop for Life Detection in Samples from Mars
The question of whether there is or was life on Mars has been one of the most pivotal since Schiaparellis' telescopic observations of the red planet. With the advent of the space age, this question can be addressed directly by exploring the surface of Mars and by bringing samples to Earth for analysis. The latter, however, is not free of problems. Life can be found virtually everywhere on Earth. Hence the potential for contaminating the Mars samples and compromising their scientific integrity is not negligible. Conversely, if life is present in samples from Mars, this may represent a potential source of extraterrestrial biological contamination for Earth. A range of measures and policies, collectively termed 'planetary protection', are employed to minimise risks and thereby prevent undesirable consequences for the terrestrial biosphere. This report documents discussions and conclusions from a workshop held in 2012, which followed a public conference focused on current capabilities for performing life-detection studies on Mars samples. The workshop focused on the evaluation of Mars samples that would maximise scientific productivity and inform decision making in the context of planetary protection. Workshop participants developed a strong consensus that the same measurements could be employed to effectively inform both science and planetary protection, when applied in the context of two competing hypotheses: 1) that there is no detectable life in the samples; or 2) that there is martian life in the samples. Participants then outlined a sequence for sample processing and defined analytical methods that would test these hypotheses. They also identified critical developments to enable the analysis of samples from Mars.
Life Detection↗
Unlocking the Spacecraft and Human Habitat Microbiome to Enable the Next Generation of Space Exploration
Planetary protection is the discipline that prevents harmful contamination of the solar system during exploration activities. The current international guidelines and NASA policy addressing biological contamination on spacecraft surfaces contains prescriptive guidelines of spore requirements (e.g., 300 spores/m2, 5×105 spores per spacecraft) applicable to spacecraft bound for Mars. To verify these requirements spacecraft engineers sample spacecraft surfaces throughout the assembly, test and launch operations phase of the mission using damp water cotton swabs and polyester wipes. After sampling, the potential biological contamination is enumerated using a series of traditional microbiology techniques to include sonication, heat shocking at 80°C for 15min to select for spores, and growth on tryptic soy agar at 32°C for 72 hours. To enable crewed missions to Mars and robotic exploration of the Ocean Worlds a risk informed decision making / performance-based approach to assess biological contamination offers a promising solution in the trade space. Recognizing the need for a performance-based approach, NASA’s new Planetary Protection policies now incorporate the agility for missions to be able to leverage a performance or prescriptive approach. One of top contenders in the option space is a coupled quantitative, descriptive and functional based approach to be able to assess the quantity, types and capabilities of the biological contamination present on spacecraft surfaces. A tailored, mission by mission assurance case could then be formulated by building an argument around the target body, projected capabilities surrounding the types of organisms their potential for survival and proliferation, and ability to be transported on the target body to contaminate an area of biological interest. A performance-based requirement would then be used to demonstrate the mission’s compliance in protecting the planetary environment safety objectives. This symposium talk will showcase the background and need case for NASA to develop such a capability as well as provide an update on the efforts underway in developing a transparent and responsible performance-based approach to biological contamination assessments on spacecraft surfaces.
Habitat Microbiome↗
Restricted by Whom? A Historical Review of Strategies and Organization for Restricted Earth Return of Samples from NASA Planetary Missions
This presentation is a review of the timeline for Apollo's approach to Planetary Protection, then known as Planetary Quarantine. Return of samples from Apollo 11, 12 and 14 represented NASA's first attempts into conducting what is now known as Restricted Earth Return, where return of samples is undertaken by the Agency with the utmost care for the impact that the samples may have on Earth's environment due to the potential presence of microbial or other life forms that originate from the parent body (in this case, Earth's Moon).
Apollo↗
Biological Contamination of Mars: Issues and Recommendations
The ad hoc Task Group on Planetary Protection formed by the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council focused on making recommendations concerning the protection of Mars from forward contamination (i.e., Earth to Mars) during upcoming missions by both the United States and the former Soviet Union. In so doing, it distinguished between missions whose goals include reconnaissance and measurement and those that specifically include experiments to detect life. The task group also discussed what additional knowledge will be needed in order to assure that future recommendations regarding contamination of Earth from Mars might be made with a higher degree of certainty than is now possible. Following a short introduction to the rationale underlying planetary exploration (Chapter 1) is a brief summary of approved and contemplated missions to Mars (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 briefly reviews the state of knowledge in several areas pertinent to the problem of planetary protection, in the limits of life on Earth and the abilities of known terrestrial organisms to withstand extreme environment conditions, as well as new approaches to detecting life forms. Chapter 5 includes a review and comments (made in light of current knowledge)- on the recommendations made in 'Recommendations on Quarantine Policy for Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Titan'. Updates to the recommendations made in 1978 are also given in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 gives additional recommendations concerning collection of essential data, spacecraft sterilization and bioburden assessment, and future research, as well as legal and social issues and NASA's overall planetary protection program.
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