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Current Progress of the Final Design of a Subcritical Assembly at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

During the past decade, the US Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has been coordinating nuclear criticality safety (NCS) courses to provide training and qualification to new staff, supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals involved with NCS. To address the growing need for more NCS training possibilities, a subcritical assembly was designed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The Oak Ridge Subcritical Assembly (ORSA), operated at ORNL, could be used in a new course for fissile material handlers/operators or as a backup training facility for currently existing NCSP hands-on NCS training. This paper describes some of the design steps necessary for obtaining a final ORSA design, beginning with a successful feasibility study performed in 2020. Numerous parameters within each main element of the assembly were considered, such as the reflector used, the type of fuel coating or plating used, and the number of fuel plates used. The design choices related to each parametric study described in this paper are detailed and justified at the end of each subsection. An overview of the current final design characteristics of ORSA and the experiments’ possibilities is also provided. ORSA will be built with fuel plates from legacy Aerojet General Nucleonics (AGN)-201M research reactors currently stored at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). The cylindrical fuel plates comprise UO 2 particles embedded in polyethylene and have a nominal enrichment of 19.5 ± 0.5 wt % 235 U. The basis for the final design was the feasibility study from 2020. In the feasibility study, ORSA achieved k eff = 0.95, corresponding to a multiplication factor of 20, with approximately 620 g of 235 U (four 4 cm plates, three 2 cm plates, and two 1 cm plates) and an 8.5 cm thick graphite reflector radially and on top of the assembly. The bottom of the assembly has a graphite thickness of 5 cm, and the chosen graphite density was 2.3 g/cm 3 . All design calculations were performed using SCALE 6.2.4 KENO-VI and with the ENDF/B VII.1 Continuous Energy cross-section library.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NIF Operations Management Plan, August 2011

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL) National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a key component of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program, whose purpose is to maintain the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of our nation’s nuclear stockpile without underground nuclear testing. The NIF is crucial to the Stockpile Stewardship Program because it is the only facility that can create the conditions of extreme temperature and pressure—conditions that exist only in stars or in exploding nuclear weapons—that are relevant to understanding how our modern nuclear weapons operate. As such, the NIF’s primary mission is to attain fusion ignition in the laboratory. Fusion ignition not only supports Stockpile Stewardship needs, but also provides the basis for future decisions about fusion’s potential as a long-term energy source. Additionally, NIF provides scientists with access to high-energy-density regimes that can yield new insight and understanding in the areas of astrophysics, hydrodynamics, material properties, plasma physics, and radiative properties. The use of the NIF to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the advancement of basic high-energy-density science understanding is planned and managed through program-level execution plans and NIF directorate-level management teams. An example of a plan is the National Ignition Campaign Execution Plan. The NIF Operations Management Plan provides an overview of the NIF Operations organization and describes how the NIF is supported by the LLNL infrastructure and how it is safely and responsibly managed and operated. Detailed information on NIF management of the organization is found in a series of supporting plans, policies, and procedures. A list of related acronyms can be found in Appendix A of this document. The purpose of this document is to provide a roadmap of how the NIF Operations organization functions. It provides a guide to understanding the requirements, document flow down, organizational vision and mission, performance metrics, and interrelationship of the NIF Operations organization with other directorate and laboratory organizations. This document also provides a listing of roles and responsibilities, core processes, procedures, authority matrices, change control boards, and other information necessary for successfully functioning in the NIF Operations organization. This document, the NIF Shot Operations Plan, and the NIF Maintenance Plan together represent the primary documents satisfying our Conduct of Operations compliance requirement.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Energy Savings from GSA's National Deep Retrofit Program

Under its National Deep Energy Retrofit (NDER) program, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) awarded 10 ESPC projects with the objectives of using innovative technologies and renewable energy technologies, and moving buildings toward net zero energy consumption. This report analyzes data on energy savings from the 10 NDER projects, and compares them with the savings of a sample of other recently awarded Federal ESPC projects. It is shown that by emphasizing the need for deeper energy savings, and by the establishment of a central Project Management Office (PMO) to provide authoritative contracting, technical and pricing assistance, the NDER projects achieved an average level of savings more than twice that of the other Federal ESPC projects. The level of savings achieved in each project seems to be dependent more on the availability of ECMs at the site than on energy price, energy cost per square foot, pre-retrofit EUI or the length of the contract term. This suggests that GSA can achieve similar results in a wide variety of building

ESPC↗

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Columbia Estuary Ecosystem Restoration Program: Restoration Design Challenges for Topographic Mounds, Channel Outlets, and Reed Canarygrass

The purpose of this study was to provide science-based information to practitioners and managers of restoration projects in the Columbia Estuary Ecosystem Restoration Program (CEERP) regarding aspects of restoration techniques that currently pose known challenges and uncertainties. The CEERP is a program of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), Portland District, in collaboration with the National Marine Fisheries Service and five estuary sponsors implementing restoration. The estuary sponsors are Columbia Land Trust, Columbia River Estuary Study Taskforce, Cowlitz Tribe, Lower Columbia Estuary Partnership, and Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife. The scope of the research conducted during federal fiscal year 2015 included three aspects of hydrologic reconnection that were selected based on available scientific information and feedback from restoration practitioners during project reviews: the design of mounds (also called hummocks, peninsulas, or berms); the control of reed canarygrass (Phalaris arundinaceae); and aspects of channel network design related to habitat connectivity for juvenile salmonids.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

ATR Spent Fuel Options Study

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a materials and fuels test nuclear reactor that performs irradiation services for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Naval Reactors, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and other research programs. ATR achieved initial criticality in 1967 and is expected to operate in support of needed missions until the year 2050 or beyond. It is anticipated that ATR will generate approximately 105 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) elements per year through the year 2050. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) currently stores 2,008 ATR SNF elements in dry storage, 976 in wet storage, and expects to have 1,000 elements in wet storage before January 2017. A capability gap exists at INL for long-term (greater than the year 2050) management, in compliance with the Idaho Settlement Agreement (ISA), of ATR SNF until a monitored retrievable geological repository is open. INL has significant wet and dry storage capabilities that are owned by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) and operated and managed by Fluor Idaho, which include the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center’s (INTEC’s) CPP-666, CPP-749, and CPP-603. In addition, INL has other capabilities owned by DOE-NE and operated and managed by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA), which are located at the Materials and Fuel Complex (MFC). Additional storage capabilities are located on the INL Site at the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF). Current INL SNF management planning, as defined in the Fluor Idaho contract, shows INTEC dry fuel storage, which is currently used for ATR SNF, will be nearly full after transfer of an additional 1,000 ATR SNF from wet storage. DOE-NE tasked BEA with identifying and analyzing options that have the potential to fulfill this capability gap. BEA assembled a team comprised of SNF management experts from Fluor Idaho, Savannah River Site (SRS), INL/BEA, and the MITRE Corp with an objective of developing and analyzing options for fulfilling the capability gap. This management options analysis is not an alternatives analysis as defined by DOE Order 413.3B; rather, it is an evaluation of near-term, mid term and long-term actions needed to fulfill the capability gap. The actions are described in sufficient detail to inform stakeholders and DOE decision makers regarding a potential path forward. The recommended path forward will inform Fiscal Year 2019 budget formulation, support potential National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analyses, and may or may not include capital asset projects.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Publicly Available, Annotated Dataset for Naturalistic Driving Study and Computer Vision Algorithm Development

Oak Ridge National Laboratory developed and implemented a data collection effort to create a dataset for use in evaluating and testing algorithms for analyzing driver behavior under controlled settings for support of the Federal Highway Administration’s Exploratory Advanced Research Program. This collection is called the ORNL Naturalistic Driving Study Sample (ONDSS). The dataset is designed to emulate aspects of the Second Strategic Highway Research Project (SHRP2), which contained a massive naturalistic driving study (NDS) with over 3000 drivers between 2010 and 2013 using their personal vehicles, with over 4300 person-years of data collected [HANKEY].

42 ENGINEERING↗

Randomized Cholesky Preconditioning for Graph Partitioning Applications

Graph partitioning has emerged as an area of interest due to its use in various applications in computational research. One way to partition a graph is to solve for the eigenvectors of the corresponding graph Laplacian matrix. This project focuses on the eigensolver LOBPCG and the evaluation of a new preconditioner: Randomized Cholesky Factorization (rchol). This proconditioner was tested for its speed and accuracy against other well-known preconditioners for the method. After experiments were run on several known test matrices, rchol appears to be a better preconditioner for structured matrices. This research was sponsored by National Nuclear Security Administration Minority Serving Institutions Internship Program (NNSA-MSIIP) and completed at host facility Sandia National Laboratories. As such, after discussion of the research project itself, this report contains a brief reflection on experience gained as a result of participating in the NNSA-MSIIP.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Options for Subscale Maturation of Advanced Reactor Technologies Testing for Nuclear Thermal Propulsion

Several options could be implemented to establish an irradiation testing capability suitable for investigation of the performance of multiple nuclear thermal propulsion fuel elements at prototypic conditions. The prototypic conditions of interest are based on the current needs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Space Nuclear Power Program. The results of such testing are also intended to reduce the risks currently seen for any future subscale or full-scale ground testing of an engine-reactor system. The optimal solution is dependent upon several factors such as performance, cost, availability, schedule, technology readiness level, and plans for future testing in the SNP Program. Three options, based on different combinations of these factors, are considered in this report.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Updated Application of Frequency of Detection Methods for the INL Site Ambient Air Monitoring Network

This report presents a quantitative assessment of the current INL Site air monitoring network using frequency of detection (FD) methods. The first assessment of the INL network was performed in 2015 and made recommendations for improving the network. As a result of changes made in response to the recommendations and the addition of new source locations, the network was modified and reassessed in 2017. Since 2017, administration of the air sampling program has been consolidated under one contractor, which resulted in additional changes to the network (sampler numbers and locations) and changes in radionuclide detection levels. As a result of these changes and others, an updated assessment of the INL Site ambient air monitoring network was performed. The same two exposure scenarios used in previous assessments were used for this assessment: a resident scenario and a shepherd/rancher scenario. The resident was assumed to be continuously present at their residence/business/farm operation outside the INL Site boundary while the shepherd/rancher was assumed to be present 24-hours at the nearest INL grazing allotment boundary in each of the 22.5-degree sectors along the sector centerline from each source. Updates to both the resident and shepherd/rancher receptor locations were included. Other changes include updates to flow rates for stack sources, expansion of the list of important radionuclides based on the most recent National Emission Standards for Hazardous Pollutants (NESHAPs) analysis, and updated dose coefficients. The assessment was conducted to determine whether the current INL monitoring network is capable of detecting releases of important radionuclides from INL Site sources that have the potential to exceed a conservative dose threshold for the two exposure scenarios. The assessment revealed that for the resident scenario, the current network meets the desired performance objective (FD = 95%) for all radionuclides and sources except for Cl-36 from the TRA-770 stack (94.4%). For the shepherd/rancher scenario, the FD performance objective is met for all radionuclides and sources except tritium from MFC-774 and TAN 679 (91% for both). An investigation of reported emissions for the past three years revealed that Cl 36 is not emitted from TRA-770, and routine tritium emissions from MFC-774 and TAN-679 are very small and the sources are likely incapable of emitting enough tritium to cause a release that should be detectable by the monitoring network. This assessment is based on a conservative dose threshold. This coupled with fact that the FD for Cl 36 is only slightly less than the performance objective and Cl-36 is not emitted from TRA-770, modifying the network (i.e. adding another sampler, increasing sampler flow rate, moving samplers) to meet the 95% performance objective for this radionuclide/source/receptor scenario is not warranted. Similarly, because tritium emissions from MFC-774 and TAN-679 are very small and these two sources are likely incapable of causing a dose due to tritium release that should be detectable by the network, modifications to increase tritium detection for these sources is also unwarranted at this time. However, if it is required to meet the performance objective for tritium for all sources and receptor scenarios, additional analysis determined the FD could be raised from 91% to > 99% for both sources by adding two tritium samplers to the network.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Sigma Division Capability Strategy

Sigma Division maintains a unique manufacturing science capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory that has made substantial contributions to weapons component process development for more than 70 years. This mission requires the ability to handle a range of radiological and hazardous materials, work with a variety of metallic and non-metallic components, and process materials systems with elements spanning hydrogen to uranium. Today, Sigma serves as a national resource for uranium research and development, provides hardware for experimental campaigns, supports production by demonstrating modern fabrication technologies, and conducts manufacturing science research primarily for customers across the nuclear weapons complex, including the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, and Office of Defense Programs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the 'Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities' (DSA) (LLNL 2008). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.6.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment (LLNL 2007). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment are shown in the B695 Segment DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained waste. Furthermore, a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., {sup 90}Sr, {sup 137}Cs, {sup 3}H. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for this facility. The DSA is applicable to the handling of radioactive waste stored and treated in the B695 Segment. Section 5 of the TSR, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the B695 Segment. A basis explanation for each of the requirements described in Section 5.5, Specific Administrative Controls is provided in Appendix B. The basis explanation does not constitute an additional requirement, but is intended as an expansion of the logic and reasoning behind development of the requirement. Programmatic Administrative Controls are addressed in Section 5.6. This introduction to the B695 Segment TSRs is not part of the TSR limits or conditions and contains no requirements related to B695 Segment operations or to the safety analyses in the DSA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of Salmon Spawning Below Bonneville Dam Annual Report October 2006 - September 2007.

From 1999 through 2007, the Fish and Wildlife Program of the Bonneville Power Administration funded a project to determine the number of fall Chinook and chum salmon spawning downstream of Bonneville Dam, the characteristics of their spawning areas, and the flows necessary to ensure their long-term survival. Data were collected to ensure that established flow guidelines are appropriate and provide adequate protection for the species of concern. The projects objectives are consistent with the high priority placed by the Northwest Power and Conservation Council Independent Scientific Advisory Board and the salmon managers on determining the importance of mainstem habitats to the production of salmon in the Columbia River Basin. Because of the influence of mainstem habitat on salmon production, there is a continued need to better understand the physical habitat variables used by mainstem fall Chinook and chum salmon populations and the effects of hydropower project operations on spawning and incubation. During FY 2007, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory focused on (1) locating and mapping deep-water fall Chinook salmon and chum salmon spawning areas, (2) investigating the interaction between groundwater and surface water near fall Chinook and chum salmon spawning areas, and (3) providing in-season hyporheic temperature and water surface elevation data to assist state agencies with emergence timing and redd dewatering estimates. This report documents the studies and tasks performed by PNNL during FY 2007. Chapter 1 provides a description of the searches conducted for deepwater redds-adjacent to Pierce and Ives islands for fall Chinook salmon and near the Interstate 205 bridge for chum salmon. The chapter also provides data on redd location, information about habitat associations, and estimates of total spawning populations. Chapter 2 documents the collection of data on riverbed and river temperatures and water surface elevations, from the onset of spawning to the end of emergence, and the provision of those data in-season to fisheries management agencies to assist with emergence timing estimates and evaluations of redd dewatering.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Protect and Restore the Upper Lochsa : Annual Progress Report, May 2008 – April 2009.

The Upper Lochsa watersheds included in the project contain critical spawning and rearing habitat for anadromous and resident fish (Clearwater National Forest 1999). Species that depend on the tributary habitat include spring chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha), Snake River summer steelhead (Oncorhynchus mykiss), bull trout (Salvelinus confluentes), and westslope cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki lewisi). Steelhead and bull trout populations are currently listed as Threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and westslope cutthroat trout has been petitioned for listing. Both out-of-basin and in-basin factors threaten fish populations in the Lochsa Drainage (Clearwater Subbasin Plan 2003). Out-of-basin factors include the hydroelectric system and ocean conditions, while in-basin factors include a variety of management activities leading to habitat degradation. This project is implemented under Bonneville Power Administration's Fish and Wildlife program in order to meet National Marine Fisheries Service requirements to offset losses caused by the operation of the hydrosystem by improving tributary habitats to promote increased productivity of salmon and steelhead. The Clearwater Subbasin Plan (2003) defines limiting factors to fisheries in the area as watershed disturbances, habitat degradation, sediment, temperature, and connectivity.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Radiography Facility - Building 239 Independent Validation Review

The purpose of this task was to perform an Independent Validation Review to evaluate the successful implementation and effectiveness of Safety Basis controls, including new and revised controls, to support the implementation of a new DSA/TSR for B239. This task addresses Milestone 2 of FY10 PEP 7.6.6. As the first IVR ever conducted on a LLNL nuclear facility, it was designated a pilot project. The review follows the outline developed for Milestone 1 of the PEP, which is based on the DOE Draft Guide for Performance of Independent Verification Review of Safety Basis Controls. A formal Safety Basis procedure will be developed later, based on the lessons learned with this pilot project. Note, this review is termed a ''Validation'' in order to be consistent with the PEP definition and address issues historically raised about verification mechanisms at LLNL. Validation is intended to confirm that implementing mechanisms realistically establish the ability of TSR LCO, administrative control or safety management program to accomplish its intended safety function and that the controls are being implemented. This effort should not, however, be confused with a compliance assessment against all relevant DOE requirements and national standards. Nor is it used as a vehicle to question the derivation of controls already approved by LSO unless a given TSR statement simply cannot be implemented as stated.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.4.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Utilization of Local Law Enforcement Aerial Resources in Consequence Management (CM) Response

During the past decade the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was instrumental in enhancing the nation’s ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in the highest risk cities. Under the DHS Securing the Cities initiative, nearly 13,000 personnel in the New York City region have been trained in preventive radiological and nuclear detection operations, and nearly 8,500 pieces of radiological detection equipment have been funded. As part of the preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) mission, several cities have received funding to purchase commercial aerial radiation detection systems. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Aerial Measuring System (AMS) program started providing Mobile Aerial Radiological Surveillance (MARS) training to such assets, resulting in over 150 HAZMAT teams’ officers and pilots from 10 law enforcement organizations and fire departments being trained in the aerial radiation detection. From the beginning, the MARS training course covered both the PRND and consequence management (CM) missions. Even if the law enforcement main focus is PRND, their aerial assets can be utilized in the collection of initial radiation data for post-event radiological CM response. Based on over 50 years of AMS operational experience and information collected during MARS training, this presentation will focus on the concepts of CM response using aerial assets as well as utilizing law enforcement/fire department aerial assets in CM. Also discussed will be the need for establishing closer relationships between local jurisdictions’ aerial radiation detection capabilities and state and local radiation control program directors, radiological health department managers, etc. During radiological events these individuals may become primary experts/advisers to Incident Commanders for radiological emergency response, especially in the early stages of a response. The knowledge of the existence, specific capabilities, and use of local aerial radiation detection systems would be critical in planning the response, even before federal assets arrive on the scene. The relationship between local and federal aerial assets and the potential role for the further use of the MARS training and expanded AMS Reachback capabilities in facilitating such interactions will be discussed.

consequence management, CM, local law enforcement,↗