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SRMS History, Evolution and Lessons Learned

Early in the development of the Space Shuttle, it became clear that NASA needed a method of deploying and retrieving payloads from the payload bay. The Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) was developed to fill this need. The 50 foot long robotic arm is an anthropomorphic design consisting of three electromechanical joints, six degrees of freedom, and two boom segments. Its composite boom construction provided a light weight solution needed for space operations. Additionally, a method of capturing payloads with the arm was required and a unique End Effector was developed using an electromechanical snare mechanism. The SRMS is operated using a Displays and Controls Panel and hand controllers located within the aft crew compartment of the shuttle. Although the SRMS was originally conceived to deploy and retrieve payloads, its generic capabilities allowed it to perform many other functions not originally conceived of. Over the years it has been used for deploying and retrieving constrained and free flying payloads, maneuvering and supporting EVA astronauts, satellite repair, International Space Station construction, and as a viewing aid for on-orbit International Space Station operations. After the Columbia accident, a robotically compatible Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) was developed and used in conjunction with the SRMS to scan the Thermal Protection System (TPS) of the shuttle. These scans ensure there is not a breach of the TPS prior to shuttle re-entry. Ground operations and pre mission simulation, analysis and planning played a major role in the success of the SRMS program. A Systems Engineering Simulator (SES) was developed to provide a utility complimentary to open loop engineering simulations. This system provided a closed-loop real-time pilot-driven simulation giving visual feedback, display and control panel interaction, and integration with other vehicle systems, such as GN&C. It has been useful for many more applications than traditional training. Evolution of the simulations, guided by the Math Model Working Group, showed the utility of input from multiple modeling groups with a structured forum for discussion.There were many unique development challenges in the areas of hardware, software, certification, modeling and simulation. Over the years, upgrades and enhancements were implemented to increase the capability, performance and safety of the SRMS. The history and evolution of the SRMS program provided many lessons learned that can be used for future space robotic systems.

Jorgensen, Glenn↗

Design Considerations for Spacecraft Operations During Uncrewed Dormant Phases of Human Exploration Missions

NASA is transforming human spaceflight. The Agency is shifting from an exploration-based program with human activities in low Earth orbit (LEO) and targeted robotic missions in deep space to a more sustainable and integrated pioneering approach. However, pioneering space involves daunting technical challenges of transportation, maintaining health, and enabling crew productivity for long durations in remote, hostile, and alien environments. Subject matter experts from NASA's Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) are currently studying a human exploration campaign that involves deployment of assets for planetary exploration. This study, called the Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC) study, explores options with solar electric propulsion as a central component of the transportation architecture. This particular in-space transportation option often results in long duration transit to destinations. The EMC study is also investigating deployed human rated systems like landers, habitats, rovers, power systems and ISRU system to the surface of Mars, which also will involve long dormant periods when these systems are staged on the surface. In order to enable the EMC architecture, campaign and element design leads along with system and capability development experts from HEOMD's System Maturation Team (SMT) have identified additional capabilities, systems and operation modes that will sustain these systems especially during these dormant phases of the mission. Dormancy is defined by the absence of crew and relative inactivity of the systems. For EMC missions, dormant periods could range from several months to several years. Two aspects of uncrewed dormant operations are considered herein: (1) the vehicle systems that are placed in a dormant state and (2) the autonomous vehicle systems and robotic capabilities that monitor, maintain, and repair the vehicle and systems. This paper describes the mission stages of dormancy operations, phases of dormant operations, and critical system capabilities that are needed for dormant operations. This paper will compare dormancy operations of past robotic missions to identify lessons that can be applied to planned human exploration missions. Finally, this paper will also identify future work and analysis planned to assess system performance metrics and integrated system operations.

Williams-Byrd, Julie↗

STS 101: Post Flight Presentation

The crew (Mission Commander James D. Halsell, Jr., Pilot Scott J. Horowitz, and Mission Specialists Mary Ellen Weber, Jeffrey N. Williams, James S. Voss, Susan J. Helms, and Yuri Vladimirovich Usachev) describe the highlights of the STS 101 Mission. The primary scenes reviewed include the spacewalk, incremental assembly/upgrades, space station rendevous, suit testing, critical replacement and repairs to suspect batteries, and reboosting the station from 230 statute miles to 250 statute miles.

Source record↗

STS-114 Flight Day 10 Highlights

On Flight Day 10 of the STS-114 mission the International Space Station (ISS) is seen in low lighting while the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS), also known as Canadarm 2 grapples the Raffaello Multipurpose Logistics Module (MPLM) in preparation for its undocking the following day. Members of the shuttle crew (Commander Eileen Collins, Pilot James Kelly, Mission Specialists Soichi Noguchi, Stephen Robinson, Andrew Thomas, Wendy Lawrence, and Charles Camarda) and the Expedition 11 crew (Commander Sergei Krikalev and NASA ISS Science Officer and Flight Engineer John Phillips) of the ISS read statements in English and Russian in a ceremony for astronauts who gave their lives. Interview segments include one of Collins, Robinson, and Camarda, wearing red shirts to commemorate the STS-107 Columbia crew, and one of Collins and Noguchi on board the ISS, which features voice over from an interpreter translating questions from the Japanese prime minister. The video also features a segment showing gap fillers on board Discovery after being removed from underneath the orbiter, and another segment which explains an experimental plug for future shuttle repairs being tested onboard the mid deck.

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Space Shuttle MMOD Threat Mitigation Techniques

Prior to each shuttle mission, threat assessments are performed to determine the risk of critical penetration, payload bay door radiator tube leak and crew module window replacement from Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD). Mission parameters, such as vehicle attitude, exposure time and altitude are used as inputs for the analysis. Ballistic limit equations, based on hypervelocity impact testing of shuttle materials are used to estimate the critical particle diameters of the outer surfaces of the vehicle. The assessments are performed using the BUMPER computer code at the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF). The most critical involves the calculation of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) risk. In recent years, NASA has implemented several techniques to reduce the risk to the Shuttle from MMOD impacts. This paper will describe on-orbit inspection of the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) regions and the methods used discern hypervelocity impact damage. Impact damage contingency plans and on-orbit repair techniques will also be discussed. The wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS) and it's role in the reduction of on-orbit risk reduction will be presented. Finally, an analysis of the effectivity of alternative shuttle flight attitudes on MMOD risk will be demonstrated.

Hyde, Justin L.↗

Astronauts and IoT: Toward True Human-Autonomy Teaming

Advances in the area of Internet of Things (IoT) or Cyber-Physical Systems will have a significant impact on many areas of human activity and commercial/technological development. One application of importance to NASA is the need to make crews on deep space missions more independent from earth in both their routine activities and handling of unexpected events. IoT will allow increasingly intelligent systems to be aware of what humans are doing, what tools/resources they are using, and what help they might need in terms of procedure execution in tasks such as assembly, maintenance, repair, and perhaps even in more complex activities like medical interventions. This talk focuses on the convergence of research and technologies that will be needed to effect such intelligent systems based on IoT.

Internet of Things (IoT)↗

STS-101: Crew Interview / Susan J. Helms

Live footage of a preflight interview with Mission Specialist Susan J. Helms is seen. The interview addresses many different questions including why Helms became an astronaut, the individuals who influenced her, and the events that led to her interest. Other interesting information that this one-on-one interview discusses is his reaction to and the reasons for the change of the mission objectives. Susan also mentions the docking with the International Space Station (ISS), the repairs of equipment, the change of the batteries, and the transfer of equipment. Susan explains why she, James S. Voss, and Yuri Vladimirovich Usachev are the perfect choice for this mission because of their experience with the ISS modules. She also discusses what the ISS means to her as well as to the human efforts to explore space.

Source record↗

STS-101 Crew Interview / Mary Ellen Weber

Live footage of a preflight interview with Mission Specialist Mary Ellen Weber is seen. The interview addresses many different questions including why Weber became an astronaut, the events that led to her interest in chemistry and sky diving. Other interesting information that this one-on-one interview discusses is the reaction and reasons for the change of the mission objectives. Weber also mentions the scheduled space-walk, docking with the International Space Station (ISS), the repairs of equipment and change of the batteries, and the installation of handrails. Weber also discusses her responsibilities during the space-walk, and docking of the spacecraft.

Source record↗

Task network models in the prediction of workload imposed by extravehicular activities during the Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission

In a joint effort with Brooks AFB, Texas, the Flight Crew Support Division at JSC has begun a computer simulation and performance modeling program directed at establishing the predictive validity of software tools for modeling human performance during spaceflight. This paper addresses the utility of task network modeling for predicting the workload that astronauts are likely to encounter in extravehicular activities (EVA) during the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) repair mission. The intent of the study was to determine whether two EVA crewmembers and one intravehicular activity (IVA) crewmember could reasonably be expected to complete HST Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WFPC) replacement in the allotted time. Ultimately, examination of the points during HST servicing that may result in excessive workload will lead to recommendations to the HST Flight Systems and Servicing Project concerning (1) expectation of degraded performance, (2) the need to change task allocation across crewmembers, (3) the need to expand the timeline, and (4) the need to increase the number of EVA's.

Diaz, Manuel F.↗

Potential Lunar In-Situ Resource Utilization Experiments and Mission Scenarios

The extraction and use of resources on the Moon, known as In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU), can potentially reduce the cost and risk of human lunar exploration while also increasing science achieved. By not having to bring all of the shielding and mission consumables from Earth and being able to make products on the Moon, missions may require less mass to accomplish the same objectives, carry more science equipment, go to more sites of exploration, and/or provide options to recover from failures not possible with delivery of spares and consumables from Earth alone. The concept of lunar ISRU has been considered and studied for decades, and scientists and engineers were theorizing and even testing concepts for how to extract oxygen from lunar soil even before the Apollo 11 mission to the Moon. There are four main areas where ISRU can significantly impact how human missions to the Moon will be performed: mission consumable production, civil engineering and construction, energy production, storage, and transfer, and manufacturing and repair. The area that has the greatest impact on mission mass, hardware design and selection, and mission architecture is mission consumable production, in particular, the ability to make propellants, life support consumables, and fuel cell reagents. Mission consumable production allows for refueling and reuse of spacecraft, increasing power production and storage, and increased capabilities and failure tolerance for crew life support. The other three areas allow for decreased mission risk due to radiation and plume damage, alternative power systems, and failure recover capabilities while also enabling infrastructure growth over Earth delivered assets. However, while lunar ISRU has significant potential for mass, cost, and risk reduction for human lunar missions, it has never been demonstrated before in space. To demonstrate that ISRU can meet mission needs and to increase confidence in incorporating ISRU capabilities into mission architectures, terrestrial laboratory and analog field testing along with robotic precursor missions are required. A stepwise approach with international collaboration is recommended. The first step is to understand the resources available through orbital and surface exploration missions. Resources of particular interest are hydrogen, hydroxyl, water, and other polar volatile resources recently measured by Chandrayaan, Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), and the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS). The second step is to demonstrate critical aspects of ISRU systems to prove ISRU is feasible under lunar environmental and resource conditions (ex. subscale oxygen extraction from regolith). The third step is to perform integrated missions with ISRU and other connected systems, such as power, consumable storage, surface mobility, and life support at a relevant mission scale to demonstrate ISRU capabilities as well as the critical interfaces with other exploration systems. If possible, the mission should demonstrate the use of ISRU products (ex. in a rocket engine or fuel cell). This dress rehearsal mission would be the final step before full implementation of ISRU into human missions, and may be performed during human lunar exploration activities. This stepwise approach is the most conservative approach, and may only be possible with international cooperation due to the limited number of robotic missions each nation/space agency can perform within their budget.

Sanders, Gerald B.↗

STS-101: Crew Interview / Jeffrey N. Williams

Live footage of a preflight interview with Mission Specialist Jeffrey N. Williams is seen. The interview addresses many different questions including why Williams became an astronaut, and the events that led to his interest. Other interesting information that this one-on-one interview discusses is his reaction to and the reasons for the change of the mission objectives. Williams also mentions the scheduled space-walk that he will perform, docking with the International Space Station (ISS), the repairs of equipment, and the change of the batteries.

Source record↗

STS-109 Crew Interviews - Carey

STS-109 pilot Duane G. Carey is seen during a prelaunch interview. He answers questions about his inspiration to become an astronaut and his career path. He gives details on the mission's goals and significance, as well as an extended description of his role in the Orbiter's return landing. As its primary objective, this mission has the maintenance of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). Following the Columbia Orbiter's rendezvous with the telescope, extravehicular activities (EVA) will focus on repairs to and augmentation of the HST.

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ISS External Microorganisms: A Planetary Protection Experiment to Inform Requirements for Crewed Missions to Mars

We have developed, tested, and flown a caddy capable of collecting aseptic samples from external surfaces of the ISS (International Space Station). The sampling caddy is certified for use during US EVA (extra vehicular activity) and was launched to ISS in the summer of 2023. We are scheduled to collect samples from 6 locations outside ISS during an EVA in May of 2024. We will freeze these samples at -80°C on orbit and return them to Earth. We will then extract and sequence any DNA collected during the EVA using next generation sequencing technologies to characterize the community composition and function of each sample. Measuring the type and quantity of microbes present on the exterior of ISS will allow us to address knowledge gap 2B, “Acceptable levels of microbial/organic releases from humans and support systems” described in a 2019 COSPAR report. Collecting data about microbial release from current crewed vehicles will inform requirements for acceptable leak rates for future crewed missions to Mars. The sampling kit consists of eight commercially available, sterile, DNA free, macrofoam swabs ( 23 mm. diameter ) installed in custom aluminum end effectors. Each end effector is housed in and individual aluminum canister. Each canister contains a 0.2 μm Teflon filter to allow the interior volume to accommodate pressure changes without permitting microbial contaminants to enter the sterile interior volume. A handle repurposed from the space shuttle tile repair kit is used to remove the end effector from the sample canister, collect a sample by swabbing a surface and then replace the end effector in its canister. The canisters and end effectors were cleaned and assembled on Earth. Prior to installing the sterile swab the canisters and end effectors were sterilized in an autoclave at 134°C, 215 kPA, for 7 min.. The final assembly occurred in a sterilized class II biosafety cabinet. We will collect six samples from the 1) airlock vestibule, 2) airlock thermal cover, 3) a gap in the micrometeorite shielding near the airlock, 4) a handrail near the airlock, 5) the CDRA (Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly) vent, and 6) the VES (Vacuum Exhaust System) vent. The remaining two swabs will be reserved as controls. One swab will be exposed during the EVA without touching any surfaces to act as a blank. The final swab will remain sealed until the entire sampling kit is returned to earth. Based on previously published results from the Russian segment, we hypothesize that there will be detectable microbes at some or all of these locations. Ground-based testing of this sampling caddy confirms that the swabs remain sterile as the canisters transition in and out of vacuum. We were able to retrieve, viable bacterial and fungal cells as well as DNA from samples collected from US space suits during vacuum chamber tests lasting as long as seven hours. Based on these results and feedback from the test subjects the sampling caddy was modified to improve ergonomics and meet US EVA safety requirements. Bayonet probes were added to the sides of the sample kit as alternate mounting points. Additional locking features were added to the end effector and the filter stack to prevent inadvertent release during use. The opening mechanism was changed from one where the end effector was rocked laterally to defeat a ball detent to a twist-to-open threaded closure for similar reasons. Demonstrating, this sampling caddy’s effectiveness during a US EVA will allow us to address knowledge gaps identified in COSPAR reports and begin to define planetary protection requirements for life support systems on crewed missions to mars. This kit could also be used to collect contamination control samples during Artemis missions to verify requirements and could be easily modified for robotic sample collection.

Planetary Protection↗

ISS External Microorganisms: Collecting Planetary Protection Samples During Extravehicular Activity

We have developed, tested, and flown a caddy capable of collecting aseptic samples from external surfaces of the ISS (International Space Station). The sampling caddy is certified for use during US EVA (extra vehicular activity) and was launched to ISS in the summer of 2023. We are scheduled to collect samples from 6 locations outside ISS during an EVA in May of 2024. We will freeze these samples at -80°C on orbit and return them to Earth. We will then extract and sequence any DNA collected during the EVA using next generation sequencing technologies to characterize the community composition and function of each sample. Measuring the type and quantity of microbes present on the exterior of ISS will allow us to address knowledge gap 2B, “Acceptable levels of microbial/organic releases from humans and support systems” described in a 2019 COSPAR report. Collecting data about microbial release from current crewed vehicles will inform requirements for acceptable leak rates for future crewed missions to Mars. The sampling kit consists of eight commercially available, sterile, DNA free, macrofoam swabs ( 23 mm. diameter ) installed in custom aluminum end effectors. Each end effector is housed in and individual aluminum canister. Each canister contains a 0.2 μm Teflon filter to allow the interior volume to accommodate pressure changes without permitting microbial contaminants to enter the sterile interior volume. A handle repurposed from the space shuttle tile repair kit is used to remove the end effector from the sample canister, collect a sample by swabbing a surface and then replace the end effector in its canister. The canisters and end effectors were cleaned and assembled on Earth. Prior to installing the sterile swab the canisters and end effectors were sterilized in an autoclave at 134°C, 215 kPA, for 7 min.. The final assembly occurred in a sterilized class II biosafety cabinet. We will collect six samples from the 1) airlock vestibule, 2) airlock thermal cover, 3) a gap in the micrometeorite shielding near the airlock, 4) a handrail near the airlock, 5) the CDRA (Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly) vent, and 6) the VES (Vacuum Exhaust System) vent. The remaining two swabs will be reserved as controls. One swab will be exposed during the EVA without touching any surfaces to act as a blank. The final swab will remain sealed until the entire sampling kit is returned to earth. Based on previously published results from the Russian segment, we hypothesize that there will be detectable microbes at some or all of these locations. Ground-based testing of this sampling caddy confirms that the swabs remain sterile as the canisters transition in and out of vacuum. We were able to retrieve, viable bacterial and fungal cells as well as DNA from samples collected from US space suits during vacuum chamber tests lasting as long as seven hours. Based on these results and feedback from the test subjects the sampling caddy was modified to improve ergonomics and meet US EVA safety requirements. Bayonet probes were added to the sides of the sample kit as alternate mounting points. Additional locking features were added to the end effector and the filter stack to prevent inadvertent release during use. The opening mechanism was changed from one where the end effector was rocked laterally to defeat a ball detent to a twist-to-open threaded closure for similar reasons. Demonstrating, this sampling caddy’s effectiveness during a US EVA will allow us to address knowledge gaps identified in COSPAR reports and begin to define planetary protection requirements for life support systems on crewed missions to mars. This kit could also be used to collect contamination control samples during Artemis missions to verify requirements and could be easily modified for robotic sample collection.

Planetary Protection↗

Launch-Off-Need Shuttle Hubble Rescue Mission: Medical Issues

The Space Shuttle Hubble repair mission (STS-125) is unique in that a rescue mission (STS-400) has to be ready to launch before STS-125 life support runs out should the vehicle become stranded. The shuttle uses electrical power derived from fuel cells that use cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen (CRYO) to run all subsystems including the Environmental Control System. If the STS-125 crew cannot return to Earth due to failure of a critical subsystem, they must power down all nonessential systems and wait to be rescued by STS-400. This power down will cause the cabin temperature to be 60 F or less and freeze the rest of the vehicle, preventing it from attempting a reentry. After an emergency has been declared, STS-125 must wait at least 7 days to power down since that is the earliest that STS-400 can be launched. Problem The delayed power down of STS-125 causes CYRO to be consumed at high rates and limits the survival time after STS-400 launches to 10 days or less. CRYO will run out sooner every day that the STS-400 launch is delayed (weather at launch, technical issues etc.). To preserve CRYO and lithium hydroxide (LiOH - carbon dioxide removal) the crew will perform no exercise to reduce their metabolic rates, yet each deconditioned STS-125 crewmember must perform an EVA to rescue himself. The cabin may be cold for 10 days, which may cause shivering, increasing the metabolic rate of the STS-125 crew. Solution To preserve LiOH, the STS-125 manifest includes nutrition bars with low carbohydrate content to maintain crew respiratory quotient (RQ) below 0.85 as opposed to the usual shuttle galley food which is rich in carbohydrates and keeps the RQ at approximately 0.95. To keep the crew more comfortable in the cold vehicle warm clothing also has been included. However, with no exercise and limited diet, the deconditioned STS-125 crew returning on STS-400 may not be able to egress the vehicle autonomously requiring a supplemented crash-and-rescue capability.

Hamilton, Douglas↗

U.S. experience in satellite servicing and linkage to the Space Station era

A history of on-orbit servicing and repair is given with emphasis placed on the Solar Maximum Repair Mission. The experience gained thus far in on-orbit servicing and the design of the Space Station's servicing capabilities impose the following requirements on users: (1) satellites must have a standard grapple for capture and a standard berthing interface, (2) Space Station safety requirements must meet to preclude damage to the Space Station or injury to the EVA crew, (3) sensitive instruments will need to implement remotely controlled protective devices to prevent damage, and (4) satellite thermal systems must be designed to maintain survival temperatures during transfer from orbit to the Space Station servicing facility.

Browning, R. K.↗

A History of Space Toxicology Mishaps: Lessons Learned and Risk Management

After several decades of human spaceflight, the community of space-faring nations has accumulated a diverse and sometimes harrowing history of toxicological events that have plagued human space endeavors almost from the very beginning. Lessons have been learned in ground-based test beds and others were discovered the hard way - when human lives were at stake in space. From such lessons one can build a risk-management framework for toxicological events to minimize the probability of a harmful exposure, while recognizing that we cannot foresee all events. Space toxicologists have learned that relatively harmless compounds can be converted by air revitalization systems into compounds that cause serious harm to the crew. Our toxic risk management strategy now includes an assessment of the fate of any compound that might be released into the atmosphere. Propellants are highly toxic compounds, yet we have not always been able to thoroughly isolate the crew from exposure to these toxicants. Leakage of fluids from systems has resulted in hazardous conditions at times, and the behavior of such compounds inside a spacecraft has taught us how to manage potentially harmful escapes should they occur. Potential combustion events are an ever-present threat to the wellbeing of the crew. Such events have been sufficiently common that we have learned that one cannot judge the health threat of a given fire by the magnitude of the event. Management of such risks demands monitoring of combustion products. In the category of unpredictable toxic events, if one assumes that fires are predictable, we can place experience with toxic microbial metabolites, upsets during repair operations, and discharges from filters that have accumulated a substantial load of pollutants in their absorption beds. Management of such events requires a broad-spectrum, real-time analytical capability to discern the identity and concentrations of pollutants if they enter the atmosphere. Adverse events are an integral part of any human activity, and the spacefaring community must learn as much as possible from mistakes and near misses.

James, John T.↗

Experiences with Extra-Vehicular Activities in Response to Critical ISS Contingencies

The maturation of the International Space Station (ISS) design from the proposed Space Station Freedom to today's current implementation resulted in external hardware redundancy vulnerabilities in the final design. Failure to compensate for or respond to these vulnerabilities could put the ISS in a posture to where it could no longer function as a habitable space station. In the first years of ISS assembly, these responses were to largely be addressed by the continued resupply and Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) capabilities of the Space Shuttle. Even prior to the decision to retire the Space Shuttle, it was realized that ISS needed to have its own capability to be able to rapidly repair or replace external hardware without needing to wait for the next cargo resupply mission. As documented in a previous publicatoin5, in 2006 development was started to baseline Extra- Vehicular Activity (EVA, or spacewalk) procedures to replace hardware components whose failure would expose some of the ISS vulnerabilities should a second failure occur. This development work laid the groundwork for the onboard crews and the ground operations and engineering teams to be ready to replace any of this failed hardware. In 2010, this development work was put to the test when one of these pieces of hardware failed. This paper will provide a brief summary of the planning and processes established in the original Contingency EVA development phase. It will then review how those plans and processes were implemented in 2010, highlighting what went well as well as where there were deficiencies between theory and reality. This paper will show that the original approach and analyses, though sound, were not as thorough as they should have been in the realm of planning for next worse failures, for documenting Programmatic approval of key assumptions, and not pursuing sufficient engineering analysis prior to the failure of the hardware. The paper will further highlight the changes made to the Contingency EVA preparation team structure, approach, goals, and the resources allocated to its work after the 2010 events. Finally, the authors will overview the implementation of these updates in addressing failures onboard the ISS in 2012, 2013, and 2014. The successful use of the updated approaches, and the application of the approaches to other spacewalks, will demonstrate the effectiveness of this additional work and make a case for putting significant time and resources into pre-failure planning and analysis for critical hardware items on human-tended spacecraft.

Van Cise, E. A.↗