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At least 253 records · Page 14

A Tuned Single Parameter for Representing Conjunction Risk

Satellite conjunction assessment risk analysis is a subjective enterprise that can benefit from quantitative aids and, to this end, NASA/GSFC has developed a fuzzy logic construct - called the F-value - to attempt to provide a statement of conjunction risk that amalgamates multiple indices and yields a more stable intra-event assessment. This construct has now sustained an extended tuning procedure against heuristic analyst assessment of event risk. The tuning effort has resulted in modifications to the calculation procedure and the adjustment of tuning coefficients, producing a construct with both more predictive force and a better statement of its error.

Plakaloic, D.↗

Assessing GEO and LEO Repeating Conjunctions Using High Fidelity Brute Force Monte Carlo Simulations

Probability of collision (P(sub c)) estimates for Earth-orbiting satellites typically assume a temporally-isolated conjunction event. However, under certain conditions two objects may experience multiple high-risk close approach events over the course of hours or days. In these repeating conjunction cases, the P(sub c) accumulates as each successive encounter occurs. The NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis team has updated its “brute force Monte Carlo” (BFMC) software to estimate such accumulating P(sub c) values for repeating conjunctions. This study describes the updated BFMC algorithm and discusses the implications for conjunction risk assessment.

Baars, Luis↗

Assessing Geo and Leo Repeating Conjunctions Using High Fidelity Brute Force Monte Carlo Simulations

Probability of collision (P(sub c)) estimates for Earth-orbiting satellites typically assume a temporally-isolated conjunction event. However, under certain conditions two objects may experience multiple high-risk close approach events over the course of hours or days. In these repeating conjunction cases, the P(sub c) accumulates as each successive encounter occurs. The NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis team has updated its “brute force Monte Carlo” (BFMC) software to estimate such accumulating P(sub c) values for repeating conjunctions. This study describes the updated BFMC algorithm and discusses the implications for conjunction risk assessment.

Baars, Luis↗

Reliability considerations for the total strain range version of strainrange partitioning

A proposed total strainrange version of strainrange partitioning (SRP) to enhance the manner in which SRP is applied to life prediction is considered with emphasis on how advanced reliability technology can be applied to perform risk analysis and to derive safety check expressions. Uncertainties existing in the design factors associated with life prediction of a component which experiences the combined effects of creep and fatigue can be identified. Examples illustrate how reliability analyses of such a component can be performed when all design factors in the SRP model are random variables reflecting these uncertainties. The Rackwitz-Fiessler and Wu algorithms are used and estimates of the safety index and the probablity of failure are demonstrated for a SRP problem. Methods of analysis of creep-fatigue data with emphasis on procedures for producing synoptic statistics are presented. An attempt to demonstrate the importance of the contribution of the uncertainties associated with small sample sizes (fatique data) to risk estimates is discussed. The procedure for deriving a safety check expression for possible use in a design criteria document is presented.

Wirsching, P. H.↗

Risk Management Technique for design and operation of facilities and equipment

The Risk Management System collects information from engineering, operating, and management personnel to identify potentially hazardous conditions. This information is used in risk analysis, problem resolution, and contingency planning. The resulting hazard accountability system enables management to monitor all identified hazards. Data from this system are examined in project reviews so that management can decide to eliminate or accept these risks. This technique is particularly effective in improving the management of risks in large, complex, high-energy facilities. These improvements are needed for increased cooperation among industry, regulatory agencies, and the public.

Fedor, O. H.↗

An Integrated Low-Speed Performance and Noise Prediction Methodology for Subsonic Aircraft

An integrated methodology has been assembled to compute the engine performance, takeoff and landing trajectories, and community noise levels for a subsonic commercial aircraft. Where feasible, physics-based noise analysis methods have been used to make the results more applicable to newer, revolutionary designs and to allow for a more direct evaluation of new technologies. The methodology is intended to be used with approximation methods and risk analysis techniques to allow for the analysis of a greater number of variable combinations while retaining the advantages of physics-based analysis. Details of the methodology are described and limited results are presented for a representative subsonic commercial aircraft.

Olson, E. D.↗

Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Tool for Understanding the NASA Human Spaceflight System Risks - Human System Risk Board

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding of these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document is a sister document to NASA/TM 20220006812 Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation (1). In that document, the basic guidance for creating and standardizing directed acyclic graphs as tools for cross-risk analysis is provided. This document contains the initial configuration managed DAGs that were created as a result of applying those principles. These initial versions were accepted by the HSRB in January of 2022. Each of the Human System Risks are represented by a DAG that has been reviewed by the larger Human Health and Performance community at NASA including life scientists, physical scientists, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, exercise specialists and more. These results show the starting point for Human System Risk DAGs as shared mental models and communication aids across the boundaries of the various expertise needed to understand and mitigate the human risks in spaceflight. Because they are a starting point, each of these DAGs can be expected to change over time as new or refined evidence becomes available. The process for updating these DAGs can be found in the JSC-66705 Human System Risk Management Plan (2) that is publicly available on the NASA Technical Reports Server.

Erik L. Antonsen↗

Towards Automated Assessment of Vulnerability Exposures in Security Operations

Current approaches for risk analysis of software vulnerabilities using manual assessment and numeric scoring do not complete fast enough to keep pace with the maintenance work rate to patch and mitigate the vulnerabilities. This paper proposes a new approach to modeling software vulnerability risk in the context of the network environment and firewall configuration. In the approach, vulnerability features are automatically matched up with networking, target asset, and adversary features to determine whether adversaries can exploit a vulnerability. The ability of adversaries to reach a vulnerability is modeled by automatically identifying the network services associated with vulnerabilities through a pipeline of machine learning and natural language processing and automatically analyzing network reachability. Our results show that the pipeline can identify network services accurately. We also find that only a small number of vulnerabilities pose real risks to a system. However, if left unmitigated, adversarial reach to vulnerabilities may extend to nullify the effect of firewall countermeasures.

Huff, Philip↗

Difficult Decisions Made Easier

NASA missions are extremely complex and prone to sudden, catastrophic failure if equipment falters or if an unforeseen event occurs. For these reasons, NASA trains to expect the unexpected. It tests its equipment and systems in extreme conditions, and it develops risk-analysis tests to foresee any possible problems. The Space Agency recently worked with an industry partner to develop reliability analysis software capable of modeling complex, highly dynamic systems, taking into account variations in input parameters and the evolution of the system over the course of a mission. The goal of this research was multifold. It included performance and risk analyses of complex, multiphase missions, like the insertion of the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter; reliability analyses of systems with redundant and/or repairable components; optimization analyses of system configurations with respect to cost and reliability; and sensitivity analyses to identify optimal areas for uncertainty reduction or performance enhancement.

Source record↗

Propensity and Risk Assessment for Solar Particle Events: Consideration of Integral Fluence at High Proton Energies

For future space missions with longer duration, exposure to large solar particle events (SPEs) with high energy levels is the major concern during extra-vehicular activities (EVAs) on the lunar and Mars surface. The expected SPE propensity for large proton fluence was estimated from a non-homogeneous Poisson model using the historical database for measurements of protons with energy > 30 MeV, Phi(sub 30). The database includes a continuous data set for the past 5 solar cycles. The resultant SPE risk analysis for a specific mission period was made including the 95% confidence level. In addition to total particle intensity of SPE, the detailed energy spectra of protons especially at high energy levels were recognized as extremely important parameter for the risk assessment, since there remains a significant cancer risks from those energetic particles for large events. Using all the recorded proton fluence of SPEs for energies >60 and >100 MeV, Phi(sub 60) and Phi(sub 100), respectively, the expected propensities of SPEs abundant with high energy protons were estimated from the same non-homogeneous Poisson model and the representative cancer risk was analyzed. The dependencies of risk with different energy spectra, for e.g. between soft and hard SPEs, were evaluated. Finally, we describe approaches to improve radiation protection of astronauts and optimize mission planning for future space missions.

Kim, Myung-Hee↗

Bowtie Analysis of the Effects of Unmanned Aircraft on Air Traffic Control

Within the aviation domain, there is a growing industry demand to develop and integrate remotely piloted operations into the National Airspace System. However, it is not yet well understood how the integration of unmanned aircraft with impact air traffic control, and specifically, the air traffic controllers who are at the sharp end of this safety critical system. This research presented in this paper aimed to begin to address this gap in understanding by identifying and exploring potential hazards associated with introducing Unmanned Aircraft into the national airspace system, and identify possible mitigations to reduce identified risks. A bowtie risk analysis methodology was used to identify and analyze hazards. A focus-group format discussion was conducted with nine subject matter experts as participants. Findings identified five areas of potential risk, each associated with multiple hazards. Mitigations for each hazard are reported. Findings have essential implications for the safe and efficient integration of unmanned aircraft into the national airspace.

unmanned aerial vehicles↗

Risk-Informed Decision Making: Application to Technology Development Alternative Selection

NASA NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements, defines risk management in terms of two complementary processes: Risk-informed Decision Making (RIDM) and Continuous Risk Management (CRM). The RIDM process is used to inform decision making by emphasizing proper use of risk analysis to make decisions that impact all mission execution domains (e.g., safety, technical, cost, and schedule) for program/projects and mission support organizations. The RIDM process supports the selection of an alternative prior to program commitment. The CRM process is used to manage risk associated with the implementation of the selected alternative. The two processes work together to foster proactive risk management at NASA. The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance at NASA Headquarters has developed a technical handbook to provide guidance for implementing the RIDM process in the context of NASA risk management and systems engineering. This paper summarizes the key concepts and procedures of the RIDM process as presented in the handbook, and also illustrates how the RIDM process can be applied to the selection of technology investments as NASA's new technology development programs are initiated.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

Evaluation of a proposed expert system development methodology: Two case studies

Two expert system development projects were studied to evaluate a proposed Expert Systems Development Methodology (ESDM). The ESDM was developed to provide guidance to managers and technical personnel and serve as a standard in the development of expert systems. It was agreed that the proposed ESDM must be evaluated before it could be adopted; therefore a study was planned for its evaluation. This detailed study is now underway. Before the study began, however, two ongoing projects were selected for a retrospective evaluation. They were the Ranging Equipment Diagnostic Expert System (REDEX) and the Backup Control Mode Analysis and Utility System (BCAUS). Both projects were approximately 1 year into development. Interviews of project personnel were conducted, and the resulting data was used to prepare the retrospective evaluation. Decision models of the two projects were constructed and used to evaluate the completeness and accuracy of key provisions of ESDM. A major conclusion reached from these case studies is that suitability and risk analysis should be required for all AI projects, large and small. Further, the objectives of each stage of development during a project should be selected to reduce the next largest area of risk or uncertainty on the project.

Gilstrap, Lewey↗

Bowtie Analysis of the Effects of Unmanned Aircraft on Air Traffic Control

Within the aviation domain, there is a growing industry demand to develop and integrate remotely piloted operations into the National Airspace System. However, it is not yet well understood how the integration of unmanned aircraft with impact air traffic control, and specifically, the air traffic controllers who are at the sharp end of this safety critical system. This research presented in this paper aimed to begin to address this gap in understanding by identifying and exploring potential hazards associated with introducing Unmanned Aircraft into the national airspace system, and identify possible mitigations to reduce identified risks. A bowtie risk analysis methodology was used to identify and analyze hazards. A focus-group format discussion was conducted with nine subject matter experts as participants. Findings identified five areas of potential risk, each associated with multiple hazards. Mitigations for each hazard are reported. Findings have essential implications for the safe and efficient integration of unmanned aircraft into the national airspace.

Tamsyn Edwards↗

Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) Cost-Benefit Analysis

Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) are designed to prevent space launch vehicles from flight through environments conducive to natural or triggered lightning and are used for all U.S. government and commercial launches at government and civilian ranges. They are maintained by a committee known as the NASA/USAF Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP). The previous LLCC for anvil cloud, meant to avoid triggered lightning, have been shown to be overly restrictive. Some of these rules have had such high safety margins that they prohibited flight under conditions that are now thought to be safe 90% of the time, leading to costly launch delays and scrubs. The LLCC for anvil clouds was upgraded in the summer of 2005 to incorporate results from the Airborne Field Mill (ABFM) experiment at the Eastern Range (ER). Numerous combinations of parameters were considered to develop the best correlation of operational weather observations to in-cloud electric fields capable of rocket triggered lightning in anvil clouds. The Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) was the best metric found. Dr. Harry Koons of Aerospace Corporation conducted a risk analysis of the VAHIRR product. The results indicated that the LLCC based on the VAHIRR product would pose a negligible risk of flying through hazardous electric fields. Based on these findings, the Kennedy Space Center Weather Office is considering seeking funding for development of an automated VAHIRR algorithm for the new ER 45th Weather Squadron (45 WS) RadTec 431250 weather radar and Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) radars. Before developing an automated algorithm, the Applied Meteorology Unit (AMU) was tasked to determine the frequency with which VAHIRR would have allowed a launch to safely proceed during weather conditions otherwise deemed "red" by the Launch Weather Officer. To do this, the AMU manually calculated VAHIRR values based on candidate cases from past launches with known anvil cloud LLCC violations. An automated algorithm may be developed if the analyses from past launches show VAHIRR would have provided a significant cost benefit by allowing a launch to proceed. The 45 WS at the ER and 30th Weather Squadron (30 WS) at the Western Range provided the AMU with launch weather summaries from past launches that were impacted by LLCC. The 45 WS provided summaries from 14 launch attempts and the 30 WS fkom 5. The launch attempts occurred between December 2001 and June 2007. These summaries helped the AMU determine when the LLCC were "red" due to anvil cloud. The AMU collected WSR-88D radar reflectivity, cloud-to-ground lightning strikes, soundings and satellite imagery. The AMU used step-by-step instructions for calculating VAHIRR manually as provided by the 45 WS. These instructions were used for all of the candidate cases when anvil cloud caused an LLCC violation identified in the launch weather summaries. The AMU evaluated several software programs capable of visualizing radar data so that VAHIRR could be calculated and chose GR2Analyst from Gibson Ridge Software, LLC. Data availability and lack of detail from some launch weather summaries permitted analysis of six launch attempts from the ER and none from the WR. The AMU did not take into account whether or not other weather LCC violations were occurring at the same time as the anvil cloud LLCC since the goal of this task was to determine how often VAHIRR provided relief to the anvil cloud LLCC at any time during several previous launch attempts. Therefore, in the statistics presented in this report, it is possible that even though VAHIRR provided relief to the anvil cloud LLCC, other weather LCC could have been violated not permitting the launch to proceed. The results of this cost-benefit analysis indicated VAHIRR provided relief from the anvil cloud LLCC between about 15% and 18% of the time for varying 5-minute time periods based on summaries fkom six launch attempts and would have allowed launch to proceed that were otherwise "NO GO" due to the anvil cloud LLCC if the T-0 time occurred during the anvil cloud LLCC violations.

Bauman, William H., III↗

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗